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FOREWORD
This is the second volume of a two volume final report titled
"Potential Roles of Supersonic Transport Crews and Some Implications
for the Flight Deck". Volume I is concerned with Workload, Crew
Roles, Flight Deck Concepts, and Conclusions. This volume is con-
cerned with Feasible Automated and Manual Implementation Concepts
for SST Activities and Functions. It is published as a separate volume
because of the large amount of material it contains. It should be noted
for continuity purposes that Volume I identified seven major activities
for the operation of an SST and this volume presents the results of the
derivation of functions within each activity and analysis of these functions
to develop implementation concepts. The seven major activities from
Volume I are:
1. Flight management
2. Phase-oriented system checks
3. Communication
4. Power plant operation
5. Flight control
6. Inlet nozzle configuration
7. Navigation.
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SST FUNCTION DERIVATION/ANA LYSIS
In order to identify potential crew roles in the implementation of SST
operations, it was necessary to derive specific functions within each activi-
ty and these functions were then analyzed with respect to different concepts
for their implementation and potential crew participation. The functions
were derived in a systematic, a priori analysis. Each activity was parti-
tioned Lato smaller performance units until it was believed that the perform-
ance units represented individual functions. The general method for both
doing and documenting this was the development of a flow-logic diagram of
SST operations.
Figures 1A, 1B, and 1C show portions of the flow-logic
diagram derived for SST operational functions. 1 The dependencies,
contingencies, alternatives or interrelationships between functions are shown
by the use of logic symbols. Each function is bounded or delineated in terms
of relative parameters, and sequential functions are separated on the basis of
changes of state of any critical parameter. Since the functions are delineated
in parametric terms, they represent performance requirements rather than
means although the performance requirements are practically constrained
by the design concepts for the SST. During the derivation of the functions
and the development of the flow-logic diagram, the flight management concept
evolved principally in order to handle automatic and manual implementation of
the decision making or management type functions.
The flow-logic diagram of the SST operational functions had several
other uses in addition to specifying the basic performance units which were
analyzed with respect to crew role. First, it provided the information
necessary to develop a time line analysis in which each function was pro-
grammed on a real time basis, and this in turn became the basis for our
1
The complete flow-logic diagram is quite long and is not included here.
Readers who feel they may want the complete diagram should contact the author.
crew workload analysis. Second, the diagram presents the general
interrelationships between functions that must be considered when sim-
ulation programs are carried out. If specific phases or functions rather
than a complete mission are to be simulated, the diagram depicts the
functions which are interactive so that they may be simulated to include
a true workload situation. Third, the output parameters of each function
are essentially criterion parameters which can be used to establish
evaluation criteria during simulation. Most of these parameters do not
have specific values, but once a specific aircraft configuration is settled
upon, these parameters acquire values and become criterion measures.
The functions in the diagram are consistently arranged from the
top to the bottom of the diagram. Those functions associated with naviga-
tion activity are near the top of the diagram, communications functions
are next, flight management functions are near the center, and under
flight management are flight control, power plant operation and inlet
nozzle configuration functions, in that order. To simplify the diagram-
matic presentation somewhat, functions associated with flight manage-
ment and navigation activity are presented in their entirety and enclosed
by a dotted line when they first appear on the diagram. The next time
these groups of functions appear, usually in the following phase, they are
not repeated in detail, but are represented by a box labeled flight manage-
ment or navigation. The flow-logic diagram is an overall representation
of the operational functions, and details concerning each activity and the
functions included within that activity are presented in separate chapters.
Each function identified on the flow-logic diagram and each activity
class to which the function belongs was analyzed and an activity/function
description prepared. Basically, the activity and function descrip-
tions are the same except for the level of generality used. Activity
descriptions are more gross than function descriptions and contain back-
ground information pertinent to all of the functions within that activity.
2
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Sample of flow-logic diagram of SST operational functions (initial climb phase)
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Some of the information contained in the activity descriptions may even
be considered elementary by the sophisticated reader with experience in
aviation research and development. Each activity and function descrip-
tion consists of six parts which make up that description. These parts
and the kinds of information they include are described below:
Purpose. The basic requirements and constraints of the activity
or function as well as the general rationale or need are presented here.
Current jet operational requirements and constraints. This part
includes International and Federal Air Regulations, or comments about
these regulations. No attempt was made to be exhaustive and include
all regulations which applied to a function, rather, those regulations
which have some effect on the operations and crew requirements of cur-
rent jets, were generally included. Specifically not included were
regulations dealing with certification and air worthiness. Regulations
were included for both International (flag) and domestic commercial
air carriers and were from two principal sources: (1) the Federal
Aviation Regulations (FAR) issued by the Federal Aviation Agency of
the United States with which all U.S. domestic air carriers and inter-
national carriers (whether U.S. or other) must comply when operating
within the Continental boundaries of the United States, and (2) Interna-
tional Standards issued by the International Congress of Aviation (ICAO)
which apply to all international carriers which are members of the
ICAO when operating outside the boundaries of their country. (Note:
Since this report is photographically reproduced, the actual regulations
were utilized whenever possible to prevent possible misquotes. )
Current jet implementation concepts. This is a description of
the means whereby the activity or function is implemented in current
jet aircraft. There is, of course, no standardization throughout current
jet operations, and in general, we have presented or discussed several
different concepts for implementing the activity or function and frequently
integrated these into a typical concept for our purpose. This part is
included for two principal reasons, namely, (1) to enable useful compari-
son between SST concepts for this function and current jet concepts for
the specific functions, and (2) because the manual implementation concepts
for SST are frequently very similar or the same as current jet implementa-
tion concepts. The information in this part in general focused on the
equipment involved, the crew responsibility, the crew equipment inter-
face (display and controls), any job aids used, and procedures.
SST potential operational requirements and constraints. This is a
discussion of requirements and constraints which may have to be changed
in order to accommodate the SST. Further, some discussion of new
requirements and constraints necessary for SST operation is presented.
The discussion here sometimes refers to a specific regulation and some-
times to an area of operation which affects the crew.
Feasible automated implementation concepts for SST. This is a
description of automated means or techniques for implementing the
function of concern for the SST. Automation, as used here, means that
the function may be initiated, terminated, or have data inserted, and
that the crew may monitor the process without participating in the actual
processing per s__e. Feasibility, as used here, is primarily a qualifica-
tion based on concepts which were available in the technical literature.
No attempt was made by the authors to invent new concepts, although
some of the existing concepts were extended or integrated to develop
what may be considered new concepts. While no rigid format was fol-
lowed, the same general factors discussed under current jet implemen-
tation concepts were also discussed here. These were equipment, crew
responsibility, crew interface (controls and displays, job aids) and
appropriate procedures. Frequently several alternative automatic
concepts were presented.
Feasible manual implementation concepts for SST. This part is
similar to the previous one with the exception that it includes feasible
manual implementation concepts rather than automated concepts. The
term, feasible manual concepts, was used to imply mechanized means
or some level of aidedness for implementing the functions in an opera-
tional situation, thus, the concepts described do not imply the max-
imum or limit of human capability, but concepts which may be consider-
ed realistic in the routine, non-emergency operation of the SST.
Generally, the concepts are no more "manual" than concepts in current
jet operations and in many cases they are the same. In some cases
it has been stated that no feasible manual implementation concepts exist
for a particular function. This statement means that no manual con-
cepts are deemed feasible ff the aircraft is to remain within the intended
flight plan and accomplish the cruise phase supersonically. Occasionally,
manual implementation concepts have been considered feasible ff the
aircraft descends from supersonic cruise altitude and continues the
flight subsonically. Most planned flights for the SST could probably be
completed subsonically within the planned fuel reserve criteria, but
obviously this would have a severe economic impact because of loss of
utilization of the aircraft. Thus, throughout this report SST operational
functions refers to those functions necessary for a flight profile involving
supersonic cruise.
'Jolume I contains a set of summary tables which presents function
versus implementation concepts for current operations, SST manual
operations, and SST automatic operations.
APPENDIX 1.0 FLIGHT MANAGEMENT
PURPOSE
The purpose of this activity is to ensure safe, reliable, efficient
and economic operation of the SST flight during the enroute phases
of operations. The activity is visualized as identical to line management
functions in any profit-motivated operation. Pilots when functioning as
flight-crew captains have long been delegated the responsibility and
authority to exercise final judgments as to the course of action demanded
by any given operational or emergency situation. Thus, in effect the
Captain operates as a flight manager. He has responsibility for assess-
ing the situation, evaluating the situation, and the responsibility and
final authority for deciding the course of action required. Although it
is true that erroneous judgments may be cause for dismissal or demotion
from command, these consequences are always "after the fact" in an
operational sense.
As general aviation has progressed, the performance capabilities
of aircraft have vastly improved, speeds have increased, and systems
have become more complex. This has all served to heighten the com-
plexity of the management activity, and lessen the time available for
performance. Moreover, as the complexity has increased and time
compressed, the margin for error has decreased proportionately, and
many decisions have to be made which are essentially irrevocable. With
increasing complexity and decreasing error margins, there have been
corresponding increases in available tools designed to extend man's
capabilities to cope with the situations. However, progress in this
area has been slow relative to the progress in aircraft performance
capabilities, and has been evolutionary rather than revolutionary. The
impact has been essentially the retention of each set of basic tools,
plus the continuous addition of other tools as parameters become more
6
operationally significant; the outgrowth of this development process is
the cockpit in a current jet transport. This seems to be due largely to
the reluctance on the part of flight crews to accept integrated instru-
mentation and displays. Research has proven that crew acceptance is
the dominating force in the evolutionary nature of cockpit instrumenta-
tion. The significant result as far as this discussion is concerned is
that flight crews on the decks of current subsonic jet transports are
surrounded with a myriad of instrumentation which provides the data
necessary to perform the flight management functions either directly or
through inference.
The lag in integrated instrumentation behind aircraft performance
improvements as well as the compression of time, has significantly in-
creased the cockpit workload. As a result, there have been correspond-
ing increases in cockpit automation. However, this automation has pro-
ceeded very slowly, and primarily in piece-meal fashion. The flight
management activity may be even more demanding in SST operations and
new concepts must be considered.
The flight management activity is comprised of six basic functions
as depicted in Figure ID. A brief description of each function follows:
Data Record. This function satisfies the requirement for keeping
records of the various factors associated with flight operations. Basi-
cally, three types of record keeping are required: (1) temporary data
records which may be required later during the actual flight, {2) per-
manent data records designed to facilitate flight management at a higher
management echelon, and (3) temporary records of pertinent factors dur-
ing the progress of a flight which may provide insight into accident causes.
Data Monitoring. This function consists of both system performance
monitoring and input credibility monitoring. The monitoring task involves
comparison of a parameter dimension or characteristic to a criterion
referent which may be a magnitude, an envelope boundary, or a condition.
Performance monitoring comparisons generally use the desired output
7
conditions and parameters as a referent. An example might be the
monitoring of the performance of a simple transformer designed to
convert 50 cycle power to 60 cycle power. The transformer perfor-
mance specification might be an output of 60 cycles + 1.5 cycles.
Performance monitoring would be accomplished by measuring the
output frequency to ensure that the criteria envelope is not exceeded.
Input credibility monitoring is concerned with ascertaining that
the system receives the necessary qualitative and quantitative ingredients.
In the case of _ transformer, input credibility monitoring would be
the determination that the input frequency was within some acceptable
limits from which it could be inferred that the output would be credible
at least in terms of the input parameter. Any out-of-tolerance fluctuations
determined by output monitoring would be indicative of non-normal per-
formance and in this case the transformer would be suspect.
In large, complex systems, there are many cases in which system
performance monitoring may be construed to satisfy both types of moni-
toring to an extent. This is due to the cascading effect of functions
(or pieces of performance) such that the output of a given function may
be the total, or some part of the input to a succeeding function in time.
Adding a radio receiver to the transformer above results in a "system"
comprising an external power source, a transformer, and a radio receiver.
Overall system performance may be measured by certain characteristics
of the receiver output, such as volume or fidelity. In this case, system
performance monitoring of the transformer performance may also be
viewed as input credibility monitoring for radio receiver performance,
and so on.
The last example is a highly simplified description of the moni-
toring problem that exists in the cockpit of a modern day jet transport.
Barring some rather revolutionary concepts in instrumentation, the
monitoring problem promises to become even more severe in the SST.
8
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Data Transduction. This is the conversion of information into the
form and format required for subsequent utilization. Data transduction
may be construed to occur almost anywhere within a system, if the
definition above is not qualified. For purposes of this discussion,
the limiting factor is the system level at which flight management is
either directly or indirectly involved in the conversion process. A
typical example of direct involvement would be the conversion of a
cross-track error component into a proportionate heading change command
where the autopiiot is not engaged _nd the navigation system output is
mentally transduced into an appropriate flight control system input. With
the autopilot coupled in, the transduction is accomplished automatically
and the crew involvement is indirect in that only the monitoring function
is performed.
There are two types of data transduction visualized by this analysis,
transduction by design and transduction by inference. The former simply
means that system design calls for a direct or indirect conversion pro-
cess by providing all the essential qualitative and quantitative parameters
necessary to provide the desired output in an appropriate form and format.
Further, that the system design provides for whatever integration of the
input parameters may be required. Transduction by inference directly
implies that a crew member is in the conversion loop to provide part
or all of the conversion process output. The crew member's involvement
is dictated by the need to infer an element or characteristic of any perti-
nent parameter either by integrating certain parameters for which
mechanization has not provided the means, or by focussing skills and
knowledge on the problem, or both.
Transduced Data Monitor. This function is the same as that des-
cribed previously under "Data Monitor. " The definition of the two types
of data monitoring is equally applicable here. The only change is that
the data have been converted into other forms.
ll
Data Evaluation. This function is to provide the capability for
situation assessment and decision-making for all normal operating
problems and problems of a non-routine and]or emergency nature.
Performance in this function will include, in addition to normal opera-
tional decLsions, (1) evaluation of trouble symptoms, to include the appli-
cation of cause]effect logic, (2) determination of the impact of the trouble
on the overall system in terms of safety, reliability, efficiency and
economy, (3) determination of alternative courses of remedial action,
and (4} decision-making in the selection of the most appropriate course of
action.
System Reconfiguration. This concerns the implementation of the
decision resulting from the "Data Evaluation"-function, when that decision
calls for some remedial action involving a physical change in the system
avionics, or total performance, which will permit the SST to proceed to
its destination in accordance with the original flight plan. An example
of an avionics change may be simply selecting an alternate sensor when
the situation assessment indicates that the on-line sensor is malfunctioning
or suspect. Another example may be the insertion of a man into a pre-
viously automated servo-loop when it is determined that the mechanization
is suspect, there are no alternates, and man's performance would not
degrade system performance below an acceptable level. In all of these
cases, there is a degree of physical change in the total system.
To discuss the flight management activity on the basis of those
functions just described is at present unmanageable for the current jet
transports and exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, for the SST.
Current jet operations vary greatly in terms of: (1) aircraft design and
performance characteristics, instrumentation concepts, operations
for which certificated, etc. (2) crew complement and composition, (3)
routes flown, and (4) individual airline operator management require-
ments. The degree of variation is such that a discussion of the flight
management function at that level of detail could not possibly reflect
all of the pertinent requirements, constraints, and other considerations.
12
The converse is true with the SST, i.e., at present the information
base available is insufficient to permit the degree of specificity indicated
in the function descriptions outlined above. It is believed that the purposes
of this analysis are best met by combining several of the functions into a
single function where a more general discussion will avoid redundancy
in the case of the SST, and retain meaning if not specificity in the case
of present jet fleets. Therefore, "Data Monitor. " "Data Transduction, "
"Transduced Data Monitor, " and '_Data Evaluation" will be discussed as
one function, namely "Data Monitor and Evaluation. " "Data Record" and
"System Reconfiguration" will constitute the remainder of the functional
descriptions of the flight management activity.
CURRENT JET OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS AND CONSTRAINTS
The flight management activity is provided for on current jet
transports by FAA Regulations which designate the complement and
composition of the flight crew which must be available on each flight,
or specify proven means which must be available in the event the crew
complement and composition are altered from the standards. Airmen
and crew member requirements are specified under FAR Manual (ref. 11),
Subpart M. Flight management responsibilities are tacitly designated
in the description of the required crew composition. Crew qualifications
are also specified. FAR 121. 557 specifically assigns the responsibility
for final judgment to the pilot in command and provides him with the
authority to deviate from any prescribed procedures, regulations, etc.
to the extent required in his judgment, in the interests of safety. These
crew requirements are meant to provide the means for executing the
flight management activities labeled "Data Monitor and Evaluation" and
"System Reconfiguration. "
Some specific regulations affecting flight management follow:
13
FAR 121.383_ ref. 11:
Airman: limitations on use of services.
(a) No certificate holder may use a person
as an airman unless that person--
(1) Holds an appropriate current air-
man certificate issued by the FAA;
(2) Has any required appropriate current
airman and medical certificates in his pos-
session while engaged in operations under
this part; and
(3) Is otherwise qualified for the oper-
ation for which he is to be used.
(b) Each airman covered by paragraph (a)
(2) of this section shall present either or both
certificates for inspection upon the request of
the Administrator.
(c) No certificate holder may use the services
of any person _s a pilot on an airplane engaged
in operations under this part if that person
has reached his 60th birthday. No person
may serve as a pilot on an airplane engaged in
operations under this part if that person has
reached his 60th birthday.
FAR 121. 385, ref. 11:
Composition of flight crew.
(a) No certificate holder nnty operate an air-
craft _vith less than the minimum flight crew in
the airworthiness certificate or the Aircraft
Flight Manual approved for that type aircraft
and required by this part for the kind of oper-
ation being condudted.
(b) In any case in which this part re-
quires the performance of two or more func-
tions for which an airman certificate is neces-
sary, that requirement is not satisfied by the
performance of multiple fllnctions at the same
time by one airman.
(c) The following minimum pilot crews
apply:
(1) Domestic air carriers. If a domestic
air carrier is authorized to operate under
IFR, or if it operates large aircraft, the
14
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fifinimum pilot crew is two pilots and the air
carrier shall designate one pilot as pilot in
command and the other second in cam-
mand.
(2) Flag air carriers. If a flag air car_
rier is authorized to operate under IFR, or if
it operates large aircraft, the minimum pilot
crew is two pilots.
(3) Supplemental air carriers and vom-
merc/a/operators. If a supplemental air car-
tier or coramercial oper_.tor is autb.o_*_d_ to
operate helicopters under IFR, or if it oper-
ates large aircraft, the minimum pilot crew is
two pilots and the supplemental air carrier or
commercial operator shall designate one pilot
as pilot in command and the other second in
colD_Inand.
(d) On each flight requiring a flight en-
gineer at least one flight crewmember, other
than the flight engineer, must be qualified to
provide emergency performance of the flight
engineer's functions for the safe completion of
the flight if the flight engineer becomes ill or
is otherwise incapacitated. A pilot need not
hold a flight engineer's certificate to perform
the flight engineerh functions in such _ situa-
tion.
FAR 121.387, ref. 11:
Flight engineer.
(_) No certificate holder may operate an air-
plane having a maximum certificated takeoff
weight of more than 80,000 pounds without a
flight crewmember holding a current flight en-
gincer certificate.
(b) Such a flight crewmember is also re-
quired on each four-engine airplane having a
maximum certificated takeoff weight of more
than 30,000 pounds, if the Administrator de-
termines that the design of the airplane or the
kind of operation requires a flight engineer for
safe operation.
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FAR 121. 389, ref. ii:
Flight navigator: flag and supplemental air carriers and
commercial operators.
(a) No flag or supplemental air carrier or
commercial operator may operate an airplane
over any area, route, or route segment that is
outside the 48 contiguous States and the District
of Columbia_ without a flight crewmember
holding a current flight navigator certificate,
whenever the Administrator determines that
celestial navigation is necessary or other spe-
cialized means of navigation necessary to obtain
a reliable fix for the safety of the flight cannot
be adequately accomplished from the pilot sta-
tion for a period of more than one hour. How-
ever_ the Administrator may also require a cer-
tificated flight navigator when those specialized
means of navigation are necessary for one hour
or less. In making that determination the Ad-
ministrator considers--
(1) The speed of the airplane;
(2) Normal weather conditions ell route;
(3) Extent of air traffic control;
(4) Trafilc congestion;
(5) Area of land at destination;
(6) Fuel requirements;
(7) Fuel available for return to point of
departure or alternates; and
(8) Predication of flight upon operation
beyond the point-of-no-return.
(b) The areas, routes, or route segments over
which a navigator is required are specified in
the operations specifications of the air carrier or
commercial operator.
FAR 121.391, ref. 11:
Flight attendants: domestic air carriers.
Each domestic air carrier conducting a pas-
senger operation shall provide at least one flight
attendant on each airplane with a capacity of
more than nine passengers.
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F.kl=t 121. 393, ref. 11:
Flight attendants: flag and supplemental air carriers and
commercial operators.
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of
this .,_ction. e_ach flag and supplemental air car-
tier and each commercial operator conducting
a pa._qen_r operation shall provide at least
the following flight attendants on each airplane
!1 ,qc_d :
(1) For airplanes having a seating capac-
ity of at least 10 lint less than 45 passengers--
one flight attendant.
(2) For airplanes having a seating capac-
ity of at les._t 45 but less than 101 passen-
gers--two flight attendant_
(3) For airplanes having a seating capac-
ity of more than 100 pa._ngers---three flight
attendants.
(b) Upon application by the air carrier or
commercial operator, the. Administrator m_y
approve the u_ of an airplane in a particular
operation with less than the number of flight
• ttendants required by paragraph (a) of this
._ection, if the air carrier or commercial opera-
ator shows that, based on the following, sgfety
and emer_ncy procedures and functions estab-
lished under § 121.397 for the partioular type
of airplane and q,peration can be adeqmttely per-
formed by fewer flight attendants:
( 1 ) Kind of operation.
(2) The numl_r of passenger seats.
(3) The n,mber of compartment&
(4) The re,tuber of emergency exit_
(5) Emerge.hey equipmenk
(6) The presence of other trained flight
crewmembers, not on flight deck duty, whose
services may be u_d in emergencies.
FAR 121.395, ref. 11:
Aircraft dispatcher: domestic and flag air carriers.
Each domestic and flag air carrier shall pro-
vide enough qu.dified aircraft dispatchers at
e-teh dispatch center to ensure proper ope_-
tiontd control of caeh flight.
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FAR 121. 397, ref. 11:
Emergency and emergency evacuation duties: flag and
supplemental air carriers and commercial operators.
I'(a) Each certificate holder shall, for each
type and model of airplane, assign to each cate-
gory of required crewmember, as appropriate,
the necessary functions to be performed in an
emergency or a situation requiring emergency
evacuation. The certificate holder shall show
those functions are realistic, can be practical]y
accomplished, and will meet any reasonably an-
ticipated emergency including the possible in-
capacitation of individual crewmembers or
their inability to reach the passenger cabin
because of shifting cargo in combination cargo-
passenger airplanes.
I'(b) The certificate holder shall describe ill
its manual the functions of each category of
required crewmembers under paragraph (a)
of this section.
I'(c) The certificate holder shall train each
required crewmember in his functions under
paragraph (a) of this section during the emer-
gency training part of the approved training
program prescribed in ,_ 121.411.]
FAR 121. 543, ref. 11:
Flight crew members at controls.
Each required flight crewmember on flight
deck duty shall remain at his station while the
aircraft is taking off or hmding, and while it is
en route unless the absence of one member is nec-
essary for the performance of duties in connec-
tion with the operation of the aircraft. Each
flight crewmember shall keep his seat belt
fastened when at his station.
FAR 121. 545, ref. 11:
Manipulation of controls.
No person may manipulate the flight controls
of an aircraft during flight unless he is-
(a) A qualified pilot of the certificate holder
operating that aircraft;
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(b) An authorized pilot safety reprssenta-
tire of the Administrator or of the Civil Aero-
nautics Board who has the permission of the
pilot in command, is qualified in the aircraft,
and is checking flight operations; or
(c) A pilot of another certificate holder who
has tile permission of the pilot in command,
is qualified in the aircraft, and is authorized by
the certificate holder operating the aircraft_
FAR 121.557, ref. 11:
Emergencies: domestic and flag carriers.
(a) In an emergency situation that requires
immediate decision and action the pilot in com-
mand may take any action that he considers
necessary under the circumstances. In such a
case he may deviate from prescribed operations
procedures and methods, weather minimums,
and this chapter, to the extent required in the
interests of safety.
(c) Whenever a pilot in command or dis-
patcher exercises emergency authority, he shall
keep the appropriate ATC facility and dispatch
centers fully informed of the progress of the
flight.
FAR 121. 561, ref. 11:
(Similar to ICAO Reg. 4.4.3, ref. 8)
(a) Whenever he encounters a meteorological
condition or an irregularity in a ground or navi-
gational facility, in flight, the knowledge of
which he considers e_qential to the safety of
other flights, the pilot in command shall notify
an appropriate ground station as soon as practi-
cable.
(b) The ground radio station that is notified
under paragraph (a) of this section shall report
the information to the agency directly responsi-
ble for operating the facility.
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FAR 121. 565, ref. 11:
Engine inoperative: landing: reporting.
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of
this section, whenever an engine of an airplane
fails or whenever the rotation of an engine is
stopped to prevent possible damage, the pilot in
command shall land the airplane at the nearest
suitable airport, in point of time, at which a
safe landing can be made.
(b) If not more than one engine of an air-
plane that has three or more engines fails or its
rotation is stopped, the pilot in command may
proceed to an airport that he selects if, after
considering the following, he decides that pro-
ceeding to that airport is as safe as landing at
the nearest suitable airport:
(1) The nature of the malfunction and the
possible mechanical difficulties that may occur
if flight is continued.
(2) The altitude, weight, and usable fuel
at the time of engine stoppage.
(3) The weather conditions en route and
at possible landing points.
(4) The air traffic congestion.
(5) The kind of terrain.
(6) His familiarity with the airport to be
used.
(c) The pilot in command shall report each
stoppage of engine rotation in flight to the ap-
propriate ground radio station as soon as practi-
cable and shall keep that station fully informed
of the progress of the flight.
FAR 121. 645, ref. 11:
Fuel supply: turbine engine powered airplanes, other than
turbo propeller: flag and supplemental air carriers and
commercial operators.
(a) For any flag air carrier operation and for
a supplemental air carrier or commercial oper-
ator operation outside the 48 contiguous States
and the District of Columbia, no person muy re-
2O
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lease for flight or take off a turbine-engine pow-
ered airplane (other than a turbo-propeller air-
plane) unless, considering wind and other
weather conditions expected, it has enough
fuel-
(l) To fly to and land at the airport to
which it is released;
(2) Thereafter, to fly for a period of 10
percent of the total time required to fly from
the airport of departure to, and land at, the
airport to which it was released;
(3) Thereafter, to fly to and land at the
most distant alternate airport specified in the
flight release, if an alternate is required ; and
(4) Thereafter, to fly for 30 minutes at
holding speed at 1,500 feet above the alter-
nate airport (or the destination airport if no
alternate is required) under standard tem-
perature conditions.
(e) The Administrator may amend the opera-
tions specifications of a flag or supplemental air
carrier or commercial operator to require more
fuel than any of the minimums stated in para-
graph (a) or (b) of this section if he finds that
additional fuel is necessary on a particular
route in the interest of safety.
FAR 121. 587, ref. 11:
Closing and locking of flight crew compartment door.
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of
this section, the pilot in command of a large
airplane carrying passengers shall ensure that
the door separating the flight crew compart-
ment from the passenger compartment is closed
and locked during flight.
(b) The provisions of paragraph (a) of this
section do not applym
(1) During takeoff and landing if the crew
compartment door is the means .of access to
a required passenger emergency exit; or
(2) At any time that it is necessary to pro-
vide access to the flight crew or passenger
compartment, to a crewmember in the per-
formance of his duties or for a person author-
ized admission to the flight crew compart-
ment under § 121.547.
23.
FAR 91.23, ref. 13:
Fuel requirements for flight in IFR conditions.
No person may operate a civil aircraft in
IFR conditions unless it carries enough fuel
(considering weather reports and forecasts,
and weather conditions) to complete the flight
to the first intended point of landing, to fly
from that point to the alternate airport, and
to fly thereafter for 45 minutes at normal
cruising speed.
FAR 91.67, ref. 13: (Similar to ICAO 3.22, ref.
Right-of-way rules; except water operations.
(a) Gel, eral. Except when, because of
restrictions to visibility beyond the pilot's con-
trol, another aircraft cannot be seen, each
person operating all aircraft shall comply with
this section. When a rule of this section gives
another aircraft the right of way, he shall
give way to that aircraft and nmy not pass
over, under, or ahead of it, unless well clear.
(b) In distress. An aircraft in distress has
the right of way over all other air traffic.
(c) Converging. When aircraft of the same
category are converging at approximately the
same altitude (except head-on, or nearly so)
the aircraft to the other's right has the right
of way. If the aircraft are of different cate-
gories-
(1) A balloon has the right of way over
any other category of aircraft;
(2) A glider has the right of way over an
airship, airplane or rotorcraft; and
(3) An airship has the right of way over
an airplane or rotorcraft.
However, an aircraft towing or refueling other
aircraft has the right of way over all other
engine-driven aircraft.
(d) Approaching head-on. When aircraft
ar_ approaching each other head-on, or nearly
so, each pilot of each aircraft shall alter course
to the right.
14:)
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(e) Overtaking. Each aircraft that is being
overtaken has the right of way and each pilot
of an overtaking aircraft shall alter course to
the right to pass well clear.
(f) Landing. Aircraft, while on final ap-
preach to !and, or while, landing, have the
right of way over other aircraft in flight or
operating on the surface. When two or more
aircraft are approaching an airport for the
purpose of landing, tile aircraft at the lower
altitude has the right of way, but it shall not
take advantage of this rule to cut in front of
another which is on final approach to land, or
to overtake that aircraft.
(g) Inapplicability. This section does not
apply to the operation of all aircraft on water.
FAR 91.87, ref. 13:
Operation of airports with operating control towers.
(g) Pre)terel, t/,d runway system. When
landing or taking off from an airport with
an operating control tower and for which a
preferential runway system has been estab-
lished by the FAA, each pilot of a large air-
plane, assigned a preferential runway by ATC,
shall use that mmway. However, each pilot
has final authority and responsibility for the
safe operation of his airplane "rod if he deter-
mines that another runway should be used,
ATC will assign that runway (air tragic and
other conditions permitting). Each pilot not
using the preferential runway assigned shall,
if requested by ATC, submit within 48 hours
of that request a written report of the reasons
therefor to the Chief Airport Tragic Con-
troller of the airport at which the deviation
occurred.
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FAR 91. 127, ref. 13: (Similar to ICAO Reg. 5.3.42, ref.
IFR operations; two-way radio communications failure.
(a) Gelwr_ll. l_nless otherwise authorized
by ATC, each pilot who has two-way radio
comnmnication_ failure when operating under
IFR shall eoml,ly with tile rules of this sec-
tion.
(b) VFR co_ditions. If the failure occurs
in VFR conditions, or if VFR conditions are
encountered after the failure, each pilot shall
continue the flight under VFR and land as
soon as practicable.
(c) IFR conditions. If the failure occurs
in IFR conditions, or if paragraph (b) of
this section cannot be complied with, each pilot
shall continue the flight to the original desti-
nation and shall-
(l) Continue the flight along the route
specified in the last ATC clearance received,
or, if no route has been specified, along the
plmmed route ;
(2) Contimm the flight at the highest of
the following altitudes or flight levels:
(i) The altitude or flight level specified
in the last ATC clearance received;
(ii) The mininmm safe altitude; or
(iii) The lowest cardinal altitude or
flight level at or above the MEA of the
highest planned route structure;
(3) When climb to "t higher altitude is
required by subparagraph (2)(iii) of this
section, begin that climb 10 minutes .lfter
passing the first compulsory reporting point
over which the failure prevented comnmni-
cations with ATC ;
(4) If lmlding instructions have been re-
ceived_ depart the holding fix at the expected
further clearance time received, or_ if an
expected apl)roach clearance time has been
received, depart the holding fix so as to
arrive over the radio facility to be used for
the approach at the destination as close as
possible to the expected approach clearance
time; and
14)
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(5) Begin descent from the en route alti-
tude or flight level at the radio facility to
be used for the approach at the destination
at the latest of the following times:
(i) The expected approach clearance
time (if received}.
(ii) The estimated time of arrival
shown on tile flight plan, as amended with
ATC.
(iii) The actual time of arrival over
the facility.
FAR 91.75, ref. 13:
Compliance with ATC clearances and instructions.
(a) When all ATC clearance has been ob-
tained, no pilot ill command may deviate from
that clearance, except in an emergency, unless
he obtains an amended clearance. However,
except in positive controlled airspace, this
paragraph does not prohibit him from cancel-
ling an IFR flight plan if he is operating in
VFR weather conditions.
(b) Except in an emergency, no person may,
in an area in which air traffic control is ex-
ercised, operate an aircraft contrary to an
ATC instruction.
(c) Each pilot in command who deviates, in
an emergency, from an ATC clearance or in-
struction shall notify ATC ,,:" that deviation
as soon as possible.
(d) Each pilot in command who (though
not deviating from a rule of this subpart) is
given priority by ATC in an emergency, shall
submit, within 48 hours after the emergency,
a detailed report of the emergency to the
nearest FAA Regional Office.
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FAR 91.79, ref. 13:
Minimum safe altitudes; general.
Except when necessary for takeoff or land-
ing, no person may operate an aircraft below
the following altitudes:
(a) Anywhere. An altitude allowing, if a
power unit fails, an emergency landing with-
out undue hazard to persons or property on
the surface.
(b) Over congested areas. Over any con-
gested area of a city, town, or settlement, or
over any open air assembly of persons, an
altitude of 1,000 feet above the highest obstacle
within a horizontal radius of 2,000 feet of the
aircraft.
(c) Over other than congested areas. An
altitude of 500 feet above the surface, except
over open water or sparsely populated areas.
In that case, the aircraft may not be operated
closer than 500 feet to any person, vessel, ve-
hicle, or structure.
FAR 91. 129, ref. 13:
Operation under IFR in controlled airspace; malfunction reports.
(a) The pilot in command of each aircraft
operated ill controlled airspace under IFR,
shall report immediately to ATC any of the
following malfunctions of equipment occurring
in flight :
(1) Loss of VOR, TACAN, ADF, or low
frequency navigation receiver capability.
(2) Complete or partial loss of ILS re-
ceiver capability.
(3) Impairment of air/ground communi-
cations capability.
(b) In each report required by paragraph
(a) of this section, the pilot in ('ommand shall
include the--
(1) Aircraft identification;
(2) Equipment affected;
(3) Degree to which lhe (,aiml)ility of
the pi]ot to operate under IFR in the ATC
system is impaired; and
(4) Nature aml extent of assistance he
desires from ATC.
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ICAO Reg. 3.2.2.4, ref. 14:
Landing.
An aircraft in flight, or
operating on the ground or water, shall
give way to other aircraft landing or on
final approach to land.
When two or more heav-
ier-than-air aircraft are approaching an
aerodrome for the purpose of landing,
aircraft at the higher altitude shall give
way to aircraft at the lower altitude, but
the latter shall not take advantage of
_his r, do to cut in in front of another
which is on final approach to land, or to
overtake that aircraft. Nevertheless,
power-driven heavier-than-air aircraft
shall give way to gliders.
Emergency landing. An
aircraft that is aware that another is
compelled to land shall give way to that
aircraft.
ICAO Reg. 3.5.1.1, ref. 14:
Air Traffic Control clearances.
An aircraft shall be oper-
ated in compliance with air traffic control
clearances received.
ICAO Reg. 4.3.3.1, ref. 12:
All aircraft. (Fuel and oil supply)
A flight shall
not be commenced unless, taking into
account both the meteorological condi-
tions and any delays that are expected in
flight, the aircraft carries sufficient fuel
and oil to ensure that it can safely com-
plete the flight. In addition, a reserve
shall be carried to provide for contingen-
cies, and to enable the aircraft to reach
the alternate aerodrome when such is
included in the flight plan in accordance
with 4.3.1.1.
Note.--Nothing in 4.3.3 precludes an
aircra[t ]rom amendin9 its flight plan
while in flight in order to re-plan the
flight to another aerodrome provided that
from the point at which the flight is
re-planned the requirements o] 4.3.3 can
be complied _t_th.
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ICAO Reg. 4.4.1, ref. 12:
Aerodrome Meteorological Minima
S A flight shall not be con-
tinued towards the aerodrome of intended
landing unless the latest available meteo-
rological information indicates that con-
ditions at that aerodrome, or at least one
alternate aerodrome, will, at the expected
times of arrival, be at or above the meteo-
rological minima specified for such aero-
dromes in the Operations Manual.
S. Except in case of emer_
gency an aircraft shall not continue its
approach-to-land at any aerodrome beyond
a point at which the limits of the meteo-
rological minima specified for that aero-
drome in the Operations Manual would be
infringed.
NS A flight shall not be con-
tinued towards the aerodrome of intended
landing unless the latest available meteo-
rological information indicates that con-
ditions at that aerodrome or at least one
alternate aerodrome, will, at the expected
times of arrival, be at or above the
meteorological minima specified for such
aerodromes.
NS Except in case of emer-
gency, an aircraft shall not continue its
approach-to-land at any aerodrome beyond
a point at which the limits of the meteo-
rological minima specified for that aero-
drome would be infringed.
ICAO Reg. 4.4.4, ref. 12:
Pilots at Controls.
At least one pilot shall remain at the
controls at all times during flight. Two
pilots shall remain at the controls during
take-off and landing if the certificate of
airworthiness or other documents asso-
ciated with the certificate of airworthiness
of the aircraft require the carriag_ of two
pilots.
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ICAO Reg. 4.6, ref. 14:
Change from VFR _ight to IFR flight.
An aircraft operated in
accordance with the visual flight rules
which wishes to change to compliance
with the instrtanent flight rules shall:
a) if a flight plan was submitted,
communicate the necessary changes to
be effected to its current flight plan, or
b) when so required by 3.31.1.2.1,
submit a flight plan to the appropriate
air tral_c services trait grid obta_;n a
clearance prior to proceeding IFR
when in controlled airspace.
ICAO Reg. 5.1.2, ref. 14:
Minimum Heights.
Except when necessary, fc, r take-off or
landing, or except when specifically au-
thorized by the appropriate authority, air-
craft shall be flown at a height of at least
300 metres (1,000 feet) above the highest
obstacle located within 8 km (5 miles)
of the estimated position of the aircraft
in flight.
ICAO Reg. 5.1.3.1, ref. 14:
Change from IFR flight to VFR flight.
An aircraft electing to
change the conduct of its flight from
compliance with the instrument flight
rules to compliance with the visual flight
rules shall, if a flight plan was sub-
mitted, notify the appropriate air traffic
services unit specifically that the IFR
flight is cancelled and communicate
thereto the changes to be made to its
current flight plan.
_9
ICAOReg. 5. 3. 1. 2. 1, ref.
Changes to a flight plan.
5.3.1.2.1 Except as provided for
in 5.3.1.2.2 no change shall be made to
the current flight plan submitted for an
IFR flight within controlled airspace,
unless a request for such change has
been made and clearance obtained from
air traffic control, or unless an emer-
gency situation arises which necessitates
immediate action by the aircraft, in
which event as soon as circumstances
permit, after such emergency authority
is exercised, the appropriate air traffic
services unit shall be notified of the
action taken and if necessary obtain
clearance for any change effected.
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ICAOReg. 5. 3. 3, ref. 14:
Termination of control.
When an IFR flight operating under
the air traffic control service has landed,
or leaves a controlled airspace and it is
no longer subject to air traffic control
service, the appropriate air traffic control
unit shall be notified as soon as possible.
ICAO Reg. 5. 1. 3. 2, ref. 14:
Change from IFR flight to VFR flight,
5.1.3.2 When an aircraft oper-
ating under the instrument flight rules
is flown in or encounters visual meteor-
ological conditions it shall not cancel
its IFR flight unless it is anticipated,
and intended, that the flight will be
c_ttlnued for a reasonable period of
time in uninterrupted visual meteor-
ological conditions.
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CURRENT JET IMPLEMENTATION CONCEPTS
The implementation of flight management activity varies widely
on current jet transports and can be generalized only in terms of
typical crew composition and equipment. (Typical cockpit instrumen-
tation for a current jet transport is shown in Figures 4-10. ) For
example, flights originating in the United States and bound for destina-
tions Outside of the continental United States, usually carry a cockpit
crew of four members consisting of: one captain, aircraft commander
and pilot, one copilot, one flight engineer, and one navigator. This is
standard specified by FAA, and deviations must have prior FAA appro-
val.
Crew composition and qualifications for a given f]ight are based
upon consideration of such factors as cockpit workload (normal opera-
tions), system reliability, special skills and knowledge requirements,
safety factors, and emergency situations. Each air carrier operating
along a given route must comply with a specific set of requirements
for his operation alone. Although some common denominator may
exist in the form of a minimum standard, such a standard would still
be subject to variation among carriers depending upon their individual
requirements. In essence, the data monitor and evaluation and system
reconfiguration flight management functions are provided for by desig-
nating an appropriate crew complement which includes the necessary
numbers and qualifications applicable to a specific operation. The
crew members also provide the means for maintaining specific records
and logs required by the FAA and individual airline companies. This
excludes, of course, the accident analysis data provided by encapsulated
flight recorders which maintain continuous performance records of
selected flight parameters throughout the entire flight. These recorders
are automatic and only require activation and deactivation by the crew.
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SST POTENTIAL OPERATIONAL R.EQUIREMENTS
AND CONSTRAINTS
Essentially, flight management activity for the SST will be con-
cerned with problems similar to those on today's subsonic jets. Some
new parameters associated with some of these problems will undoubted-
ly require the development of specific management techniques, e. g.,
enroute management of the sonic boom phenomenon. Even though the
navigational system will offer control solutions for this problem,
flight management will still be required to assess the practicality of
the solution.
The paramount differences between today's jets and the SST are
potential constraints, such as the severity of time compression and
the resultant time available to perform the management activity, and
the increased criticality of making an erroneous judgment or decision.
It has been stated time and again in the literature that less than opti-
mum performance may well relegate the SST to an extremely unprofit-
able role. There is unanimous agreement that this factor must be
faced and its potential causes minimized to the extent possible and prac-
tical through good management as well as design. There is no doubt
that higher echelon management will make every attempt to resolve as
many of the operational problems as is possible on the ground. However,
it goes without saying that enroute flight management must be able to
solve problems on a real-time basis, and must be provided the tools,
methods, and techniques required to minimize the probability of exer-
cising erroneous judgment.
An error in judgment for SST flight management may be consider-
ably more serious from an economic point of view than it is for current
jet operations. This is due primarily to the alternative subsonic flight
regime which may permit completing a flight within adequate safety
criteria, but at a considerable economic penalty due to decreased
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utilization. Essentially three types of errors can be committed:
Type 1 Error: A judgment that there is a malfunction when
in fact there is not and the flight is aborted or returned to
subsonic regime.
T_pe 2 Error: Failure to recognize a malfunction and con-
tinuing to operate in an unsafe situation.
T_/pe 3 Error: Recognition of a malfunction, but selection
of an alternative which is unnecessarily penalizing, e.g.,
going subsonic when it is unnecessary.
Enroute flight management will undoubtedly require some modi-
fications in existing practices and procedures from the viewpoint of
ground-based facilities. There may be a need for ATC, for example,
to establish some minimum clearance change for the enroute portion
of the flight, and possibly some priority handling scheme in the ter-
minal areas. There will undoubtedly be a requirement for reli-
able, efficient, and faster coordination between all ground facilities
and the SST flight management. There are some research programs
looking into some of these problem areas, but as yet, recommenda-
tions have not been formulated which would permit the specification of
practical requirements, However, the potential operational character-
istics of the SST, along with the operating environment, permit the gen-
eralization of potential effects on the flight management activity. These
effects are described in as much detail as is now possible in the discus-
sion of the individual flight management functions.
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FEASIBLE AUTOMATED IMPLEMENTATION CONCEPTS FOR SST
With respect to automatic implementation of the flight manage-
ment activity, there is an underlying premise which must be given
initial consideration, i. e., man will have a major role in the execu-
tion of SST flight management functions, and in this role he is an
absolute necessity. Available evidence indicates that it is not a ques-
tion of whether man is necessary to successful SST flight managem ent,
but of the degree of automation necessary to extend man's capabilities
sufficiently to perform the functions involved. First of all, it is impor-
tant to point out that at present there are no machines available which
can duplicate man's capability in the areas of computation and judgment
(ref. 15). Moreover, even if such a machine were available which
could also meet the exacting requirements for size, weight, reliability,
adaptiveness, and all of the other constraints and requirements, there
is a final authority which would rule out complete automation, or in a
broader sense, the absence of man in the system, and that authority
is the traveling public. Price, Behan, and Ereneta (ref. 1) point out
that "The public has a deep-seated fear of air transport that is inde-
pendent of objective safety data, and therefore may be termed irration-
al ... ", and "... to partially cope with this fear, the airplane must be
under the control of a force which the public will perceive as competent.
Today's public will not so perceive a machine, regardless of the ob-
jective facts." An even more basic acceptance factor is concerned
with survival needs_ While the public will draw some degree of com-
fort in knowing that the ultimate agent responsible for their safety is
governed by the same natural instinct to survive, they also recognize
that one cannot so endow a machine.
Regardless of the degree of automation provided within the total
system concept, the flight deck will provide for man's (generic here,
meaning crew) role in the system. In the first report under this contract
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(rei I), Price, Behan, and Ereneta point out many considerations which
are directly applicable conceptually to the definition of implementation
concepts to satisfy performance requirements for flight management
functions. It is concluded that the implementation concept for the most
automatic means feasible for performing the flight management activity
will still involve direct participation by the crew. More specific data
concerning the degree of crew participation and some possible avenues
for satisfying performance requirements are given in the discussions
u_ _L,_ specific functions involved.
Donald W. Richardson of Hughes Aircraft Company has written
several papers regarding a Central Electronic Management System
Concept (CEMS) for SST. Since it is an inclusive concept referred to
throughout this report, a brief description of CEMS is presented here
reproduced from "VECTORS, " a Hughes Aircraft Company Quarterly
Publication (ref. 16). Some of the CEMS features are applicable to
activities other than flight management, but for continuity the complete
CEMS description is included here.
With dramatic changes in air transport oper-
ations, the public is rapidly becoming indoctrinated
in the ways of the jet age. We have already geared
our thinking in terms of delivery of mail, cargo and
people at the 600 m.p.h, range presently being
achieved by the major airlines throughout the world.
Obviously, jet aircraft transportation is here on a
permanent basis. However, not so obvious to the
general public--but glaringly evident to the manufac-
turers and users of these aircraft, the designers and
pilots, the engineers and control tower operators--is
the entire new family of operational and traffic con-
trol problems created by the universal acceptance of
these aircraft. The ever-increasing numbers of turbo-
jet transports in the Mach 0. 8-0.9 speed range oper-
ating at altitudes up to 40, 000 ft., are already of such
magnitude as to cause considerable concern among
the personnel responsible for the safe and economical
operation and control of these aircraft. The mere
thought of the transition to Mach 3 and 70, 000 feet
staggers the imagination.
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The basic problems for supersonic air transpor-
tation in the Mach 3 range include: how may these air-
craft be operated in the most efficient, safe and econom-
ical manner possible ? This and other questions airline
operators and the passenger public jointly will ask, and
in effect are now asking. In answer to these problems,
Hughes Aircraft Company has advanced a radically new
concept of air transportation control, called the Central
Electronic Management System or CEMS for short.
CEMS system consists of two basic elements: a
small, highly reliable, general-purpose digital computer
--and a multi-purpose central display station. The com-
puter ties together all of the various subsystems required
by the aircraft for navigation, communications and flight
control. It processes their output and controls them in
accordance with instructions from the flight crew or--in
some instances the ground controller. (See Figure 2. ) *
To anyone familiar with the extreme versatility of a digi-
tal computer, it becomes almost a case in self-hypnosis
to allow it to absorb more and mcre functions until, with-
out one realizing it, the supersonic transport will seem-
ingly become a pilotless drone--almost a guided missile
with human passengers. It therefore becomes necessary
to apply judicious restraint to such enthusiasm, realizing
that there must be a reasonable trade-off between the
exact capabilities of a computer and interpretative ability
of the human. Nowhere will the pilot become more impor-
tant than in the cockpit of a supersonic transport.
The second element of CEMS is the central display
station, a TV-like screen which is the link between the
computer and the flight crew. The display would include
a cathode ray tube capable of presenting super-imposed
electronic and optically projected displays. (See Figure 3. )*
The presentation of optical and electronic information on
the same screen eliminates viewing parallax (the apparent
displacement or the difference in apparent direction of an
object, as seen from two different points. ) Symbols of
aircraft present position and heading, fuel circle and
homing points can be projected electronically, and naviga-
tion and instructional charts projected on the screen by
an optical projection system.
CEMS has the flexibility to perform a variety of
basic and essential functions; such as: Takeoff Monitor-
ing, Navigation, Automatic Position Reporting, Cruise
* Parenthetic insertion ours
36
IN_J'T'S
AIR DATA II
J VG+0G Olt J
i I
I RADIO I
NAVIGATK_I _--
QUANTITY
l-ICONS(X[II+ U
co_lm_rl[_
L AIR DATA
BLOC(
NAVIGATIGN
BLOCK
_11 &UTO-I_LOTBLOCK
I DISPLAY I
--- CONOI_
BLOCK
OU'n=U'I_
_ I STABILITY
PITCI4 %[ _,'¢,UEm_TIONANOTRIM
Ii TI.HiOTTLIE
: SIERVO
DISPLAYS
FLIGHT
._ ATTITUO[,
NAVIGATION MAP,
*IACM - DESIRED
Figure 2. CEMS operational block diagram
(Courtesy Hughes Aircraft Company)
37
0_
0
0
4_
o
o_-I
,4..)
f_
0
0
"4-)
o
0
o
0
o.
0
o
.,--4
0
or,4
38
Control, Terminal Navigation, System Checkout and Self-
Test.
Examine each of these briefly: first, takeoff moni-
toring. The problem of safely taking off a supersonic
transport will be complicated by the aircraft's tremendous
gross weight and the sensitivity of its engines to changes
in atmospheric conditions. If the aircraft is to be operated
efficiently, it must take off with the maximum safe load.
However, assuming the aircraft has the optimum safe load,
but the air temperature increases by as little as 20 degrees
over standard atmospheric conditions, a safe takeoff may
not be achieved. Therefore, an important fimction CEMS
might perform is monitoring the conditions affecting take-
off safety. Prior to takeoff, CEMS could compute the maxi-
mum allowable gross takeoff weight on the basis of runway
characteristics, wind, temperature and so on. The compu-
ted weight would be indicated to the flight crew on the cen-
tral display console. Once the aircraft was loaded and
started down the runway, CEMS would monitor the aircraft's
acceleration and compare it with the predicted accelera-
tion for a safe takeoff. At the critical acceleration stop-
point, CEMS would inform the pilot whether or not to
proceed.
A more critical function will be navigation. The
i supersonic transport will cross the United States in an
hour and a half; a flight from New York to Chicago will
take less than 30 minutes. At these short flying times,
precise navigation and accurate position reporting are of
paramount importance. It is necessary for each aircraft
to maintain an assigned ground track. In order to provide
adequate airspace and ensure continuous compliance to
assigned ground tracks, area navigation is necessary.
Finally, the aircraft's position changes so rapidly that the
present techniques of indicating position will be unsatsifac-
tory. CEMS will continuously indicate the aircraft's present
position and heading on a pictorial map display. The oper-
ator will be able to select maps of different scales for plan-
ning enroute navigation and flight terminal areas. If ever
the flow of information data to CEMS is interrupted, the
system will dead-reckon the aircraft's position. In addi-
tion to computing position, CEMS will navigate the aircraft
along any desired ground track. Once the flight plan has
been entered, CEMS will compute the ground track from
any one point to the next. The track will be indicated on
the map display by a line joining the two points. CEMS
will generate precise commands for directing the aircraft
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onto the track. These may either be displayed visually
to the pilot or coupled directly to the autopilot. CEMS
will also compute such pertinent navigational informa-
tion as the time-to-go till the next navigation point will
be reached and the maximum range that can be flown at
the present ground speed with the fuel remaining.
Another function which might be performed by
CEMS is cruise control to minimize fuel costs. Present
jet transports on domestic and shorter range flights have
little need for this function. In the case of the Mach-3
aircraft a maximum-speed flight leaving New York at
7:00 a.m. would arrive in Los Angeles at 8:30 a. m. ; a
minimum cost flight might arrive at 8:35 a.m. This dif-
ference would be of little concern to the average passen-
ger; yet, the difference in fuel cost between the two
flights would be approximately $500. Minimum-cost
operation, will be highly attractive.
System checkout and self-test may in the end prove
more valuable than all the rest. Studies indicate that to
be economically practical, a supersonic transport must
actually be in flight an average of 10 hours a day; conse-
quently, between flights little time would be available for
trouble-shooting and repair. To alleviate this situation,
CEMS would perform self-test functions of two types.
The first would be to monitor the operation of all elements
of the aircraft system. --The engines, hydraulic system,
control system, electrical system, electronic system and
so on. Should a failure occur, CEMS would notify the
flight crew and indicate which item during the self-test
checkout had failed; the flight crew in turn would make
the necessary arrangements to correct the failure.
The second type of self-testing which CEMS would
perform is failure prediction. For example, the r. p. m.
of an aircraft engine will, from time to time, exceed the
controlled value. The duration of the engine's overspeeds
can be correlated with the engine's wear. By monitoring
the overspeeds, CEMS could predict when the engine rotor
should be replaced. Data such as this would be used in
scheduling maintenance operations, and greatly reduce the
amount of downtime required.
The complicated CEMS computer will be similar in
operation to other Hughes-produced digital computers per-
forming similar functions in advanced military aircraft.
However, the CEMS computer will be radically different.
Whereas present computers employ etched circuits and
4O
conventional circuit elements, the CEMS computer will
employ thin-film circuitry. This circuitry has two out-
standing advantages: first, its extremely small size.
The CEMS computer will occupy no more than one-half
of a cubic foot. The second advantage of thin-film cir-
cuitry is its extremely high reliability. For every 100
planes flying regular schedules, it is estimated that no
more than two computer failures will occur in 10 years.
The other basic element of CEMS, the central dis-
play station, presents two somewhat conflicting require-
ments. It must present a tremendous amount of static
information, charts, instructions, and it must present
simultaneously a variety of dynamic information such as
positions, headings, courses and ranges. The two re-
quirements have been met by combining a slide projector
with an electronic display tube. Static information is
recorded on a 35mm film strip for optical projection,
and dynamic information is presented by electronically
controlling the beam of the cathode ray tube. The re-
sult is a single, integrated display of not only static,
but also dynamic information.
While the concept of CEI_IS was conceived by its
inventors as a specific solution to the operational prob-
lems of Mach-3 aircraft, in perhaps slightly different
form the CEMS concept could very well be the answer
to the operational problems of manned spacecraft.
FEASIBLE MANUAL IMPLEMENTATION CONCEPTS FOR SST
It has been stated that the cockpit workload on current jet trans-
ports is at the saturation point. More and more, as aviation technology
has progressed, man has been forced into an activity for which he is
not particularly suited, i. e., monitoring. It can be concluded, more-
over, that the monitoring requirements for the SST will increase in
complexity and criticality. Any implementation concept, then, which
considers manual feasibility should consider these two aspects along
with the pertinent ramifications. Increased complexity and criticality
of the monitoring task, along with the unsuitability of the human opera-
tor for task performance, would appear to significantly increase the
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probability of a serious error. It follows that a feasible manual imple-
mentation concept should be concerned initially with potential techniques
for decreasing the monitoring load on the human being, thus freeing
him to perform other functions at which he excels, e. g., situation
assessment and making judgments.
It seems reasonable to assume that crews are not going to in-
crease significantly in size, nor undergo any radical changes in com-
position, although further research may indicate increased requirements
for interchangeability. The degree to which crew members will be able
to devote themselves to flight management activity will depend in large
part on the specification of means for performing the remainder of the
system-oriented activities. This analysis has pointed out and substan-
tiated by reference to a broad authoritative base, the requirement for
a high degree of automation in the vast majority of other system-oriented
activities. Although the justification for automation in each activity will
involve a widely varying set of requirements, the ultimate objective has
been to attain a balanced man-machine relationship. The exploitation
of the crew in the flight management role is a natural outgrowth of such
a complementary arrangement. There are tasks associated with flight
management which are either beyond man's capabilities or are represen-
tative of areas where man is inferior to machines, e.g., continuous
recording of numerous flight parameters associated with accident analy-
sis. Conversely, it appears that a large portion of the flight manage-
ment activity is of a nature that the optimum configuration must surely
exploit man's capabilities. Details may be found in the specific function
description associated with this activity.
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i. 1 FUNCTION I. 1 DATA MONITORING AND EVALUATION
Purpose
The purposes of this function are to:
II Provide input credibility and system performance
monitoring on all individual parameters indicative
of the degree or extent of safety, economy_ reli-
ability, and efficiency being achieved by the
flight.
. Provide for data transduction where flight manage-
ment is directly or indirectly involved, so that the
required information is available in the form and
format needed for subsequent utilization.
B Provide input credibility and system performance
monitoring on all transduced information.
. Provide for situation assessment and decision-
making for all normal operating problems and
problems of a non-routine and/or emergency
nature.
It is evident that this function embraces the majority of flight
management tasks. Webster defines management as "... judicious
use of means to accomplish an end; skillful treatment" and "the col-
lective body of those who manage any enterprise or interest. "
Judicious use of means implies discerning and sound judgment based
on being cognizant and informed. Cognizance or awareness is an
obvious result of a good monitoring scheme; being informed implies
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working knowledge and skills, plus experience. The point is that the
performance of this function by the flight crew of a commercial jet
transport involves management in every sense of the word.
Current Jet Operational Requirements and Constraints
Requirements and constraints for this function are as numerous
as the different aircraft, avionics, crew complements and composi-
tion, airline company operations, specific company procedures for
individual routes and so on that exist today. Basic regulations for
flight management have been included under the activity description.
The following are some general requirement and constraint consider-
ations.
le Cognizance of the progress of the flight relative
to the flight plan must be maintained, and appro-
priate control over flight progress must be exer-
cised.
o Cognizance of the operating condition of the total
system and individual subsystems must be main-
tained, and appropriate control over system/sub-
system operation must be exercised.
e Detection and isolation of system/subsystem fail-
ures and decisions as to whether reconfiguration
is possible or whether the aircraft must deviate
from the original flight plan must be made.
. The impact of other perturbations in total system
operation must be assessed in terms of continuing
the flight safely, reliably, economically, and
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efficiently; some typical perturbations might
result from:
a. Alteration in the ATC clearance
b. Unfavorable flight conditions enroute
c. Any deterioration in crew capability
de Non-system oriented incidents (e. g.,
passenger emergency).
Although certain courses of action are specified by procedures,
and advice may be available through communication, there are essen-
tially no constraints on the aircraft commander as far as exercising
judgment in any situation and selecting the most appropriate course of
action. There are constraints which, although not directly involved
in the performance per se, may be construed as regulatory for pur-
poses of facilitating performance. Generally, these constraints are
concerned with minimum standard equipment requirements and mini-
mum standard crew complement and composition requirements. These
constraints are manifested in FAA and/or ICAO certification of airline
operations along specific routes when these aircraft possess the mini-
mum standard cockpit instrumentation, equipment and crew.
Current Jet Implementation Concepts
As is the case with the other flight management functions, cur-
rent jet transports provide for data monitoring and evaluation by the
cockpit instrumentation together with present standards for crew com-
plement and composition. Although there are many variations in cock-
pit instrumentation depending on specific aircraft types, equipment
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manufacturers, or company specifications, Figures 4 through 10 illus-
trate typical, current jet transport cockpit instrumentation concepts.
Figures 4 through 9 are from an early (1960) Boeing 707 operations
manual (ref. 17). Figure 10 is a later Boeing 707 pilot and copilot
panel presented in life size. It can be seen that many instruments
provide the crew with information and that the instruments are not
simple meters or lights, but are rather complex. These instrument
panel illustrations are for an aircraft with a crew complement of four
consisting of pilot, copilot, flight engineer and navigator.
With variations according to specific requirements, the instru-
mentation presented in Figures 4 through 10 is representative of cur-
rent jet concepts for the implementation of data monitoring and evalu-
ation. Input credibility and system performance monitoring on all
required parameters is facilitated by the displays. In the absence of
a specific parameter display, the monitoring is accomplished by infer-
ence from displayed data. Some provisions for automated data trans-
duction and system control are available in most cockpit instrumentation
schemes, e. g., auto-pilot or flight director systems. Auto-throttling
and integrated all-weather landing systems are expected to be in wide
use in the near future. Cockpit navigation techniques employing semi-
automatic dead-reckoning devices, such as doppler radar and inertial
navigator systems, are already being used and are on the increase.
Such innovations will have an impact on credibility and performance
monitoring as well as on situation assessment and the exercise of good
judgment.
SST Potential Operational Requirements and Constraints
The generalized requirements indicated under "Current Jet Oper-
ational Requirements and Constraints" are equally valid for SST data
monitoring and evaluation. There is no doubt that specific requirements
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Figure 5. Forward electronic control panel (From ref. 17).
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will change, if for no other reason because there will be a considerable
increase in parameters to monitor and in the resultant system per-
formance control required. Examples are the sonic boom problem,
engine intake air flow control, and environmental control.
There are factors which will radically alter performance of this
function in the SST and necessitate a critical re-evaluation of the
present underlying premises. Of these, the most severe will be time
compression and the resulting reduced working tithe in the air, both
total time and decision-making time. Another severe factor is the
irrevocability of certain critical decisions. To further complicate
matters, there is some conce_'n that the SST may be only marginally
profitable and some question as to public acceptance, both the riding
public and the walking public, so to speak; it also seems, however,
that both of these concerns may be minimized by continued research.
The significance of these factors is evident in the position of
responsible authorities in both government and industry that mistakes
cannot be afforded in the design and development of the SST (Shank,
ref. 18). Our analysis concludes that the quoted criterion is generally
applicable to the performance of this function particularly in the exer-
cising of good judgment and decision-making. Clearly, this criterion
will vary in applicability as a function of the seriousness of the mistake,
which of course is proportional to the magnitude of the resultant costs
or price of the mistake.
Feasible Automated Implementation Concepts for SST
There is no doubt that the implementation concept for this function
in the SST will be a man-machine solution as in current jets. The
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paramount differences are to be expected in the allocation of specific
performance to man or machine, and the resultant interface.
Previous reference was made to the first report of this contract
(ref. I) which discusses at length the problems inherent in optimizing
man-machine relationships. Some generalized conclusions may be
reached regarding the optimum man-machine relationship for the per-
formance of this function. Supporting detail is available in the first
report.
It is apparent that, with time compression and the resultant per-
formance time available, the first consideration must be the conserva-
tion of man's time for performance in those areas where man is known
to excel. Task automation to conserve man's time should be considered
if man is currently performing tasks which for example are:
. In given areas where man is known to exhibit
weakness es.
. Relatively time consuming; (both elapsed time
and frequency}.
3. Repetitive or boring in nature.
4. Easily definable in concrete terms.
5. Basically non-intellectual in nature.
Monitoring can be described by all five statements above and it appears
that a good deal of the monitoring performance on the SST will be auto-
mated. One possible solution to the cognizance problem has been sug-
gested by Hunn(ref. 19):
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To summarize, the supersonic transport of the future will,
I believe, utilize duplicate general purpose digital compu-
ters designed to monitor themselves and other equipment
in the aircraft. These computers will, at least in the early
days, perform an advisory function in a way which does not
increase the visual and interpretive task of the crew. I
believe, also, that even though this is a relatively modest
technical advance, resting as it does on much military and
civil automation experience, it is sufficiently advanced for
use in the aviation field provided we continue to use well
proven instruments as stand-bys and give the aircrews
something familiar to fall back on.
Man's weakness in the monitoring performance area has been
attributed both to a decrease in motivation with time, and negative
adaptation with time. When man's effectiveness in a monitoring role
is plotted as a function of elapsed time, the performance curve obtained
has a mean negative slope and has been termed the vigilance decre-
ment.
In addition to his poor continuous monitoring capability, man's
cognitive processing capability is relatively slow compared to a com-
puter. Man may be capable of functioning as a servo-mechanism
where time is not a constraint and the tolerable accuracy is within
his performance envelope. However, if either or both constraints
(i. e., response time and accuracy) exceed man's capabilities, there
is an obvious requirement to provide means for either extending man's
capabilities to perform the tasks, or automating the tasks. Since ex-
tending man's capabilities so that his performance is adequate retains
man as a component of the servo-loop, no conservation of time is
obtained. It follows, however, that if the objective is conservation of
man's time, consideration should be given to the feasibility and prac-
ticality of automation in some areas of performance; data transduction
requirements exemplify this situation.
An awareness of man's limitations in response time (this includes
perception, assessment, decision and action) is apparent in performance
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innovations on current subsonic jets. A specific example is the pro-
vision for a fully automatic landing capability for all-weather landing
systems designed to operate in Category IIIa conditions. Aircraft
performance characteristics may be such that the aircraft's response
time is too large to permit compliance with an overriding command
to abort the landing made at a breakout altitude of 50 feet. However,
it is doubtful even if the landing were reversible, that man could effect
the transfer from instruments to the contact situation quickly enough
to perceive the need to abort the landing and react to that need. As a
result, the automatic landing capability is being provided.
The data transduction process of the monitoring and evaluation
function is also likely to be automated. For purposes of this analysis,
the transduction process includes the capability to:
i. Accept the input data and recognize its qualitative
and quantitative characteristics.
e Perform the necessary computations on the input
data to translate it into appropriate qualitative
and quantitative values required for its subsequent
usage.
. Translate these values into the form and format
required by those components which must accept
and utilize them.
4. Route the information to the appropriate receptors.
Man's performance in the transduction process can be seen by
examining the comparatively simple task of correcting the aircraft
heading under manual control. The pilot first accepts the input data
and recognizes its characteristics by perceiving the readout of the
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heading indicator or course deviation indicator. Then he performs
the necessary computations by comparing the input to a referent (L e.,
desired course), and deducing the magnitude and direction of the error
component. The pilot translates error values into a turning command
which has magnitude and direction, and routes the information by exer-
cising the motor control required to implement a turn of the magnitude
and direction desired. In this particular case, man is acting as a
servo-mechanism in that he receives feedback from his actions in the
form of a decreasiL, g ex_x_or magnitude, if _,,c _,_=_ _= _,-6 _"..........
correctly. He will compensate for over-correction and terminate the
corrective action when the error component nulls out. Clearly, the
introduction of the auto-pilot was a highly significant contribution to
the conservation of man's time, even though that was only one consi-
deration in developing the auto-pilot. Other considerations would cer-
tainly have included pilot fatigue and the vigilance decrement.
In the areas of fault isolation, situation assessment, and decision-
making, instrumentation must be designed primarily to facilitate man's
capabilities and therefore provide an optimum interface of displays and
means for communicating with the system. It is the interface design
area which must provide the solution to the problem of keeping man
cognizant and informed while automating the monitoring load.
Feasible Manual Implementation Concepts for SST
In reality, the discussion of automated concepts is equally appli-
cable here. There is no doubt that the SST implementation concept
will involve both man and machine components and the potential rela-
tionship already discussed considers both. What can be said here,
however, is that current practices would probably be acceptable if the
SST were to return to the subsonic speed regime. This would, of
course, assume that at least the same degree of automation would be
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provided in the SST as in the most advanced subsonics, and that the
crew complement and composition would be essentially the same as
on todayWs subsonics.
6O
I. 2 FUNCTION I. 2 DATA RECORD
Purpose
The purpose of the data record function is to provide:
. A temporary record of selected system per-
formance parameters which are in terms of
go-a/ uuj=_,=_ ....-.,,u.,_,. can be made a _,m_l-
able to the flight crew upon demand.
e A permanent record of selected aircraft per-
formance parameters which wcmld be indica-
tive of probable accident causes or would
assist in the determination of accident causes.
. An historical record of selected aircraft per-
formance parameters, individual system
parameters, actions taken, etc., which higher
echelon airline management may use to effect
more efficient flight operations by conducting
empirical analyses.
Current Jet Operational Requirements and Constraints
Data recording requirements for the enroute operation of current
subsonic jets include a minimum standard established by FAR's and
wider data base requirements of individual airline companies. The
latter vary among airline companies, but are described below in gen-
eral terms in the following FAR's:
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FAR 121. 343, ref. 11:
Flight recor ders°
(a) No person may operate any of the fol-
lowing airplanes unless it is equipped with an
approved flight recorder that records at least
time, altitude, airspeed, vertical acceleration,
and heading:
(1) A large airplane that is certificated
for operations above 25,000 feet altitude.
(2) Any large turbine engine powered air-
plane.
(b) Whenever an approved flight recorder is
installed, it must be operated continuously from
the instant the airplane begins the takeoff roll
until it has completed the landing roll at an air-
port.
(c) Each certificato holder shall keep the
recorded information for at least 60 days an&
for a longer period upon the request of the Ad-
ministrator or the Civil Aeronautics Board for
a particular flight or series of flighta
FAR 121. 711, ref. 11:
Communication records: domestic and flag air carriers.
Each domestic and flag air carrier shall record
each en route radio contact between the air car-
rier and its pilots and shall keep that record for
at least 30 days.
FAR Subpart V--Records and reports, establishes the minimum
FAA requirements for preparation of reports, aircraft logs, etc., and
stipulates the required distribution and tenure of such documents. These
reports and records are primarily those required prior to aircraft
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departure (e. g. • load manifest• flight release• flight plan• airworthiness
release• etc. )• prior to a given operation• or between successive oper-
ations (e. g. • maintenance logs• maintenance records• etc. ).
There are also enroute record keeping requirements which are
mostly established by company management. Some typical company
forms for enroute record keeping are shown in Figures 11, 12 and 13.
Although these forms will vary from company to company depending
upon individual needs, proceuure_ uLttr-eu• _,_,._ ,.,,-.
these are considered typical of the enroute record keeping required of
the crew on current subsonic jet transports.
Current Jet Implementation Concepts
The recording of incident and accident analysis data is currently
being accomplished by the use of "crash recorders" or aircraft flight
performance recorders. Holkstra and Hoover (ref. 20) describe the
current recorders and indicate further development efforts in this area
as follows:
The aircraft flight performance recorder, generally
referred to as a crash recorder and required for all
turbine transports, has proved to be a valuable tool
in incident and accident investigations. The present
recorders were designed and tested to withstand crash
conditions of 100 g, and 1100 ° C (2012 ° F) for 30 rain,
and to record speed, altitude, acceleration (normal g),
and heading against time on tape. Two production
recorders employ metal tape and one employs mag-
netic tape, CAB (Civil Aeronautics Board)* informa-
tion indicates that the recordings have been found
usable in 24 out of 28 major accidents. In the remain-
ing 4 cases, either the recorder was not operating or
it was destroyed in the crash.
"* Insertion by authors
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The present FAA development effort, based upon study
of past experiences and consultation with CAB and FAA
investigators and industry, is intended to provide addi-
tional recording channels, easier readout, greater
ruggedness against crushing and puncturing loads,
better positioning within the aircraft, and locating
devices.
Further development efforts are underway by the FAA to obtain
a flight-deck voice recorder which would provide supplementary infor-
mation for "-^'_^-*/accidentLl,,_,,, a,_oly_i_..____. Holkstra_ and Hoover (ref. 20)
describe this effort and evaluate a potential maintenance recorder as
follow s:
A flight-deck voice recorder may be of value in certain
accidents to supplement the information provided by the
flight data recorder. Different makes of recorders are
intended to record all flight deck crew conversation,
continuously "erase" all but the last 30 rain of record,
withstand the crash conditions listed in the foregoing,
and operate for 500 hr without maintenance attention.
Several maintenance recorders have been developed
by industry, and there is considerable interest on the
part of maintenance people regarding their use in
regular airline operation as a means of keeping an
accurate check on many powerplant and airframe vari-
ables.
At this time FAA development interest lies in the in-
stallation of an available recorder in one of the FAA
jet transports with the objective of gaining experience
on its usefulness as a maintenance aid.
Appropriate flight logs and records are maintained manually by
the crew during the enroute phase of current jet operations. This record
keeping is facilitated by the provision of forms designed to permit pencil
entries of the required data (see Figures 11, 12, 13). The delineation
of crew complement and composition for given routes will generally
relegate the responsibility for maintaining such forms to appropriate
crew members. For example, the flight engineer's log is designed for
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use on those flights and routes where either the FAA or the company
has required one crew member in the position of flight engineer. The
same is true of the flight navigator's log, except that this form, or a
less detailed version, may be maintained by pilot/copilot personnel
when "cockpit navigation" techniques are employed. The flight log is
normally maintained by the pilot/copilot personnel.
Clearly, record keeping during the enroute phase of flight oper-
ations is a considerable chore. It can be assumed that personnel man-
ning the flight decks of current jet transports are essentially no differ-
ent from other highly skilled, technically competent personnel, and such
individuals have long regarded these kinds of tasks as drudgery. The
exception is in those instances where the data maintained in the records
can be operationally utilized in problem solving on a real-time basis.
However, the majority of record-keeping requirements concern routine
operations and require highly repetitive data entries, which have little,
if any, operational significance on a real-time basis. In any event,
manual data logging is the present means for satisfying both the need for
data on a real-time basis {obviously in conjunction with cockpit instru-
mentation readouts} and for data to be utilized by higher echelon manage-
m ent analyses.
SST Potential Operational Requirements and Constraints
The requirements for data recording in SST operations satisfy
the basic needs identified in the discussion of function purpose, i. e.,
incident/accident analysis, real-time situation assessment, and higher
echelon management analyses.
7O
INCIDENT/ACCIDENT ANALYSIS DATA
There would appear to be a possibly increased need for incident/
accident data in the SST compared with current jets, even if present day
situations include the cockpit voice recorder as a reality. This possibil-
ity is based on the tremendous differences in performance characteris-
tics and performance envelope, and the totally new operational strata for
the SST. The prime argument for increasing the parameters recorded
is the potential for ...... i ....u,=,,,passe.._, d_=ab!ement due to an undetected or
explosive malfunction in one or more of the environmental control mecha-
nisms. Operational altitudes of present jet transports are such that only
comparatively minor consideration and provision have been necessary
for the physiological status of passengers and crew. A virtually new
problem complex of environmental control must be considered in the
SST design. Potential hazards and their physiological effects were dis-
cussed in some detail in the first report under this contract (ref. i).
Even with the attempt to "design out" these problems in the SST, there
still would appear to be a possibility that the crew could become totally
or partially incapacitated through undue exposure to environmental fac-
tors. This would appear to be a good reason for continuous recording
of cockpit instrumentation readouts concerning these parameters. Fur-
thermore, it would appear to be necessary to record samples of several
factors (e. g., ozone levels, radiation levels, etc. ) in order to maintain
cumulative exposure records at least for the crew, if not for the passen-
gers.
REAL-TIME SITUATION ASSESSMENT DATA
A pilot's primary source of information is the instrument panel
and his method of scanning will depend on piloting technique developed
from experience. In addition to his instruments, the pilot receives in-
formation from the flight engineer and navigator. The pilot then infers
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the present situation and mentally relates to the desired progress
and planned situation, and to the appropriateness of the system operat-
ing conditions. This is a periodic check function as opposed to active
attempts to isolate a fault. Essentially, the data available for making
such an assessment are obtained from dynamic displays usually reflect-
ing a single parameter for a given system (e. g., #1 EGT, #2 EGT, etc.,
#1% RPM, #2 % RPM, etc.).
Anyone familiar with the cockpit instrumentation of a modern-
day jet transport is aware that real-time situation assessment involves
considerable information readout, integration of that data with the infor-
mation available at other crew stations, and a significant amount of in-
ference. A data recording and display concept is required which would
permit logical, functional grouping of sets of parameters. Such a con-
cept should insure that the flight management requirement could be met
in a manner which would significantly reduce the scanning and integra-
tion requirements, and could possibly replace some, if not all, of the
requirement for manual data entries in flight logs.
In this same vein, periodic recording of certain parameters may
be necessary to enable detection of a trend. Inside cabin pressure is an
example. If it were discovered that the inside cabin pressurization alti-
tude had increased to 12 000 feet from 8, 000 feet, sampled readings
available on call-up would enable flight management to determine immedi-
ately whether the change was abrupt or slow. A slow increasing trend
might be indicative of a slow pressure leak. The abrupt change might
be attributable to an equipment transient, a slow leak which was not
noticed due to the sampling cycle, or a fast leak. For such critical
parameters it would appear reasonable to provide as much information
as would be practical in assisting in situation-assessment and decision-
making processes.
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HIGHER ECHELON MANAGEMENT ANALYSES
Even though airline companies have many years of experience
and data analysis incorporated into their current management techniques,
it would appear that the SST will present new management problems and
more critical requirements for current management problems. It will
be a requirement of the flight management data recording function to
insure that the appropriate quality and quantity of information is col-
lected during each operation_ Cert_inly_ a new management headache
in the SST era will be the sonic boom damage lawsuit problem. For
just such eventualities, it would appear highly desirable to have a
record of time, location, altitude, and estimated ground shockwave
magnitude. There undoubtedly will be many other areas in which higher
echelon management will require new data. In addition, data which is
currently recorded will probably need to be increased in quantity and
improved in quality to shore up any indicated weaknesses in SST oper-
ations.
Feasible Automated Implementation Concepts for SST
Initially, those data required by the FAA or other authoritative
sources for incident]accident analyses will continue to be provided by
protected crash recorders. The nature of the requirement dictates the
means. There is no reason to believe that any additional information
beyond that required today will not be provided for in an identical manner.
There are some interesting possibilities for real-time situation
assessment data and those data required for higher echelon management
analysis. It seems reasonable to assume that there is a high degree of
commonality in the data base required for both levels of the management
function. And, due to the real-time nature of the enroute flight manage-
ment function, a combination of these data recording requirements would
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necessarily ascribe first priority to the enroute aspect. This does not
me an to imply that the common data base is essentially all-inclusive for
both levels. What it does mean is that if the two requirements are viewed
as one, the data records required by enroute flight management should
take precedent and should not be compromised in form or format to satis-
fy higher echelon management needs at the expense of enroute manage-
ment. Rather, the ground-based management activity wc_ld alter its
techniques to accept the output of the enroute recording function.
Enroute recording assumes that a parametric analysis has been
conducted which would indicate the kinds of data required for the flight
management activity, the form and format in which the data should be
recorded, how often it should be recorded, and whether updating or
serial readout is more appropriate. Functionally related data groupings
could be temporarily stored, updated or serialized, and displayed to
flight management upon demand. One such scheme which deals primari-
ly with flight progress data, has been described by Hunn, (ref. 19) who
states:
However, as aircraft speeds increase, so does
the dependence on avionic equipment. It has been men-
tioned elsewhere that the captain of a supersonic trans-
port will be the boss of a 5 million dollar industry and
he must be given every assistance to make the proper
decisions in dis charging this onerous responsibility.
All these problems that I have somewhat loosely
described suggest the need for more sophisticated
avionic systems. However, one must beware of intro-
ducing added complexity in such a way that it adds to,
rather than detracts from, the already exceedingly com-
plicated data processing problem presented to the aircrew.
It has already been suggested that a significant number
of accidents arise from the pilot's error in interpreting
his mass of instruments.
What kind of equipment is needed? In my opinion,
it is sensible to aim at a system which can do a great
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deal of data processing for the crew, relieve them of
the routine repetitive tasks and assist them to make
critical decision when necessary. However, in doing
so, the crew must not be denied the opportunity of
taking over the task of this equipment satisfactorily
in the event that it fails or when they feel that there
is some element of doubt.
An airborne digital computer is admirably
suited to this problem if it has adequate speed and
capacity, for it is capable of taking on many inde-
pendent tasks simultaneously on a time-shared basis.
To satisfy the general requirements of the system I
believe it is desirable to use such a computer as a
situation monitor. In other words it displays to the
crew a qualitative picture of how the aircraft is per-
forming in relation to plan and will, on request, supply
quantitative data on flight management. *
The two figures within Figure 14 are reproduced from Hunn's
article and are shown here to illustrate the kind of data recording and
can-up scheme which, in an expanded version, would permit handling
the temporary recording of SST real-time situation assessment data.
The amount of data recorded for subsequent ca11-up would depend upon
the storage capacity of the computer and whatever other functions were
assigned to the same hardware. The computer could also be used to
drive recording equipment and to provide a hard-copy output which
would preserve the data generated by each computation cycle. Thus
the recording device could be the means for supplying flight management
with a brced base of parametric data recorded continuously every
machine cycle or sampled at some predetermined rate. Upon demand,
the computer would address the recording device, and provide flight
management with an immediate display of the data accumulated up to
the time of the demand. If desired, the computer could also drive a
hard-copy printer to produce a complete record of the parameters
selected during the flight. The record would be available for analysis
by higher echelon management. Means for implementing such a concept
* Underscored by authors
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ALT. FUELRES. E.T.A
Fi_. I : The airborne computer used as a situation monitor could
display information showing how the aircraft is performing
relative to the flight plan, and would, on request, supply quanti-
tative flight management data. Above : quick-look displays.
Right: Data demand and print-out panel.
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Fig. 2 :
Two small computers would be carried
for data processing, one acting as a standby.
A simple communication link between them
as shown would enable the two computers
to compare answers every machine cycle, a
significant discrepancy initiating a checking
routine.
TELEPRINTER
SYSIEHAND
OENANOBIJTIONS
INPUTBUFFER
Figure 14. A flLght management data recording scheme (from ref. 19)
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are as numerous as the number of manufacturers of automatic computa-
tion, recording, and display devices. The system illustrated is only
one typical method suggested in the literature and should not be con-
strued to be recommended. In conclusion, automatic recording of data
which serves the purpose defined for this function, could be accom-
plished easily within the current state-of-the-art. There is no reason
to believe that cost and reliability requirements could not be met by any
number of equipment manufacturers.
Feasible Manual Implementation Concepts for SST
In considering a manual implementation concept for satisfying
the requirements for this function, it must be recognized initially that
the crash recorders are established as a firm requirement by the FAA.
Therefore, that requirement can be deleted from any manual system
considered. It seems reasonable to assume that the present method of
log keeping on current jets is considered by airline operators to be the
optimum method utilizing available means. In this scheme, each crew
member maintains a log of required data on those aspects of the air-
craft performance with which he is particularly concerned. In the event
that manual log keeping is implemented for the SST, it would seem
logical to maintain such a scheme. However, this raises some impor-
tant considerations. For example, working time in the air will be
reduced by a factor of approximately one-half to two-thirds. As has
already been pointed out, the current cockpit workload may be at the
saturation point. Maintaining the ratio of effort which currently exists
would result in one-half to two-thirds fewer entries in the data logs.
In reality, however, it appears that the manually recorded data would
decrease even more significantly in quantity because of the potential
requirement to maintain records on a broader base of parameters.
Time compression, current workload, and criticality of other functions,
are real-time constraints on manual record keeping and would appear
to relegate such a concept to "last resort" consideration.
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On the other hand, Price et al. (ref. 1) raised the issue of keeping
the crew sufficiently involved in the aircraft situation so that they are
physiologically and psychologically prepared to handle the requirement
for manual intervention when required. Put into context, this discussion
was considering the interface problem between man and machine with
the assumption that considerable automation would be employed in imple-
menting the system-oriented activities and that man would be primarily
concerned with monitoring the resulting performance. It is suggested
that considerable thought, and possibly empirical research, be invested
in considering data recording techniques designed to provide the neces-
sary records. By including man in the recording loop, this function
could serve to provide the necessary depth in awareness of the situation
and flight progress. Such might be accomplished by several techniques
involving mechanized recording rather than completely automated record-
ing. Man may, for example, be required to initiate the recording com-
mand according to some well-designed procedures which would assure
his awareness of the situation prior to initiating the command. Various
schemes could be researched until the appropriate man-procedure-
mechanism relationship is determined. What is being suggested here,
in essence, is a concept which would provide the necessary data record-
ing, and at the same time, offer a solution to a potential problem area
which will be significant for the SST due to the increased complexity of
the monitoring task visualized, as well as the inherent danger in over-
simplifying the performance means.
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1. 3 FUNCTION 1.3 SYSTEM RECONFIGURATION
Purpose
This function provides for the implementation of a decision
reached in the "Data Monitor and Evaluation" function to go to an
alternate mode of operation. The alternate mode would: (1) affect
some modification to the total system for purposes of correcting a
malfunction or marginal performance situation which threatens to
further degrade system performance; and (2) ensure that the resul-
tant total system output is adequate and sufficiently reliable to con-
tinue the flight to its destination within the original flight plan. The
decision reached in the evaluative process will not necessarily be
couched in a specific course of action regarding system reconfigura-
tion. It may merely be in terms of the three basic alternatives, L e.,
(1) the problem is noted and is insignificant in terms of overall system
performance, (2) the problem is catastrophic in nature and the only
recourse is mission abort, and (3) the problem is sufficiently acute
that it must be rectified, at least partially, and there are some avail-
able alternatives for effecting that rectification. It is the last decision
which initiates the system reconfiguration function. Performance of
this function includes:
lo Recognition of the classes of alternatives available,
such as
ao
b.
C.
d°
e.
f.
Primary system redundancy exploitation
Secondary or back-up system exploitation
Alternate off-line hardware exploitation
Exploitation of man's capabilities
Airborne maintenance provisions and applicability
Aircraft performance envelope exploitation
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. Derivation of each alternative within the classes,
such as
ao Primary system redundancy may be duplex,
or triplex, at the entity level (for example,
dual inertial platforms) and may offer two
or more operational modes for each system,
not all of which are necessarily affected by
a malfunction or marginal performance in
one of the alternative modes.
be Secondary, or back-up systems, for the
primary system may be able to serve as
the primary system without a significant
loss of accuracy. In this situation, reli-
ability must be on a "one mission, one air-
craft" basis as opposed to MTBF (mean
time between failures) as a function of
hours per month, or year.
Co Alternate, off-line hardware may offer
various solutions, particularly if exploited
in conjunction with man's capabilities.
d. The potential use of a skilled crew member's
capabilities in trouble situations provides
an extremely powerful and versatile tool
for flight management.
e, The inclusion of airborne maintenance pro-
visions presumes that some basic corrective
maintenance will be provided for in terms
8O
of both capability (skills and knowledge)
and means (e. g., spare parts, compon-
ents, plug-in modules). If such is not the
case, this class must be deleted from
the potential alternatives.
fi The tremendous range of the aircraft
operational envelope is offered as a poten-
tial class of possible alternatives, however,
it would appear desirable to consider this
alternative as the last resort in the hier-
archy since it is highly probable that ex-
ploiting this alternative would usually incur
below optimum performance penalties.
. Selecting that alternative which is optimum in terms
of the overall situation and the goal objectives.
. Effecting the modifications required to implement
the selected alternative.
Current Jet Operational Requirements and Constraints
To specify operational requirements and constraints in this area
would involve delineating all the possible individual and conjunctive mal-
functions and/or marginal performance which could occur within the
total system. Moreover, a wide range of different systems employed
on modern jet transport fleets would have to be considered. The im-
practicality of this approach is immediately obvious. Some of the more
common occurrences have been translated into required procedures by
the FAA. For example, airworthiness certification of the aircraft and
pilot qualification procedures require demonstrating adequate handling
qualities and piloting technique when an engine is lost on takeoff.
8]_
Another example is the specific procedure to be followed when trouble
symptoms develop before or after the "point of no return" on a trans-
oceanic flight. Still another example is the three-leg or triangle
pattern an aircraft flies when certain equipment is lost and the crew
is uncertain of the aircraft's position, or when the aircraft is unable
to comply with the last clearance given by ATC. There are many such
procedures covering relatively common occurrences and difficulties.
The requirements and constraints in this area can best be summarized
by the requirement for the aircraft commander to exercise his best
judgment in any situation. This most certainly would include the decis-
ion to use any and all of the available system components in any man-
ner which would, in the pilot's judgment, maximize safety, reliability,
economy, and efficiency, as well as the probability of the aircraft's
completing its flight to the scheduled destination.
Current Jet Implementation Concepts
Current jet transports are instrumented and manned so as to
provide for considerable system reconfiguration. As a result, they
have achieved a high degree of reliability in schedule integrity. The
first order of redundancy is the pilot/copilot manning concept. The
second order of redundancy is the combined concept of instrumentation
and independent equipment which enables the aircraft to be piloted
from either of the front two seats and provides for system reliability
through the use of redundant instrumentation. Both controls and dis-
plays are in many instances driven by independent sensors, power
supplies, or control systems.
The inclusion of a flight engineer leads to even greater reliabil-
ity by providing the skills and knowledge required to quickly detect a
trouble symptom, isolate the fault, and take appropriate corrective
action. Such action may simply be to advise the aircraft commander
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of the situation, inform him of the impact, and suggest corrective
procedures.
The addition of a navigator and instrumentation for various
methods of navigation, provides an inherent capability for system
reconfiguration insofar as the navigational activity is concerned.
The availability of the navigator's skills and knowledge plus equip-
ment such as VOR/DME, ADF, LORAN, periscopic sextant, doppler
and inertial dead reckoning systems, probably offer the widest
range of possibilities for system reconfiguration in current jet
transports. However, it can be concluded that present day air-
craft show considerable evidence of the requirement for system
reconfiguration and have gone to some length to provide the necessary
m eans.
SST Potential Operational Requirements and Constraints
All of the specific requirements for SST system reconfiguration
capabilities are as impossible to project as are the identification of entire
current jet requirements. It is reasonable to assume that the recon-
figuration scheme employed will be based in part on obtaining at least
the overall system reliability currently enjoyed by jet transports.
Total system reliability requirements will probably be considerably
more stringent for the SST than for current jets, in view of the
increased concern with economics and the expanded realm of potential
hazards. The requirement for reliability to a large extent governs the
range of potential system reconfigurations that can be conceived, and
undoubtedly will dictate the crew complement and composition as well
as the cockpit instrumentation concept. Rather than attempt to specify
potential requirements at this stage of system development, it would
appear more useful, and indeed more practical, to point out some
potential problem areas for consideration in arriving at the final man-
machine relationship.
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A current trend in modern jet transport manning and instrumen-
tation offers a useful framework for discussing potential problem areas,
namely, the trend away from navigator personnel to semi-automatic
dead reckoning systems operated by pilot/copilot personnel, labeled
"cockpit navigation. " With this concept, specialist navigator and/or
pilot/navigator personnel who have had special training in the neces-
sary skills and knowledge required to employ conventional navigation
techniques, are being replaced by semi-automatic devices such as
doppler-radar systems and inertial navigation systems, commonly
referred to as "present position navigators. "
To achieve the required reliability, dual installations of such
navigational systems are being provided. The significance of this in
terms of the present discussion is simply that the loss of a single
installation plus the absence of the capability to employ conventional
techniques and tools (e. g., sextant) results in a reconfiguration which
may not meet minimum navigatiou standards in an adequate manner.
Dual equipment installation is not always without problems.
For example, a large divergence in dual outputs requires the capabil-
ity to determine which output is more nearly correct and implies that
a sufficiently reliable means for solution is provided. In the case at
hand, there is evidence that possibly a third installation will be neces-
sary in the SST to monitor the dual installation and resolve the diver-
gence problem. The significance here is that the reconfiguration
capability must provide the necessary overall system reliability.
For purposes of this discussion, the next requirement is in the
area of accuracy. Agreement between solutions from two or more
installations of a given problem-solver which have essentially identical
operating characteristics, does not necessarily mean the required
accuracy is being achieved. Repeatability ensures reliability, not
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accuracy. Present position navigators are known to be subject to
both random and systematic error components, and in some equip-
ment, the systematic error components are known to be cumulative
in nature. It is presumed that in reconfiguring the total system by
utilizing primary system redundancy (selection of an alternate sensor),
the probability that the arbitrating system of a triplex installation
would tend to agree with the less accurate of the other two installa-
tions would approach zero. This presumption must be made if
arbitration is to be automated because of the absence of a crewmember
with the necessary skills and knowledge to exercise judgment.
SUch a problem might be illustrated by considering a triplex
inertial installation where System #I of the two on-line sensors
which are being checked against one another to satisfy the input
credibility monitoring function, has diverged from System #2 by
more than the specified tolerance, but in reality is the more accurate
of the two installations. System #3, the arbiter, is consulted, and due
to the phase relationships of its Schuler period with the other two in-
stallations (e. g., 180 ° out of phase with System #I and in phase with
System #2) the output of System #2 is selected as the more accurate.
The selection would be based on the repeatability of systems known to
have phase-oriented divergence as well as differing degrees of cumu-
lative error. The probability of the systems being in phase is un-
doubtedly less than 1.0 unless it can be demonstrated that the three
gyro-stabilizing platforms have attained precisely identical alignment
following gyro-stabilizing platform erection and north alignment. This
example, as remote as it may be in the practical world, illustrates
the kinds of problems with which the development program for the SST
must cope so that the system reconfiguration function can select the
most reliable means with a positive assurance of the accuracy attain-
able.
8_
The use of the navigational sensors to illustrate problems in
system reconfiguration does not necessarily mean that this kind of
problem would exist in the final installation concept, nor should it
be considered an exclusive area where such problems may be appli-
cable. It is typical of the kinds of problems which will be researched
and resolved in a practical manner prior to the definition of the cock-
pit instrumentation concept. The extent to which this analysis can
indicate requirements for reconfiguration is necessarily limited to the
statement that the means must exist for achieving the necessary
overall system reliability and accuracy. Anything less than this
capability is assumed by this analysis to be a sufficient basis for
aborting the flight and landing at the nearest adequate facility.
Feasible Automated Implementation Concepts for SST
By definition, automatic system reconfiguration is only feasible
when hardware redundancy or back-up is available. Therefore, any
reconfiguration concept or scheme which would result in man perform-
ing as a replacement for some system component defines a class of
alternatives for which automation is not feasible. An additional limit-
ing factor or constraint on the feasibility of automatic system reconfigu-
ration is the degree to which criteria for system failures and/or inade-
quate performance can be specified and programmed into comparator
circuits or self-checking circuitry so that the system is able to recog-
nize the need to reconfigure itself. The provision of automatic switching
circuitry and self-check/comparator circuitry would depend on consi-
derations of resultant reliability, size, weight, cost factors, and so
forth. Clearly, trade-off analyses are required to establish the exact
needs in this area.
It is important that such trade-off analyses consider a great many
factors, not the least of which is the criticality of response time between
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failure detection and remedial action. For example, it would aupear
obvious to provide for immediate automatic switching from the on-line
control system to the off-line redundancy capability (assure ed to be an
equivalent control system) in the event of a definite failure of the con-
trol system concerned with adjusting the configuration geometry of the
engine intake air ducts. Such a provision is particularly crucial in
phases of the operation where erroneous configuration could result in
engine failure due to unacceptable air flow rates. This situation of
course, assumes that (1) the time lapse between failure detection, dis-
play to the crew, recognition by the crew, and execution of remedial
action by the crew, would represent a response lag large enough to
result in engine failure, and/or (2) an engine failure at high Mach num-
bers produces effects such that other engines may likewise fail.
In summary, the following might be a criterion statement for
automatic reconfiguration: if the system is capable of recognizing the
criteria denoting system failure and the obvious requirement to switch
to alternate equipments, then the design should allow such to be the
criteria for automatic switching. The crew should be warned immedi-
ately, or perhaps even simultaneously about the suspected malfunction
and informed that alternate equipment has been switched on. The crew
could then assess the situation and override the system if in the judg-
ment of flight management that would be the more appropriate action.
The advantage gained would be off-line assessment of the trouble symptom
which could clearly be highly critical to safe operations.
Feasible Manual Implementation Concepts for SST
The primary limiting factor for automatic system configuration as
just discussed is the availability of alternate equipment. However, it is
improbable that automation would be employed solely because of hard-
ware feasibility. There would appear to be two prime factors involved
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in trade-off analyses which will influence the use of manual reconfigu-
ration concepts, i. e., cost and reliability factors for automation, and
criticality of response time. To this, an additional factor can be added,
L e., the limitations of the hardware in detecting insidious malfunctions
and exercising judgment. This analysis has also indicated a related
argument regarding optimization of the monitoring process to compen-
sate for man's weakness in this area, and at the same time to avoid
over-simplification of the monitoring interface so that manual interven-
tion is adversely affected.
Although these arguments are not in a specific manual implemen-
tation concept context, they do support the premise that man will un-
doubtedly be involved in a considerable role in the system reconfigura-
tion process. In his discussion of the use of digital computers as
situation monitors and providers of flight management information,
(Function 1. 2, "Data Record"). Hunn (ref. 19) further states with
regards to a specific navigation equipment scheme that:
I believe it is highly desirable for the crew rather than
the computers to decide when equipment should not be
used and to choose which reversionary method of opera-
tion is to be utilized. To do this it is first necessary to
display to them the state of the system. With the system
I have described, a warning light would show when a sig-
nificant discrepancy occurred. When the computers had
finished self checks, by means of sums done on dummy
inputs compared with dummy answers, and sensor checks
by similar means, a remedial action panel would show the
result of the check. (See Fig. 15). Associated crew-
operated switches would then command as necessary the
cross feed of sensor data through the communication link
without the need for extra wires.
In summary, it appears reasonable to assume the following con-
cept for manual system reconfiguration:
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I CHANNEL 2
COMPUTER
.eL
PLATFORM
A
I CHANNEL Z
(_ COMPUTER le"PLATFORM
B
I CHANNEL 2
' _
C
Fig. 3 : Diagram showing use of the remedial action panel. (A) Normal, all lights on. Illuminated strips indicate con-
tinuity of channels. (B) Platform I failed: platform I light extinguished. (C) Reversion--channel 2 platform selected.
Diagonal strips lit to indicate restoration of channel continuity. Channel 1 now using platform data from channel 2
transmitted through the intercommunication link.
Figure 15. Navigation reconfiguration display (from ref. 19)
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. Obvious failures detected by the equipment will
result in automatic reversion to standby equip-
ment where trade-off analyses have dictated the
requirement for such provisions.
. All other system reconfiguration requirements
will involve the crew directly. Broadly stated,
this will include:
a. Checkout of automatic reversion for appro-
priateness.
be Where no automation is provided, deriva-
tion of all alternates, assessment of each
alternate, and selection of the most appro-
pr iate alternate.
C. Establishing the required man-machine
set-up and relationship which is indicated
by the alternate selected.
It seems clear that a great deal of decision making will be re-
quired in the performance of this function. Although a computer may
select from various pre-programmed alternatives, it is felt that de-
cision making per se is reserved for the crew complement, and is not
the same type of choice selection exercised by the computer. And it
then follows that the exercising of good judgment dictates significant
requirements for experience, skills and knowledge which must be met
in the crew complement and which will undoubtedly have considerable
impact on the ultimate crew composition.
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ACTIVITY 2. 0 PHASE-ORIENTED SYSTEM CHECKS
AND PREPARATION
PURPOSE
These activities are to set up equipment, verify performance,
and insure that the overall system is readied to enter a given flight
phase. To insure system integrity, all significant parameters must
be surveyed and evaluated. Monitoring and evaluating functions are
part of the flight management activities, while the step-by-step pro-
cedures are the requirements of the phase-oriented checks.
CURRENT JET OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS AND CONSTRAINTS
Although regulations do not outline specific system checks, the
following do apply:
FAR 121. 315, ref_ 11:
Cockpit check procedure
(a) Each certificate holder shall provide an
approved cockpit check procedure for each
type of ail_raft.
(b) The approved procedures must include
each item necessary for flight crewmembers
tocheek for mfety beforostartingengines,tak-
ing off, or landing, and in engine and systems
emergencies. The procedures must be designed
so that a flight crewmember will not need to
rely upon his memory for items to be checked.
(c) The approved procedures must be
readily usable in the cockpit-of each aircraft
and the flight crew shall follow them when
operating the aircraft
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ICAOReg. 4. 2. 3, ref. 12:
FliGht check system
An operator shall establish a check sys-
tem to be used by flight crew prior to and
on take-off, in flight, on landing, and in
emergency, to ensure that the operating
procedures contained in the Operations
Manual and the Aeroplane Flight Manual
or other documents associated with the
certificate of airworthiness are followed
exactly.
It is evident in these regulations that the FAA is aware of the
capabilities of the human operator. The regulations are intended to
insure optimum crew performance. Moreover, the complexities of
modern systems generate requirements for systematic performance
evaluation.
CURRENT JET IMPLEMENTATION CONCEPTS
In order to conform to FAA regulations and comply with airline
operating policies, crews perform system checks and preparations at
prescribed times, using checklists to insure sequential and complete
performance. In general, these checks are performed prior to engine
start, after engine start, prior to takeoff, after takeoff, prior to des-
cent, prior to landing, and after landing. Separate checklists are used
which provide sequential procedures to aid the crew in complying with
standard operating procedures. A sample flight engineer's checklist
is shown in Figure 16.
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I 'S PRE-FLIGHT I
COCKPIT ! I
Maint. Log,
File Folder-CKD
Check Lists, Spare Forms, Maint
& Wiring Manuals-ABOARD
Ext pwr, DC pwr, Battery-CKD, ON
Ess Bus, CB Panels, Galley-l_R ON
CBs & Fuses-ON_ CKD
-. Radio Master Switches-ON
7. Equlpm Cooling-OPERATING
8. yaw Rate GyrO Selector-NORM
9. Crew02 Noses, Goggles(5)-ABOARD
10. Gear Handle-DO'_N
11. Q Heater-CKD & OFF
12. Temp Probe Heater-OFF -300B/C
_. Portable 02 & Mask-ABOARD
Emerg Gear Handle-STOWED
__Jear Ext. Access Doors-LATCHED-720B
56. Bulbs, Fuses, VHF, F/A Kit-STOWED
57. Nay Sextant-STOWED
Spare 02 Masks-ABOARDelcal - SET (Except -121)
ou. Contrul & Flap (;_sual)(if __eqd)-COMPIETE
I LOWERNOSE I
I. Fwd Cargo Int. Door-CLOSED
2. Radio Rack Equip & CBs-CKD, ON
3- Nose Gear RED PIN-RESET
Window Heat-OFF h. J-9 Panel CBs-ON
Pitot Heat-CKD; OFF _5_ Nose Gear i_nerg Lever-STO_ED
Tail Delce-OFF -lOO _ Selcal - SET -121
Landing & Turnoff Lites(if reqd)CKD OFF
Beacon, Wing &Nav Lites-ON l PAX COMPARTMENT
13.
14.
15.
_. Wing Anti-ice-OFF
Emerg Exit Lites-CKD & OFF
Emerg Flap-SWITCHES OFF, GUARD DOWN
Anti-Skid-CKD & OFF
Spoiler Switches-GUARDS DOWN
Nacelle Anti-iee-CKD & OFF
25. Overhead Panel Warn Lites-CKD
25. Mash Airspeed Warn-TEST
26. Flight & Engine Inst-CKD
27. Horizon Seleetor-#l
28. L.R. Kifls System-CKD (Except -139)
29. Emerg Air Brakes-OFF, SAFTIED
30. Marker Lites-CKD
31. Inst Warn System-CKD (Except -139)
32. Fire Exting Handles-FULL FWD
33. Fire Warn-TEST, TRANSFER NORMAL
34. Gear Warn Lites-CKD
35. Center Panel Warn Lites-CKD
36. Transponder-TEST
37. Engine Hyd Pumps-ON
38. Water Inj Drain Switch-OFF
39. Door Warn Lttes-CKD
50. F/O Warn & Marker Lites-CKD
51. F/O Kifis-CKD (Except -139)
52. Mash Trim, Autopilot-CKD
53. Air Brake Press -1000-1500 PSI
55. Pitot Isolation Valve-ON
_5. Aldls Lamp-STOWED
h6. Eng Start Levers - CUT-OFF
h7. Control Stand Warn Lites-CKD
58. Stick Shaker-CKD
59. Warning Horns-CKD
50. Control & Flap (Cockpit)-CKD
51. Life Jackets(5)-ABOARD
52. Fire Axe, C02, Gloves-CKD
io
2.
3-
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
i0.
ll.
12.
13.
14.
6.
7.
8.
9.
lo°
14.
15.
16.
Doors, Slides, Airbottles-CKD
Washroom, Galley Equip - CKD
Crew 02 Bottle-ON (Except 3OOB/C)
Battery & C.B. - SECURE, ON (Except-139/
331/720B
Gibson Girl, Spare Vests-ABOARD
Water Tank Quantities (2)-CKD
Rafts, Polar Equip if reqd-STOWED
Fire Extinguishers -CKD
Portable 02-CKD
Top Wing Sul_faces-VISUAL
Windows, Wing Exits, Service Units-SECURE
First Aid Kit-STOWED
02 Release Valves - CLOSED -121
02 pax Bottles - CKD & ON -121
FORWARD FUSEI_a_ I
Main Cargo Press Doors-CLOSED -300C
L.H. Static Ports-CLEAR
L.H. Pitot Mast-COVER OFF
Nose Gear & Door-CKD, Gnd Lock-IN
Gear Inspect Window & Lite-CKD, OFF
Battery-SECURE -139/-331/720B
Radc_ne -SECURE
H.H. Pitot Mast-COVER OFF
Temp Probe-CKD 30OB/C
Water & Toilet panels-SECI_E
Water Drain Mast & Heater-CKD
R.H. Static Ports-CLEAR
Crew 02 Bottles-ON -30OB/-300C
Fwd Outflow Valve-CLOSED
Equip Cooling Exhaust-CLEAR
Pack & Antenna Bay Doors-SECURE
F.A.A. Approved
N.Y. I.F.O.
Figure 16. Sample flight engineer's checklist.
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I RIGHT WING _. I
i. Pack Air Inlet-CLEI_
2. Stall Warn Sensor-CKD
3. Fire Bottles, Plugs & Press-CKD
.........-#3 ENGINE............
Tail Pipe Inspection-CONP_TEStrut, Access Plates, Cowling,
Latches-CK])
6. Surge Bleed IO0/300B/300C/720B-AS REQ
O Intake Inspection-COMPLETE
8° _ae!ir_ Bay Door-SEC_u?_E
.......................................
#4 ENGn_ - SA_ AS #3 E_GL_E
................................... .___
Wing Tip & Lite-CKDControl Surfaces & Flaps, Cove Lip
Doors-CKD
O- Gear, Brakes, Leveler, Snubber &
Tires-CKD
12. Gear Lock, Window, Lite-CKD, OFF
13. Deboosters-CKD
14. Hyd Bypass Valve-SAFETIED
15. Accumulator Press (3)-CKD
16. Pack Exhaust Fans & Doors
- iO0/- 300/- 3OOB/-300C/O30B) -CED
17. Cond Fan Dampers(2)_OPEN.331/_O23B
IAFT FUSELAGE 8= TAIL"J
i. Center 0utf_ow Valve-CLOSED
2. Sliding Rear Fillet-CKD 790B
3. 02 Release Valves-CLOSED(except-121)
4. 02 Pax Bottles-tED & ON(except -121)
5. Aft Outflow Valve-CLOSED
6. Water & Toilet Panels-SECURE
_ Water Drain Mast & Heater-CED
Tail & De-lcing Boots-CKD
Tail Nav Lite-CKD
lO. Q Inlet-CKP
(_ LEFT WING I
Hyd Fluid Quantity-CKD
2. Gear Lock, Window, Lite-CKD, OFF
(_ Deboosters-CKDGear, Brakes, Leveler, Snubbers,
Tires-CKD
Q Surfaces, Flaps,Control Cove
Lip Doors-CKD
Wing Tip & Lite-CKDRotating Beacons(2) -CKD
#1 _on_ - SA_ AS #3 _en_
......................................
I
I E.G,. ERs FL,G..I
,
.
i0.
ii.
@
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
i0.
Ii.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
8:
27.
_8.
29.
3
35.
36.
Fueling Bay-CKD
....
Fire Bottles, Plugs & Press-CED
Stall Warn Sensor-CKD
Pack Air Inlet-CLEAR
En 6 Ferry Pod (if used)-CKD
COCKPIT Tr !
Ext Lites & Beacon-AS P_Q'D --
Crew 02-ON, CKD
Flight Recorder-TEST
Flowmeter Power Selector-NORMAL
Gen Disconnects-GUARDS DOWN
Elect Panel Warn Lites-CE3)
Wing Valves-OPEN
Recirc Control-NOP_kL -331/O23B
Air Cond Packs-OFF
Eng Air Bleeds-OFF(except -lOG)
Ram Air-GUARD DOWN
Cabin Press Override-NORMAL-300B/300C
Thrust Recovery Valves-NORMAL(exc.-720B)
Air Cond Panel Warn Lites-CKD
Fuel Heaters-OFF
Condenser Fan O'ride-NORMAL-331/OR3B
Air Cond O'ride-AS REQD-331/O23B
Programmer Bypas s-NORMAL-O23B
C 9ndenser I_unpers-AUTO- 331
Freon Reset Switches-AS REQD-O23B
Hyd Shut-Off Valve-OPEN
Start Air/Compressor Control-AS REQD-3OOB/3OOC
Vibration Monitor-TEST
Fuel Flow Meters-ZEROED(except 100/023B)
Fuel Dump_ Sw & Lights-CHECKED
Fuel Panel-CK & SET
Engine Fuel Valves-OPEN
Pre-set Fuel Controls-NORMAL
Lower Panel Warning Lights-CKD
Starter Air Pressure-CKD
Hyd & Water Quantity-CKD & RECORD
Fuel & 0il Quantity-TEST & RECORD
Pax 02 Press-CKD
Coolant Air System-OFF-3OOB/3OOC
Crew Aux Heat Valve-CLOSED-30OC
Smoke Deteetor-CKD- 300C
OItems performed at intransit stops.
F.A.A. Approved "_, _.AC._
N.Y.I.F.O.
Figure 16. Sample flight engineer's checklist (continued).
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COCKPIT CHECK LIST
I ! [
i. All CBs & Master Swltches-ON i.
2. External Power-CKD & ON 2.
3- Oxy. System, Mask & Interphone-CKD 3-
4. Seat Belts-No Smoking-ON
5. Emerg Exit Lights-_
6. Exterior Lights-AS REQD
7. Flight recorder-ON
8. SmokeDet-ON3ooc (c,_o o_)
9- Gyro Compasses & Controller-SET
i0. VOR-AD_ Selectors-AS EEQD
_ _i _ ^I+ Corr-OFF(Excewt 139)
12. Horizon-Altimeters-Clocks-CED & SET
13. VOR & Compass Transfer-_ARD6 DOWN
i_. Raalo-CKD, Radar & Transponder-STANDBY
15. Gear Handle-(Check Ground Crew)-D0WN I
16. Speed Brake Handle-FORWARD 1.
17. Wing Flaps-UP 2.
18. Reverse Thrust-FWD & DOWN, Lts.-OUT 3.
19. Throttles-CLOSED 4.
20. Autopilot-MANUAL & OFF, CK RUD
21. Trim Tabs-ZER0 5.
22. Stabilizer Trim, Manual-NORMAL 6.
Mach_Xn_UT 7.
23. Air Brake Pressure-1000-1_O0 PSI
24. Engine Hyd Pumps-ON
25. Hyd Interconnect-SYg]Y/_(0PEN)
26. Aux Hyd Pump-(Ck Gna Crew)-#l ON
27. Rudder Boost-oN & PHESS CKD
28. Anti-Skia-oFF
29. Parking_'_e-O_/_SS c_
30. Electrical Panel-SET
31. Aircond Press Panel-SET-PACKS OFF
32. Fuel Valves-oFEN, Pumps Heaters-oFF
33. Fuel Flow-ZEROED (except -100/023B)
34. Gear Locks-R_4OVED
35- Engineer's Check-CO_LE_
36. Fuel-Oil-Water-Hyd Fluid-CKD
37..____:_o_.c..o_m._t:c_0__ :__c,s..___
38. Cabin Rpt, Maint Log, B'case-ABOARD
39. Door Lights-CKD & OUT
hO. Stabilizer Trim-SET _x/_ CG
41. Start & ATC Clearance-HECEIVED
I START ENGINES I
I. WIndows-CLOSED, Heat-LO_
2. Rotating Beacon-oN
3- Start Selector-AS EEQD
4. Engines-CLEAR -AIR-QN
5- Fuel Boost Pumps-FOUR ON
6. Start 3-4-2-1
PRE-TAXI J
Engine Start Switches-GUARD DOWN
Fuel System & Fuel _eat-AS REQD
Generators-oN & PARAIJ2/_
4. Essential Power-#4
5. Aircond Packs-oN
6. Turbo' s-CKD & AS HEQD
7. Bleeds-oFF (except -i00)
8. Ext Power-Air Supp!y-Phone-REMDVED
9. Nacelle Anti-ice-AS REQD
lO. Hyd Interconnect-oFF(CLOSE)
11. Aux Hyd Pump-#2 ON
12. Taxi & Take-off Clearance-CLEARED
o
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
I
1.
2.
3.
TA×I I
BrakesHyd Press-CKD
Wing Flaps-TAKE-OFF, Geuges-CKD
Leading Edge Flap Lltes-oN
Horizons, RMI'S Turn & Banks,
ADF' s, PDI' s-CKD
Instrument Warn.-ARM(Except -139)
Water InJ Inlet Valve-AS REQD-IO0 A/C
Controls-FREE, Rudder Boost-CED
|
PRE-TAKE-OFF II
i. Traffic-CLEAR
2. Fuel Manifold Valves-SET
3. Fuel Boost Pumps-AS REQD
_. Fuel Heat - OFF
5. Start iever-CKD in IDLE BETENT
6. Gyro Compasses-CKD
7. ATC Transponder-AS REQD
8. Anti-ice: Nacelle, Wing_ Tail,
Pitot Heat, Q Inlet-AS REQD
Wlmlow Heat-HIGH
Recirc Cont-FLT PRESET -331/02313
Turbo's-AS REQD
Anti-skid-oN
Eng. Start Sw.-FLIGHT START
011 Cooler Valves-OVERRIDE -100/-300
Water In_ Pumps-As REQD
DURING TAKE-OFF I
Power-0 .K.
Airspeeds-CROSS
100 Knots, Vl, VR, & V2-CALL OUT
N.Y. I.F.0
Figure 16. Sample flight engineer's checklist (continued).
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COCE_IT CHECK LIST
AFTER TAKE-OFF I
1. Turbo's & Bleeds-AS HEQD
2. Cabin Press-SET
3- Pack Valve CB -I_JI_D -331/-023B
4. Galley Power-AS REQD
5- Engine Start Swltches-OFF
6. Gear Handle-UP & OFF
7. Wing Flaps-UP, Leading Edge Lts-OUT
8. Water Inj Pumps-OFF, Drain-OPEN
9. Water Inlet Valve-CLO_ED-lO0 A/C
lO. Eng Hyd Pumps-AS REQD
11. Aux Hyd Pump4_2OFF
12. Mach Trlm-ON
13. Yaw Damper-AS REQD
14. Landing Lights-UP & OFF
15. KIFIS Alt Corr-ON (except 139)
16. Rudder Boost Press-10OO PSI
_. Seat Belts-NO Smoking-AS REQD
'ater InJ Drain-CLOSED(after ID rain)
L PRE-LANDING I
Before Descent
i. Instr Warn-ARMED-CKD-0FF(Exe.139)
2. Fuel Heater-AS REQD
3. Air Brake Press-iO00-1400 PSI
4. Fire Warning-CKd)
5- Window Heat-As REQD
6. Engine Hyd Pumps-BOTH ON
7. Aux Hyd _ump_ ON
8. Brakes-CKD, Press-UP
9. Coolant Air Valves-OPEN-3OOB/300C
Durin_ Descent
1. Seat Belts-ON
2. Pressurization-SET
3. Fuel, Oil, Hyd Quantlty-CKD
4. Fuel Panel-TANK TO ENGINE
5. Fuel Boost Pumps-EIGHT ON
6. L_, Vthresh, EPR-CE])-BUG-SET
7. Recire Cont-FLT PRESET -331/-023B
8. Landing Lights-AS REQD
9. KIFIS Alt Corr-OFF(Exeept 139)
i0. Press Altimeters-SET & CROSS CE_
11. Mach Trlm-OFF
I AFTER LANDING I
I APPROACH I
1. Rudder Boost-ON, PRESS CKD
2. Wing Flaps-AS REQD; Leading Edge LTS-ON
3. Instrument Warn-ARM(Except 139)
4. No Smoking-ON
5- Gear-DOWN
6. 3 Green Lts, Hyd Press/Qty-CED
7. Anti-Skid-ON, CK 4-RELEASES
8. Engine Start Sw' s-AS REQD
9. Speed Brake Handle-FORWARD
lO. Yaw Damper-OFF WHEN CONTACT
11. Turbos-As REQD
i. Anti-skid-OFF
2. Engine Start Switches-0FF
3. Wlng Flaps-UP
4. Speed Brake Handle-FORWARD
5. Anti-ice: Wing, Tail, Window,
Pitot, Temp Probe & Q Inlet-OFF
6. Trim Tabs & Stab -ZERO & NORMAL
7. Radar & Transponder-STANDBY, D_-OFF
8. Fuel Boost Pumps-FOUR OFF
9- Pack Valve CB-IN -3B1/-O23B
lO. Recirc Cont-NORMAL -331/-023B
11. Temp Override-AS REQD -331/_O23B
12. Freon System-BO_q_ OFF_ =.q'_l/,_, -v_.j.L,_°°_
13. Turbo' s & Packs-OFF
14. Emerg Exit Lights-OFF
,(before A/C power OFF)
I BLOCKS TRANSIT I
i. Seat Belts-OFF
2. Nacelle Anti-ice-OFF
3. Ext. Lights-AS REQD
4. Flight Recorder-TEST & OFF
5. Smoke Detector-0FF -300C
6. Aux Hyd Pumps 1 & 2-OFF
7. External Power-As REQD
8. Engine Start Levers-CUT OFF
9. Rotating Beacon-OFF
i0. Fuel Boost Pumps-OFF
Ii. Chocks in Place-BRAKES OFF.
BLOCKS TERMINAL I
i. Blocks Transit-COMPLETE
2. Radio Master Switches-oFF
3. White Marked CBs - PULLED
4. Crew 02 Supply-OFF
5. Battery Switch-OFF
6. Gasper Fan-OFF
7. Heating Blankets-oFF -300C
I RADIO CHECK LIST I
i. All Radio CBs Ground Power-ON
2. Check HF's, VHF's, ADF's, VOR's
REQUIRED ROUTE, LOCAL FREQUENCY &
SELCAL
3. VOR 1 and 2-CKD. ON LOCALIZER
4. Cross Functions-CHECKED
.y. i.F.0
Figure 16. Sample flight engineer's checklist (concluded).
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SST POTENTIAL OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS AND CONSTRAINTS
For the most part, the SST requirements for checking and insur-
ing system integrity throughout the flight profile will be the sam e as
those on current jets. The SST requirements will probably be even
more stringent and will need to be completed in a timely manner. The
fact that the SST will be experiencing new aerodynamic phenomena, and
operating in a strange and adverse environment, will mean that the
_rew will be responsible for insuring that all systems are set up and
operating as required.
FEASIBLE AUTOMATED IMPLEMENTATION CONCEPTS FOR. SST
As was described above, requirements for systematic checks
have become more stringent with the increased complexities of aircraft
systems. No longer is the crew able to rely upon memory to insure
that all parameters are checked; today, lengthy checklists must be
used which contribute to the crew's workload and introduce a severe
degree of restrictiveness in the cockpit.
Many experts agree that the lengthy, involved, checking process
can be optimized by introducing a combined computer-man concept.
In his article, "The Feasibility of Cockpit Automation as Applied to
the Supersonic Transport" (ref. 21), Richardson points out that:
The basic problem is this; given a supersonic
passenger carrying aircraft of, at the moment, some-
what flexible physical characteristics, how may this
craft be operated in the most efficient, safe, and eco-
nomical manner possible. This is a question which
the airline operators and the passenger public jointly
will ask, and in effect are now asking. This is the
same question which industry must answer, and soon.
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One concept which has been advanced as a means
of achieving these goals is the central electronic man-
agement system (CEMS}. Stripped to its bare essen-
tials, the CEMS proposes the use of a central airborne
digital computer to integrate all or many of the varied
functions presently being performed on subsonic air-
craft by a variety of subsystems, requiring assistance
from human flight crew personnel in some cases. Some
of these functions include navigation, cruise control,
vertical and horizontal profile scheduling, communi-
cations, systems test and checkout, auxiliary systems
monitor and control, and malfunction detection and
identification. In effect th_CEMS acts as an overall
systems manager, providing either command or con-
trol functions as specified by the flight crew.
Due to the complexity and the sophistication of SST systems, it
appears that the crew will be more involved in operating the aircraft
than it is currently. Supersonic flight and uninhabitable environment
will require almost flawless performance by aircraft systems as well
as the crew. Although the requirements and responsibilities will be-
come more stringent, it appears that additional means will be avail-
able to assist the crew in obtaining optimum performance.
It would appear that the crew will be able to utilize the proposed
on-line computer to assist them in determining system status, and in
some cases to set up systems through solenoid activation. However,
this will not be a completely automatic function; the crew will per-
form many of the set-ups and verify system status and procedures with
the computer.
FEASIBLE MANUAL IMPLEMENTATION CONCEPTS FOR SST
In the event of a malfunction in the automatic portion of the
systems checkout, the crew would be required to check critical
parameters first, and then attempt to complete the remaining items.
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It must be remembered that the SST has introduced what might be
called "time compression, " so that although more time is needed to
complete the checkout manually, there is less time available.
In some segments of the flight profile the implications of using
only manual procedures--as in current operations--are insignificant,
because the procedures are of short duration. However, elsewhere
(e. g., post-start checks) time is an important factor. Within the
following functional descriptions an attempt will be made to show the
criticality introduced by employing a manual implementation of a par-
ticular function.
The manual concept is generally feasible, although it affects the
economy and efficiency of operations. With the sophistication of the
systems proposed for the SST, efforts will probably be made to incor-
porate system status parameters into some integrated display which
can be easily evaluated by the crew.
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2. 1 FUNCTION 2. 1 PRE-START SYSTEM CHECKOUT
Purpose
Pre-start system checkout entails determining the status of the
aircraft prior to engine start, and insuring that all systems necessary
for power plant activation are set up as required. Moreover, the
exterior portions of the aircraft must be checked to insure that all are
functioning normally.
Current Jet Operational Requirements and Constraints
Federal regulations, safety, and airline procedures specify that
the aircraft must be completely checked, within the capabilities of the
crew. Even though aircraft are checked by maintenance and ground
handling personnel prior to each flight, the crew's responsibility is
still to insure that all systems appear to be functioning normally.
Current Jet Implementation Concepts
Crews rely on lists of sequential procedures to assess the state
of the aircraft. Before boarding, the crew inspects the aircraft exteri-
or examining all those accessible places that would have some influence
on the flight.
Once the crew is in the cockpit it can be assumed that the exteri-
or pre-flight check has been successfully completed. With power ex-
ternally applied to the aircraft, the crew will determine if cockpit
systems are functioning normally, and will be ready for the engine
start. Of course, not all systems can be completely checked prior to
engine start, since full power is required for a complete systems check.
lO0
In most cases, electrical power and blown air are the external
energy sources applied to the aircraft. The crew must insure that the
fuel system and electrical system are ready to furnish power to the
engines for start.
When system checks and preparations have been completed, the
system is ready for power plant activation.
SST Potential Operational Requirements and Constraints
Several new factors will be introduced with the SST: the sophis-
tication of the systems, the size of the aircraft, and most importantly
the need to hold ground handling time to a minimum. As a result, SST
pre-start checkout will involve the same number or even more param-
eters to check as in current jets, and less time to do it in.
Feasible Automated Implementation Concepts for SST
The procedure utilized in the SST will make the greatest possible
use of automatic checkout equipment, but will still require strictly
manual means in certain areas. Checking the external portions of the
aircraft will in all likelihood combine automatic system checkout equip-
ment with the crew's normal exterior inspection or "walk around. "
The advantages of such a procedure will be a savings in time and the
use of ground handling equipment which will not add to the weight of the
aircraft.
Within the cockpit, the crew could possibly utilize the proposed
on-line computer to check out all systems and actually set up the
systems (solenoid actuated). However, it appears more likely that the
crew will utilize the computer for a system status check, and will con-
tinue as in today's operations to follow sequential procedures in readying
the aircraft for takeoff.
lOl
Feasible Manual Implementation Concepts for SST
In general, the crew will be able to utilize procedures similar
to those in current use. Although these checkout procedures are time
consuming, they occur prior to engine start so that high fuel consump-
tion rates need not be considered. The procedures used would assist
the crew to insure an optimum engine start. Manual performance is
well within the capability of the crew and SST operations should not
introduce any training or transition problems.
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2. 2 FUNCTION 2.2 POST-START SYSTEM CHECKOUT
Purpose
This function is the aircraft status check made after energy is
supplied by the power plants. Once an aircraft is no longer on ex_,rnal
power, but is receiving its energy from the power plants and associa-
ted systems, it is good operating procedure to check the status of all
important subsystems. In most cases, it is only possible to ascertain
that system output is within tolerances (e. g., the pneumatic and hy-
draulic systems pressure).
The greatest attention must be given to those systems which are
the most critical during the flight because of safety or operating efficien-
cy. For this reason the performance necessary to activate and check out
the communications system, the flight control system, the navigation
system, and the environmental control system are expanded to show
their importance,
Current Jet Operational Requirements and Constraints
Once internal power is applied to the aircraft systems, it is neces-
sary to determine if these systems are operating in accordance with
their specified output requirements. In the case of certain systems,
such as the pneumatic, hydraulic, and electrical, system parameters
(i.e., pressures and voltages) are displayed as soon as the power
plants are activated. In some other systems, especially those employ-
ing avionics, initial set-up is required to energize the systems before
status can be checked (e. g. , communications or navigation). Thus, to
insure that the entire aircraft is performing within tolerances, all
systems must be checked after engine start and prior to takeoff.
1o3
Current Jet Implementation Concepts
In current operations, once the power plants have been activated
and checked out the crew determines the status of the rest of the system.
For the most part this is a standard sequential procedure divided among
the crew members according to their locations. The crew examines the
various systems using a checklist and insures that outputs are within
certain limits. An out-of-tolerance system would bebrought to the
attention of the crew member responsible for cvaluation and decision.
SST Potential Operational Requirements and Constraints
Even if the SST incorporates the amount of automation being advo-
cated, there will still be the requirement to insure normal system func-
tioning prior to takeoff. However, the amount of time available constrains
performance of this task. Any delays due to ground lingering could be
costly both in terms of economics and safety. Because of high fuel con-
sumption rates, delays cause the aircraft to draw on fuel reserves thus
reducing the possible flight distance and safety.
The sophistication of systems may necessitate additional support-
ing subsystems which would generate more checks and system set-ups.
In general, however, the same parameters which currently indicate
system performance will be used to measure performance in the SST
cockpit. To decrease the checkout time required, better display
methods will need to be developed so that system status can be dis-
played in its entirety.
Feasible Automated Implementation Concepts for SST
The procedures to be followed in the major subsystems, (i. e.,
flight control, communications, environmental control, and navigation)
will be described in the appropriate functional descriptions included in
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this section. The other systems involved in post-start operations (e. g.,
hydraulic, pneumatic, fuel system, electrical) will be handled by a joint
man-machine procedure. The on-line computer will be used to compare
the inputs and outputs to these systems, and indicate the resultant status;
the crew will be concerned with activating systems and regulating the out-
puts of others.
As was pointed out previously, the amount of post-start checking
is becoming unwieldy. Steps within a checklist can easily be overlooked,
and may not be caught until a critical moment in flight. It is evident that
much effort should be devoted to establishing a man-machine procedure
which will keep the workload at least at the current level. One such
me thod might be the development of a flow-logic diagram display which
would permit completeness in such preparation procedures.
Feasible Manual Implementation Concepts for SST
A procedure similar to that employed in current operations does
not seem consistent with the proposed sophistication of the SST. However,
it is a feasible concept to have the crew determine the aircraft systems
status and set-up equipment in accordance with some sequential proced-
ure. Using such a procedure the crew will usually check all critical
systems first, and having ascertained that the aircraft is functioning
normally will proceed with the equipment preparation.
General descriptions of checkout for the communications flight con-
trol and environmental systems are presented in the remainder of this
section.
io5
COMMUNICATION SYSTEM ACTIVATION AND CHECKOUT
Purpose
The purpose of this activity is to bring about activation of the com-
munications system, and then to insure that its operational capability
fulfills basic system requirements. During the operation of the SST
there will be a requirement to coordinate and convey information to:
(1) other members of the crew within the cockpit, (2) members of the
crew in other areas of the aircraft, (3) the passengers, (4) external
parties in close proximity to the aircraft, e. g., ground handling crews,
(5) external parties concerned with control (separation) of aircraft, e. g.,
Air Traffic Control facilities; and (6) external parties concerned with
the operation of the aircraft, e. g., the dispatcher. In most cases the
means provided for coordinating and conveying this information will be
different for each of the parties or agencies listed. Therefore, during
the activation and checkout of the communications systems each means
of communication will need to be tested. As will be discussed later,
malfunction of portions of this system will vary in criticality.
Current Jet Implementation Concepts
Once the engines have been activated and the electrical bus set
to supply power to communication and navigation equipment, the crew
follows a checklist or some sequential pattern in setting up and checking
the equipment. The HF, VHF/UHF, intercom and public address systems
must be activated, tuned as necessary, and monitored to ascertain oper-
ation. Total system status of some equipment cannot be completely known
until the equipment is actually utilized (e. g., the receiver may be working,
but the transmitter may be inoperative even though it is activated).
106
Feasible Automated Implementation Concepts for SST
The SST designers are forecasting the use of the on-line computer
for communications system checkouts, with displayed checklists to be
available as a back-up. Richardson points out (reL 21) the feasibility
of automating many cockpit functions using the central electronic man-
agement systems (CEMS), one such function being system checkout.
To fiiustrate how the on-li_e computer might be, used in _Tstem
checkout, consider the situation in which the SST is parked at the load-
ing area, external checkout of the system has been completed, the crew
have taken their places in the cockpit, and the power plants have been
activated supplying energy to all subsystems. The communications system
is in an unenergized state, i. e., the switches are all off. The crew's role
is to insure that sufficient electrical power is available for the commun-
ications system, and then to energize the system in the SOP sequence.
If the activating sequence is lengthy, a displayed checklist will in all
likelihood be utilized. Once all of the switches have been properly
positioned, the on-line computer can measure the status of the system
and display this information to the crew. Although the crew will be in-
volved in the actual activation and subsequent checkout procedures, the
evaluation of the system status is made in the flight management function
(ground handling phase).
Feasible Manual Implementation Concepts for SST
If the crew is required to utilize a strictly manual checkout and
set-up, the procedure will be similar to that used today. The crew
would set switches and evaluate system status in accordance with steps
on a checklist. The major objection to this method of set-up and check-
out is the length of time necessary to complete it. Present estimates
indicate that the time factor involved would be unacceptable.
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FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM ACTIVATION AND CHECKOUT
Purpose
This function insures that the flight control system (s) is operating
within tolerances, i. e., responding to the control signals furnished both
by the yoke, and the autopilot.
Current Jet Implementation Concepts
Currently it is standard operating procedure to visually check the
control surfaces prior to boarding. Then, after the power plants have
been activated and hydraulic and electrical power supplied, movement
of the control surfaces is checked in response to yoke or autopilot con-
trol. The other control surfaces are also checked, as is the operation
of the hydraulic system. The most common form of flight control system
in operation today is typified by that found on the Boeing 720. According
to the Boeing Operations Manual (ref. 22),
•.. the primary control surfaces consist of ailerons,
elevator and rudder. These surfaces are aerodynam-
ically balanced and are actuated by means of cable con-
trolled tabs. The flaps and spoilers are hydraulically
operated• In addition to aiding in lateral control, the
spoilers can also be used as speed brakes. The hori-
zontal stabilizer angle of incidence may be varied elec-
trically, manually or by the autopilot. The primary
flight controls incorporate control systems for both
manual and automatic (autopilot) operation of inboard
ailerons, rudder and elevator. Hydraulic rudder boost
is incorporated. The automatic flight control system
consists of an Autopilot which includes an automatic
VOR-ILS beam coupler. The Autopilot provides sensi-
tive, automatic, coordinated control of the airplane at
any desired altitude, attitude, and heading...
The various components of the flight control system are checked
in coordination with a gr(mnd handler, by following a sequential procedure.
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Usually the crew will move the controls through their limits, and the
ground handler will ascertain that movement corresponds.
Feasible Automated Implementation Concepts for SST
Depending upon the complexity of the systems which will be utilized
by the flight control system (e. g., autopilot, all-weather landing, trim,
and stability augmentation), crew functions will be similar to those in cur-
rent operations. However, since time is a [actor every effort will --^k-_.l..
be made either to complete the checks prior to engine start by utilizing
some form of external power, or to use the proposed on-line computer
to check system integrity. The latter can probably indicate subsystem
status, but the crew will still need to coordinate with ground handlers
to ascertain proper control surface movement. This man-machine pro-
cedure will probably keep time within acceptable limits.
Feasible Manual Implementation Concepts for SST
Whatever the final flight control system (s) chosen, crew require-
ments in checking operational performance will not change significantly
from what is required of today's subsonic jet crews. Since many of the
checks are lengthy and complex, some form of checklist should be pro-
vided to insure that all important parameters are checked. No problems
are anticipated in this area of operations.
The major disadvantage of using a strictly manual procedure in
checking the flight control system is that coupled with the other system
checkouts the time factor becomes monumental. This area of checkout
and set-up might be more amenable to a manual implementation concept,
if the other systems were automatically checked.
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ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL SYSTEM ACTIVATION,
CHECKOUT AND PREPARATION
Purpos e
This function is to check and insure the normal operation of the
habitability maintenance systems. The main factors to be considered
in an environmental control system are pressure, temperature, humid-
ity, radiation and lighting. The effects that these systems and their
controlled parameters have on the passengers, directly affect the oper-
ation of the flight. Since safety and passenger comfort are underlying
goals in any flight, every effort must be made to provide high reliabil-
ity in this area. Because these systems are so important, they must be
checked prior to takeoff.
The primary functions of an aircraft air conditioning and pressuri-
zation system are:
I. Maintain cabin air and wall temperature at a com-
fortable level.
2. Maintain a comfortable cabin pressure level.
3. Provide sufficient ventilation.
In most instances these are automatic systems which require little
crew control to function properly. However, since these systems play
such an important role for passengers and crew, every effort must be
made to insure that the systems and their backups will perform within
tolerances throughout the flight.
Generally, th_ parameters to be maintained include passenger and
crew compartment temperatures between approximately 59.9 ° F and
81. 5 ° F (15. 5 ° C and 17. 5 ° C), cabin pressures no greater than 8,000
llO
feet equivalem+ altitude with changes due to ascents or descents being
less than 300 feet/minute, rhe air conditioning system must provide
a fairly uniform temperature balance, a feeling of freshness, and free-
dom from disagreeable odors.
Current Jet Implementation Concepts
Almost all the environmental control system parameters are main-
tained by the air conditioning and pressurization systems. In both
systems an automatic mode of operation is provided which keeps the
temperature, pressure and all associated parameters within tolerances.
Rates of pressure change, humidity levels, and constant temperatures
are automatically compensated for by the systems. In both these major
systems provisions are made for a manual mode of operation in the event
of a malfunction in either of the systems.
Feasible Automated Implementation Concepts for SST
Coupling the outputs of the environmental control systems to the
on-line computer and comparing with required outputs will give the
status of system capability. The crew may be required to "set-in" such
parameters as airport altitude, desired temperatures or rates of pres-
sure change. In most cases these can be set prior to engine start which
would save time. System status would be checked after power plant acti-
vation_ As with all system checkouts, time must be kept to a minimum
to be consistent with proposed ground operations.
Feasible Manual Implementation Concepts for SST
The crew will comply with procedures in much the same manner
as in today's operations. Some of the environmental systems will be set
up on external inputs prior to engine start. Once the engines have been
iiI
activated the systems must be switched to internal power and checked
for adequate output. The use of a sequential procedure will aid the crew
by insuring an encompassing procedure.
112
2.3 FUNCTION 2.3 SYSTEM PREPARATION FOR TAKEOFF
Purpose
This function is to prepare all systems for takeoff. This might be
considered the final overall system check and as such the resulting
evaluation should be either "ready for takeoff" or "abort. "
Current Jet Operational Requirements and Constraints
Once the aircraft's power plants have been activated, the subsystems
supplied with internal power, and the general status of the aircraft found
to be normal, some of the aircraft subsyst eros are positioned for takeoff.
These last minute checks and preparations are necessary to insure optimum
performance during takeoff.
Current Jet Implementation Concepts
Standard current procedures entail examining aircraft systems
prior to takeoff to check for such things as:
Electrical System: Warning lights OFF
Generators checked
Circuit breakers all in
Fuel System: Boost pump switches ON
Distribution and flow
Engine System: Oil pressure
Oil temperature
Oil quantity
I13
Air Conditioning System: Turbocompressors checked
Automatic function checked
Hydraulic System: Pressure
Hydraulic pumps ON
Warning lights OFF
Flight Control System: Flaps set as required
Speed brakes at 0°
Trim set as required
Autostabilization normal
Controls free moving
Antiskid ON
Miscellaneous: External and internal lighting set
as required
Flight and navigation instruments set
as required
Engine instruments read normal
Altimeters set
Takeoff d_ta reviewed
This list is not meant to be comprehensive, but rather indicates the nature
of the tasks performed by the crew prior to takeoff. Procedures would
vary slightly depending upon equipment chosen by a particular airline.
Generally speaking, the crew will divide the tasks using location
in the cockpit as a criterion for assignment. Then a checklist will be
utilized to insure that all sequential steps are perfnrmed.
SST Potential Operational Requirements and Constraints
The SST will not bring any revolutionary procedures to the cockpit
in equipment set-up and checkout. The same basic parameters indicated
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above will need to be checked. Moreover, the SST's use of new and
sophisticated systems may require additional set-up and checkouts.
The greatest constraint will be the time element.
Feasible Automated Implementation Concepts for SST
The crew will be able to utilize the proposed on-line computer to
check the status of systems as well as their outputs. However, it
would appear that equipment set-up will continue to be performed
manually. To conserve time, procedures may be changed to perform
as many of these set-ups as possible prior to engine activation, and
perform the system checks during taxi. The crew will continue to be
responsible for insuring that the aircraft is in its optimum configuration
when ready for takeoff.
Feasible Manual Implementation Concepts for SST
Current operational procedures would provide the manual mode of
operation. It varies only slightly from the automatic mode, chiefly in
determining system status. Warning lights and other instrumentation
make this performance by the crew relatively non-restrictive, and thus
the workload will not increase appreciably. The crew's responsibility
would not change to any extent. The use of checklists in addition to
the aforementioned lights and instruments would assist the crew is setting
up for takeoff.
2.4 FUNCTION 2.4 POST-TAKEOFF CHECK
Purpose
This function is to ascertain status after takeoff, reconfigure as
necessary for the climb, and set up equipment for climb-out require-
ments.
Current Jet Operational Requirements and Constraints
Once the aircraft has completed takeoff, new requirements exist
for completion of the climb-out. Systems must be rechecked and equip-
ment reset. These checks and set-ups are necessary to insure optimum
equipment performance during the climb profile.
Current Jet Implementation Concepts
After takeoff (i. e., once the aircraft has established an acceptable
rate of ascent), the crew must redistribute system loads channeled for
takeoff requirements. They accomplish this by performing certain checks
and set-ups for such things as:
Flight Control System: Landing Gear UP
Landing Gear Warning lights normal
Flaps reset as required
Autopilot set as required
Engine System: RPM, fuel flow, and EPR set as
required
Air Conditioning/Pressuri- Pressure rate of change set as
zation System: required (_ 500 feet/rain. )
if6
Desired altitude selected
Turbocompressors activated as feasible
Miscellaneous: Lights as required
Warning signs as required
These are but a few of the system parameters which are checked
immediately after takeoff. Depending on the equipment utilized, the
procedure could be lengthy and complex. However, these check_ _=an
usually be spread out over the climb schedule. The crew, in most cases,
w ill use a checklist to assist in completing the sequential procedure
required.
SST Potential Operational Requirements and Constraints
Compared with current jets, the SST will bring higher performance
characteristics to the cockpit which will create a greater degree of res-
trictiveness for the crew. In addition, new equipment concepts may add
further set-up requirements to the crew's procedure. Also, because of
the SST's fuel sensitivity at low altitudes, the crew will be required to
ready the aircraft and get it on climb profile as soon as possible after
takeoff.
Feasible Automated Implementation Concepts for SST
Systems which must be checked to verify performance can be
checked automatically using the on-line computer. However, for the few
systems which require changes, the crew will continue to manually set up
the equipment. The time saved in automating this performance area would
be insignificant when compared to the complexity of the system needed.
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Feasible Manual Implementation Concepts for SST
Those parameters mentioned for jets will continue to draw atten-
tion in SST operations, and in all likelihood, the crew will function in
much the same manner as currently.
Immediately after takeoff the crew must reconfigure the aircraft,
redistribute the loads, and pick up the assigned climb profile. A check-
list will probably be used to insurc a comp;ete sequential procedure.
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2.5 FUNCTION 2.5 PRE-TRANSITION PHASE SYSTEM CHECKOUT
Pul_pose
This function is to ascertain the status of the aircraft prior to
transonic acceleration, and to set up equipment and/or systems for the
supersonic phase. The transitional acceleration phase will commence
at the upper extremities of the current subsonic aircraft environment
and terminate somewhere in that region which is adverse to current
operations. Because of this entrance into the unfavorable environment,
it must be ascertained that all artificial environment systems are func-
tioning normally.
Current Jet Operational Requirements and Constraints
Since current aircraft are not concerned with transonic accelera-
tions, this is not a requirement for current subsonic jets.
Current Jet Implementation Concepts
Not applicable in current operations.
SST Potential Operational Requirements and Constraints
Because of the adverse conditions the aircraft will encounter after
passing the sonic barrier, a complete system status report is required
prior to transonic acceleration. The integrity of the aircraft must be
assured and all equipment set-ups must be made before continuing with
the flight phase. All systems which will provide either artificial environ-
ment, or artificial stability throughout the supersonic portions of the
flight must be checked to insure normal functioning. The inlet nozzle
system will begin to play an important role in the output of the power
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plants, and its automatic mode of operation must be engaged and checked
out. (Note: The automatic system used in the XB-70 is presenting tech-
nical problems. }
Feasible Automated Implementation Concepts for SST
Somewhere within the subsonic climb phase the crew will commence
system checkout and equipment set-up necessary for the transonic accelera-
tion. They will check such paramcters as:
Flight Control System: Autopilot set as required
Variable incidence set as required
Automatic stabilization checked and
operating as required
Engine System: RPM, fuel flow, and EPR set as required
Lubrication system operating normally
Inlet duct system's automatic mode
checked as required
Air Conditioning/Pressuri-
zation System:
Tempe r atur e nor mal
Pressure as desired
Air mixture within tolerances
Radiation level normal
Miscellaneous: Warning signs as required
Intercom announcements as necessary
Almost all the parameters above and many others which would also
give an indication of system status, will be able to be checked automatically
via the proposed on-line computer. Since all parameters will be monitored
and evaluated, a continuous watch will be available on the system status.
For the other areas, the crew will reset equipment, reconfigure the air-
craft, and make whatever decisions are necessary to ready the aircraft
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for transonic acceleration. As in the case of any checkout or system
set-up, checklists will be used by the crew to assist in providing
s equential pr ocedur es.
Feasible Manual Implementation Concepts for SST
The only difference between the manual procedure and the one
described above is the checking of system status by the crew instead of
by the computer. Manual checking is usually done anyway, so there
should be no appreciable workload difference between the two concepts.
The crew would continue to function as currently, following sequential
procedures as dictated by checklists.
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2.6 FUNCTION 2.6 PRE-DECELERATION ]DESCENT PHASE
SYSTEM CHECKOUT
Purpose
This function is to ascertain the status of the aircraft, reconfigure
as required, and to employ any subsystems necessary to fulfill the descent
requirements.
Current Jet Operational Requirements and Constraints
In this phase, aircraft checkout and utilization of new subsystems
is not specified by Federal regulation, but by safety and economic factors.
The two systems of chief concern are the pressurization system, and
the anti-icing and window heating systems. As the aircraft begins its
descent it is necessary to insure that the pressure change in the cabin is
limited to 300 feet per minute. It should be pointed out that if bleed air
(i. e., air from one of the engine compressor stages) is used to pressurize
the aircraft as well as to heat the windows and for anti-icing, then a specific
power plant RPM is necessary to keep below pressure change limits during
descent.
Current Jet Implementation Concepts
The type of descent profile desired would dictate any changes
necessary in the flight control or basic configuration systems. Prior
to descent the crew checks such parameters as:
Engine System: Fuel quantity for computing landing
gross weight
Bleed air as required
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Pressurization/Air Condi-
tioning System :
Airport altitude set in pressure system
Rate of change set to about 300 feet/minute
M is c ellaneous: Hydraulic pump ON
Altimeters set
Air speed instruments checked
Window heat ON
Anti-icing system ON
Warning lights as required
The parameters above are only a few of those which are checked
prior to any descent of appreciable altitude. Of course, the parameters
included depend upon the type of aircraft and airline, however, in most
cases the procedure would remain the same. The crew utilizes a check-
list to assure completeness in the sequential procedures. Assignment
of the task to a crew member is usually based on the location of either
the crew member or the display for the required parameter.
SST Poteatial Operational Requirements and Constraints
In general, requirements will remain the same as in current opera-
t ions. Of course, the sophistication of the entire system, plus the new
implementation concepts may generate the need to closely monitor specific
parameters during descent. One area of concern may be temperature
control during descent. Since the fuel system will probably be used as
a heat sink, the decreased fuel flow associated with the descent may intro-
duce some heat dissipation problems.
Feasible Automated Implementation Concepts for SST
As described in previous sections, the monitoring and evaluating
of the SST systems and their associated parameters will be a continuous
function of the on-line computer. Therefore, the crew's role becomes
one of monitoring the operation of the "data monitor, " and performing
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any equipment set-ups or system reconfigurations necessary to fulfill
descent requirements. The crew's tasks would all be accomplished in
much the same manner as Ls used today.
Feasible Manual Implementation Concepts for SST
Unless concepts change drastically, the crew will continue to per-
form these periodic system checkout_ and equipment set-ups in the present
m annero Of course, in a purely manual mode of operation the crew would
need to be cognizant of the status of the major systems at all times. How-
ever, this would be no more than is currently expected. The crew's res-
ponsibility would be to insure that the aircraft was configured to meet
the demands of the descent profile. A checklist would be used to insure
completeness in assessing system status.
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2.7 FUNCTION 2.7 PRE-LANDING SYSTEM CHECKOUT AND
PR EP AR AT ION
Purpose
This procedure is conducted to ascertain the status of the aircraft
and its systems, re-set equipment, and reconfigure the aircraft as
necessary to meet approach and landing requirements. Prior to landing,
the aircraft operates in a high density traffic area which requires that
slower and more maneuverable speeds be maintained. This can only
be accomplished by some form of aircraft configuration change. Also,
all systems used primarily for landing must be checked for normal
operation.
Current Jet Operational Requirements and Constraints
Federal regulations state that the system will be checked prior
to landing and that adequate checklists must be provided. In addition,
every effort must be made to optimize performance in this region.
The sophistication and complexity of high performance aircraft have
brought about the need for sequential procedures which would be quite
incius ive.
Current Jet Implementation Concepts
As has been previously described, the crew utilizes checklists
during critical portions of the flight to set up equipment and reconfigure
the aircraft to meet the demands of the particular flight phase. During
the approach the crew must check the aircraft and set up equipment
paying particular attention to such parameters as:
le5
Flight Control System: Speed brakes 0 ° or as required
Flaps set as required
Trim system as required
Gear DOWN and checked
Hydraulic System: Pressure checked
Anti-skid system checked
Parking brake OFF
Engine System: Fuel boost pumps ON
Fuel checked
Miscellaneous: Passenger warning lights as required
Anti-icing system as required
Emergency braking system checked
Landing lights as necessary
There are more parameters which must be checked, but their
inclusion is dependent to a large degree on the equipment utilized. In
most cases those things not mentioned will be performed as a portion
of the required performance associated with a particular function (e. g.,
flight control system will check flaps, gear, and any other high lift
devices required).
The crew's role is to assure that a complete preparation has taken
p lace. Most of these checks can be made during the let down and initial
portions of the approach, leaving very few items for the final approach.
SST Potential Operational Requirements and Constraints
The specific configuration chosen for SST may influence proce-
dures slightly during the pre-landing check, but not sufficiently to
warrant concern. Generally speaking the same parameters which draw
attention in current operations will do so in SST operations. New equip-
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ment and new automated systems will require some setting up during
this check.
Feasible Automated Implementation Concepts for SST
Although portions of the approach and landing patterns are slated
for automatic operations, the crew will continue to have the primary
role in equipment preparation and aircraft reconfiguration. One reason
is that many variables may be introduced during these operations and the
crew is quite capable of responding to them. A computer would have to
be huge to compensate for all possible variants. Therefore, although
general system status will be automatically evaluated and displayed
continuously, the crew will continue to perform the rest of the required
set-ups and reconfigurations.
Feasible Manual Implementation Concepts for SST
As in today's operations, a checklist will be employed by the SST
crew in readying the aircraft for landing. Crew responsibility will be
largely what it is today. However, with the added automatic systems need-
ing actuation during landing a lengthier check may be required. This will
be primarily dependent upon the equipment used.
The crew should not require any revolutionary training to achieve
optimum performance.
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2. 8 FUNCTION 2. 8 SYSTEM DEACTIVATION PROCEDURES
Purpose
This function is to de-energize all the systems and equipment
which draw their power from the aircraft power plants, note any mal-
functions or discrepancies in performance, and generally ready the air-
craft for power plant deactivation. As the aircraft completes its landing
rol!out and clears the rur, way, the crew will deactivate those systems
which will no longer be utilized. Most of these steps will be completed
during the taxi to the assigned unloading area so that all that remains
is engine deactivation.
Current Jet Operational Requirements and Constraints
Federal regulations are concerned with takeoff and landing check-
lists, while airline management and maintenance are concerned with
optimum equipment usage. In an attempt to obtain maximum performance
from systems and equipment, procedures have been set up which assist
in maintaining high service rates.
Current Jet Implementation Concepts
As the aircraft is moved towards the unloading area the crew de-
activates such systems as:
Flight Control: Speed brakes at 0 °
Flaps at 0 °
Trim at 0 °
Nose gear straight or as required
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Pressurization/Air Condi-
tioning System:
Cabin pressure checked
Air conditioning unit switches OFF
Hydraulic System: Pressure checked
Quantity of fluid checked
Auxiliary hydraulic pumps OFF
Flectrical Sys tern: Set for external power
External power of:
Frequency 400 + 8 cps
Voltage 200 + 8 v
Miscellaneous: Landing lights OFF
Pilot heat OFF
Anti-icing system deactivated
Weather radar and transponder OFF
Passenger warning lights OFF
Although it is not entirely inclusive, this list illustrates the de-
activation procedure by the crew upon landing and parking. In addition
communications and navigation equipment must be de-energized. Descrip-
tions of deactivation procedures for the communications and navigation
systems are in the succeeding sections of this appendix,
Crew members will usually follow checklists which are specific
to each location within the cockpit. Once all other systems have been
checked and external power is applied to the aircraft, the crew will de-
activate the engine system and its associated subsystems.
SST Potential Operational Requirements and Constraints
The same considerations listed for current jet aircraft should con-
cern operations in the SST era. However, from an economics point of
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view the SST will need a short "turn-around" time (i. e., the time to
ready the aircraft for the next flight). This means that all discrepan-
cies in performance will need to be noted, reported, and repaired in
a short time.
Feasible Automated Implementation Concepts for SST
Almost all the deactivation procedure will consist of "switch
flicking" and notation of any discrepancies. For this reason it appears
that automatic means are not necessary or practical during this stage.
Feasible Manual Implementation Concepts for SST
No new concepts will be introduced at this point to implement the
crew's performance in the deactivation procedures. The crew will con-
tinue to utilize the checklist as an aid to being inclusive in their proced-
ures. It should be stressed that every effort must be made to discover
discrepancies so that turn-around time can be kept to a minimum.
COMMUNICA TIONS SYSTEM DEA CTIVATION
This procedure insures that the communications system is de-
energized and that any discrepancies are noted and reported for repair.
This function is the reverse of Function 2. 2. Once the crew has com-
pleted all the required communication functions, and the aircraft is in
the process of being de-energized (power plant deactivated), the com-
munication system should be deactivated. As has been pointed out pre-
viously, power surges and electrical transients can decrease the relia-
bility of electrical equipment. To preclude this, standard operating
procedures call for deactivation.
As in present operations, the SST crew will comply with standard-
ized checklists to make sure that all the equipment is utilized in accordance
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with manufacturers w specifications. The system can be automatically
checked prior to deactivation by some form of CEMS, and then deacti-
vated manually by the crew.
Operating procedures pertaining to activation and deactivation of
the various systems and subsystems will be quite similar to those in
existence for current operations. Therefore, it is not anticipated that
SST crews will require any specialized training, nor will any real auto-
mation occur in this phase.
FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM DEACTIVATION
This function insures that the flight control system is deactivated
in accordance with the standard operating procedures of the particular
carrier and/or the subsystem manufacturer. The actual procedures to
be followed by the SST crew in deactivating the flight control system will
be a portion of the phase-oriented checkout functions and are described
under current implementation concepts. However, these procedures
should include such items as raising flaps, neutralizing trim systems,
deactivating the autopilot system, and checking the general operational
performance of the flight control system.
When the power plants are deactivated, most of the electrical and
hydraulic power will be absent from the system. Therefore, it is usually
standard operating procedure to deactivate the separate subsystems so
that upon subsequent activation, energy surges or transients will not
cause damage.
This function is not actually required for the successful completion
of the flight, but from an economics standpoint it is essential The crew
will not need any new training to deactivate the flight control system, nor
will performing the task increase their workload. In all likelihood some
form of checklist will be utilized to insure that all systems are shut down.
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ACTIVITY 3.0 COMMUNICATIONS
P UR POS E
This group of functions provides the coordination and information
flow needed for effective utilization of the SST. The communications of
the future are not envisioned to be revolutionary, but rather, evolution-
ary. That is to say, the areas which need coordination today will con-
tinue into the SST era, but new means will be developed to esfablish
better coordination.
There are four major areas of communications which are of
concern:
i. Air Traffic Control communications
2. Company communications (i. e. , ground handlers
and dispatchers)
3. Intra-crew communications
4. Crew-passenger communications
These types of communications vary in their requirements, and vary
as to the degree of restrictiveness which they impose on the crew
throughout the flight profile.
Since the SST will be moving at 30 miles a minute, current
methods of communications will need to be re-evaluated to see if they
provide the capability necessary for such high speed, high altitude
operations. The role of the crew will be primarily the same, as a
coordinator. The sophistication of the SST and the Air Traffic Control
structure within which it will be operating would appear to create lower
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workload levels, but with new methods of operation. The crew's
involvement should change from that of operator to that of monitor.
However, a shift in crew involvement will not bring a corresponding
shift in responsibility.
CURRENT JET OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS AND CONSTRAINTS
In all areas of aircraft operation there exists the requirement
for coordination and flow of information. These requirements are the
same four types of communications listed on the preceding page. The
information which must be conveyed is dictated in part by Federal regu-
lations, by efficient operating procedures, and by concern for safety.
Some specific existing regulations follow:
FAR 121. 557, ref. ii:
Emergencies: domestic and flag air carriers.
(c) Whenever a pilot in command or dis-
patcher exercises emergency authority, he shall
keep the appropriate ATC facility and dispatch
centers fully informed of the progress of the
flight.
FAR 121. 561, ref. 11 (Similar to ICAO Reg. 4. 4. 3, ref. 12:)
Reporting potentially hazardous meteorological conditions
and irregularities of ground and navigation facilities.
(a) Whenever he encounters a meteorological
condition or an irregularity in a ground or navi-
gational facility, in flight, the knowledge of
which he considers essential to the safety of
other flights, the pilot in command shall notify
an appropriate ground station as soon as practi-
cable.
(b) The ground radio station that is notified
under paragraph (a) of this section shall report
the information to the agency directly responsi-
ble for operating the facility.
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FAR 121. 565, ref. 11:
Engine inoperative: landing; reporting.
(c) The pilot in command shall report each
stoppage of engine rotation in flight to the ap-
propriate ground radio station as soon as practi-
cable and shall keep that station fully informed
of the progress of the flight.
FAR 91. 87, ref. 9: (Similar to ICAO Reg. 3. 5. 2. 1, ref. 14)
Operation at airports with operating control towers.
(a) General. Unless otherwise authorized
or required by ATC, each person operating an
aircraft to, from, or on an airport with an
operating control tower shall comply with the
applicable provisions of this section.
(b) Communlcat;ons _cith control tracers
operated by the U_/ted State._,. No person
may, within an airport traffic area, operate all
aircraft to, from, or on an airport having a
control tower operated by the Vnited States
unless two-way radio commlmications are
maintained between that aircraft and the con-
trol tower. However, if the aircraft radio
fails in flight, he may operate that aircraft
and land if weather conditions are at or above
basic VFR weather minimums, he maintains
visual contact with the tower, and he receives
a clearance to land. If the aircraft radio fails
while in flight under IFR, he must comply
with § 91.127.
(c) Oomrnunications with other control
towers. No person may, within an airport
traffic area, operate an aircraft to, from, or
on an airport having a control tower that is
operated by any person other than the United
States unless--
(1) If that aircraft's radio equipment so
allows, two-way radio communications are
maintained between the aircraft and the
tower; or
(2) If that aircraft's radio equil)ment
allows only reception from the tower, the
pilot has the tower's frequency monitored.
FAR 121. 349, ref, 11:
Radio equipment for operations under VFR over routes not
navigated by pilotage or for operations under IFR or
over -the -top.
(a) No person may operate an airphme
under VFR over mutes that cannot be navi-
gated by pilotage or for operations conducted
under IFR or over-the-top, unless tile airplane
is equipped with that radio equipment neces-
sary under no..,:m..alope_ing conditions to ful-
fill the functions specified in ._121.347(a} and
to receive satisfactorily hy either of two in-
dependent sy_ems_ radio navigational signals
from all primary en route and approach navi-
gationul facilitieA_ intended to be u_d. How-
ever, only one marker b_ncon receiver provid-
ing visual and aural signals and one II,q re-
ceiver need be. provided. Equipment provided
to receive signals en r(,ute may be u._d to
-receive s;4mals on approach, if it is capMde of
receiving both signals.
(b) In the ease of operation over routes on
which na.vigation is ba.,_ed on low frequency
radio range or amomatic direction finding, only
one low frequency radio range or ADF re,
ceirer need be installed if the airplane is
equipped with two VOR receivers, and VOR
navigational aids are so located and the air-
plane is _ fueled thut, in the ca_ of failure of
the low frequency radio range receiver or
ADF receiver, the flight may proc_d safely to
a suitable airport, by means of VOR aids, and
complete an instrument approach by u_ of th,_
remaining airplane radio sy_em.
(c) Whenever VOR navikmtional re_.eivcrs
are required by paragraph (a) or (b) ,,f this
section, at least one approved distance nu,asur
ing equipment unit (DME), capable of Iv,.eiv
ing and indicating distance information from
VORTAC facilities, nmst be iustalled o, each
i • xl_ _ .._g_airphne when operated wiinm _._ con-
tiguous States and the District of Columbia at
and almve 24,000 feet MSL and must be in-
stalled on eadl of the followin_ airplal_es, re-
_¢ardless of the altitude flown, when op,.ratin_
within the 48 conti_mu_ State._ and tl,0 Dis-
trict of Columbia qfter the indicated d:,_es:
(1) Turbojet airplaues--June 30. l:'g.'l.
(o} Turboprop airplanes--Dee_ml,or .21.
1963.
(3) Pmssuriz_t reciprocatin_ engine air-
planes--.hme 30, 1964.
(4) O/her lar_ airplanes--Felwlr, ry 2%
1966.
(d) If the di_nnce measuring eqnipment
(DME) hecomes inoperative en route, the pilot
shall notify ATC of that failure as s_on .1_ it
O(_llrs.
135
FAR 91. 125, ref. 13: (Similar to ICAO Regs.
reL 14)
IFR, radio communications.
The pilot in command of each aircraft oper-
ated under IFR ill controlled airspace shall
have a continuous watch maintained on the
appropriate frequency and shall report by
radio as soon as possible-
(a) The time and altitude of passing each
designated reporting point, or lhe rel)orting
points specified by AT(_;
(b) Any ,nf.re,'ast we.dher conditions en-
countered ; and
(c) Any other information relating to the
safety of flight.
5. 3.4 and 5. 3. 2,
FAR 91. 127, ref. 13: (Similar to ICAO Reg. 5. 3.4. 2, ref. 14)
IFR operations; two-way radio communications failure.
(a) General. Unless otherwise authorized
by ATC, each pilot who has two-way radio
communications failure when operating under
IFR shall comply with the rules of this sec-
tion.
(b) VFR conditions. If the failure occurs
in VFR conditions, or if VFR conditions are
encountered after the failure, each pilot shall
continue the fight under VFR and land as
soon as practicable.
(c) IFR eond;tion._. If the failure occurs
in IFR conditions, or if paragraph (b) of
this section cannot be complied with, each
pilot shall continue the flight [according to
the following :
I'(1) Route.
r(i) By the route assigned in the last
ATC clearance received:
I'(ii) If being radar vectored, by the
direct route from the point of radio fail-
ure to the fix, route, or airway specified
in the vector clearance:
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[(iii) In the absence of all assigned
route, by the ,x)ute that ATC has advised
,nay be expected in a further clearance;
or
[(iv) In the absence of an assigned
route or a route that ATC has advised
may be expected in a further clearance,
by the route filed in the flight plan.
[(2) Alt#ude. At the highest of tlle
following altitudes or flight levels:
[(i) Tile altitude or flight level as-
signed in the la_ ATC clearance re-
ceived ;
[(ii) The minimum altitude (con-
verted, if appropriate, to minimum flight
level as prescribed in _ 91.81(c)) for IFR
operations; or
[(iii) The altitude or flight level ATC
has advi_d may be expected in a further
clearance.
[(3) Climb. When it is necessary to
climb in order to comply with subpara-
graph (2) of this paragraph, the following
applies :
[(i) Climb to the assigned altitude or
flight level in accordance with the last
ATC clearance received;
[(ii) Climb to the minimum altitude
for IFR operation at the time or place
necessary to comply with that minimum;
or
[(iii) Climb to the altitude or flight
level ATC has advi_d may be expected
in a further clearance at the time or place
included in the expect-further-clearance.
[(4) Lea,,e hold;rig fix. If holding in-
structions have been received, leave the hold-
ing fix at the expect-further-clearance time
received, or, if an expected approach clear-
ance time has been received, leave the hold-
ing fix in order to arrive over the fix from
which the approach begins as close as pos-
sible to the expected approach clearance
lime.
[(5) Descent. Begin descent from the en
route altitude or flight level upon reaching
the fix from which tile approach begins, but
not before--
[(i) The expect-approach-clearance
time (if received); or
[(ii) If no expect-approach-clearance
time has been received, atr tile estimated
time of arrival, shown on the flight plan,
as amended with ATC.]
ICAO Reg. 3.3. 1.5, ref. 14:
Closing a flight plan.
3.3.I.5.1 A report of arrival shall
be made, either in person or by radio at
the earliest practicable moment after
landing, to the appropriate air traffic
services unit at the aerodrome of arrival,
normally the aerodrome reporting office,
by any flight for which a flight plan has
been submitted.
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3.3.1.5.2 When no air traffic serv-
ices unit exists at the aerodrome of
arrival, the arrival report shall be made
as soon as practicable after landing and
by the quickest means available to the
nearest air traffic services unit.
3.3.1.5.3 When communication fa-
cilities at the aerodrome of arrival are
known to be inadequate and alternate
arrangements for the handling of arrival
reports on the ground are not available,
the aircraft shall, if practicable, transmit
by radio immediately prior to landing a
message comparable to an arrival report,
to an appropriate air traffic serviee._ unit,
normally the air-ground communication
station serving the air traffic services
unit in charge of the flight information
region in which the aircraft is flying.
Note.IFailure to comply with these
prorffsions may cause serious disruption
in the air traffic services and incur great
expense in carrying out unnecessary
search and rescue operations.
ICAO Reg. 4. 6, ref. 14:
Change from VFR flight to IFR flight.
An aircraft operated in
accordance with the visual flight rules
which wishes to change to compliance
with the instr,ment flight rules shall:
a) if a flight plan was submitted,
communicate the necessary changes to
be effected to its current flieht plan. or
b) when so required by 3.3.1.1.2.1.
submit a flight plan to the appropriate
air traffic services unit and obtain a
clearance prior to proceeding IFR
when in controlled airspace.
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ICAO Reg. 5. 1.3. 1, ref.
Change from IFR flight to
An aircraft electing to
change the conduct of _ tt_jht _m
¢omplianoe _ the instrument
rules to compliance with the visual Right
rules shall, if a tlight plan was
mitred, notify the approrriate air tr_c
m_t medflcalIT ttmt the IFR
_ cancdled and
thereto the changes to be made to its
current flight plan.
14:
VFR flight.
ICAO Reg. 5. 3. 3, ref. 14:
Termination of Control
When an II_ flight operating umder
the air trmff_c control service has Immled,
or leaves a controlled airslm_ and it is
no longer subject to air traffx ccmtrol
service, the approp_ae air tmlk
unit shah be _ u 8oom as
CURRENT JET IMPLEMENTATION CONCEPTS
Generally speaking, the categories of communications will utilize
different pieces of equipment, and will be redundant to the extent required
by necessary reliability factors. The specific uses and procedures em-
ployed by the crew will be covered in the functional descriptions.
In general, company communications (L e., ground handlers and
dispatchers) are handled via HF communication nets with selected
calling features and via intercom when conducting system activation
and deactivation procedures. The crew utilizes direct voice communi-
cations and intercom to obtain necessary coordination and information
flow within the cockpit during all phases of the flight. To keep the
passengers up-to-date with flight highlights and safety procedures,
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the crew utilizes both the public address system, and the series of
lighted signs (e. g., No Smoking).
For ATC communications, the crew uses VHF/UHF voice
communications and coded transponder beacons. Early in aviation
the increase in traffic density was accompanied by a steady increase
in workload due to communications. Fortunately, the trend has
reversed, and the workload due to communications is decreasing.
Just what implications this will have on supersonic flight will be
discussed ur_der SST Implementation Concepts.
A block diagram of present aviation communication networks
is shown in Figure 17 (from ref. 23). Communications equipment
consoles in a current jet transport are shown in Figures 5 and 6 of
Activity I.
SST Potential Operational Requirements and Constraints
For both company and crew communications there do not appear
to be any major modifications required by the SST. However, because
of the newness of the SST and its inherent flight characteristics, there
will, in all likelihood, be a requirement for increased crew-passenger
communications. With respect to Air Traffic Control, the basic con-
cept will change and different procedures will be utilized. This in turn
will generate requirements for different information flow. The Bureau
of Flight Standards, Federal Aviation Agency, describes the new com-
munications requirements in the report, "Supersonic Transports, "
(ref. 24):
... present voice communications between air traffic
controllers and aircraft may not be adequate, because
of high speed of the aircraft as well as the great in-
crease in volume of air traffic communications.
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An automatic data link system to transmit infor-
mation from ground to air and air to ground (AGACS*
or equivalent) will be required to relieve air crew
members and air traffic controllers of the heavy burden
of communications. The data link system should also
be capable of providing to ground controllers, on a con-
tinuous basis, the aircraft's position, velocity, altitude,
and any other pertinent data necessary for air traffic
control purposes. It is likely that only communications
of an emergency nature will be handled on voice channels
in order to relieve traffic congestion and to expedite the
handling of communications ....
The major changes to be introduced with the SST, appear to be
in the area of ATC communications. However, most of these changes
will result in a decrease in crew and controller workload.
FEASIBLE AUTOMATED IMPLEMENTATION CONCEPTS FOR SST
An extension of the coded transponder beacon, automatic ground/
air data link will be utilized in the SST era for conveying all informa-
tion of a general nature. A printer used in combination with this
system would present an available read-out for the crew. Non-routine
or emergency information would be conveyed via the usual VHF/UHF
communications links (HF or satellite links on transoceanic flights),
but would have a selected call-up feature which would eliminate the
requirement for constant monitoring of frequencies. (Pilots are still
apprehensive, however, about not being able to monitor what is happen-
ing around them. They generally like to monitor frequencies to cross-
check control procedures. ) Most of the other communication areas
will continue to utilize equipment and concepts similar to those cur-
rently used, and there does not appear to be a practical reason for
attempting to automate these areas of communications.
* Automatic ground air communications system
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The main areas of concern will be the integration of automatic
systems into the cockpit, and the establishment of optimum utilization
procedures. Richardson (ref. 21), an advocate of the central elec-
tronic management system (CEMS), points out that such a system
could be utilized to perform those communications functions which
are time consuming. He indicates that in one mode of operations
automatic two-way (ground-to-air-to-ground) data link is quite feasible,
and that it would provide for "computer decoded ground-to-air data
link and displays data on an integrated navigational display. The com-
puter also assembles me_sages automatically or through manual inser-
tion, and transmits pertinent position and flight plan data to ground
control center• " He goes on to point out that,
•.. in an automatic ground-air-ground communications
system such as the RCA AGACS presently undergoing
development by the FAA, incoming ground-to-air data
must be translated into displays in the cockpit. Infor-
mation inserted either by the pilot or the navigation
system must also be translated into a format suitable
for transmission from air-to-ground. In an integrsted
system containing a digital computer, these functions
can readily and economically be absorbed by the com-
puter, thus eliminating the need for a special external
digital data converter ...
Although the present AGACS project is planned
to be integrated with the ground based data processing
central system for ATC, its major utilization is in the
area of automatic position reporting. Considering ihe
capability and utilization of the CEMS, it is now feasible
to transmit much more information in the air-to-ground
message than has heretofore been possible. For instance,
such data as present and future destinations or course
change points, ETA to'these points, present course,
speed, and altitude are all items of information continu-
ally being computed and used in the computer program ....
The description and requirements given in the foregoing para-
graphs pertain to communications which involve coordinalion and control
with exterior systems. It is in these areas of communication that
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supersonic flight will introduce the major problems to be solved by
the designers. Since the overall SST concept has incorporated a large
amount of automation, it seems likely that the communication system
will also use as much automation as is feasible and within the state of
the art. Beacon control, data-link system, and SELCAL (selected
calling) systems will do much to fulfill coordination requirements.
Improved UHF, VHF, HF, and in some instances satellite relay will
provide the means for supplementing the automated systems.
Figure 18 shows in simplified form, the various Air Traffic
Control functions during a flight in the system to be used by 1975.
The diagram indicates how the following design objectives are satisfied:
lJ Flight plans may be entered into the computer
from remote points such as an operations office.
. Tabular displays provide a method of automating
the control transfer function.
g Sector size is increased through the separation
of planning and active control functions.
FEASIBLE MANUAL IMPLEMENTATION CONCEPTS FOR SST
The entire crew involvement may be quite different from that on
today's subsonic aircraft. However, these changes in procedures are
expected to be "evolutionary, " which means that they may be introduced
into service with subsonic carriers before the advent of the SST. Even
today, the need for frequent position reports has been eliminated on
continental flights. Because of radar coverage over the entire route,
crews have been able to substantially reduce their workload due to the
reduced communications. As Hill points out (ref. 25),
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• .. the communications systems will largely be quite
conventional, but there will be more complex periph-
eral equipment to provide a greater degree of automa-
ticity. The first step in this direction is being taken
in the introduction of more complex reply codes from
secondary radar transponders• We will shortly be
introducing an altitude-reporting code, and this will be
followed by additional modes which will provide infor-
mation of value to Air Traffic Control•
Extension of this approach to routine messages
can result in a considerable reduction of work-load on
the crew which will be extremely significant. On cer-
tain routes today's aircraft saddle their pilots with a
work-load which is about 50 percent communications
duties•..
Many of the new and forthcoming procedures are the result of
the Beacon Report• Brady (ref. 26) summarizeS" some implications
of the report as follows,
... the Beacon Report concluded that identity, alti-
tude, and position information provided by altitude
coded transponder beacons would reduce communica-
tions workload to a tolerable level, at least for the
foreseeable future. The report recognized that auto-
matic air/ground data link might some time in the
future be an important system adjunct ....
Whatever communications system is chosen for the SST, there
will always be a requirement to convey information outside the capabil-
ity of the automatic system• To meet this need the crew will in all
likelihood use communications techniques in much the same way as
they do today• Until now the amount of work connected with the com-
munications system has increased with the expansion of the aviation
field• Now that other systems have been perfected, it is time to reduce
loading, and there is no obvious reason why a sizeable reduction can
not be made.
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3. 1 FUNCTION 3. 1 GROUND HANDLING PHASE COMMUNICATIONS
Purpose
This function provides the necessary coordination and exchange
of information required to change aircraft status from off-line (i. e.,
parked in the loading area) to readiness for takeoff (L e.. on the oper-
_,_,,_,.,1 ..... ,,_, ,,,_th _ t_keoff clearance). The communications neces-
sary for this function include those with ATC, the company, among
the crew, and between the crew and passengers.
Current Jet Operational Requirements and Constraints
Most of the requirements in this area are concerned with Air
Traffic Control; others are generated by the need for safe and efficient
ground operations. To ready the aircraft for takeoff, there must be
coordination between the aircraft and the ground handling crews,
coordination between the aircraft crew and the flight attendants, intra-
crew coordination, crew and passenger coordination, and finally
coordination with ATC facilities (i. e., both ground and local control).
Current Jet Implementation Concepts
Current communication techniques may best be described by
considering again the different types of communications.
Crew-Ground Handlers Communications. When the aircraft is
operating on internally generated power, and communications systems
have been activated and are in go condition, the crew proceeds with
the post-start and pre-takeoff system readiness checks. The intercom
system is used to establish coordination and information exchange with
ground handling crews. Once the aircraft has completed these checks
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and has been cleared to taxi (described in the paragraph on ATC com-
munications) the crew resorts to visual signals (e. g., hand signals or
light signals} to receive obstruction clearance directions as the air-
craft moves away from the loading area. The ground handlers job is
usually completed once the aircraft has acquired a taxi guideline.
Intra-Crew Communications. Intra-crew communications involve
those coordinated procedures which establish an efficient working team.
During the activation and subsequent checkout of the aircraft system,
there is a constant need for conveying status information to the Captain
for final evaluation and decision making. In most cases direct verbal
communication, or perhaps, the intercom would be used. The basic
purpose of these communications is to keep the Captain aware of the
total status of the aircraft so that he can make appropriate decisions.
Although different crew members may be responsible for activating
and checking out particular subsystems, the Captain requires such
responses as, "ready for taxi, " and "ready for takeoff. "
Crew-Passenger Communications. The crew's communication
with the passengers is limited in the early portion of the flight, and in
most cases is performed by the flight attendants. In current operations
the flight attendants make sure that passengers comply with safety regu-
lations, remind the passengers of the seat belt and no smoking signs,
and inform the Captain when the passengers are ready for takeoff. On
some airlines the flight attendants also describe the flight in general.
and at a later time the Captain or a member of his staff gives a more
detailed description.
Crew-ATC Communications. The bulk of the communications
workload is in fulfilling coordination requirements with Air Traffic
Control. Initially, the flight plan is filed with the Air Traffic Control
Center. This is actually accomplished prior to entering the aircraft.
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Currently a scheduled block of time with a canned flight plan help to
expedite operations.
Once the checkouts have been satisfactorily completed, clearance
must be obtained from local ground control to taxi from the loading area
to the operational runway. (Refer to Flight Control and Power Plant
Operation for a description of the taxi performance. ) In many cases,
the crew not only receives clearance to taxi, but also information as
*--_,,*_-_-_,.,_ope--o÷_,_n_1._.. .........._,mw_y in use (in the case of multiple runways),
and directions for getting there. Other types of information which can
be obtained by the crew include ground traffic advisements and any
amendments to previous clearances.
When the aircraft has taxied to the end of the operational runway,
by regulation it must obtain clearance to roll onto the runway for take-
off. Local ground control gives this clearance in addition to giving a
change of frequency to the next ATC controller. At this point the com-
munications frequency must be changed and initial contact and identifi-
cation made. If the local controller wants to warn the aircraft of some
impending danger once the aircraft had changed frequencies, a series
of light signals may be utilized, or, since the local controller coordi-
nates with the departure controller, the information may be passed
through him.
SST Potential Operational Requirements and Constraints
The major constraint to be introduced by SST aircraft will be the
economics involved in long ground handling times. Every effort taunt
be made to shorten this time, and yet not degrade performance by
insufficient coordination. The current ground communications require-
ments should also apply to SST operations.
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Feasible Automated Implementation Concepts for SST
Only one segment of the ground handling communication function
seems compatible with automated systems, i. e. , ATC clearance re-
ception and copying. The communications outputs can be either in the
form of an automatic print-out or an approved pre-punched flight plan.
For the most part, the means of communication will remain the same
with the biggest changes occurring in operating procedures. The shift-
ing of tasks currently accomplished after engine start, to the time
period prior to engine start, can also significantly decrease the ground
operation time.
Feasible Manual Implementation Concepts for SST
The SST should not increase workload or require a change in
technique in the coordination with ground handling crews. Similarly,
intra-crew communications should not significantly change and the crew
should not be required to perform any more intercom tasks than in
today's operations. In fact, the use of the on-line computer to check
out system status should cause a decrease in cockpit coordination.
In the initial days of SST flights, public apprehension may neces-
sitate some sort of early communication from the Captain or a member
of the crew, but the current procedure would be used, i. e., lighted
signs for safety information and public address for other communiques.
It is understood that present commercial jet operations encourage the
captain to use the public address systems to inform passengers of
details of flight.
With the SST it may not be practical to file a flight plan far in
advance due to the significance of atmospheric parameters on the SST
operation. It is likely that the SST crew will submit the flight plan just
prior to the flight, and receive final clearance just prior to boarding
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the aircraft. The crew will receive the latest local weather, and a
clearance for engine start by contacting the local ground control.
This clearance for start should be predicated on any estimated delays,
so that once the power plants are activated and the system checked
out, there will be no delays in obtaining clearance for takeoff. With
the SST such delays could be very costly, from the standpoint of
economics as well as fuel reserves. In a complex and busy terminal,
ATC communications tasks could generate workloads inconsistent with
the sophistication of the rest of the aircraft system. _=:r_'_+LL,_,=...., iI!_ha,To,..
to be made to reduce this conflict by means of new procedures and
succinct communications. Crew tasks should not radically change
from those of today's flight crews, except that the increased traffic
may further congest an already overloaded system.
Figure 19 illustrates the typical initialportion of a flight in the
automatic ATC environment and the various equipment consoles.
Console 1: A data entry device which accepts the pilot's
filed flight plan.
Console 2: Marshalling Controller's console which
assigns departure times for filed flights.
Console 3:
B
Departure planning controller's console
which examines the terminal area departure
route,
Console 5: A printer for delivering clearances.
Console 6: Ground Controller's console for clearance
delivery.
Console 8: Ground Controller's console for ground
operations.
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Console 9: Local control's console.
Console 10: Departure radar control's console.
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3. 2 FUNCTION 3. 2 COCKPIT COMMUNICATIONS FOR TAKEOFF
Purpose
This function provides the necessary internal coordination and
dissemination of information during|the takeoff roll and subsequent
operations which pertain either to takeoff or abort. These will be
intra-crew communications primarily concerned with keeping the
Captain informed about aircraft status and takeoff performance.
Although SST systems and subsystems are checked prior to leaving
the loading area, maximum loads are not placed upon the systems
until the takeoff commences. Probably the greatest concern of the
crew will be the performance of the power plant system, and of the
subsystems which support its efficient operation.
Current Jet Operational Requirements and Constraints
During pre-flight planning certain speeds are calculated which
take into consideration the gross weight of the aircraft, the runway
conditions, and weather conditions. These speeds are an indication
of power plant system performance, and are compared to the usable
runway remaining to determine the aircraft's acceleration. They
serve as guides for the crew in determining whether to continue a
takeoff or abort. During periods of marginal weather when the visi-
bility is low, the Captain will require additional information during
takeoff to insure optimum performance. Thus, there is a requirement
for an airspeed-versus-runway-remaining input to check on the accel-
eration. Once V 1 speed has been attained, the aircraft is committed
to takeoff, and the input is no longer necessary.
In the event that the acceleration is not achieved and the decision
is made to abort the takeoff, there must be coordination among the
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crew to decelerate the aircraft in the remaining runway. This will
introduce a new communications task similar to the communication_
necessary during the landing roll-out. Thus, while abort communi-
cations may be considered to be non-routine, the required perform-
ance is similar to communications Function 3. 13.
Current Jet Implementation Concepts
---- ,..1....,e¢+k,_c,.,_,,_ involved in many rh_ek_ _nd evslu-1-% ,._
ation processes. The results of these evaluations must be passed to
the crew member responsible for making decisions. In standard prac-
tice, certain performance values must be met. The evaluation then
results in a "go" or "no go" statement. These evaluations are passed
via oral communication, intercom, or perhaps warning lights.
SST Potential Operational Requirements and Constraints
The same coordination required in current operations will be
required in the SST, with the added need for more timely information.
The SST will be accelerating faster than current aircraft, and decisions
will of necessity have to be made and communicated as quickly as possi-
ble. Since it does not appear feasible for one person to have the entire
responsibility for the whole system, it seems likely that areas of re-
sponsibility will be divided among the crew as in current operations.
Each crew member will then communicate his evaluation of a certain
portion of the system as a "go" or "no go" statement.
Feasible Automated Implementation Concepts
Cockpit communications in the SST will be _imilar to those in
current jet aircraft during the takeoff. However, with any system
which requires close coordination for optimum performance, the
i_5
decision-maker must have timely inputs. To meet this need, a takeoff
monitor has been suggested for incorporation into the SST. This would
present in a timely manner, all parameters critical for optimum take-
off performance. Although such a monitor is not strictly a piece of
communications equipment, it is a method of conveying information
which is the purpose of this function. The use of a takeoff monitor
would aid in cockpit coordination, and decrease the need for many
cockpit communications during takeoff. All vital systems and sub-
systems would be automatically monitored and evaluated, and the
Captain given an aircraft status report during the takeoff.
Feasible Manual Implementation Concepts for SST
Without the implementation of a monitor, the crew would perform
in much the same way as they do today (i. e., information as to the
status of the various systems and the performance of the aircraft
would be exchanged via direct oral communication or intercom). The
division of responsibility among the crew members would continue to
exist, with the ultimate responsibility belonging to the Captain.
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3. 3 FUNCTION 3. 3 DEPARTURE CONTROL COMMUNICATIONS
Purpose
This function establishes and maintains coordination and infor-
mation transfer with the first Air Traffic Control facility which con-
cerns the airborne system (i.e., departure control). In looking at
the overall Air Traffic Control system, it is quite obvious that in
terminal areas (i.e. , in the vicinity of the airports) the aircraft
density increases, resulting in the requirement for stricter control
and closer coordination.
In current operations it is necessary for the crew to establish
contact with the departure controller, verify responding to assigned
transponder code, and verify radar contact. Once these initial contacts
have been made, the crew must monitor the assigned frequencies for
any further instructions or traffic advisories. Because of the increase
in air traffic, the greatest problem in departure control is congestion
on the frequencies, and the need to continually change frequencies in
changing from one controller to another.
Current Jet Operational Requirements and Constraints
Coordinated control of aircraft in high traffic density, terminal
areas is the chief concern of departure control. Aircraft operating in
this airspace are required to maintain a communications link with the
facility and pass information as requested, or to comply with ATC
instructions. This allows ATC to effect the appropriate separations
for departing aircraft.
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Current Jet Implementation Concepts
As aircraft are cleared onto the runway for takeoff, they are
usually switched from local control to departure control. This is
accomplished via the VHF communications equipment. The crew
must dial in the new frequency, or if using channelized equipment,
select the appropriate channel. The crew conveys information con-
cerning identification, position, and compliance with transponder
code instructions. The ATC facility will usually indicate radar sur-
veillance (i.e., radar contact and identification) and any maneuver
instructions or other pertinent information.
SST Potential Operational Requirements and Constraints
For the most part, the same type of information requirements
will exist for SST flight as for current jets. In "The Role of Com-
munications in SST Flight Path Management, " Polhemus (ref. 27)
points out some additional SST requirements,
We presently employ the air/ground communi-
cations system to ensure safe separation and control
of aircraft using the airspace; to determine terminal
and enroute weather conditions; to indicate aircrew
intentions as regards track, position, and planned
time of arrival when ground facilities require this
information; and to select and evaluate alternate
routes of flight in cooperation with company operated
_erformance, computers, etc. However, each of
these functions presently exists independent of the
other. The manager or coordinator of the various
data required in operation of the aircraft is the air-
crew member. In subsonic jet aircraft the range of
alternative courses of action is small and the penal-
ties for mismanagement of the coordination function
is not too severe. In supersonic aircraft, the com-
pression of time in which a decision may be made is
significantly shorter and the consequences of a poor
decision may be great enough to turn an otherwise
_rofitable flight into a costly blooper...
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It is also necessary that the ATC controller note any conflicts
at the earliest possible moment, so that the SST crew will be able to
level off without subjecting passengers to unnecessary g loading.
Feasible Automated Implementation Concepts for SST
The SST crew should be relieved of many communications by the
coded transponder (beacon) and the utilization of the air/ground data
lir_k. A look at a forecasted ATC system may be helpful in estimating
the workload which ATC will place upon the SST crew. This will help
identify those areas where actual voice communications will be neces-
sary to coordinate and pass information.
A paper presented at the IATA Fourteenth Technical Conference,
on "Air Traffic Control for the Supersonic Transport, " (ref. 28)
describes one conception of the future ATC system.
• .. it is assumed that the supersonic transport will be
automatically controlled during most of its flight pro-
file, especially during the climbout phase. Therefore,
since air traffic control will have the complete flight
profile submitted in the form of a flight plan, a clear
takeoff route and climbout profile in the form of a
clearance can be given to the aircraft with a high
degree of assurance that the aircraft will be capable
of making such a profile good. With the available
data gathering equipment mentioned previously, the
climbout can be monitored by traffic control to assure
that the aircraft is following its clearance. With three-
dimensional radar information available, it will be
possible to provide vectoring when required. The
supersonic transport will climb out on standard types
of routes which will be established to minimize the
noise problems and control problems inherent in inte-
grating it with other traffic movements. Control will
be based primarily on radar information to minimize
horizontal separation distances and by the use of radar
height information to provide vertical separation from
other aircraft on crossing paths...
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It would appear from the foregoing discussion that the major
portion of the forecasted communications workload can be absorbed
by automatic systems. All routine communications would be handled
automatically and only in the case of clearance changes or non-routine
messages would stand-by voice communications be utilized. Even
these situations would be automated to the extent that much of the
frequency monitoring could be eliminated, and the selected calling
method of operation utilized. Such changes would reduce the com-
munications workload, as well as the restrictiveness of such monitor-
ing tasks. It would appear that under ideal conditions the workload
created in the cockpit by present communications requirements,
would be considerably reduced. This relief in workload could be put
to good use in optimizing the SST flight profile.
As was previously discussed, new equipment and procedures
will be introduced in an evolutionary manner. As a result, subsonic
jet crews may experience the new system before the SST becomes
operational.
Feasible Manual Implementation Concepts for SST
In a manual concept the crew is responsible for complying with
ATC regulations, making any reports as required and passing all
requested information. Voice communications will continue to be the
backup communications capability. All non-routine messages will be
passed by this means. The major disadvantages of using voice com-
munications alone are the over-crowded frequencies and the require-
ment for constant frequency monitoring.
It would appear that with the new control procedures and equip-
ment being utilized by ATC, the number of required communications
is decreasing. However, the manual concept will still be more
restricted and more demanding of the crew than the proposed automatic
implementation concepts.
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3. 4 FUNCTION 3. 4 ACTIVATE/DEACTIVATE NO SMOKING SIGNS
Purpose
The purpose of this function is to establish crew-passenger com-
munications so as to insure compliance with safety and standard operating
procedures. At specific times during the flight the crew will be required
to inform passengers of any restrictions pertaining to smoking. These
•_.-..._o,_,,,,.oa "o._ usually __p_eified_ by. regulation_ and/or company standard oper-
ating procedures.
Current Jet Operational Requirements and Constraints
Federal aviation regulations specify that aircraft must be equipped
with visual signs operated by the crew to advise passengers of any re-
strictions pertaining to smoking:
FAR 121. 317, ref. 11:
Passenger Information.
(u) No person may operate an airplane un-
less it is equipped with signs that am visible
to passengers and cabin attendants to notify
them when smoking is prohibited and when
safety belts should be fastened. The signs must
be so constructed that the crew, can turn them
on and off. They must be turned on for each
takeoff and each landing and when otherwise
considered to be necessary, by the pilot in com-
mand.
(b) No passenger or cabin a_endant may
smoke while the no smoking sign is lighted and
each passenger shall fasten his seat belt and
keep it fastened while the seat belt sign is
lighted.
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Current Jet Implementation Concepts
As specified in the regulations, lighted signs operated by the crew
are utilized to inform both passengers and attendants of any restrictions
placed on smoking. Usually these signs are activated prior to takeoff
(during ground handling activities) and then again prior to landing. Once
the aircraft is airborne and operating normally, the signs are deactivated.
SST Potential Operational Requirements and Constraints
At the present time there do not appear to be any potential con-
straints. However, if at a later date it appears that during flight at
cruise altitude, the air conditioning system is overtaxed providing for
ozone control, some provision may have to be made to make this a no
smoking phase of flight.
Feasible Automated Implementation Concepts for SST
Since this is merely the activation or deactivation of a lighted sign,
automated performance does not seem necessary.
Feasible Manual Implementation Concepts for SST
The crew must insure that passengers are made aware of the no
smoking sign and comply with regulations.
In most cases the means for conveying this information is a lighted
sign, activated and deactivated by the cockpit crew at certain established
points in the flight (e. g., takeoff and landing). For the crew the task is
merely moving a switch to energize or de-energize the sign. Then,
depending on airline operating procedures flight attendants usually advise
passengers of the sign and insure compliance with the regulation.
_62
These small tasks can usually be incorporated as a step in a
phase-oriented check (see Phase-Oriented System Checks) and would
not be considered a function. However, in those cases where the
requirements preclude incorporation within a check procedure, the
activation and deactivation of no-smoking reigns must be called oul
separately.
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3. 5 FUNCTION 3. 5 ACTIVATE/DEACTIVATE FASTEN SEAT BELT
Purpose
This function establishes crew-passenger communications to
insure compliance with safety procedures requiring the use of the
fasten seat belt sign. During those phases of flight which could ad-
versely affect the passengers, it is the crew's responsibility to insure
that the passengers comply with this requirement. Although the flight
profile would only seem to indicate two periods for seat belt use, (i. e.,
the takeoff and the landing), the fasten seat belt sign must be turned
on whenever the pilot considers it necessary because of weather or
any other reason.
Current Jet Operational Requirements and Constraints
Federal aviation regulations, standard operating procedures, and
passenger safety dictate the use of warning signs throughout specific
portions of the flight. The applicable FAA regulation is presented in
the section on Function 3. 4.
Current Jet Implementation Concepts
As specified in regulations, aircraft are equipped with warning
signs to advise passengers when seat belts are warranted. During
ground handling, takeoff, and landing when there is always the possi-
bility of some abrupt maneuver, the crew must make sure that these
signs are lighted and complied with. In most situations the activation
of these signs is merely a step in a phase-oriented check and system
set-up. However, there are situations (e. g., enroute turbulence)
when this becomes a discrete segment of performance.
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SST Potential Operational Requirements and Constraints
The SST may bring with it restrictions on passenger mobility
because of higher accelerations, steeper climb/descent angles, and
higher speeds than on current aircraft. The steep climb angles may
preclude any movement by passengers away from their seats until
cruise altitude is attained; and at the other end of the flight, no move-
ment once the cruise altitude has been left.
Feasible Automated Implementation Concepts for SST
As has been pointed out, regulations require a lighted warning
sign which must be activated and deactivated by the crew at specific
times. This will be handled manually as in current operations.
Feasible Manual Implementation Concepts for SST
The activation and deactivation of a lighted sign will be the means
employed by the SST crew to comply with regulations and to insure
passenger awareness of safety procedures. The high performance
characteristics of the SST will require that passengers have their seat
belts fastened for longer periods of time than at present. The crew
will need to consider this as a factor in maneuvering at supersonic
speeds.
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3. 6 FUNCTION 3. 6 INITIAL POSITION REPORT
Purpose
This function establishes informational flow to provide Air
Traffic Control with sufficient information to optimize control pro-
cedures and traffic separation. These communications can actually
be considered a part of the departure communications. However, the
initial position report is described separately to differentiate between
those communiques necessary during the initial minutes of flight and
those necessary during departure maneuvers.
In terms of today's operations, the initial position phase of the
flight would be concerned with either the first communications with an
ATC facility after being released by departure, or in a large control
sector, with the original departure controller. In any case the aircraft
would be clear of the terminal area, and more than likely, would be
involved in the subsonic climb portion of the instrument departure.
During this phase the crew might be required to change frequencies,
and to report completion of a portion of the standard instrument
departure.
Current Jet Operational Requirements and Constraints
In areas that lack surveillance radar coverage, much reliance
is placed on manual separation procedures, however, these procedures
increase the amount of communication required. To resolve any possi-
ble conflicts and ascertain that appropriate separations are being pro-
vided, the ATC controller needs reassurance that clearances are being
followed. He obtains this information from the crew in the form of a
position report (e. g., over some fix at some altitude and time), and is
then able to establish a three-dimensional image of his traffic.
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Current Jet Implementation Concepts
Shortly after takeoff the crew becomes involved in a series of
communications which include amendments to clearances, radar vec-
tors, traffic information, and requests for information. Since all this
data is passed via common VHF/UHF frequencies, the possDdc con-
gestion problem is evident. As control procedures become more r_,]i-
able, the number of necessary communiques will decrease and in fact.
today, the number of necessary communications is already decr_:asing.
SST Potential Operational Requirements and Constraints
The SST will be operating in the subsonic environment for as
short a time as possible. The speed and high performance character-
istics of the aircraft will necessitate timely communications. It would
appear that with the equipment and radar coverage envisioned by ATC,
problems of timeliness will be eliminated because the data will be auto-
matically obtained and displayed.
Feasible Automated Implementation Concepts for SST
The role of communications in aircraft operation is"changin_
constantly and as a result the role of the crew is also changing. By
the time the SST commences operations most communications concerned
with air traffic control are expected to be handled by automatic systems.
Data from aircraft will be in a form acceptable to ground computers
which will in turn present visual displays to the controllers. This
situation display wLll give the controller the capability of forecasting
traffic conflicts far enough in advance to resolve them within the
maneuvering capabilities of the SST. The automated ATC structure is
depicted in Figure 20 for the initial portion of the enroute operation.
The four consoles shown are:
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Console 4: Enroute planning controller's console which
maintains coordination throughout the enroute
portion of the flight.
Console 11: Enroute controller's console which is used to
accept control from departure control and
maintain control throughout sector.
Console 12: Subsequent enroute controller's console.
_onsole 7: Flow control console maintains data on future
flight for possible conflicts.
It should be emphasized that information concerning altitude,
position, airspeed, and so on, is essential for proper functioning of
the control system. If the aircraft were to lose its automatic capa-
bility, or the ground presentation system were to malfunction, then
it would be necessary to obtain this information by other techniques.
So, although it appears that routine communications could be handled
automatically from takeoff to landing, the possibility of reverting to a
manual system must not be overlooked.
On an automatic system such as the one described, the crew's
role would be to monitor the system operation, and to convey any
information requested which cannot be passed via the automatic system
(e. g. , visual observation of traffic).
Feasible Manual Implementation Concepts for SST
VHF/UHF voice communications would continue to provide back-
up for automatic systems. It is interesting to note that because of the
increased sophistication of the ATC structure, the crew's communications
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workload is decreasing as less coordination is necessary to achieve
the same or greater degrees of control reliability. This appears to
indicate that a manual implementation concept could be both practical
and feas ible.
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3. 7 FUNCTION 3. 7 AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL COMMUNICATIONS
FOR HAND-OFF
Purpose
This function is to establish communications with a new ATC
control facility after release from the preceding control sector. ATC
hand-off is the procedure in which the controller of one sector transfers
an etch--"...._ aL_:*"'"'_""_,,,u,._h_._ r.nn*T.n]_........... tn the controller of another ATC control
sector. This involves identifying the aircraft, and transferring all
important control information. For the aircraft crew, this involves
receipt of a new frequency, release from the original operating fre-
quency, initial contact with the new control sector, verification of
position, and provision of any other requested information.
The Air Traffic Control structure is complex, and is divided into
sectors which coordinate the movement of air traffic within the system.
In the early days of aviation the control sector boundaries represented
large blocks of time, and there was no problem of repeated frequency
shifts. However, with today's subsonic carriers and especially with
future supersonic aircraft these sectors are not realistic. Since
modern aircraft pass quickly through several control sectors, com-
pliance with the old communications requirements results in heavy
communications tasks.
Current Jet Operational Requirements and Constraints
In a typical scheduled flight an aircraft crosses several control
sectors and is required to maintain coordination with each of them so
that information can be conveyed in a timely fashion and the aircraft
can be under constant radar surveillance.
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Current Jet Implementation Concepts
As an aircraft enters a new area of control, the ATC controller
from the previous control sector clears the aircraft from his frequency
and instructs the crew to contact the next facility on a given frequency.
Once the new facility controller has identified the aircraft and its route
of flight, there are usually no further requirements for communications
until the aircraft is ready to enter still another area of control at
which time new hand-off instructions would be provided.
SST Potential Operational Requirements and Constraints
Supersonic aircraft, traveling at 30 miles per minute, would
traverse control sectors rapidly, and if required to establish contact
with them all, would be overwhelmed with communications. Fortunate-
ly, the ATC structure is changing to handle this coordination problem.
Although current distances between reports are not realistic for the
SST, changes are already being incorporated into ATC procedures
which will alleviate this situation and keep control communications down
to a minimum.
Feasible Automated Implementation Concepts for SST
The advent of the SST will bring about new ATC concepts and a
completely automatic system that will permit automatic hand-off and
ground controlled frequency changes of the aircraft's equipment. Thus
the automatic system will fulfill the requirement to change frequencies,
make initial contact, establish radar contact, pass along position infor-
mation, and acknowledge instructions. These are routine communica-
tions which currently clutter radio frequencies. In addition, a form of
SELCAL (selected calling) will eliminate the present need to continually
monitor all communications.
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With the completely automatic system envisioned for the SST, the
crew will be able to monitor other parameters of flight and concentrate
efforts on obtaining an efficient and economical SST flight, rather than
worrying about control communications. The crew will still be respon-
sible for insuring that the data link equipment is functioning normally,
and that control information is conveyed as required.
In the event of malfunction, the crew would in all likelihood
experience workloads comparable to those in today's operations. ATC
requires the same information ""_'_*_"_"_,,=_,,,..it ;_ tran_m_ttoa.............. hy voice com-
munications or the automatic system. Automatic data is faster, relieves
congestion on over-crowded frequencies, and can be fed into ground
based data processors for easy display.
Feasible Manual Implementation Concepts for SST
The use of VHF/UHF voice communications, as in today's oper-
ations, would serve to fulfill hand-off requirements in the event of mal-
function of the automatic systems. The crew's responsibility would be
to comply with ATC controller instructions and to convey any requested
information.
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3. 8 FUNCTION 3. 8 ENROUTE ATC COMMUNICATIONS
Purpose
This function provides informational flow as necessary throughout
the cruise portion of the flight so that ATC can maintain safe and expedi-
tious flow of air traffic. These communications consist of such infor-
mation as position of the aircraft in three-dimensional space, requests
for changes in original clearances, unpredicted weather phenomena,
and non-routine information. The crew also requires information con-
cerning other traffic, amendments to clearances, unforecasted weather
and anything else which might affect the flight.
Current Jet Operational Requirements and Constraints
An aircraft operating within the Air Traffic Control structure is
required to maintain informational flow with ATC to optimize coordina-
tion. With the advent of jet aircraft, communications during the enroute
portion of the flight started to become quite heavy. The small sectors
of control coupled with the faster aircraft speeds created tremendous
communications workload. New procedures have reduced the communi-
cations necessary, but the basic requirement to supply information as
requested still exists.
Current Jet Implementation Concepts
The VHF/UHF voice communications and the transponder beacon
are the methods of providing the coordination necessary during enroute
portions of the flight. Sectors of control for high altitude subsonic jets
have been expanded, and scheduled reporting points have almost been
completely eliminated. In the event some conflict arises, or informa-
tion needs to be passed (e.g., pilot observed weather phenomena),
voice communications are used.
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SST Potential Operational Requirements and Constraints
The means of communications available and the types of infor-
mation needed by the SST crew will differ slightly from those on cur-
rent jets. Additional information will also be required. For example,
the SST's sensitivity to weather, and the ever-prevailing problem of
sonic boom generation makes timely weather data essential for the
efficient accomplishment of the SST profile. Although some data will
be internally generated by sensors, there will be a need for other
parameters best conveyed via the communications link.
Feasible Automated Implementation Concepts for SST
Although the need exists for increased informational flow, the
implementation concepts envisioned seem to forecast a lighter crew
workload. Automatic data link with a printer, selected call-up, and
ground initiated frequency shifts will relieve the crew of many of the
routine tasks performed by today's crews. The crew's main function
will be to monitor the automatic system and insure that proper infor-
mational flow is maintained. The use of the coded transponder beacon
will furnish the ATC controller with most of the information he needs
to provide safe and expeditious control. In most cases few if any voice
communications will be necessary.
Feasible Manual Implementation Concepts for SST
It appears that the use of VHF/UHF voice communications for
fulfilling the enroute ATC requirements is feasible, although because
of increased workload this might require a larger crew.
As the aircraft operates within the enroute portion of the auto-
mated ATC environment, various functions may occur. Some of these
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are shown in Figure 21, and include such things as revisions to clearances,
let down instructions, and hand-off instructions.
These control consoles indicated are:
Console 13: Flow control planner coordinates traffic in
the terminal area.
Console 14: Enroute planning controller detects conflicts
within an area and resolves them.
Console 15: Enroute controller within a new control sector.
Console 18: Enroute controller within subsequent control
sector.
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3. 9 FUNCTION 3. 9 INTERCOM ANNOUNCEMENTS
Purpose
This function entails keeping the passengers informed of the
progress of the flight and of any noteworthy highlights. The frequency
of such communications is primarily dependent upon the Captain, com-
pany policies, and Federal regulations. Except for safety information
these communiques are scarcely a passenger requirement. Such com-
munications began in the early days of aviation when people were quite
apprehensive about flying. To alleviate these tensions, the crew tried
to establish rapport by keeping passengers aware of the weather, the
route of flight, landmarks, and so forth. The SST will introduce a new
era of aviation to the public, and once again such rapport may be im-
portant in quieting apprehensions. Passengers will want to be advised
of safety procedures and characteristics of the flight profile.
Current Jet Requirements and Constraints
For the most part, intercom announcements are limited to items
of interest and safety. The cockpit crew, or in some cases the cabin
attendants, communicate any required information to the passengers.
The following regulations apply:
FAR 121. 571, ref. 11: (Similar to ICAO Regs. 4. 2. 8. 1
and 4. 2. 8. 2, ref. 12)
Briefing passengers; extended over-water flights.
(a) Each certificate holder operating an air-
plane in extended overwater operations shall
ensure that all passengers ai_e orally briefed
Oil-
(l) The location and operation of emer-
gency exits;
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(9) The location and operation of life pre-
servers, including a demonstration of don-
ning and inflating a life preserver; and
(3) The location of liferafts.
(b) The certificate holder shall describe the
procedure to be followed in the briefing in its
manual.
(e) If the airplane proceeds directly over
water after takeoff, the briefing on locations of
life preservers and emergency exits must be
done before takeoff; and the re.st of the briefing
must be done as soon as practicable after take-
off.
(d) if the airplane does not piv, ceed -':--_"_LI. 11 t"lL i I_
over water after takeoff, no part of the briefing
has to be given before takeoff but the entire
briefing must be given before reaching the over
water part of the flight.
ICAO Reg. 4. 2.8, ref. 12:
Passengers.
An operator shall ensure that pas-
sengers are made familiar with the
location and use of:
a) safety belts;
b) emergency exits;
c) life jackets, if the carriage of life
jackets is prescribed;
d) oxygen dispensing equipment, if
the provision of oxygen for the use of
passengers is prescribed; and
e) other emergency equipment pro-
vided for individual use.
179
Current Jet Implementation Concepts
Subsonic carrier crews use the public address system to greet
the passengers, advise them of any safety instructions, and point out
any highlights of the flight. Once the initial remarks have been made,
cabin attendants instruct the passengers in the use of any safety equip-
ment or procedures.
SST Potential Operational Requirements and Constraints
The SST will be a new aircraft operating in a new environment.
The public will want to know as much as possible about the flight and
the aircraft environment. Passengers will be experiencing more
restraints than on current carriers and will want to be reassured
about their safety. Current requirements will continue into SST oper-
ations with the added need for more complete information.
Feasible Automated Implementation Concepts for SST
Since one of the main purposes of this function is to establish a
relationship between the passengers and the crew, it does not appear
feasible to think in terms of an automatic implementation concept.
Therefore, current operations would be continued, at least with regard
to equipment.
Feasible Manual Implementation Concepts for SST
As in current operations, the crew will be required to inform
passengers of anything that might be of interest. Any information which
would help to alleviate passenger apprehension should be conveyed at
the appropriate time (i. e. , during climb-out, transonic acceleration,
descent, etc. ). These detailed communications will be particularly
important in the initial SST operations when the public will be curious
about the SST characteristics and the new operational environment.
Although this type of communication is beneficial to airline-
passenger relationships, it is a non-essential function. Obviously.
theSST could depart on a scheduled flight, complete its profile, and
arrive at its destination without any intercom announcements° Th(,
operation of the system would be unaffected. It is not anticipated tha_
the SST crew will be required to increase concern for this ar_a of co_-_
munications. The intercom-public address system will continue to be
used for most such informationaltransfer, although reading matter
might also help to _L_:Ju_= _=_angcr int_,_* =n_ o_nfidence.
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3. I0 FUNCTION 3. I0 ENROUTE COMPANY COMMUNICATIONS
Purpose
This function is the coordination and informational flow to the
company for use by management in scheduling and other decisions.
Information concerning operating efficiency and deviations from the
scheduled profile is also conveyed.
The main purpose of ATC communications is the safe and expedi-
tious flow of air traffic, and as a result it constitutes the majority of
communication activities. Company communications are used to
gather operational data and to anticipate changes in any scheduling.
Accordingly, they make up a small portion of the communications
workload.
Current Jet Operational Requirements and Constraints
Airline policies and standard operating procedures dictate when
and what kind of communications are necessary to fulfill requirements.
Management often needs to make timely decisions based upon informa-
tion provided by aircraft crews.
In current operations at least the following company communica-
tions are necessary: (1} immediately after takeoff the time off and the
fuel on board must be reported; (2} flight watch reports may be required,
and estimates to subsequent reporting points; (3) terminal area com-
munications with the dispatcher are necessary to find out about weather
in the terminal area, and for reporting ETA (estimated time of arrival}
and fuel. Any change in the alternate would also be discussed with the
dispatcher; and (4} after landing and being cleared off the runway, the
crew switches to company gate control for a gate assignment.
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Current Jet Implementation Concepts
The crew's responsibility is to convey information as necessary.
and to insure that the company is kept advised of any non-scheduled
performance (e. g., diverting to an alternate, non-routine performance
of some system, etc. ). HF voice communications are used in current
operations to fulfill the requirement for enroute company communica-
tion. In most cases, a separate piece of equipment is fitted with a
selected calling (SELCAL) feature which eliminates the need for the
crew to continually monitor company frequencies.
SST Potential Operational Requirements and Constraints
It would appear that with the advent of SST operations, manage-
ment will require closer coordination with airborne crews to insure
economy of operation. This may mean that either more, or lengthier
communications will be required. In particular, communications
coordination will be required with maintenance so that turn around
time can be kept to a minimum.
Feasible Automated Implementation Concepts for SST
There is the possibility that the company can utilize a form of
ground air data link to obtain routine information, and the selected
calling voice communications to pass non-routine information, in
much the same manner envisioned for normal ATC communications.
It has also been suggested that much of the profile generation informa-
tion be processed by company computers and conveyed via data link to
the aircraft. The aircraft would receive and process the raw data to
obtain an optimum flight profile.
All indications seem to point to an increase in informational
flow between the company and the airborne aircraft during all phases
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of the flight profile. However, it is also evident that the majority of
this information will be carried via automatic communication channels.
Coded interrogation signals will initiate a "data dump" from the air-
craft's memory core. Non-routine information will be transmitted
via print-out or selected calling methods.
Feasible Manual Implementation Concepts for SST
Operations similar to current techniques will be used to manually
implement this functional performance.
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3. II FUNCTION 3. II ATC COMMUNICATIONS FOR
DECELERATION/INITIAL DESCENT
Purpose
This function is the receipt of information and clearances from
Air Traffic Control for coordination of the deceleration and supersonic
descent of the SST. Prior to starting this phase of operations, it
would be beneficial if clearance ._traight through to touchdown is
obtained. This assurance will be predicated on the traffic situation,
the current weather parameters, and the performance characteristics
of the particular aircraft.
Current Jet Operational Requirements and Constraints
The basic requirement for subsonic operations is that clearance
be obtained for departing ci'uise altitude. As aircraft near their desti-
nation, begin to leave cruise altitudes, and are funneled towards the
final landing, more stringent control must be placed upon aircraft
maneuvers. It must also be remembered that jet aircraft operate
more efficiently at higher altitudes; therefore, all delays should be
absorbed while the aircraft is still at altitude.
Current Jet Implementation Concepts
As the aircraft approaches its terminal area, it will require a
descent clearance, an approach fix, and an expected approach clear-
ance time (EAC). These procedural parameters are obtained by a
clearance from ATC. Current jet crews utilize normal VHF/UHF
communication channels to obtain this information and to coordinate
their maneuvers with other ATC traffic.
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SST Potential Operational Requirements and Constraints
As in current operations, the need will exist to coordinate
passage through various altitude layers during the descent and decel-
eration. This coordination may need to be more rigid if the SST is
less maneuverable than current aircraft while it is decelerating, and
because care must be taken to control possible sonic boom over-
pressure generation. There will also be the requirement to consider
fuel consumption of the SST during subsonic operations. If at all
feasible, all delays should be absorbed prior to descent clearance.
Feasible Automated Implementation Concepts for SST
In this phase of the flight profile there will be no new equipment
to perform the communications function. The basic ground-air data
link will continue to furnish all routine data and information, while
non-routine and emergency data will be conveyed via voice communi-
cations. Under completely ideal conditions the pre-flight filed flight
plan in its final clearance form will continue to be in effect. As the
destination is neared, the descent would be initiated automatically in
accordance with the original clearance. Only in those situations where
revisions were necessary would the crew be required to feed new clear-
ance data into their navigational equipment.
Feasible Manual Implementation Concepts for SST
The crew's utilization of VHF/UHF voice communications will be
sufficient to fulfill requirements of this function. In this mode of oper-
ation, the crew's performance will be similar to that on current air-
craft. The crew will be responsible for obtaining a descent clearance,
and any other clearance information necessary for them to complete the
subsequent phases of flight in an optimum manner.
186
3. 12 FUNCTION 3. 12 ATC APPROACH CONTROL COMMUNICATIONS
Purpose
This function establishes coordination and informational flow with
the facility controlling air traffic in the terminal control area (i.e., the
area containing the destination terminal).
The area in and around air termin__Js is highly saturated with both
departing and arriving aircraft. For this reason control and coordination
requirements become very strict as .one nears the destination terminal.
Informational flow must be timely, both to the controller and to the air
crew, to resolve any traffic conflicts which might arise.
Current Jet Operational Requirements and Constraints
The number of communiques in this phase is high because of high
traffic density terminal areas, and the coordination necessary to provide
sequencing and spacing for both arriving and departing aircraft. The
crew needs to obtain specific control information (e. g., holding instruc-
tions, expected approach, weather, etc. ). The ATC controller needs
confirmation that the aircraft is complying with instructions {i.e., hold-
ing as instructed, commenced approach, maintaining specified altitudes,
etc. ). A large amount of information must be exchanged between air-
craft and controller. In addition, there are numerous aircraft in the
terminal area, and they often use the same frequencies. The conges-
tion problem which exists as a result, should be evident.
Current Jet Implementation Concepts
As aircraft approach the terminal area, the enroute ATC con-
troller usually initiates a hand-off (see Function 3. 7) to the approach
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control facility handling the destination terminal. Once contact has
been established, a clearance is usually issued which contains all
necessary approach information for the crew. The crew usually
indicates their compliance with instructions to approach control.
Any amendments to the clearance are also communicated.
These communications continue until the aircraft has completed all
approach maneuvers, and has been turned onto final approach. At
that time a control hand-off is made to local control.
SST Potential Operational Requirements and Constraints
The SST may be very sensitive to unscheduled delays in the
subsonic environment. Holds and rerouting will need to be kept to
a minimum. Other than the requirement for terse and precise pro-
cedures and communiques, all current requirements should exist in
the SST era.
Feasible Automated Implementation Concepts for SST
The use of the data link, printer, and transponder beacon will
assist in making control decisions, and maintaining appropriate
separations. However, it does not appear feasible at this time to
think in terms of complete automatic implementation of this function.
Feasible Manual Implementation Concepts for SST
The FAA report, "Design for the National Airspace Utilization
System," (ref. 23) indicates that aircraft in the approach phase of
flight will be involved in communications concerning approach clear-
ance, hand-off, terminal route, descent clearance, runway and ter-
minal weather, speed reduction, and many other factors. Most of
these communiques must be considered as non-routine (i. e. , not
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readily handled by data link) and would be conveyed via voice communi-
cations as in current operations. However, it does not appear that there
will be an increase over current communications control. In general,
current subsonic aircraft crews indicate that communications, although
bothersome, are relatively unrestrictive in the approach phase of flight.
It is anticipated that the SST crew involvement will be less than
that currently, and that the workload will decrease slightly_ primarily
due to the new equipment and procedures which will be utilized by ATC
facilities.
The same type of information will be needed for the SST as for
current aircraft, but because of greater internal coordination conflicts
will be resolved earlier which will preclude having to make amendment
communiques. Tighter control and coordination should decrease the
amount of necessary communiques and thus the workload for both the
controller and the crew.
An aircraft operating within the automated ATC environment will
be handled in a manner similar to that depicted in Figure 22 as it enters
the terminal control area.
Those control consoles shown include:
Console 16: Marshalling controller's console where
landing times are assigned.
Console 17: Arrival planning controller's console
where hold orders and altitudes are issued.
Console 19: Sequence controller's console where
initial approach instructions are issued.
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Console 20: Final spacing controller's console where
where final approach instructions are issued.
Console 21: Local controller's console where landing
clearance is is sued.
Console 22: Ground controller's console where taxi
instructions are issued and the flight plan
is closed.
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3. 13 FUNCTION 3. 13 FINAL APPROACH COMMUNICATIONS
Purpose
This function provides coordination and informational flow to the
ATC controller during the final approach to landing, to insure safe
spacing, sequencing, and landing clearance. Final approach communi-
cations are usually exchanges concerned with that portion of the flight
in which the aircraft has intercepted the localizer on the ILS final
approach course, and communications control has been handed off to
the local controller. Final approach communications continue until
such time as the aircraft has landed and taxied clear of the operational
runway.
Current Jet Operational Requirements and Constraints
During the later portions of the approach to landing, both the
crew and the ATC controller require certain information. The crew
needs assurance that the runway is clear, information concerning run-
way conditions (e. g., runway surface weather conditions), and a land-
ing clearance. The controller requires information about the aircraft's
configuration (e. g., landing gear extended), and any information about
missed approach. Current procedures in the final approach phase have
been described by the FAA (ref. 23) as follows:
... After the pilot has turned on final approach and reduced
to final approach speed, the final spacing controller executes
a control transfer to local control.
Local control clears the flight to land and issues
present surface weather information to the pilot. After
the aircraft has landed and turned off the runway, the
local controller executes a control transfer to the ground
controller who issues taxi clearance ....
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Current Jet Implementation Concepts
In current operations, VHF/UHF voice communications are used
to convey all required information both to the crew and ATC controller.
Feasible Automated Implementation Concepts for SST
In this phase the crew is concerned with the shifting of frequen-
cies which accompanies hand-off from one controller to another, land-
ing clearance, and the prevailing surface weather. As in current
operations, the increased traffic density within the terminal area gives
rise to increased communications. It does not appear that use of trans-
ponders or the air-ground data link will decrease the workload of either
the aircrew or the ATC controller. The types of communications
required appear to be outside the routine classification and thus voice
communications will be required.
Feasible Manual ImplementatLon Concepts for SST
It appears that the communications activity required of the crew
during final approach will not change appreciably from current oper-
ations with the advent of SST.
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3. 14 FUNCTION 3. 14 DESTINATION GROUND HANDLING
COMMUNICA TIONS
Purpose
Upon completion of landing rollout, this function provides the
necessary coordination and exchange of information required to move
the aircraft from the end of the operational runway to its designated
unloading area, and then insures compliance with company policies in
unloading passengers and deactivating the aircraft system. In general,
the communications tasks will involve ATC ground control communica-
tions, company communications with the gate assigner and ground
handling crews, as well as intra-crew and crew-passenger communi-
cations.
Current Jet Operational Requirements and Constraints
A matter of prime concern of the major air terminals is the safe
and expeditious movement of aircraft and other vehicles along the taxi-
ways, ramps, and parking areas of the facility. To fulfill this require-
ment, coordination must be established between the aircraft crew and
the ground controller. Instructions in the form of a clearance are
passed to the aircraft, once the ground controller has been informed
of its assigned gate. The primary reason for ATC communications is
the receipt of appropriate taxi clearance and instruction. This parti-
cular aircraft-ATC coordination has been described as follows (ref.
23):
... After the aircraft has landed and turned off the runway,
the local controller executes a control transfer to the
ground controller who issues taxi instructions.
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Next in importance are those company communications concern-
ing dispatcher coordination with ground handling crews. The crew
obtains an unloading area from the gate assigner. Once the unloading
area has been assigned and any other urgent information is conveyed,
remaining communications are with the ground handling crew regard-
ing parking the aircraft and deactivating the system.
Communications and coordination tasks involving system status
increase in the cockpit right after the landing. Post landing checks,
pre-d_activation equipment set-ups, systems evaluations for possible
maintenance reports, and deactivation procedures all require intra-
crew communication and coordination to some degree.
Also during this final phase of the flight information concerning
safety or items of interest must be conveyed to the passengers, e.g.,
local time and weather.
Current Jet Implementation Concepts
The tasks performed by the crew will be very similar to those
described in Function 3. 1 Ground Handling Communications as will
the implementation concepts, requirements and constraints. Initially,
the crew contacts the company dispatcher to receive a gate assignment,
conveys this information to ATC ground control via VHF/UHF voice
communications and receives a taxi clearance and instructions.
Most of the cockpit coordination needed to perform system shut-
down procedures is handled by direct voice communications. For those
areas outside normal voice range, intercom equipment is utilized.
The crew informs the passengers about continuing to observe
the fasten seat belts and no smoking signs. Further amplifying remarks
are usually communicated by the flight attendants. The flight attendants
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remind the passengers about hand carried articles, procedures of the
particular terminal, and any other noteworthy items.
Once the aircraft has been parked, external power attached to
the aircraft, and the engines deactivated, ground handling communica-
tions are considered complete. It is essential that the aircraft crew
be in communication with the ground handling crews during power plants
shut down, in the event of some malfunction, (e. g. , fire). For the
most part, communication required during ground handling operations
at the destination is comparable to communications during the initial
ground handling operations.
SST Potential Operational Requirements and Constraints
It would appear that no new areas of concern will be generated
by the introduction of the SST into commercial aviation. The only possi-
ble exception to this might be different coordination due to potentially
restricted visibility from the SST cockpit.
Feasible Automated Implementation Concepts for SST
There does not appear to be a need for automating this particular
function. Performance will be quite similar to current operations, and
the equipment used will likewise be similar.
Feasible Manual Implementation Concepts for SST
All operations will be quite similar to current operational pro-
cedures, and in general the means employed will be VHF/UHF com-
munications (ATC communications), HF communications {company
communications), intercom {intra-crew and ground handling), public
address (crew-passenger).
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ATC communications will be similar to current operations.
However, it is likely that because of the decreased visibility character-
istics of the SST, more coordination will be necessary so that the SST
will clear all obstructions. This may mean that the ATC communica-
tions workload will increase in this phase of the flight. (See the
description of taxiing, Function 5. 21, to find the requirements of the
crew in regard to obstruction clearance information. )
As was stated in the description of Function 3. 1, many of the
lengthy system checks will be accomplished via the on-line computcr,
which will also display a checklist for crew to cross-check. The com-
puter system check should decrease the workload associated at present
with procedures verification, preclude the use of lengthy checklists, and
decrease intra-crew communication requirements. Crew-passenger
communications and the coordination with ground handling crews should
remain the same as in current operations.
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3. 15 FUNCTION 3. 15 VISUAL TRAFFIC VIGILANCE
Purpose
This function provides information concerning any visual sight-
ings of other air traffic which might have some bearing on the safety
or integrity of the SST. Generally speaking, the crew is responsible
for clearing obstructions when operating on the ground, and for being
constantly alert for conflicting traffic while airborne. Although ATC
provides separation for all aircraft under control, the crew is not
relieved of the responsibility to scan the area in the proximity of the
flight path for any possible conflicting traffic.
Current Jet Operational Requirements and Constraints
The increase in traffic density has created the requirement for
constant vigilance to maintain safe separation distances. Even on the
ground, the requirement for obstruction clearance makes it necessary
for the crew to maintain inspection of the area in close proximity to
the aircraft. The following specific regulations apply:
FAR 91.65, ref. 13: (Similar to ICAO Reg.
Operating near other aircraft
(a) No person may operate an aircraft so
close to another aircraft as to create a collision
hazard.
(b) :No person may operate an aircraft in
formation flight except by arrangement with
the pilot in command of each aircraft in the
formation.
(c) No person may operate an aircraft,
carrying passengers for hire, in formation
flight.
3. 2. 1, ref. 14)
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ICAO Reg. 3. 2. 2.5, ref.
Taking off.
An aircraft
about to take off shall not attempt to do
so until there is no apparent risk of col-
lision with other aircraft.
14:
ICAO Reg. 3. 2.6. i, ref. 14:
_eration on and in the vicinity of an aerodrome.
An aircraft operated on
or in the vicinity of an aerodrome shall,
whether or not within an aerodrome
traffic zone :
a) observe other aerodrome traffic
for the purpose of avoiding collision;
b) conform with or avoid the pattern
of traffic formed by other aircraft in
operation;
c) make all turns to the left, when
approaching for a landing and after
taking off, units otherwise instructed;
d) land and take off into the wind
unless safety or air traffic considera-
tions determine that a di/Terent direc-
tion is preferable.
Current Jet Implementation Concepts
Even though Air Traffic Control procedures endeavor to remove
all possible conflicts through the use of radar and manual separations,
aircraft not under ATC control can cause conflicts. As a result, the
crew is responsible for being constantly vigilant. The amount of crew
involvement will vary among airlines and crews. Generally speaking,
though, any time other tasks permit, a constant scan is maintained by
all crew members. It should be pointed out that this is becoming an
increasingly more difficult task, because airspeeds are increasing
(closing rates are very high) and visibility in the environment of the
subsonic jet is such that aircraft are difficult to see.
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SST Potential Operational Requirements and Constraints
The basic jet requirements will continue to exist in SST operations.
The safety of the aircraft will dictate that the crew maintain all possible
vigilance with regards to ground obstructions and airborne traffic.
It appears that ATC is becoming more stringent, with the result that
all traffic which might influence flight safety should be under their
control. This should reduce the involvement of the crew in maintain-
ing such vigilance.
Feasible Automated Implementation Concepts for SST
At the present time there are no strongly advocated concepts
which use a completely automatic implementation. Some experts have
advocated an automatic anti-collision system, but even this may not
be feasible for the aircraft during Mach 3 flight.
In general, the major vigilance problems will exist while the SST
is operating in the subsonic regime and within areas of high traffic
density. A purely manual concept is advocated to supplement the con-
trol provided by ATC.
Feasible Manual Implementation Concepts for SST
As in current operations, all available eyes will be scanning the
vicinity of the aircraft during ground operations, and the skies for
possible conflicting traffic while airborne. This means that the crew
will continue to have final responsibility for the aircraft's safety, even
though ATC is providing all possible separation through their procedures
and equipment.
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ACTIVITY4.0 POWER PLANT OPERATION
PURPOSE
The requirements placed upon the SST pose some monumental
problems for power plant design personnel. The power plant system
must be able to maintain a 400,000 to 500,000 pound aircraft at speeds
of Mach 3.0, and altitudes of 70, 000 to 80,000 feet. However, they
must also be capable of operating economically in the subsonic regime
and environment, and operating outside of the critical sonic boom over-
pressure envelope.
The specific engine design has not yet been selected, and as a
result the exact crew involvement cannot be specified. However, regard-
less of the engine design, there will be only minor differences in crew
roles, so that for all practtcai purposes the functiona! descr_,ptions on
the following pages will portray the relationships of the crew in utilizing
the power plant system.
Those factors which will influence the final design choice include
such things as noise problems (both ground noise and sonic boom),
specific fuel consumption (SFC), size, weight, and acceleration pro-
perties. These are problem areas which must be solved by the engine
designers.
Those factors which will influence the crew will be reliability of
the basic system, adequate thrust/weight capabilities, and controllability
of performance. All these factors will also pertain to the various back-
up subsystems (e. g., fuel, lubrication, heat transfer, etc. ). The type
of engine to be used (i. e., turbofan or turbojet), the need for optimizing
inlet duct and exhaust nozzle configurations, and the need to control the
output while operating at maximum RPM, will all introduce new procedures
into the cockpit of the SST.
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Without question the SST power plant must dwarf present subsonic
engines. Assuming gross takeoff weights of approximately 400,000
pounds and four engines per aircraft, each SST engine would develop
a sea-level thrust of 40,000 to 55,000 pounds. Diameter of a typical
engine will be such that a man could actually stand up inside it (5-6 feet},
and its overall length could easily be more than 20 feet, a good part of
this accounted for by inlet-outlet geometry.
In a sense, the SST power plant designer will be called upon to build
two engines in one--a subsonic engine and a supersonic engine. As a
subsonic mechanism, the SST engine will operate as a straightforward
compressor-turbine gas generator. As a supersonic mechanism, the
power plant will not only exist as a gas generator, but will have to handle
extraordinarily large masses of air at extremely high velocities, pres-
sures, and temperatures.
The solution to this particular problem is discussed in Activity
6 which deals with the Inlet Nozzle Configuration. Basically, the inlet
must be reconfigured in order to decelerate the incoming airflow so that
the engine can accept it. Once energy has been added to the airflow,
the outlet nozzle must be configured so as to control gas expansion and
eliminate power losses resulting from uncontrolled expansion to ambient
conditions.
Conventionally, throttling of an engine is considered to be a func-
tion of fuel flow and engine RPM's. In the SST engine, however, the
engine may be an automated variable in an integrated inlet-engine-outlet
schedule. And, optimum design may require that engine speeds and
airflows be kept constant at aircraft speeds above Mach 1.5, so that
thrust variations would be accomplished by changing the specific thrust
(thrust per pound of airflow).
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CURRENT JET OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS AND CONSTRAINTS
Regulations stipulate power plant performance under both normal
and non-routine conditions. These regulations pertain primarily to the
basic system design, and must be complied with if the aircraft is to be
certified. The crew is affected to the extent that any performance dic-
tated by the rules must be within the capability of the crew.
Another area of concern to the crew is the control of both ground
and airport noise. At present, no definite sound level has been put forth
as acceptable, although the value of 112 Pndb at 3.5 miles is utilized
in many cases. This noise factor influences the design of the power plant
and also the operational performance of the crew. Certain ground areas
must be designated as "high power turnup" areas. Also, power reductions
after takeoff are being introduced into procedures in an attempt to stay
w [thin the 112 Pndb level at 3.5 miles. These power reductions occur
in that critical area right after takeoff, when the aircraft is heavily loaded
and probably initiating a turn to comply with ATC procedures. Accom-
panying these power reductions are attitude readjustments which can intro-
duce discomforting negative g loading on the aircraft and its passengers.
CURRENT JET IMPLEMENTATION CONCEPTS
Power plants are handled manually in current operations by mani-
pulating the throttles. The throttle provides linkage through an automatic
fuel control, which controls the engines. The crew operates the throttles
to obtain a certain RPM and fuel flow which in turn results in a certain
thrust output. Thrust output coupled with the changes in attitude made
by flight control activities, results in specific airspeeds and aircraft
states (e. g., climbing, descending, level, etc. ).
Thrust can also be used to decelerate the aircraft by changing the
direction of the thrust using thrust reversers. This is an extremely
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useful mechanism for providing acceptable landing rollout capability,
aborted takeoff capability, and if necessary, airborne deceleration.
It must be noted that to obtain FAA certification, aircraft must be able
to come to safe stops without the use of thrust reversers. Once certi-
fied the thrust reversers extend the capabilities of the aircraft and
provide a larger safety margin.
The crew's responsibility is to utilize the power plants as required,
while staying within engine performance envelopes. Safety, passenger
comfort, and economics should all be consideratiens ;.n the util[_a_ion
of the power plants. The crew should follow as closely as possible,the
operating procedures set up for the specific aircraft with regard to take-
off, climb, cruise, approach and landing speeds.
SST POTENTIAL OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS AND CONSTRAINTS
The SST will be operating in a new environment, and for a major
portion of the flight, in a new speed regime. For those portions in
which it is operating with subsonic carriers it will need to conform to
requirements and constraints set up for these carriers.
In the new areas, new requirements and constraints exist which
will greatly influence the performance of the SST crew. One consideration
throughout the entire profile is noise (i. e., ground noise and sonic boom
overpressures). For the present, the SST will have to conform to a
flight profile which limits the overpressures to 1.5 psi throughout the
flight, with possible 2.0 psi excursions during the transonic acceleration.
Since the SST will be appreciably affected by variations in temperature,
another area of concern will be the economic effect of variations in pre-
dicted weather parameters on operations.
The new flight regime will introduce new concepts in power plant
operation and control. As the speed of the aircraft increases, even
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at maximum RPM the engine would be unable to accept the high speed
compressed airflow. This introduces a requirement for an inlet duct
system which can be varied to decelerate the airflow and make it accep-
table to the engine. Because the engines would be operating at maximum
RPM in the supersonic regime, varying RPM to control the power plant
output is not feasible. Therefore, fuel must be controlled to obtain
necessary requirements. Finally, the expanding gases leaving the engine
must be controlled if optimum performance is required. Unrestricted
expansion results in " __1s_zeau_= p_wcr !_sses= For this reason an inlet duct
and exhaust nozzle reconfiguration system is a necessary additive to
power plant operations.
FEASIBLE AUTOMATED IMPLEMENTATION CONCEPTS FOR SST
During ground handling operations the crew will vary the output of
the power plants in much the same way as in current operations. How-
ever, once airborne, sophisticated automatic throttle systems coupled
to either an on-line computer, or to an "optimum profile generator"
will be utilized to realize system energy requirements. This concept
varies with each particular flight phase, and is discussed in each of the
functional descriptions. In most cases the equipment utilized will be the
same, with only crew involvement changing.
The crew's responsibility in the manual areas of operation will
continue to be the same as it is currently. In those areas of automatic
operation, the crew's task will shift to that of primarily a monitor, but
crew responsibility will continue to be the same.
Because power plants are sensitive to many rapidly changing
parameters in order to optimize economic considerations it may be
necessary to automate the throttle system. Automation in this area
will relieve workload and allow the crew more time to evaluate and
manage the overall flight. New instrumentation will be necessary to
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display the current situation to the crew in enough definition to allow them
to override the automatic system without delay.
FEASIBLE MANUAL IMPLEMENTATION CONCEPTS FOR SST
Manipulation of the fuel control will be the means provided the
crew for controlling the output of the power plants. In most respects
the concept is similar to current operations. The crew would be res-
ponsible for varying the throttle so as to maintain st,.ffic_.ent power
outputs for whatever maneuver required.
An automatic concept is being advocated chiefly for economic
reasons. The SST will be "fuel sensitive, " and every effort should be
made to optimize performance in this area. Without automatic opera-
tion, the crew would have to evaluate a myriad of parameters, and then
vary the output of the power plants to meet requirements. This can
result in large fuel consumption rates and less economical operation.
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4.1 FUNCTION 4. 1 ENGINE START AND CHECKOUT
purpose
This function is to ready the power plant system, coordinate with
ground handling crews, and activate the power plant.
Current Jet Operational Requirements and Constraints
Before starting any engines, it must be ascertained that all pro-
cedural steps have been taken which of necessity precede engine activation.
This includes clearing the external area in the vicinity of the aircraft, and
completing any required checklists.
Current Jet Implementation Concepts
In current operations, a checklist is utilized to insure that the
procedural sequences have been followed. Once these have been completed,
and the engine start procedures initiated, performance data must be moni-
tored to insure that the engine starts normally. Such malfunctions as
cold starts, hot starts, or fires must be anticipated so that the power
plant system will not incur damage. If none of these occur, and the RPM,
EGT, fuel flow, pressure ratio, and oil pressure are within limits, then
the engine start has been performed.
It must be remembered that the power plant system provides energy
to many of the critical subsystems. The electrical generators, the turbo-
compressors, and many of the pressure pumps are driven by the power
plant. Thus in many cases it will be necessary to have the power plants
operating before subsystem status can be determined. Although external
power may be supplied to the aircraft, at times it is insufficient to supply
the needs of all of the subsystems.
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SST Potential Operational Requirements and Constraints
It does not appear that there will be any modification to current
requirements with the entry of the SST into commercial aviation.
Feasible Automated Implementation Concepts For SST
The SST will require a more precise procedure than current jets,
so that the time involved in the ground handling phase will be held to a
minimum. Many of the system_ checkouts w[ii be via an on-line computer
which will have a "_,_" _,'_ "no go" display. However, no changes are anti-
cipated in the actual performance required in power plant activation and
che ckout (i. e., the power plants will be manually activated).
Once the system has been activated, and the external power sources
have been removed, the entire system must be checked to determine if
the power requirements of the entire system will be met. This particular
phase of the flight should not change with the advent of the SST. As in
current operations, the crew will follow certain procedural sequences
to ascertain that the power plant is ready for activation. Then, in con-
junction with the ground handling crews who provide the aircraft with
external electrical power and a compressed air source, the crew will
start the power plant system. During start, indications of RPM, fuel
flow, and then EGT will be the important parameters to monitor. Once
these instruments indicate a suitable start, the oil pressure will also
be monitored.
The crew will be responsible for clearing the area in the vicinity
of the aircraft (even if the ground crew actually clear the area), making
sure the aircraft is set-up for engine start, and then insuring that engine
start procedures result in a normally functioning system.
Even while utilizing a machine to perform some of the checkout
functions, the crew will fall back on the use of a start checklist, to
insure compliance with procedures.
2O8
Feasible Manual Implementation Concepts For SST
The only difference in this concept is the set-up and checkout of
equipment prior to engine start. This is a time consuming task, and
becomes more complex with sophisticated systems. In a purely manual
concept, these checks prior to engine start would be performed by the
crew utilizing a checklist. The engine start and subsequent checkout
would be the same for both concepts.
The crewWs responsibility would not change in this situation. How-
ever, the restrictiveness of the task would tend to be greater in this
manual mode.
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4.2 FUNCTION 4.2 THRUST APPLICATION =
F(SURFACE SPEED); TAXI
Purpose
This function is to vary the power plants so that sufficient energy
is supplied the system to move from the original parking location to any
specified ground location (for this case, to the end of the operational
runway). The power required will be a function of the gross weight
of the aircraft and the desired surface speed consistent with safe
ground control procedures.
Since the aircraft is loaded away from the operational runway,
it is necessary to move the aircraft from this point, along taxiways to
the operational runway. This can be accomplished by towing the air-
craft to the end of the runway, or by using the power plants to move
the aircraft. This last method is usually the one employed and will
more than likely be used with the SST.
For our purposes the aircraft will start with a velocity, V = O,
and will be parked in the loading area. Upon completion of the function,
it will be on the operational runway, ready for takeoff, and the velocity
will again be V = O. The only change which will have transpired will
be the movement of the entire system from one ground location to another
within the limitations placed on the aircraft by the Air Traffic Control
ground procedures.
A major point which must be remembered is that with the SST,
any lengthy delays on the ground will result in the consumption of fuel
reserves. The power plants which will be ultimately selected for the
SST will give optimum performance at altitueles above 40,000 ft. To
increase the available payload, and remain within the safety require-
ments established by the FAA, ground handling time must be reduced
to a minimum.
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Current Jet Operational Requirements and Constraints
The chief constraints placed on current aircraft during taxi are
based on safety. Surface speeds must be consistent with traffic safety.
Current Jet Implementation Concepts
To accomplish the performance required, the engine RPM and
fuel flow settings are changed so as to start the aircraft moving.
Once momentum has been gained, auxiliary subsystems are utilized
to direct the aircraft in accordance with ground handling procedures.
The amount of thrust necessary to start the aircraft moving and main-
tain a safe ground speed, is a function of the throttle setting, which
in turn is a direct link through the fuel control to the engine RPM.
Thus, the usual procedure is to use certain RPM settings for ground
handling.
In current operations, when an aircraft has received clearance
to move from its parking area to the end of the operational runway,
just enough power is added to start the aircraft moving. This is usually
X% for the time necessary to gain some small increment of momentum.
Then this is reduced to some Y% RPM to maintain a desired taxi speed.
In any case, the position of the throttle will be a function of the desired
RPM and will result in a certain fuel flow. RPM and fuel flow can be
visually monitored.
SST Potential Operational Requirements and Constraints
Because ground handling time in the SST will be critical, it
appears that every effort will be made to insure ATC procedures
which will almost guarantee non-restricted ground movement from
loading area to the end of the runway.
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Poor visibility may make the crew's use of visual cues to esti-
mate taxi speeds impractical. Other means may need to be devised.
Feasible Automated Implementation Concept for SST
This function should not be automated because of many constantly
changing variables. The crew is better qualified to assimilate the data
and put it to use.
Feasible Manual Implementation Concepts for SST
There are no reasons to suspect that the ground handling operations
of the SST will differ radically from current operations. The crew will
still be responsible for controlling the system on the ground, and will
be responsible for establishing a safe taxi speed. It must be remembered
that the taxi maneuver as such is an integrated task, and that the power
plants only serve as energy suppliers. Inputs concerning speed, ob-
structions, and directions are all directed to the flight management
function where an evaluation is made and some change is made to the
system so that it conforms to a certain pattern. In this sense, power
plant operations become a means for performing an integrated task
with the entire system.
Manual manipulations of the throttle will continue to be the method
for obtaining required energy increases, similar to current procedures.
Once the inertia of the system is overcome, a lower RPM will provide
sufficient taxi speed. At too great a speed the heavily loaded SST may
be difficult to stop.
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4. 3 FUNCTION 4. 3 THRUST APPLICATION - F (MAXIMUM POWER);
TAKEOFF THRUST
Purpose
This function is to vary the output of the power plants such that
a certain acceleration and thus a certain rotation speed is attained which
is consistent with the gross weight of the aircraft, atmospheric condi-
tions, amount of usable runway, and requirements established by FAA
to insure safety margins in the event of a malfunction of the power plant.
The performance usually only involves the initial setting of the throttle,
and the monitoring of the resulting performance parameters (RPM, oil
pressure, EGT, pressure ratios, and fuel flow). If performance param-
eters are within the operating envelope, and if the system accelerates in
accordance with the pre-planned schedule, no further action is necessary
as the rotation speed V R will be attained. Since the power plants do fur-
nish the energy for the system, an initial velocity, VI, versus runway
remaining is used as a check for the acceleration being developed by the
power plants.
Current Jet Operational Requirements and Constraints
None are applicable.
Current Jet Implementation Concepts
Current aircraft power plant systems are sized for takeoff, and
as a result, maximum power is utilized then. Thus, the crew merely
applies full throttle, and then monitors instrumentation to ascertain that
sufficient power is being generated to accomplish the takeoff within pre-
scribed limits.
According to the Boeing 720 Operations Manual (ref. 22):
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Four engine take-off procedures: Prior to takeoff, review
stabilizer setting, engine thrust setting, V 1 speed, VR
speed, and required field length for the ambient condltlons
of the particular takeoff.
Apply takeoff thrust prior to brake release or rapidly
accelerate the engines to takeoff thrust as the airplane is
turned onto the runway.
During the takeoff roll, monitor engine performance
and airspeed indications. Nose wheel steering is used for
directional control on the runway until the airspeed has
increased to approximately 80 knots, above which direc-
tional control is obtained t_y use of rudder.
At V R speed, rotate the airplane smoothly to the
takeoff attitude, reaching V2 speed at a height of 35 feet
above the runway. If the takeoff is limited by obstacles,
do not permit the maximum speed during the takeoff climb
to exceed V 2 + 10 knots. Maintain this speed to the height
above the runway selected for the three engine level flight
acceleration where flap retraction shall be initiated. Accel-
erate to the final takeoff climb speed and continue climb
until reaching I, 500 feet or obstacle clearance limits have
been exceeded. Above I, 500 feet follow normal enroute
procedures.
In current operations ground noise is becoming a larger factor,
and many design concepts are being studied to see if these levels can be
lowered. However, at the present time, since engines are sized for
takeoff, maximum _ower must be utilized.
SST Potential Operational Requirements and Constraints
Ground noise will continue to play an important factor in the oper-
ations of the power plants. Depending upon the final design chosen,
noise levels would vary.
A Space/Aeronautics Staff Report (reL 29) points out that,
... takeoff noise is a particularly troublesome problem.
FAA has suggested that noise during takeoff at a point on
the ground one statute mile from the departure end of a
10, 500 ft runway (three miles from start of roll} be less
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than 112 PNdb. (PNdb is the "perceivable noise, " in
which the conventional decibel measure of loudness is
corrected to compensate for the varying reaction of the
human ear to noise amplitude at different frequencies. )
Engine noise at takeoff is generated by the shear-
ing action between the high velocity jetstream and the
surrounding air. By reducing the velocity of the pro-
pulsion jetstream relative to that of the surrounding air,
noise can be greatly reduced.
An early NASA comparison of various engines in
optimum airframes shows that an afterburning turbojet
would not reach the acceptable level of ground noise
until it has traveled approximately six miles from the
start of ground roll. An SST with a straight turbojet
engine at full thrust would reach the 112 PNdb level
somewhere about four and a half miles. The turbofan
engine, on the other hand, would reach acceptable noise
level within the required three miles ....
The other factors which affect the power plant operations in current
operations will continue into SST operations.
Feasible Automated Implementation Concepts for SST
At the current time there is no automatic concept being offered to
perform this particular function.
Feasible Manual Implementation Concepts for SST
In SST subsonic operations thrust will be controlled via the throttle
as in current operations. Jet and SST operations will differ if the SST
engines are sized for transitional acceleration instead of takeoff. In this
case the high thrust/weight ratios may dictate the use of other than maxi-
mum RPM to reduce takeoff noise.
The crew's responsibility will be to insure that the throttles are
manipulated to obtain required power, and that power plant performance
is normal. With the SST it may also be necessary to operate the power
plants so as to reduce noise. Procedurally, the crew would move the
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throttles to obtain the required RPM. Then as V1, V R, and V
attained, the crew would no longer manipulate the throttles.
were2
If less than maximum power were utilized, in the event of a par-
tial power failure (loss of an engine) the crew would add power as neces-
sary to comply with regulations and standard power failure procedures.
Because of the higher acceleration which will be associated with
the SST, the decision speed, Vl, should be as low as possible. Outside
this, there do not appear to be any other areas of major concern to the
crew.
Bateman points out in his description of a hypothetical flight of
the SST (ref. 30):
... the actual take-off, once cleared, will be slightly
difficult because the power available presumably will
preclude running up to full power on the brakes. This
means that the power will have to be applied after one
has started to roll and this will mean a certain amount
of time scatter in the application of take-off power.
A pleasant problem here possibly might be the setting
of take-off power which may be less than the maximum.
Normally everybody gets at the throttles and pushes and
waits to get off the ground; with the SST we can possibly
take off with less than the available power, this depend-
ing, of course, on the individual design of the aircraft.
Every time we take off we have at least to consider that
we may have to abandon it a short way down and the prob-
lems here will be slightly different; the acceleration will
be much greater than--at least we hope it will be much
greater than--the present-day subsonic jets; so the point
at which one will need to abandon the take-off will be
noticeably earlier. The actual engine failure problem
will possibly revolve around the time it takes the pilot
to recognize he has a power loss and to take action to
rein edy this. °.
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4. 4 FUNCTION 4. 4 THRUST APPLICATION = F (SURFACE SPEED);
THRUST REVERSAL
\\
Purpose
This function is to provide a source of braking for the accelerated
aircraft through the variation of the power plant output. If for any reason
a decision is made to abort the takeoff roll, a means must be provided to
do so --"*'_w_.,__,..,._._-'¢o_-_Tn_ other words, the aircraft must be decelerated to a
safe taxi speed in the runway remaining. Brakes will be utilized when
the speed of the aircraft is low enough to safely use them. If the braking
system alone were used while the aircraft is moving at high speeds, there
would be the possibility of blowing out the tires. Thus a means has been
provided to reverse the direction of the thrust from the power plant. This
reversal will cause a deceleration which will allow the aircraft to attain
the required speeds within the surface limits remaining.
Current Jet Operational Requirements and Constraints
With the evolution of high performance aircraft a need was generated
for new braking methods. This need was due to high aircraft energy states,
and runway length restrictions.
Current Jet Implementation Concepts
In current jet aircraft the jet engine thrust reversing and sound sup-
pression are accomplished by means of a combination unit, which replaces
the standard tailpipe. The thrust reverser consists, essentially, of a pair
of internal reversing gates or clamshells mounted just aft of the turbine
section. When closed by pneumatically-operated actuators, the reversing
gates block normal turbine exhaust flow to deflect the gases forward through
circumferential cascade vane openings. A reverse thrust lever mounted
on each thrust lever provides cockpit control. The engine will return
nearly to the idle thrust position automatically in the event that the doors
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open during reverse thrust operation, or in the event the doors close
during forward thrust operation. This prevents the engine from supply-
ing high thrust opposite to the selected direction.
In current operations thrust reversal is a manual function. If
acceleration is insufficient, or the crew decides that takeoff should be
aborted, the throttle is usually reduced from the maximum RPM setting
to the idle RPM position. Then as needed the thrust reverser levers
are actuated, and the throttles are again manipulated to give the desired
deceleration rate. In selecting a rate of deceleration, safety is the pri-
m _l'l+'y f_ ,-,,'l-r',,,'_, ,e^1 "I ............ ,,,_uw_u closely by passenger comfort.
SST Potential Operational Requirements and Constraints
There appear to be no modifications necessary. The SST will be
required to have some type of thrust reversing capability to cope with
adverse weather conditions, loss of brakes, and aborted takeoffs.
Feasible Automated Implementation Concepts for SST
In a completely automatic system utilizing auto-throttle on takeoff,
it might be feasible to program an abort procedure with subsequent thrust
reversal. However, at present it appears more practical to consider a
manual mode of operation (i. e., leaving all decisions with the crew).
Feasible Manual Implementation Concepts for SST
The performance required in the abort phase of the takeoff roll
will consist of reducing the power plant system to its idle position, and
utilizing the thrust reversers as needed to assist the braking system.
Operations will be very similar to current procedures, and the means
provided should be consistent with current equipment. Although the
engines will be designed for transonic acceleration, it must be remem-
bered that on takeoff the gross weight of the SST will be greater than
that of current jets. As a consequence the aircraft will be more diffi-
cult to stop once a high speed has been attained. The thrust reversers
/
(
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chosen will have to demonstrate the capability of decelerating the aircraft
to acceptable taxi speeds within runway limitations. As far as the crew
is concerned, there should be no significant alterations of present abort
procedures. Because of the increased gross weight, {assuming no fur-
ther increases in runway length} when a decision is made to abort, pro-
cedures will have to be initiated immediately. Safety margins will be
very small and any delays in response could result in the aircraft going
off the end of the runway, or the crew losing control of the aircraft.
Once the thrust reversing system has been actuated, the crew will
manipulate the throttle to obtain RPM settings in the same manner as in
other power plant operations.
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4. 5 FUNCTION 4. 5 THRUST APPLICATION = F (NOISE ABATEMENT);
(Vc, PNdb)
Purpose
This function is to vary the output of the power plants so as to
comply with FAA regulations or local airport noise restrictions. This
function usually integrates several of the flight activities, but is quite
consistent with the basic aerodynamics of flight. Since standard oper-
ating procedures usually dictate the climbing speed (V c) of the aircraft,
a,y change in the power available will necessitate a change in the air-
craft's attitude, so as to maintain the airspeed, Vc, but decrease the
vertical speed (rate of climb). In high performance aircraft this is
marginal performance because the aircraft has just become airborne,
is heavily loaded, and will usually have to make a turn away from the
operational runway to assist in the expedient flow of inbound and depart-
ing aircraft; and when on instruments a transition to "image interpreta-
tion flying" will have to be made. Another factor to consider is the
comfort of the passengers. It must be remembered that any significant
nose-down attitude change will generate uncomfortable negative g (just
as would be experienced in an express elevator)•
Current Jet Operational Requirements and Constraints
A paper on the performance requirements for the SST (ref. 31)
points out that:
• .. the problem of airport noise has not been adequately
defined as yet, and recourse is generally made to the
criteria defined by the Port of New York authority, which
states that the perceived noise level (PNdb) at a point 3.5
miles from start of takeoff shall not exceed 112.
The problem of airport noise is under close scrutiny in an effort to
reach some agreement concerning a standard. Until such time most
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airlines are performing noise abatement procedures whenever conditions
deem it safe.
Current Jet Implementation Concepts
In current operations, a combined power reduction and attitude
change is initiated at the 3. 5 mile point to meet noise requirements.
In effect, this maintains the airspeed, but reduces the rate of ascent.
This procedure is not without problems. Takeoffs that require a reduc-
tion in power at the 3. 5 mile point to meet noise requirements, may pre-
sent a problem of passenger comfort because of the resulting nose over
to a lower climb angle. Current jet transports experience a change in
climb angle when power is reduced at the 3. 5 mile point, but to a lesser
degree than would be experienced by the SST.
The crew's main responsibility is to obtain a noise level acceptable
to the public, while at the same time keeping the aircraft at a safe flying
speed.
SST Potential Operational Requirements and Constraints
The trend is for stricter regulations than at present; the public
is demanding improvements. It would appear that even if the SST is not
required to make a maximum power takeoff, some noise abatement pro-
cedure would still be required.
Feasible Automated Implementation Concepts for SST
At this time no provisions are being made for automatically imple-
menting this function.
Feasible Manual Implementation Concepts for SST
While local residential noise is a significant problem on current
subsonic jets, both local noise and sonic boom are major design consi-
derations for the SST, affecting wing and engine size and vehicle
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configuration. Residential noise during takeoff may be alleviated by
reduction of power during the later stages of climb-out, but passenger
comfort may be affected by the significant attitude changes introduced.
However, there is some feeling that because the engines will be sized
for the acceleration phase, maximum power would not be necessary for
the takeoff. Also, because of the great thrust-to-weight ratios, the SST
will be at a high altitude at the 3. 5 mile point, which in itself would
attenuate the noise. Empirical studies will have to be conducted to
determine the noise levels of the chosen power plant systems, and if
the need still exists, procedures can be stipulated which wo.ld take
these factors into consideration.
The desired noise level will be obtained by manual manipulation
of the throttle to reduce RPM. The reduction in RPM will generate a
requirement for a change in vertical attitude (pitch change) to maintain
the desired airspeed.
The crew's responsibility will be to comply with existing noise
level regulations, while not jeopardizing the safety of the SST. This is
similar to current operations, and should only vary to the extent that
the SST is a higher performance aircraft.
222
4. 6 FUNCTION 4. 6 THRUST APPLICATION -- F (OPTIMUM MANEUVER
SPEED); INITIAL CLIMB
Purpose
Power plant output is varied in this function to provide the neces-
sary energy for the system to maintain a constant airspeed (with a cor-
responding constant rate of ascent). Once the aircraft is airborne and
has completed its noise abatement procedures, it complies with its
departure instructions. Since the SST will be operating in the same
environment as subsonic aircraft, it will be required to maintain an
initial climb speed which is consistent with ATC procedures (approxi-
mately 300 kts. ), until it is clear of the dense traffic. The SST pro-
file will indicate constant speed climbs followed by constant Mach climb,
and then return to constant airspeed and finally back to constant Mach.
This particular portion of the flight phase deals with maintaining a con-
stant airspeed until reaching Mach 0. 9.
Current Jet Operational Requirements and Constraints"
Climb speeds are the result of economics and compliance with
ATC procedures. In the design and development of any aircraft, schedules
are developed to take all these factors into consideration (e. g., maximum
climb speed, most economical climb speed, etc. ). In planning a flight
the crew selects that profile which best conforms to the scheduled flight.
In current operations the speed selected must be low enough to pro-
vide adequate maneuvering ability. Around the terminal control areas
traffic density is high, and an aircraft operating at an excessive speed
would conflict with other traffic.
Current Jet Implementation Concepts
In current aircraft a procedure similar to that described above is
followed, but at proportionally lower airspeeds. The selection of climb
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speeds, and climb Mach is determined during the pre-flight planning
phase, and takes into consideration such things as atmospheric condi-
tions, flight endurance, and flight economics.
The crew's role is relatively small in this portion of the profile.
This flight phase (initial climb) is of very short duration, and consists
primarily of maneuvering the aircraft out of the terminal and high den-
sity traffic areas. The crew makes the initial power setting to main-
tain a certain climb profile (both airspeed and rate of ascent), and then
makes those power changes necessary to hold the desired airspeed.
SST Potential Operational Requirements and Constraints
The factors in selecting jet climb speeds will carry over into SST
operations, but will be more critical. That is to say, since the best
operating environment for the SST is at altitude, climb speeds will be
chosen which will give the aircraft the best economic advantage. Although
an unrestricted climb would be economically the best, other traffic con-
siderations will prevent using this. Another factor which must be con-
sidered will be the generation of sonic boom overpressures. In order to
alleviate this problem, the SST will be required to maintain subsonic
speeds throughout its initial climb.
Feasible Automated Implementation Concepts for SST
An auto-throttle concept will be utilized which will receive com-
mands from either the crew or the computer. The system will operate
the throttle to hold the required speed automatically. The crew will be
required to command speed, and in one proposed concept, would be
required to set the throttle to some quadrant. The automatic system
would then make all the necessary minor corrections.
In its most automatic mode of operation the navigation function of
the computer would generate speed commands which would in turn be
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transmitted to the auto-throttle system. The crew would monitor the
operation.
Feasible Manual Implementation Concepts for SST
Manipulation of the throttle to obtain required airspeed will be
similar to current operations. In the initial climb phase both the air-
speed and the rate of ascent will be restricted by ATC procedures. The
crew will establish the airspeed and the rate of ascent, and then vary
power so as to maintain these as constants. Although this may not be
the most economical mode of operation, the SST must be able to oper-
ate in areas of high density subsonic traffic.
The task will be similar to current operations with regards to
maintaining a constant airspeed/constant rate of ascent climb schedule.
All such operations are tied to flight control operations in that a change
in power results in a change in trim (thus attitude}.
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4.7 FUNCTION 4.7 THRUST APPLICATION ,, F (OPTIMUM
M/hNEUVER SPEED); SUBSONIC CLIMB
Purpose
This function is to vary the power output to intercept an optimum
Mach speed and maintain this in a constant Mach climb (subsonically).
The choice of the Mach climb speed will be dependent upon the gross
weight of the aircraft, atmospheric conditions, and the climb procedures
authorized by ATC. The performance demanded will consist of chan_in_
from the airspeed indicator to the Mach indicator as the aircraft attains
a predetermined airspeed. As the aircraft gains altitude, constant air-
speed will result in an increasing Mach. Once the desired Mach has been
attained, the power and/or the attitude of the aircraft must be changed to
maintain this speed and the desired rate of climb.
Current Jet Operational Requirements and Constraints
Jet operations in low, dense altitude environments result in high
rates of fuel consumption. Thus, within the restrictions of air traffic
control, the aircraft must choose a climb schedule which will carry it
to its optimum operating environment along an optimum climb placard.
Another factor to consider is that as altitude increases it is more diffi-
cult to hold a constant airspeed, because at altitude a constant sea level
E/kS may be well above the maximum operating speed of the aircraft.
Thus, a constant Mach is utilized instead.
Current Jet Implementation Concepts
In current subsonic operations, the pilot usually sets the throttles
to obtain a rough estimate of what is necessary to maintain a constant
Mach climb schedule consistent with pre-planned data. It is then the
responsibility of the flight engineer to readjust the throttles as necessary
to conform to the pre-planned schedule and the fuel management fuel
derivatives.
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SST Potential Operational Requirements and Constraints
With respect to fuel consumption, low altitude flight will be even
more critical for the SST than for current jets. However, the problem
of sonic boom now plagues the designers. In order to obtain public accep-
tance of sonic boom effects, it will be necessary to accelerate the SST
at transonic and supersonic speeds at much higher altitudes than minimum
fuel consumption considerations would dictate.
A comparison of c,,rrent m_i]itary climb schedules (unrestricted by
sonic boom considerations) with those for the SST reveals a large effect
on climb and acceleration schedules due to consideration of sonic boom.
The effect is pronounced and causes considerable increases in climb fuel
and climb time. The primary reason for the altitude sensitivity is that
the vehicle must fly at a higher lift coefficient due to the reduced dynamic
pressure at the higher altitude. The increased lift ._oefficient produces an
increased drag due to lift, and thereby a relati_-ely lower exa_._s _i_rust.
This situation places great emphasis on being able to realize high airframe
efficiency or high engine thrust in this speed region in order to alleviate
the aforementioned performance penalties.
Feasible Automated Implementation Concepts I:or SST
The SST will to some degree do away with manual manipulation
of the throttles. Auto-throttle has been advocated for the SST by most
of the experts. It is generally believed that it will be necessary to
utilize the on-line computer in conjunction with the power control. The
crew would set the throttle in the appropriate quadrant, command a
specific climb speed (Mach speed), and set the appropriate attitude of
the aircraft on the auto-pilot . Then the on-line computer would maintain
the appropriate climb speed. Data in the form of temperature differen-
tials, atmospheric conditions, and fuel consumption would be analyzed
and the appropriate power setting would be electromechanically set.
The crew's task would be to monitor the resultant climb schedule, and
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make any changes as determined by the navigational function. With the
use of an on-line computer the SST would, within the limitations placed
upon it by ATC regulations, fly the most economical profile consistent
with all constraints (i. e., the optimum profile).
The crew's main responsibility would be to insure that the automatic
system was operating normally, and that speeds were consistent with
tolerable overpressure generation.
Feasible Manual Implementation Concepts For SST
Keeping the attitude such that a certain rate of ascent is constant
(Flight Control Function) and maintaining a constant Mach speed leaves
only the manipulation of the power plants as a variable. Manipulation
of the throttles by the crew to maintain either optimally generated speeds
or pre-flight computed climb schedules will be similar to current proce-
d_ es. The crew's main responsibility will be to insure operation of
the power plants in a manner consistent with economy, sonic boom con-
s iderat ions, and ATC restrictions.
It must be pointed out that as the aircraft attains greater altitude,
its EAS will continue to decrease, even though the aircraft is maintaining
a constant Mach climb speed. Since the SST will be constrained by the
sonic boom consideration, it will be forced to attain that altitude corridor
which sufficiently attenuates the generated overpressures. In doing this
the aircraft will be forced to fly on the backside of the power curve, i.e.,
more power will be required to maintain a slower speed. This type of
flying is not foreign to present crews, but does require more diligence
than is currently required.
Proper power operations during this phase of the flight are manda-
tory if the SST is to prove an economic reality. The greatest portion
of the fuel is utilized in the subsonic climb-transition phases, and the
crew's performance during this period could determine the operational
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feasibility of the SST. :amy unwarranted fuel waste or mismanagement
could cancel the flight at this point.
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4. 8 FUNCTION 4. 8 THRUST APPLICATION - F (SONIC BARRIER
PENETRATION); TRANSONIC ACCELERATION
Purpose
This function is to vary the power plants so as to accelerate the
aircraft through the high drag phenomenon associated with the sonic
speed region. This phase of flight has come to be known as the "sonic
barrier penetration. " This of course is a phase of flight which does not
cause concern for present subsonic jet crews. New phenomena will be
encountered, and new procedures will need to b_ Ip_,-n,_,_ ÷,_ ,_ ..... _*_-
problems which may arise. Years of experience in military aviation
have provided the answers to many of the questions and training can
acquaint the unfamiliar with the new problems.
When the decision is made to start transonic acceleration, based
on atmospheric conditions, traffic conditions, and sonic boom consider-
ations, the SST will probably reduce or even eliminate its climb attitude
in favor of a slight descent. Then, depending upon the power plant
system chosen, maximum power would be applied so as to gain the
acceleration necessary to penetrate the barrier. With those power
plant systems utilizing augmentation, it is quite probable that full aug-
mentation would be used. The higher the altitude, the more difficult it
is to attain high accelerations. Therefore, maximum power must be
utilized for as short a period of time as possible.
Current Jet Operational Requirements and Constraints
There are none applicable.
Current Jet Implementation Concepts
There are none applicable.
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SST Potential Operational Requirements and Constraints
Because of sonic boom considerations, the SST will have to accel-
erate to its high speeds at altitudes higher than would normally be con-
sidered optimum. Since the excess of thrust over drag decreases with
increases in altitude, every effort will have to be made to optimize the
output performance of the power plant (e. g., notching of the inlet and
nozzle to the engine). Slaiby and Staubach describe the problem (ref.
32):
•.. consideration of potential ground annoyance ar_ damage
factors from "sonic boom" has dictated that acceleration to
supersonic speeds for the supersonic transport must be at
altitudes higher than normally would be optimum for a long-
range supersonic aircraft. What acceleration altitude will
be required for public acceptance of the "sonic boom" is
still a matter of speculation, but altitudes above 40, 000
feet seem likely at this time• This requirement results in
the propulsion-system thrust being critical in the transonic-
Mach-number region and hence is the condition for select-
ing powerplant size. The critical thrust margin is in the
region of Mach number 1. 2-1. 3. Unfortunately, this is also
the Mach-number region in which the losses in thrust due to
inlet and nozzle are large. It can be seen that these losses
can approach the thrust margin (thrust-drag) in magnitude.
They are primarily a function of the relationship between
inlet flow capacity and the engine flow requirements. Reduc-
tion of these losses by matching the inlet and engine flow
characteristics is obviously very important since they can
directly influence the propulsion-system size and base
weight ....
Feasible Automated Implementation Concepts for SST
Either the computer coupled auto-throttle or crew commanded
speed auto-throttle will control the power plants during transonic accel-
eration. In this mode, the crew will be responsible for monitoring the
system. As the preplanned acceleration altitude is approached the crew
will either move the throttle into the specific quadrant and command a
speed, or will check to ascertain that the profile generator is indicating
readiness to start the transition phase.
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In any case the maximum available power will usually be utilized
to obtain advantage of excess thrust/drag at the specific altitude. (The
Concorde designers are studying the feasibility of a lower-powered,
slower acceleration type of profile to cope both with sonic boom and
engine sizing considerations).
Feasible Manual Implementation Concepts for SST
The crew will manipulate the throttles and the fuel control. Since
the transitional acceleration will be at maximum power, there does not
appear to be any other performance required of the crew but the monitor-
ing of parameters. Manipulation of the fuel control will be necessary
because at supersonic speeds the SST engine will in all likelihood be
operating at maximum RPM. Thus, one way to control the energy out-
put will be to increase or decrease fuel (this is assuming an optimally
configured inlet duct and exhaust nozzle).
The crew's responsibility will be to initiate transonic acceleration
procedures at the time determined either by the optimum profile gener-
ator or preflight computed data. Once maximum power has been applied,
the crew's responsibility will be to monitor system performance, and
vary the fuel input as necessary to achieve required accelerations. This
operation is well within the capability of the crew as long as the inlet duct
and exhaust nozzle are automatically positioned. A failure in that system
may generate a requirement to halt acceleration and return to the sub-
sonic regime.
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4. 9 FUNCTION 4. 9 THRUST APPLICATION -- F {OPTIMUM AIR
SPEED); SUPERSONIC CLIMB
Purpose
The output of the power plants is varied in this function to provide
the energy necessary for the SST to continue acceleration to speeds of
Mach 3. 0, and to sustain speed during the subsequent climb to its oper-
ating environment. It has not been determined exactly what kind of pro-
file would be flown by the SST, but it has been suggested that the initial
climb and departure would be conducted at a constant airspeed; the fol-
lowing climb would be at some increase in Mach speed; and finally, a
constant airspeed would again be followed which would result in an in-
creasing Mach speed with the altitude increase. Whatever the climb
schedule proposed, the resulting family of curves would have to be cor-
rected for changes in atmospheric conditions.
The builders of the Concorde are anticipating that the crew's
responsibility during the climb phase will be to actually fly the desired
climb placard. In so doing, they will be required to assess all available
data, and make appropriate changes in a timely fashion.
U.S. builders are thinking in terms of an on-line computer/auto-
throttle which will, as the result of instantaneous calculations, maintain
the optimum profile to reduce the probability of undesirable sonic boom.
All experts agree that the transitional acceleration and the super-
sonic climb will have to take place at a higher altitude than necessary,
in an attempt to control the sonic boom effects.
Current Jet Operational Requirements and Constraints
This is not a current function.
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Current Jet Implementation Concepts
This function does not occur in current operations.
SST Potential Operational Requirements and Constraints
The major constraints throughout the supersonic portion of the
flight profile will concern the control of sonic boom overpressures.
This restriction placed upon the climb portion of the flight will result
in high fuel consumption rates which will, depending on atmospheric
conditions, determine whether the specific flight will have sufficient
In most cases, once the initial high drag area is passed, the
aircraft will start a climb acceleration which will probably vary Mach
speed linearly with increases in altitude until the desired Mach is
attained. At that point the rate of ascent will be increased until the
assigned cruise altitude is reached.
Feasible Automated Implementation Concepts for SST
The computer and coupled auto-throttle will be utilized in an
automated concept. Either a pre-programmed climb schedule, or an
optimally generated profile will feed speed and energy commands to the
auto-throttle. These commands will be the result of environmental
parameter sampling and analysis, and will approach optimum perfor-
mance.
The crew's role in this function will be to monitor the operation
of the system, and to enter data as necessary and available. Their
main responsibility will be to insure that power plant performance is
being monitored, and that automatic performance seems consistent
with pre-computed data. It does not appear that any revolutionary type
of training will be necessary to acquaint the crews with the system's
operation. This concept is an extension of the present auto-pilot system.
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Feasible Manual Implementation Concepts for SST
The crew's manipulation of the fuel control to maintain or obtain
desired speeds will be in the manual mode of operation. In these oper-
ations the RPM will be kept constant, and the fuel flow varied to obtain
a desired energy output.
This operation, although rough by comparison to the automatic
mode, is well within the capabilities of the crew. The major concern
will be whether the crew can make the operation economically feasible.
The designers of the Concorde believe that man can do so. They envi-
sion a climb schedule made up of a series of constant speed and Mach
climb segments, such as the following:
l. Accelerate and climb from 200 knots CAS at sea
level to 375 knots CAS at 5,000 feet.
. Climb at a constant CAS of 375 kts from 5, 000
feet to 39, 000 feet, where M --- 1. 147.
. Climb and accelerate to 45, 300 feet, M = 1.8
(530 kts CAS).
. Climb at 530 kts CAS until the cruise Mach num-
ber is reached.
5. Climb to cruising height at cruise Mach number.
In the manual mode of operation the crew would continue to be
responsible for controlling the generation of sonic boom overpressures.
Similarly, the crew would be responsible for insuring economical oper-
ation of the power plants. New instrumentation may be required to
indicate to the crew the implications of fuel flow changes on the energy
output of the power plants.
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4. i0 FUNCTION 4. I0 THRUST APPLICATION -- F (TRANSITION
TO CRUISE)
Purpose
This function is to vary the output of the power plants in order to
assist in the attitude change associated with termination of the climb
phase and initiation of the cruise phase. Although this can be thought
of in terms of an automatic function, the builders of the Concorde are
leaving this performance to the crew. What is involved primarily is
maintaining a uonstant iviach speed, but decreasing the vertical vector
of that speed. This maneuver will be similar to level-off maneuvers
with older aircraft, except that more care will have to be taken to keep
positive g loading on the aircraft. The power plants are utilized in con-
junction with the flight controls to obtain this smooth transition.
Current Jet Operational Requirements and Constraints
Although current jets do not make the transition from supersonic
climbs to cruise altitudes of 70, 000 to 80,000 feet, they are concerned
with transitions from climb to cruise attitudes. The nature of the task
is the same, as is the importance of passenger comfort. In leveling off
at an assigned altitude, too rapid a rate of change in the rate of ascent
will result in the generation of negative g loads. If possible, a positive
g loading should be maintained throughout this maneuver.
Current Jet Implementation Concepts
Again, although not specifically the same operation which will be
found in the SST, the subsonic carrier performs a transition to cruise
maneuver (i. e., a level-off from a climb maneuver). Currently the
crew starts the transition several thousand feet prior to the assigned
altitude. The aircraft's attitude is changed slowly and power is reduced
as necessary to maintain a desired airspeed. Optimally the aircraft
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reaches the assigned altitude with a rate of ascent equal to zero, with
the aircraft trimmed and at the desired speed, and with sufficient power
to just hold this speed.
SST Potential Operational Requirements and Constraints
Because of the higher performance characteristics of the SST
compared to current jets, even greater anticipation will be needed for
this maneuver to preclude the generation of unwanted negative g loading.
Air traffic controllers will have to give the crew sufficient warning for
altitude holds, or the aircraft will overshoot the assigned altitude.
Feasible Automated Implementation Concepts for SST
In the completely automatic mode the computer would feed com-
mands to the auto-throttle which would be consistent with a level-off
maneuver. These commands would be predicated on altitude and air-
speed data entered by the crew, pre-computed level-off data (which
would take into account passenger comfort), and optimum profile gen-
erated parameters. The crew's responsibility would be to insure that
the system was functioning normally, and that the transition was initiated
at an altitude consistent with optimum g loading profiles. The crew
would use either pre-computed data, or displayed loading placards to
check on the system performance.
Feasible Manual Implementation Concepts for SST
This function will continue to be performed by means of the throttle.
However, in all likelihood, the amount of thrust needed will no longer be
obtained by the RPM setting. Most experts agree that the power plant
chosen for the SST will be run at maximum constant speed during super-
sonic operations, and that thrust will be varied by varying the amount
of energy added to the airflow.
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This is an integrated flight control/power plant operation, and the
quality of performance will be a function of the coordination of the
maneuver. At extremely high speeds control in the vertical plane is
quite sensitive, so that poor performance in that area coupled with too
large a decrease in power could generate excessive negative g. Because
of the high performance characteristics which will be associated with the
SST, it is clear that empirical data should be collected on the amount of
anticipation necessary to obtain a trajectory consistent with the desired
flight path, assigned altitude, and passenger comfort.
As in current operations, crew involvement will be to insure that
passengers are not subjected to any prolonged discomfort. It is clear
that some form of instrumentation could be furnished the crew which
would present a tracking task both as concerns altitude and acceleration.
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4. 11 FUNCTION 4. l l THRUST APPLICATION " F {CONSTANT MACH);
CRUISE
Purpose
This function is to vary the output of the power plants to provide
the SST with a constant Mach cruise speed. It is anticipated that the
final cruise speed will be attained during the supersonic climb phase,
and as the SST approaches its assigned flight level, the attitude will be
altered to maintain a nearly l_vel cruise attitude. At that time the
amount of energy supplied to the system will be set so as to maintain
a constant Mach speed consistent with altitude and atmospheric condi-
tions.
As the aircraft loses weight due to fuel burn-off it will, within
the limitations placed upon it by the Air Traffic Control system, accept
an increase in altitude instead of an increase in speed for the same fuel
flow setting. As was pointed out earlier, thrust will probably be con-
trolled by varying the amount of fuel injected into the airflow {which
will be held constant}, rather than varying the amount of airflow avail-
able to the engine. Thus, keeping both the RPM and the fuel flow con-
stant would result in an increase in airspeed (considering a constant
flight level} as the fuel burns off. However, it can be shown that the
acceptance of a slight increase in altitude rather than the increase in
airspeed will provide the more economical operation. This slight
increase in altitude with burn-off {approximately 100 ft. per minute} is
called "cruise climbing. "
Current Jet Operational Requirements and Constraints
Current aircraft are required to maintain a constant altitude while
flying under ATC control, or to utilize a series of step climbs. Both of
these maneuvers restrict efficiency to some degree. The optimum pro-
file accepts the trade-off of weight decrease for altitude increase.
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However, because of traffic separation considerations, aircraft must
use an available altitude, rather than the optimum.
Current Jet Implementation Concepts
As was pointed out in earlier functional descriptions, this portion
of the flight profile can be compared to the current subsonic operational
cruise phase with respect to the functions performed by the crew.
However, with the SST total cruise time will be less, and fuel will
become a critical factor. The main responsibility of the crew will be
to monitor the auto-throttle and in case of malfunction, to manually
meter the fuel so as to obtain the cruise schedule consistent with
economic operations and the capabilities of the crew.
In current operations there is no provision for auto-throttle, at
least during the cruise phase, so the crew is responsible for manually
maintaining a required airspeed. This is usually done either by set-
ting a certain fuel flow and accepting the airspeed, or by varying the
fuel flow to maintain a constant airspeed. It should also be pointed out
that in current operations the fuel flow is usually some function of the
RPM and environmental conditions. Thus, the crew would set a cer-
tain pressure ratio, or RPM, and as a result receive a certain fuel
flow.
SST Potential Operational Requirements and Constraints
With the improvements in the state-of-the-art of navigational
and tracking systems, and because of the relatively low traffic densi-
ties in the SST cruise environment, there appears little reason why
the SST should be restricted to one specific cruise altitude. Since the
SST will be restricted in other areas (e. g., sonic boom considerations,
unfavorable atmospheric conditions, etc. ), every means should be used
to optimize its performance.
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Feasible Automated Implementation Concepts for SST
As for the crew, their primary responsibility will be to monitor
the operation of the automated equipment to insure that constant Mach
cruise is maintained, and that the cruise climb schedule is adhered to.
Actually, once the transition to cruise has been made, and the power
plant set for the constant Mach speed, no further performance will be
required by the crew. The various parameters will have to be moni-
tored to insure their position within operating envelopes.
The cruise climb profile could be entered by either the crew, or
by the optimum profile generator and the auto-throttle varied as neces-
sary to maintain the constant Mach cruise speed.
Feasible Manual Implementation Concepts for SST
In the manual mode, the fuel control will be set to maintain a
constant Mach speed and the fuel flow will be kept constant throughout
the cruise phase. As fuel is burned off, the excess resulting energy
will be accepted as either an increase in altitude or an increase in
Mach. Due to the supersonic flow of air to the SST engine, in all like-
lihood, the engine will be accepting maximum airflow and will be oper-
ating at maximum RPM. In this situation the amount of thrust required
will become a function of the fuel flow which will be manually varied
(in the most manual mode) to change the energy content of the exhausted
airflow.
The crew's responsibility will be to insure economic operation of
the power plant. If a cruise climb is allowed, the crew will be required
to set a certain fuel flow based on pre-computed or aircraft computer
data, and then to maintain this fuel flow profile. If the cruise climb is
not allowed, the crew's responsibility would be to maintain either a
constant Mach speed or accept the increase in energy as a speed addi-
tion. This decision would be dependent upon an analysis of all flight
parameters.
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SUBSONIC SPEED REGIME
If for some reason other than power plant failure the SST were
required to descendto lower altitudes (40,000 to 45,000 feet) and con,-
plete the flight subsonically, the crew should not encounter any appre-
ciable increases in workload due to power plant operation. The duct
system would have to be reconfigured for optimum subsonic operations.
Speed would also have to be recomputed to give the best performance
taking into consideration the fuel and distance remaining, and trying to
optimize the time factor. However, once these new factors have been
..... _,_,_=_, _,,= auton_ated _ys£em would still function as it did at altitude
and supersonic speeds. Thus, there would be no new requirements
placed upon the crew other than added endurance.
In the case where the automatic system were to malfunction, the
crew would be required to manually control the speed and/or fuel flow
very much like current subsonic operations. Again, this is well within
the capabilities of the crew and it is not anticipated that any appreciable
work load factor other than fatigue would be introduced.
If, however, a failure of a portion of the power plant system (eog.,
an engine failure} is the reason for the subsonic profile, then fuel re-
maining factors versus range must be analyzed to determine the impli-
cations of diverting to an alternate, or continuing to the designated
destination.
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4.12 FUNCTION 4. 12 THRUST APPLICATION = F (OPTIMUM AIR
SPEED); DECELERATION/DESCENT
Purpose
The output of the power plants is varied in this function to decrease
the power available to the SST in such a fashion as to both provide an
economical profile and be consistent with passenger comfort and toler-
ance. _nen Lhe decision has been made to descend, sufficient energy
must be available to control the descent profile of the aircraft. There
are many different descent profiles which may be utilized, but generally
speaking a minimum fuel flow schedule should be adhered to.
Current Jet Operational Requirements and Constraints
Power and airspeed are two factors which allow the aircraft to
maintain altitude. Accordingly, power reduction results in a lower al-
titude and a lower speed. The rate at which these occur must be regu-
lated to allow for passenger comfort, both with regard to acceptable
deceleration and acceptable rates of change of cabin pressure.
Current Jet Specific Implementation Concepts
Current subsonic aircraft have a descent schedule consistent with
economical operation, ATC procedures, and the specific destination
area. In most cases the descent will be an idle RPM descent with the
aircraft either in a clean configuration, or some degree of "dirty" con-
figuration. The dirty configuration induces a higher drag resulting in
higher rates of descent, and consequently in steeper angles of descent.
In either case, the rate at which the aircraft descends is constrained
by other factors such as passenger comfort and the operation of sub-
systems (e. g., pressurization}.
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SST Potential Operational Requirements and Constraints
Those areas of concern which dictate operations in current air-
craft will continue into SST operations. Added to these factors will be
at least two others, sonic boom generation and fuel heat sink overhea_ing.
The implications of this last factor have yet to be determined.
Throughout the flight the fuel will be used as a heat sink for the
engine to assist in dissipating some of the critical structural heat. As
the descent phase is started, fuel flow is decreased. Because of the
latent heat of the engine materials, the heat input to the fuel does not
change immediately and there is a high, transient temperature rise.
Since this rise acts to increase energy output at the same time that
lesser energies are required, it presents a real problem in engine
control.
Feasible Automated Implementation Concepts for SST
SST operations will be similar in nature to those on current jet
aircraft. A fuel flow will be selected which will cause the SST to decel-
erate at some acceptable rate. Next, the speed of the engine will be
changed to further induce deceleration. The rate of deceleration will
be primarily dependent upon the rate of descent desired. Of course all
this will be accomplished automatically via the computer coupled auto-
throttle.
The crew's role will be to obtain ATC clearance, and then feed
initiation data into the system. At the prescribed point in space, the
system will start descent procedures, sending appropriate commands
through the auto-throttle system to the power plants. The crew's re-
sponsibility will be to verify the rate of deceleration and to insure a
descent/deceleration profile consistent with passenger comfort, ATC
procedures, and other subsystem operation. No new equipment will
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be utilized, and the crew's main aid will be either the preflight computed
data, or airborne computer data.
Feasible Manual Implementation Concepts for SST
The crew's adherence to a descent/deceleration profile in a manner
similar to that in current operations is quite feasible. The crew would
manipulate the fuel flow and accept a linear Mach/altitude deceleration.
Their responsibility would not be changed from that stated in the previous
section.
In most cases, the descent/deceleration profiles would be predi-
cated on optimum, economical performance. However, in the event of
an emergency which warrants rapid deceleration and descent, the crew
has the capability of using dirty configuration descents and airborne
thrust reversal. These two procedures should only be considered as
imminent disaster maneuvers.
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4.13 FUNCTION 4.13 THRUST APPLICATION = F (SONIC
BARRIER PENETRATION); DECELERATION
Purpose
This function is to vary the output of the power plants so as to in-
sure compliance with the deceleration schedule. As the SST approaches
the sonic barrier the high associated drag will increase appreciably,
which will in turn cause a more rapid deceleration. As the aircraft
approaches its subsonic descent speed it will be necessary to establish
a new angle of descent, and to readjust the output of the power plants.
Most proposed schedules indicate the flying of a constant Mach descent
until such time as a predetermined airspeed is indicated, and then con-
tinuing with a constant airspeed descent.
While this particular performance is not experienced in current
subsonic operations, there has been extensive military experience in
these areas. As a result, no particular problems are foreseen during
this phase of the flight, at least with regard to the operation of the power
plants. The main concern of the SST crew will be to insure that the in-
let duct system is positioned for subsonic flight, and that the fuel control
system reverts back to the automatic system which operates as a function
of the engine RPM. As has been pointed out, in supersonic flight varia-
tions in the fuel control determine the thrust output, since the speed of
the engine is held constant at maximum RPM. In subsonic regimes,
however, the engines are able to accept the air masses introduced at
the intake, so that thrust is varied by varying the air mass flow and
accepting the fuel flow obtained. Most current subsonic aircraft are
outfitted with an automatic fuel control which takes into account environ-
mental conditions and provides the optimum fuel flow for any selected
RPM setting.
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Current Jet Operational Requirements and Constraints
This is not an area of concern for current subsonic air carriers.
Current Jet Implementation Concepts. None.
This is not applicable to current air carriers.
SST Potential Operational Requirements and Constraints
The only real constraint is the reduction of sonic boom overpres-
sures. This will be accomplished by performing the transonic decel-
eration at a high enough altitude to attenuate sonic effects.
Feasible Automated Implementation Concepts for SST
The pre-programmed descent/deceleration profile will control the
output of the power plants through the auto-throttle. The commanded
speeds will be the result of analyzing data with regard to sonic boom
considerations, atmospheric conditions, and economics. The crew will
monitor the operation of the automatic system. The crew's responsibility
will be to insure that the power plants are performing normally, that un-
tolerable sonic boom overpressures are not being generated, and that
upon passing through the sonic barrier, the power plant control changes
back from a variable fuel control to a variable air flow/fuel flow
operation.
Feasible Manual Implementation Concepts for SST
The crew's manipulation of the fuel control, and later the reposi-
tioning of the throttle to a lower RPM, will be the means for perform-
ing this transonic deceleration. In most cases, the fuel control would
be set to provide minimum thrust, and a decreasing Mach versus alti-
tude deceleration profile w_uld be followed. As the aircraft enters the
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subsonic speed regime, and the inlet duct is again reconfigured for low
speed operations, the crew will be able to vary the RPM to control the
power plant output even more.
The crew will be responsible for complying with descent/decel-
eration profiles which are either computed prior to flight or instan-
taneously generated and displayed for the crew. In the first case, a
family of curves could compensate for variations in forecasted condi-
tions. The instantaneously generated profile would take all existing
onn_t_nn= _n+n _°_A_+_ _LA manual performance should be well
within the capabilities of the crew, and should not really be any more
restrictive than following current descent/deceleration profiles.
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4.14 FUNCTION 4. 14 THRUST APPLICATION = F
(OPTIMUM MANEUVER SPEED}; SUBSONIC
HIGH ALTITUDE MANEUVERS
purpose
The output of the power plants is varied in this function to provide
energy to the SST system so that it can perform in high altitude subsonic
regions (45, 000 to 30,000 ft. ) and between Mach . 95 and Mach . 9. Once
the aircraft has decelerated through the sonic barrier, there will still be
an altitude region L-^_ . mustw,, ,_,, It cross and _erhaps maneuver in, prior
to commencing its standard instrument approach (let-down). This re-
gime is the concern of this section.
In the high altitude regime, the SST is again operating within the
environment of subsonic carriers, and may be required to level-off at
some altitude, or to establish a holding pattern prior to sequencing
into the final approach pattern. Because of the SST fuel consumption
rates at low altitudes, any delays or holding patterns necessary for
sequencing separation should occur at as high an altitude as is possible.
Current Jet Operational Requirements and Constraints
Currently, aircraft must be able to operate and maneuver effec-
tively in the high altitude regime in response to control commands by
ATC. These maneuvers will include changing of altitudes, vectored
turns, and standard holding patterns. Almost all of these maneuvers
are procedural methods utilized by Air Traffic Control facilities to
provide adequate separation between aircraft.
Current Jet Implementation Concepts
The particular regime discussed is equivalent to the cruise por-
tion of the subsonic jet. However, the same activities are involved.
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If the aircraft is instructed by ATC to "hold" using some standard hold-
ing fix, then the crew manipulates the throttles in a manner so as to
comply with published instructions (e. g., airspeed, type of turns, etc. ).
SST Potential Operational Requirements and Constraints
There appear to be none, other than, perhaps, consideration by
the ATC controller for the altitude sensitivity of the SST. There is no
reason to suspect that the SST will have any problems operating in this
altitude and speed regime.
Feasible Automated Implementation Concepts for SST
As with most of the other power plant operations, the auto-throttle
will usually take care of high altitude maneuvers following a certain sche-
dule. The commanded airspeed will be maintained by the automatic sys-
tem for level flight, or for some particular selected descent profile.
In those situations which require a constant airspeed, the auto-
throttle may be utilized separately to maintain any commanded speed.
Any deviation from the pre-programmed descent/deceleration profile
would necessitate changing from a completely automatic mode {computer
coupled auto-throttle} to a semi-automatic operation (auto-throttle only}.
The main responsibility of the crew would be to set up the system for
some desired airspeed, and monitor it.
Feasible Manual Implementation Concepts for SST
Crew manipulation of the throttles would provide the means for
varying the output of the power plants. This performance would be
dependent upon the maneuver required (i. e., continued descent, level-
off, holding, etc. }. This is a straightforward example of power plant
utilization to obtain necessary energy for some particular maneuver.
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The crew will be responsible for monitoring the performance of
the power plant and insuring that sufficient power is available for com-
plying with system demands. The SST crew should not encounter any
new problems and should be able to cope with any normal situations
which might arise in this regime. Although there is the possibility that
this portion of the flight could be completely automated, it is believed
that this area is well within the performance capabilities of the crew,
and that the additional programming to include such operations as level
fl{_ht nr hnldin_ natterns, would be unnecessary.
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4.15 FUNCTION 4.15 THRUST APPLICATION = F (OPTIMUM
MANEUVER SPEED); LET-DOWN
Purpose
This function is to vary the output of the power plants to maintain
an airspeed which is consistent with economic procedures and ATC de-
scent patterns. However, it must be noted that during this let-down
phase of flight the power plants will usually be in the idle position. The
rate of descent thus is a function of aircraft configuration and airspeed.
For our study we will assume that the velocity output required is pro-
vided by the power plant operations function. It can be seen that this
is really the case because if a constant airspeed is chosen for the idle
power situation, then the attitude of the aircraft is determined for any
configuration of the aircraft. It must be also noted that the configuration
of the aircraft will determine the vertical speed at which the aircraft is
descending. Depending on the aerodynamic characteristics of the air-
craft the vertical speed determined by the idle power plants and the
aircraft clean configuration may be very low. Therefore, to expedite
the descent, high drag devices are used to obtain steeper angles of de-
scent (e. g., speed brakes or spoilers). In actuality, during this phase
the crew only has to monitor the power plant performance instruments
periodically.
Current Jet Operational Requirements and Constraints
Aircraft must possess the means to maneuver in compliance with
ATC procedures. In doing this they must have the capability to select
those descent profiles which take into consideration passenger comfort,
maneuvering for traffic avoidance, and economics. In most current sit-
uations aircraft are directed to a specific navigational location (described
by position, altitude, and time), from which at a specific time they are
directed to follow a standard instrument approach (SIA) which has been
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published. This SIA furnishes specific instructions with regard to
airspeeds, rates of descent and navigational data.
FAR 91. 85 (ref. 13) is applicable here:
Operating on or in the vicinity of an airport; general rules.
(a) Unless otherwi_ required by Part 93
[New] of this chapter, each person operating
an aircraft on or in the vicinity of an airport
shall comply with tile requirements of this
.__ction and of §§91.87 and 91.89.
(b) Unless otherwise authoriT_ed or required
hy ATC_ no wrson may operate an aircraft
within an airport traffic area except for tile
purpose of landing at, or taking off from, an
airport within that area. ATC authorizations
may be given as individual approval of specific
operations or may be contained in written
agreements between airport users and the
tower concerned.
(c) No person may operate-
(l) An arriving air('raft below 10,0(_
feet MSL within 30 nautical miles of an air-
port of intended landing (or an airpot_
where, a sinmlaled approach is to be made)
at an indicq_ed ai,_peed of more lhan 050
knots (2_S m.l_.h.): or
(2) Unless otherwi_ authorized or re-
quired by ATC, any aircraft within an air-
port traffic area at an indicated airspeed of
more than-
(i) In the case of a reciprocating en-
gine aircraft, 156 knots (l_qO m.p.h.); or
(ii) In the case, of a turbine-powered
aircraft, 20o knots ('230 na.p.h.).
llowever, if the minimum airspeed required
[,w recommend.d in the airl)hme flight man-
ual to mainlain safe nmneuve2-qlfility or re-
quire(l! 1)y military normal operating proced-
ures is greater lhan the maxinmm speed pro-
scribed in this lmragraph, the aircraft may be
operated at thai mininmm airspeed.
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Current Jet Implementation Concepts
Current aircraft performance is similar to that forecast for the
SST as the Boeing 707 Operations Manual (ref. 17) indicates:
A normal descent from a cruise condition may be established
in several different configurations. The clean descent can be
established merely by reducing power and maintaining any
indicated airspeed up to the placard airspeed during a descent.
The clean descent is recommended for maximum range con-
siderations provided the descent can be started a suitable
distance away from the destination so that arrival at the
destination is at a minimum altitude. The descent can also
be accomplished by using partial airbrakes and/or with
landing gear extended. Extending the gear is generally
recommended for conditions where it is desirable to descend
in a very short air distance, such as a penetration letdown
procedure in weather to a landing approach fix. When letting
down with gear extended and/or spoilers extended, care must
be exercised to prevent overshooting the desired altitude for
leveling off because of the relatively high rates of descent.
SST Potential Operational Requirements and Constraints
With regard to the power plants there does not appear to be any
modification necessary to present requirements. Instrument approaches
may have to be altered so that the SST can hold and start descent at
higher altitudes.
Feasible Automated Implementation Concepts for SST
The computer coupled auto-throttle will furnish the means for
following a descent profile which will optimize fuel consumption and
comply with ATC procedures. The crew's responsibility would include
monitoring the automatic mode of operation and the power plant system
performance. In all likelihood, the crew would command a descent
speed and the auto-throttle would compensate for pattern character-
istics to maintain this airspeed.
254
Feasible Manual Implementation Concepts for SST
The crew will manipulate the throttle to vary power plant output,
so as to comply with let-down procedures. In most cases, an idle RPM
let-down will be utilized as in current operations. The crew will be
responsible for maintaining a given airspeed, maneuvering ability, and
rate of descent consistent with ATC procedures and economic operations.
Under normal conditions this particular power plants function is insigni-
ficmnt. The performance required is merely monitoring of power plant
instruments. A constant airspeed is maintained and the vertical rate of
descent is regulated by the flight control function.
2_5
4.16 FUNCTION 4.16 THRUST APPLICATION = F (OPTIMUM
MANEUVER SPEED); LEVEL-OFF
Purpose
This function is the varying of power plant output so that energy
is available to maintain a straight and level flight altitude at an airspeed
consistent with low level maneuvering in the Air Traffic Control system.
The preceding phase of the flight, the aircraft descends at a constant
airspeed and at a rate of descent consistent with the prescribed approach
pattern. As the approach altitude is neared, many operations are required
to change the aircraft from a descent pattern to a straight and level state.
Other factors must also be taken into consideration in this transition (e. g.,
the passengers' tolerance to deceleration).
Level-off maneuvers are coordinated flight control/power plant
performances. As the assigned altitude is approached, the vertical
rate of descent is slowed by retracting the high liftdevices and changing
the attitude of the aircraft. If an idle power plant operation is used, then
as the vertical speed approaches zero and the attitude of the aircraft starts
to change, the constant airspeed which was being maintained will start to
decrease. When the new desired airspeed is reached, power will have to
be applied to maintain it. Optimally, there should be a smooth transition
to level flight such that when the assigned altitude is attained, the vertical
speed is zero, the aircraft is at the required airspeed, sufficient power is
used to maintain the airspeed, and the aircraft is trimmed for the new
speed.
Current Jet Specific Operational Requirements and Constraints
In aviation, any transition from one state to another requires a
smooth and coordinated maneuver. Square corner maneuvers are not
possible thus, anticipation and transition are important factors in smooth
flying. Current aircraft must be able to intercept an altitude, either from
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above or below, without placing undue accelerations on the passengers,
and without overshooting, or passing through the altitude. Air Traffic
Control separation procedures are predicated on this ability to reach
an altitude without overshoot.
Most ATC procedures pertaining to an approach for landing have
some type of descent or let-down to an intermediate sequencing pattern
altitude (approximately 1,500 to 3,000 feet) where the aircraft is readied
for landing as it is maneuvered toward the final approach course. Varia-
tions in this pattern increase or decrease the separation _-_+,.,_._,,,_..n......_irrraft
on final approach (3 miles in current operations).
Current Jet Implementation Concepts
Manipulations of the throttle in conjunction with changes in aircraft
attitude are used to accomplish the level-off maneuver. As the assigned
altitude is neared the attitude of the aircraft is changed, resulting in a
decrease in vertical velocity and a slight decrease in airspeed. Ideally,
the assigned altitude is reached as the desired airspeed is attained and the
rate of descent reaches zero. The output of the power plants has to be
regulated so as to supply sufficient energy to maintain this state (i. e.
straight and level flight at a desired airspeed).
SST Potential Operational Implementation Concepts For SST
With the SST there will be the possibility of flying this transition
phase of flight via the auto-pilot/auto-throttle/on-line computer. A descent
profile can be commanded, so that as a commanded altitude is approached,
a signal to the flight control system will change the aircraft attitude, and
as a fluctuation is noted in the airspeed, a signal will be transmitted to
the auto-throttle for increased power to maintain the commanded airspeed.
Although this is a feasible concept, it is probable that a more manual
version will be implemented. More than likely the pilot will change the
attitude of the aircraft, set the throttle in some quadrant range, and then
allow the auto-throttle system to make necessary small corrections.
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Whatever the final design, responsibility will be with the crew to
maintain proper vigilance of the entire system. This is a critical phase
of the flight for the altitude is low and the aircraft is descending at a high
rate of speed. If the transition is to be completely automatic, there must
be some indication that the system is operating correctly so that the pilot
can override the controls if necessary.
Feasible Automated Implementation Concepts For SST
In the subsonic regime, the SST power plants will be operated as
__,_e ,-,,rr,_,t__"- engE_les. They will respond to changes in the RPM which
well in turn influence fuel control and fuel flow. The main control well
keep the throttle control on the power quadrant. While level-off proce-
dures should be the same as that of current operations, the larger dimen-
sions of the SST and the slower control response may necessitate the
initiation of such procedures earlier in the descent. However, experience
w ill give the crew sufficient data to make this a routine operation.
The crew's responsibility will continue to be the interception of an
assigned altitude with as little overshoot as possible, the comfort of the
passengers and the monitoring of power plant performance.
In this particular flight regime the aircraft should operate like any
current subsonic aircraft, and the crew should be able to handle it in a
manual mode. In fact, until proper training can change pilot thinking,
it will be a necessary mode of operation.
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4. 17 FUNCTION 4.17 THRUST APPLICATION - F (OPTIMUM
MANEUVER SPEED}; INITIAL APPROACH
Purpose
This function is to vary the output of the power plants so as to
maintain an airspeed for the landing sequence. Having reached a final
approach altitude, some maneuvering of the aircraft is necessary to
intercept the ILS (instrument land;_ng system) final approach course for
landing. The airspeed selected for this maneuvering is usually some
function of the stall speed. It is usually referred to as the landing refer-
ence speed and is a function of the landing gross weight and the aircraft
configuration. After the aircraft attains level flight, and has been posi-
tioned in the landing pattern, power is decreased to obtain a slower speed.
As this speed is attained, the high life devices (i.e., flaps, droop, slots,
etc.) are utilized, and as the reference speed is approached, power is
readjusted to maintain this speed (straight and level).
Current Jet Operational Requirements and Constraints
The initial approach phase is utilized to provide optimum spacing
for traffic on final approach, and for reconfiguring aircraft so that they
will be compatible with traffic on final approach. Descent speeds are
usually notably lhigher than those speeds utilized on final approach. Thus,
separation distances would be decreasing if some kind of procedure were
not set up for shifting to lower speeds.
The initial approach phase is also advantageous for the crew because
it permits readying the aircraft for landing while flying straight and level,
and prior to intercepting the final approach course.
Current Jet Implementation Concepts
Once the aircraft has leveled-off at the initial approach altitude,
the aircraft must be readied for landing. The throttle is manipulated
259
so that avail.able energy is decreased. Since a constant altitude is being
maintained, the decrease is manifested as a decrease in airspeed. After
the aircraft is re configured for landing, and the landing reference speed
attaLned, power is added to maintain this speed throughout the pattern.
The throttles are then manipulated as necessary to maintain this refer-
ence speed.
SST Potential Operational Requirements and Constraints Modification
There do not appear to be any modifications necessary to present
requirements. The SST, as proposed, will have to be capable of conform-
ing to patterns utilized by subsonic carriers, and that implies compatible
airspeeds.
Feasible Automated Implementation Concepts For SST
The auto-throttle can be utilized to maintain the constant airspeed,
but whether it is easier to dial in a commanded airspeed or to actually fly
the required speed is yet to be determined. The use of an auto-throttle
would allow the crew to concentrate attention in other areas. Whatever
the outcome, the pilot and crew will be responsible for seeing that the
required amount of power is available for the speed and configuration
desired. The use of power to maintain level flight at a constant altitude
is one of the basic concepts of flight. The aerodynamics ofethe SST
might dictate higher approach speeds, and perhaps higher power settings,
but the basic underlying principle will be the same.
Feasible Manual Implementation Concepts For SST
Throttle manipulation to obtain energy necessary for a particular
maneuver is a feasible concept and is similar to that of current opera-
tions. It must be remembered that with high performance aircraft, and
swept-winged aircraft in particular, for each configuration of the aircraft
there is a set of curves which will give the functional relationship between
260
airspeed and thrust. This is not a completely linear function, and for
jet aircraft there is a portion of the power curve called the "back side"
of the curve. In this regime more power is needed to obtain a slower
airspeed. In some aircraft it may be necessary to fly in this speed
regime because of the requirement for a slower approach speed. This
may be the case with the SST.
In the SST, the crew will be responsible for insuring that sufficient
power is available when _needed to maintain any desired airspeed in any
particular configuration. Current subsonic jets operate in this manner
and so there should be no transfer problems when the SST is introduced.
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4. 18 FUNCTION 4.18 THRUST APPLICATION - F (OPTIMUM
MANEUVER SPEED}; FINAL APPROACH
Purpose
This function is to vary the output of the power plants to insure that
sufficient power is available to maneuver the SST along the final approach
course, and to maintain an approach speed which is consistent with safety
factors. The final approach can be assumed to commence at that point
in space where the aircraft has reached the final approach altitude, or is
in the process of intercepting the ILS final approach course. Once the
final approach begins, power will have to be used to keep the SST on its
electronic glide path with the desired airspeed. The flight controls will
be used with the power plants to maintain the final approach course and to
assist in maintaining the desired airspeed.
Almost all experts on the SST insist that in order for it to be an
economic reality, it must incorporate some form of all-weather landing
system. However, all of the automatic landing techniques under con-
sideration require the pilot to perform several tasks manually. These
tasks include:
lo Establishing an initial approach attitude, altitude, and
heading.
2. Setting and utilizing flaps as desired.
3. Lowering the landing gear.
4. Establishing an initial approach airspeed.
o Setting the desired runway heading on the flight director,
horizontal situation indicator, or other instruments.
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Current Jet Operational Requirements and Constraints
Throughout the final portions of the landing approach, there is a
requirement for various energy outputs consistent with the aircraft's
configuration and the maneuvers required. These variations in the
power plant output will be a function of airspeed requirements, parti--
cularly the airspeed control throughout the initial approach pattern, the
airspeed control on final approach, and the airspeed control during
flare-out. These controls of airspeed are coordinated flight control/
power plant maneuvers.
Current Jet Implementation Concepts
In current operations the crew utilizes the throttle to vary the
output of the power plants. As airspeed and maneuver requirements
:hange, the crew manipulates the throttle so as to have sufficient power
for the maneuver. Prior to reaching the final approach course, the
throttle is varied to obtain an RPM which will provide sufficient energy
for level flight in the dirty configuration (i. e., flags and landing gear
extended), tks the final approach course is reached, and the glide slope
approached, the attitude of the aircraft is readjusted to pick up the final
approach speed, and the throttle is readjusted to start a rate of descent.
Once the glide slope is attained, the throttles are varied to maintain
this electronic beam with the smallest possible deviations (both in move-
ment away from glide path and in airspeed).
SST Potential Operational Requirements and Constraints
The requirement to maintain certain airspeeds throughout the final
approach pattern will continue into SST operations. One other factor
which will be introduced will be noise. If an aircraft makes a nose-down
approach, the engine noise will be directed away from the ground and
thus attenuated. However, if the aircraft lands nose-up, the engine noise
will be directed downward and thus accentuated.
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Feasible Automated Implementation Concepts For SST
The use of the auto-throttle through the approach pattern and on
the final approach will greatly alleviate some tasks for the crew during
this busy flight phase. The responsibility of the crew will be to insure
that sufficient power is available to maintain the required airspeeds.
This means that the crew will be responsible for commanding certain
airspeeds while in the manual portion of the approach, and monitoring
the system during final approach in the automatic mode. In the event
of some non-routine performance, the manual overriding of th_ auto-
Lhrottie will usually disengage the automatic system.
Because of the time lag between throttle movement and power out-
put, adequate instrumentation will need to be available so that the crew
can stay ahead of the aircraft. The optimum flying of high performance
aircraft is predicated on this anticipatory ability.
Without a doubt, the final approach in an SST will be a combination
of man and machine control. The crew's main function and responsibility
on the final approach will be to monitor the functioning of the automated
system, and to insure that its performance is within tolerances. Between
now and the actual introduction of the SST, crews will be using new land-
ing systems. Each will incorporate a little more automation, but presently
there is no indication the crew will be taken out of the loop.
Feasible Manual Implementation Concepts For SST
Manipulation of the throttle in response to airspeed requirements
will be the method utilized to manually fly the SST. This performance
will be similar to current operations. The crew would continue to be
responsible for controlling airspeed throughout the approach pattern, and
insuring that sufficient energy was available to perform any required
maneuvers.
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Assuming that the rest of the automatic system is operating nor-
mally, the crew could be kept in the loop by eliminating the auto-throttle
concept. The crew's task would be to track the glide slope, a task well
within the crew's capability. However, some question could be raised
concerning the crew's ability to perform the flareout. If the crew were
provided instrumentation which displayed reduced power requirements
as automatic flare was initiated, the task would continue to be a tracking
task. However, if the ,L,_...v_"'_-'o'_,,*....i_ initiated upon the crew's visual contact
with the runway, then the same restrictions described in Function 4.20
w ill hold.
As in current operations the throttle would be adjusted and readjusted
as required to control both the airspeed and the rate of descent. Ideal
performance would be the maintenance of the glide path at the optimum
airspeed (the speed corrected for the aircraft's landing weight).
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4.19 FUNCTION 4.19 THRUST APPLICATION - F (MAXIMUM
POWER); MISSED APPROACH
Purpose
This function varies power plant output so as to supply energy to
the aircraft in sufficient quantity to change its attitude and direction from
a descending aircraft to a climbing or level aircraft. At any moment during
the final approach, a decision can be made to abort and take another course
of action. When this decision is made, the aircraft must be caps hle of
stopping its descent, and in some cases must be able to climb.
Current Jet Operational Requirements and Constraints
It has always been necessary for the crew to be able to abandon
an approach at any point if such a decision is made. The advent of jet
aircraft brought a few new characteristics to this maneuver. The heavier
aircraft, the larger rates of descent, and the power lags (between throttle
movement and actual power output) have all influenced the performance
requirements of the missed approach.
By regulation the crew is required to execute such a maneuver Lf
the runway is not visually sighted at the minima of the approach. In other
wards, the aircraft can come down to a particular altitude and then must
level-off. If the runway is not sighted, some other procedure must be
follow e d.
Current Jet Implementation Concepts
Crew performance requirements are similar in any type of aircraft,
and it is not anticipated that the SST crew will experience any appreciable
workload increases. In today's subsonic jets, the crew, upon recognizing
the need to abort, will apply takeoff thrust and simultaneously start to
change the attitude. Once the aircraft has picked up a climb attitude, it
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is usually "cleaned up" (gear raised}, and the crew will make a decision
for further action.
Although noise considerations have played a major role up until
this time, most missed approaches, at least at very low altitudes,
are predicated on dangerous situations, and might be considered non-
routine operations. Thus, the basic concern of the crew will be to per-
form the maneuver so as to maintain the safety of the aircraft.
SST Potential Operational Requirements and Co_straints
If the SST utilizes an all-weather landing system, the missed
approach minima will either have to be eliminated, or limited to those
aircraft not suitably equipped with adequate systems. Other than that,
all other safety considerations will continue into SST operations. Studies
of the SST handling characteristics on final approach will have to be
reexamined once final designs have been chosen to determine any new
characteristics which might adversely affect crew performance.
Feasible Automated Implementation Concepts For SST
Because of all of the variables which would influence the missed
approach, and because of the instantaneous performance required, no
automatic implementation of this function is currently being advocated.
Of course a computer programmed missed approach is feasible and
could be actuated instantaneously. Whether the crew would accept such
a system is yet to be determined.
Feasible Manual Implemeatation Concepts For SST
The missed approach maneuver in the SST will in all likelihood
continue to be a manual operation. Although many concepts are being
presented which rely on an automatic landing system, almost all U. S.
companies insist on keeping the pilot in the loop in case there is a missed
approach situation. Thus, the pilot's ability to override the automatic
system (auto-throttle) is not inconsistent with the landing concept for the
267
SST. Once the missed approach has been performed by the crew, the
automatic system may again be utilized. The crew will continue to be
responsible for the safety of the aircraft, and compliance with any ATC
instructions.
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4.20 FUNCTION 4.20 THRUST APPLICATION - F
(FLARE EXECUTION)
Purpose
Output of the power plants is varied in this function in conjunction
with the flight control system to reduce the energy of the system in a
controlled stall maneuver. Prior to the initiation of the flare maneuver,
the aircraft is in a descending attitude (rate of descent of about 600 feet
per minute) and maintaining an approach speed which is consistent with
the weight of the aircraft and the surrounding weather conditions. In
those aircraft requiring flight on the back side of the power curve, suf-
ficient power is supplied to the system to maintain the airspeed and rate
of descent required to fly the automatic landing system. When landing
is assured, the aircraft's attitude is changed to decrease the rate of
descent (to around 200 feet per minute), and the power is set to idle so
the aircraft will actually stall as it lands. This prevents the aircraft
from floating half way down the runway, and reducing the available roll-
out distance.
Current Jet Operational Requirements and Constraints
Larger, faster aircraft approach the runway at extremely high rates
of descent, and at angles of attack other than the optimum for main landing
gear contact with the runway. Therefore, the aircraft attitude must be
changed so as to decrease the rate of descent and obtain a desirable angle
of attack for runway contact with the main landing gear. Optimum per-
formance is required in this area to prevent lengthy deviation from the
optimum touchdown point and shortening the available roll-out distance.
Price, Smith and Gartner (ref. 33) describe flareout as,
. . . a maneuver for changing the aircraft attitude and reducing
the rate of descent just prior to touchdown in order for the air-
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craft to have a desirable angle of attack for runway contact
with the main landing gear and to touchdown at an optimum
rate of descent. Flareout is usually initiated when the air-
craft is in the vicinity of the runway threshold and results
in a gradual change in attitude and rate of descent until
touchdown.
Present concepts for final approach vertical guidance
are to control the aircraft along a straight line path which
intercepts the runway in a horizontal plane. The rate of des-
cent of the aircraft is then directly proportional to its approach
speed. Current instrument landing system installations in-
clude a glide slope beam inclined at an angle of 2.5 to 3
degrees. It is impractical to lower this approach beam any
furthcr because of terrain clearance and radiation problems,
and in fact with higher performance aircraft it may be desir-
able to have higher approach angles. Thus the solution to
change from a high rate of descent (as much as 60 feet per
second for high speed aircraft) to a nominal rate of descent
(approximately 2 feet per second) at touchdown is to flare the
last segment of the vertical flight path ....
Current Jet Implementation Concepts
In today's operations the crew usually performs the flare maneuver
manually. That is, the crew makes the decision to flare, starts to change
the aircraft's attitude, and decreases power as necessary to initiate a
controlled stall. This manually flown maneuver places some restrictions
on the landing minima for the aircraft. If the aircraft is descending at a
certain rate of descent, and if it takes the crew a certain length of time to
visually survey the situation, make a decision, and then initiate the flare
maneuver, then this would describe how high above the ground the crew
must have visual contact with the runway in order to fulfill the requirements
of the performance.
SST Potential Operational Requirements and Constraints
Because of the higher rates of descent associated with the SST,
because of the slower longitudinal response of the control system, it
would appear that landing minima using manual means will need to be
and
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raised. In the case of automatic all-weather landing systems, the changes
will be such as to decrease the existing minima.
The basic consideration will be changing the aircraft's attitude so
as to decrease the rate of descent, and optimize the contact attitude of the
main landing gear and the runway.
Feasible Automated Implementation Concepts For SST
The performance of the SST crew will be similar to that of today's
subsonic aircraft crew. SST operations will find the crew monitoring the
final approach and ascertaining that the automatic landing system is func-
tioning properly. The crew will have the prerogative of allowing the
automatic system to initiate the flare, or after visual contact overriding
the system and performing the maneuver manually.
Even though the flare maneuver will be handled via an automatic
function, the crew's responsibility will continue to insure that rates of
descents are decreased to acceptable values, and that the aircraft touches
down within acceptable deviations from the optimum touchdown point.
Feasible Manual Implementation Concepts For SST
The crew will have the capability to fly the final approach manually,
and to perform the flare maneuver as in current operations. However,
because of the higher performance characteristics of the SST, in all
likelihood the visual minima will probably have to be raised for a manual
approach. Because of the higher sink rates and the higher approach speeds,
the crew will have less time to make critical decisions. Thus, although
the SST may have all-weather landing capability with the automatic system
functioning properly, a malfunction of this system will make it necessary
to divert to an alternate. It is quite feasible that this will occur even
though the destination airport has weather which is acceptable to current
subsonic aircraft.
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The crew's manipulation of the throttle in conjunction with the
aircraft's attitude change will provide the decrease in energy necessary
to obtain an optimum landing point.
The crew's responsibility will continue to be optimization of the
touchdown point, and acceptable rates of descent on touchdown (both
for passenger comfort considerations and for landing gear structural
limitations). Large deviations from optimum touchdown point decrease
the amount of available ro!!-out runway.
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4.21 FUNCTION 4.21 THRUST APPLICATION " F (SURFACE
SPEED); THRUST REVERSAL FOR BRAKING
Purpose
This function is to provide a source of braking for the decelerating
aircraft through variation of the power plant output. Depending upon the
accuracy of the flare maneuver, the aircraft will touch down at varying
distances from the threshold (usable end of runway) which will then leave
a certain amount of available runway for rollout. Since there are no
immediate plans for lengthening present runways, and since the perfor-
mance characteristics of the proposed SST on approach and landing are
"hotter" than those of current subsonic aircraft, most companies are
requiring that the SST have some form of thrust reversing for braking.
A Space/Aeronautics Staff Report (ref. 29) on the SST expresses
the general consensus concerning the development and use of thrust
reversal:
• . . the SST will probably have to be capable of thrust
reversal. FAA has suggested a maximum of 8000 ft as
a landing distance. Some experts' calculations of mini-
mum possible distances for present configurations show
a range of values from 8000 to 10,000 ft with idle thrust
and brakes only, and 5000 to 6000 ft with 20 percent re-
verse thrust. Because of the SST's higher ratio of thrust
to gross landing weights, the amount of the engine's thrust
required to be reversed is more likely to be 20 percent, as
assumed here, rather than the 40 percent that is required
of present subsonic transports.
Even if one of the three (now two)* configurations
proposed for the SST could provide acceptable landing
distances without thrust reversal, it is h[ghly probable
that the airlines would demand reversers for adverse run-
way conditions and emergencies such as loss of brakes and
takeoff aborts ....
$Parenthetic insertion by the authors.
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Upon completion of the flare maneuver and the subsequent touch-
down, the aircraft will still possess some velocity which will be less
than landing speed (landing can be considered a controlled stall}, and
because of its high gross weight, a large amount of kinetic energy.
Aerodynamic braking (utilizing the aircraft's surfaces to generate
high drag}, as well as the friction between the aircraft wheels and the
runway will cause a decrease in airspeed and hence in kinetic energy.
However, only in the ideal situation where unlimited runway is available
will these forms of energy "taps" be sufficient to slow the aircraft to a
speed at which the braking system can be effectively utilized. Of course,
perfect performance by the crew in attaining the exact landing speed,
optimum touchdown point, and a strong headwind will allow the aircraft
to slow to taxi speeds within the runway available. However since these
factors cannot be considered as constraints, some form of back-up brak-
ing system must be provided.
The aircraft must be decelerated to a safe taxi speed in the runway
remaining. Brakes will be utilized when the speed of the aircraft is in
that regime where it is safe to do so.
For further descriptions of the performance required of the SST
crew, and of the current and forecasted implementation concepts, see
Function 4.4.
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4.22 FUNCTION 4.22 THRUST APPLICATION = F
(SURFACE SPEED); TAXI TO LINE
Pur pose
This function is to vary the power plants so that sufficient energy
is supplied to move from the end of the operational runway to the desig-
nated unloading area. The power required will be a function of the weight
of the aircraft and the desired surfac_ speed "_'hich, of course, must be
consistent with safe ground control procedures.
The description of the crew's performance and involvement will
be found under the description of Function 4. 2. Function 4.2 deals with
the taxi from the loading area to the operational rm_way. Taxi to line is
just the reverse of that performance, and the crew involvement will be
the same.
The chief problems which will be encountered in SST operations
will not be in the area of power plant operations, but rather in the other
areas associated with the taxi phase. The larger aircraft, the pilot's
higher position, and the basic configuration of the crew's compartment
and amount of visibility will make it quite difficult for the SST to man-
euver on the ground.
Current Jet Operational Requirements and Constraints
Requirements are the same as those described for Function 4. 2.
Current Jet Implementation Concepts
See Function 4. 2.
SST Potential Operational Requirements and Constraints
See Function 4.2.
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Feasible Automated Implementation Concepts for SST
See Function 4.2.
Feasible Manual Implementation Concepts for SST
See Function 4.2.
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4.23 FUNCTION 4.23 ACCOMPLISH POWER PLANT
SYSTEM DEACTIVATION
Purpose
This function is to vary the power plant controls so as to comply
with operational procedures concerning shutdown and to insure that
power removal will not damage any of the subsystems because of tran-
sients or surges. Once the status of the aircraft subsystems has been
verified and contact has been made with ground handling crews, the
power plants can be deactivated. In most cases this will consist of
closing the engine throttles and fuel controls.
Current Jet Operational Requirements and Constraints
Most of the requirements in this area deal with possible mal-
functions in the system. Standard operating procedures are usually
set up as a guide to optimize the method for deactivating the power
plant systera. The application of external electrical power is usually
a necessity, for in the event of a malfunction or shutdown some source
of electrical power must be available to perform malfunction procedures.
Current Jet Implementation Concepts
The Boeing 720 Operations Manual {ref.
shutdown procedures as follows:
22) describes its normal
•.. engines must be operated below 85% N 2 rpm for 5 min-
utes before shutdown to prevent possible engine damage.
Any operating time below 85% N_ rpm may be included in
this 5 minute period such as, approach to land, landing,
taxiing and parking.
(1) Thrust Lever -- Idle; (2) External Power -- Plugged h,;
(3) External Power Switch-- On; (4) Essential Power Switch
Ext Power; (5) Engine Start Lever -- Cutoff; (6) Engine Fuel
Valves -- Close; and (7) Fuel Boost Pumps -- Off...
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The crew's main responsibility is to insure that the engines are
deactivated in a normal manner in accordance with performance criteria.
SST Potential Operational Requirement and Constraints
There does not appear to be any need for modification from cur-
rent requirements. The same safety considerations will prevail.
Feasible Automated Lmplementation Concepts for SST
No automatic concept is envisioned at present for this function.
Performance will be manual with perhaps some indication of system
status displayed prior to shutdown as a result of the on-line computer
cheek of the system.
Feasible Manual Implementation Concepts for SST
Insuring that electrical power is attached to the aircraft, moving
the throttle to the "OFF" position, and closing down the fuel controls
will be the means for deactivation for the SST.
The SST's crew's main concern during this particular perfor-
mance will be to react in ease of a malfunction. There is always the
possibility of a fire during shutdown procedures, and this must be
watched for. Other than that the crew's performance will be very
similar to what is found in today's operations. There is no reason te
suspect the operational procedures will change with the advent of the
SST.
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ACTIVITY 5.0 FLIGHT CONTROL
PURPOSE
The static forces of an aircraft, lift, weight, drag, and thrust
--all acting in the vertical plane--are assumed in equilibrium, and
their - _c_ ^, t_ o=,,=,._ on .._ performance of the vehicle is determined by apply-
ing NewtonWs fundamental laws of statics. The ability of a vehicle to
maintain its equilibrium is termed its stability; and the influence which
the pilot or guidance system can exert on the equilibrium is termed its
controllability.
An aircraft has to be able not only to raise itself from the ground,
but also, once airborne, to be controllable and able to fly steadily at
any desired speed and attitude within the operating range. Moreover,
it should preferably be stable; that is to say, if it is accidentally thrown
out of its correct flying attitude by a disturbance such as a sudden gust,
or by misuse of the controls, it should be able to recover its correct
attitude when left to itself, without any corrective action on the part of
the pilot. And it should be able to do this regardless of the attitude
from which it starts. An airplane that possesses this property is said
to be inherently stable.
In the early days of aviation small planes with relatively slow air-
speeds caused very few flight control problems. Now, with larger and
heavier aircraft and aircraft that operate through a wide spectrum of
airspeeds, other factors need to be considered. As the airspeed in-
creases, the dynamic pressures on the aircraftVs surfaces increase.
This in turn increases the pressure (force) needed to displace the con-
trol surfaces. This has resulted in the use of control tab assisted flight
controls. However, other problem areas then arise. Since the amount
of control needed in various flight phases and speed ranges differs,
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some compensation must be made so that the aircraft's control system
will be within safety limits during all phases of flight. Large aircraft
at slow speeds require large control surfaces to obtain the rate of
response necessary in these marginal areas of flight. These same
aircraft need relatively small amounts of control surface when oper-
ating in the multi-Mach ranges.
Assuming that the SST is equipped with a flight control system
which will provide the necessary controllability over the entire range
of the flight profile, the crew involvement is the concern of the fhght
control operations. It appears that the final choice for the SST will be
an electro-mechanical system into which will be integrated the various
automated systems, e. g., auto-pilot, auto-stabilization, and auto-
throttle.
Within the entire profile in which the SST will operate, there are
various degrees of crew involvement with the flight control system. In
fact, there is a changing relationship between man and machine. The
functional descriptions which are linked to the various flight phases
attempt to distinguish what role the crew will actually play in the
required performance. As was suggested by most experts in the over-
all description of the SST, many of the tasks will be completely auto-
mated, and the crew will act as monitors and will be available to either
reconfigure the system in the event of malfunction, or to manually
accomplish the required performance.
If all the factors could be forecast, and the SST could be programmed
for a completely automatic flight, it could conceivably be thought of as a
manned missile flying a particular trajectory. However, various oper-
ational constraints limit the extent of possible automation such that the
SST is merely a high performance model of today's subsonic carrier.
Higher speeds, high altitudes, longer distances, larger aircraft; these
are but a few of the changes which the SST introduces into commercial
aviation. The new parameters and the sophistication of the systems
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designed to cope with all the new problems will be the basis for a re-
evaluation of current subsonic aircraft by pilots. Performance require-
ments will change appreciably in some critical flight phases, and the
crew must be willing to accept the new responsibilities.
The automated concept is not a new one, but to the SST crew it
must not only provide reliable performance, but in the event of a mal-
function must provide adequate interface so that the takeover by the
crew may be ae_aomp!ished smoothly and in a timely fashion.
CURRENT JET OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS AND CONSTRAINTS
The following regulation applies to flight control.
FAR 121. 579, ref. 11:
Minimum altitudes for use of automatic pilot.
(a) E_ nmte operat/_ws. Except as provided
in paragraph (b) of this section, no person may
use an automatic pilot en route, including climb
and descent, at an altitude above the terrain that
is less than twice the maximum altitude loss
specified in the Airplane Flight Manual for a
malfunction of the automatic pilot under cruise
conditions, or less than 500 feet,, whichever is
higher.
(b) A_hes. When using an instrument
approach facility, no person may use an auto-
matic pilot at an altitude above the terrain
that is less than twice the maximum altitude
loss specified in the Airplane Flight Manual for
a malfunction of the automatic pilot under ap-
proach conditions, or less than 50 feet below
the approved minimum ceiling for the facility,
whichever is higher, except--
(1) When reported weather conditions are
less than the basic VFR weather conditions
in § 91.105 of this chapter, no person may use
an automatic pilot with an approach coupler
for ILS appro_he_s at an altitude above the
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terrain that is less than 50 feet higher than
the maximum altitude loss epecified in the
Airplane Flight Manual for the malfunction
of the automatic pilot with approach coupler
under approach conditions; and
(2) When reported weather conditions axe
equal to or better than the basic VFR mini-
mums in § 91.105 of this chapter, no person
may use an automatic pilot with an approach
coupler for ILS approaches at an altitude
above the terrain that is less than the maxi-
mum altitude loss specified in the Airplane
Flight Manual for the malfunction of the
automatic pilot with approach coupler under
approach conditions_ n_.... _n f_ _t.;_k,,,,._._o,o,
is higher.
CURRENT JET IMPLEMENTATION CONCEPTS
The most common forms of flight control systems in operation
today are similar to that found on the Boeing 720. The Boeing Oper-
ations Manual (ref. 22) describes the system as follows:
•.. the primary control surfaces consist of ailerons, eleva-
tor and rudder. These surfaces are aerodynamically bal-
anced and are actuated by means of cable controlled tabs.
The flaps and spoilers are hydraulically operated• In addi-
tion to aiding in lateral control, the spoilers can also be
used as speed brakes. The horizontal stabilizer angle of
incidence may be varied electrically, manually or by the
autopilot. The primary flight controls incorporate control
systems for both manual and automatic (autopilot) operation
of inboard ailerons, rudder and elevator. Hydraulic rudder
boost is incorporated• The automatic flight control system
consists of an AutopHot which includes an automatic VOR-
ILS beam coupler. The Autopilot provides sensitive, auto-
matic, coordinated control of the airplane at any desired
altitude, attitude, and heading...
The Boeing 720 flight control system typifies those found in cur-
rent subsonic aircraft, and is a prime example of the evolution which
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has taken place in this area of aviation. Looking closely at the flight
control system, it can be readily seen that certain distinct areas exist
which will influence the crew performance to some extent. The first
of these areas are the portions of the aircraft which actually induce the
controllability factors; the control surfaces. These are usually outside
the influence of the crew and are mainly the responsibility of designers.
Although not involved in the control surfaces themselves, the crew
becomes quite involved in the systems which transduce their motor
actions into desired control surface movement, in current operations
these systems are composed of cable actuated control tabs, and electro-
mechanical auto-pilot systems.
The use of the cable actuated control tabs might be considered the
most manual means of operation utilized by the crews of today's sub-
sonic carriers. The traditional yoke and wheel and rudder pedals are
m echanically positioned by the crew to obtain the required performance.
Back-up systems in the form of trim tabs assist in reducing the forces
in the system. The trim tabs aerodynamically balance out these forces,
so that the crew is no longer required to exert all of the energy to obtain
continued perform ance.
Today's cre_,vs use the cockpit controls in much the same way
controls were utilized in early aviation. The yoke is moved to contro]
vertical deviations, and the wheel and the rudder pedals sre coordinated
to obtain lateral changes. Although the flight characteristics of aircraft
have continued to change, and the performance characteristics have
become critical, the crew uses essentially the same interface means,
for obtaining three dimensional positioning of the aircraft.
Assistance has now been provided by the auto-pilot, which will
provide an electro-mechanical means for accomplishing all the required
flight control functions. In most instances the auto-pilot offers all
degrees of man-machine relationships from a completely automatic
system where the crew merely monitors, to an aided system where man
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accomplishes the complete function using only the electro-mechanical
portion of the auto-pilot instead of the straight mechanical flight con-
trol system.
Currently the manual system is utilized in those critical areas of
flight, e. g., takeoff, rough weather penetration, and landing. Some
portion of the automatic system is utilized throughout remaining por-
tions of flight.
_°_" POTENTIAL OPERATION REQUIREMENTS AND CONSTRAINTS
Many new requirements and constraints will be introduced with the
advent of the SST in commercial aviation. However, many of the prob-
lem areas which will be encountered by the designers of the SST control
systems, have already been solved and tested in associated military
systems. The FAA Bureau of Flight Standards (ref. 24) describes some
of the requirements and constraints associated with the SST,
Supersonic transport flight control systems will need
to meet a much more complex array of conditions than any
of the past or present civil transports. In addition to the
present low-to-high subsonic speed controllability with suit-
able feel characteristics there must be adequate control and
pilot feel through the transonic and supersonic ranges.
Changes in airframe configuration such as variable sweep,
hinged wing tips and other devices may be employed. Auto-
matic flight control, automatic landing systems and other
advances may be incorporated in the systems of the air-
craft...
The primary control system will be one of the most
vital elements of the supersonic transport. Its reliability
will be of paramount importance. Because of the variety
of conditions to be met and the magnitude of the forces
involved, power assist or actuation with secondary and
other standby means of operation will be essential. The
matter of primary control operation in the event of failure
of all engines must be considered. Some preliminary
studies indicate that the power demands for even limited
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controllability are beyond the capability of present energy
sources such as batteries...
Lee (ref. 34) discusses the type of control system which will in all
likelihood be used on the SST,
•.. because of the variation of Mach number experienced
in modern aeroplanes, the traditional methods of obtain-
ing aerodynamic balance (such as set-back hinges, aero-
dynamic servo tabs, etc. ) have become inadequate in many
cases and manual control has therefore had to be abandoned
in favour of power control, usually coupled with artificial
feel to replace the natural feel provided by the hinge
moments. This has meant putting a servo between the
human pilot (or automatic pilot, or autostabiliser servo)
and the control surface.
Problems which arise from such a system are those
of servo stability, frequency response (that is amplitude
ratio, phase lag, threshold, etc. ) and the power output;
all of these quantities are subject to tolerances, often
quite large ones. The high range of E. A. S. to be covered
brings with it the problem of resolution, i.e. the precision
with which the control surface can be set to the angle re-
quired by the pilot...
•.. It is now accepted that various forms of 'artificiat' aid
will probably be built into a modern aeroplane to give it the
required stability and control characteristics; this is espe-
cially the case for aeroplanes operating over a large range
of Mach number. These devices may provide damping,
based on gyro principles (e. g. the yaw damper), or may
counter movements of neutral point (e. g. a Mach trimmer)
or can vary the effective thrust drag speed relationship
(e. g. auto-throttle control), and so on.
By accepting such devices, the aeroplane designer
obtains more freedom in selecting the aerodynamic char-
acteristics of his aeroplane, for the ability to employ arti-
ficial stability aids means that, within limits, some of the
derivatives may be permitted to vary considerably and thus
it is possible to tolerate a wider range of basic 'aerody-
namic' derivatives than would have been possible if stability
and control had had to be achieved by the classical means
of airframe design (i. e. aerodynamics, mass distribution,
structural stiffness) only. Hence, this greater design free-
dom can be devoted to obtaining a higher aeroplane perfor-
mance (e. g. more speed, or a lighter structure, etc. ) and
greater operational efficiency...
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It is probably fair to say, therefore, that whereas the
modern aeroplane designer is very ready to employ non-
aerodynamic solutions to stability and control problems if,
by so doing, he can obtain operational advantages, yet there
is still a great attraction in trying to retain the old ideal of
the naturally stable, manually controlled aeroplane.
Ostgaard (ref. 35) has suggested the following performance require-
ments for SST flight control systems:
Before attempting to design a particular system or
apply any specific techniques to solving a contrn! prob!em,
the requirements for control must be specified. In the
case of supersonic transports the flight control system
must provide the dynamic performance, reliability and cap-
ability necessary for the vehicle mission with commensurate
flight safety. A brief resume of typical dynamic perfor-
mance requirements as well as systems mechanization
requirements are as follows:
A. Dynamic Stability - The transient normal accel-
eration response which occurs at approximately constant
speed by abruptly deflecting and returning the pilots control
to trimmed position shall damp to 1/10 amplitude in one
cycle or less, and the magnitude of any residual oscillations
shall not exceed 0. 03 g's at the pilots station. In addition
there shall be no sustained or uncontrollable oscillations
resulting from efforts of the pilot to maintain steady state
flight.
B. Accelerated Stability - The slope of the curve
of pilot control input versus normal acceleration shall be
stable, increasing aft displacement for increasing of load-
ing throughout the range of attainable load factors and in
all conditions of flight. In steady state turning flight and
in pull outs, increases in pull force shall be required to
produce increases in positive normal acceleration. The
variation in force required to produce an incremental
increase in acceleration shall be essentially constant up
to 85% of maximum attainable or allowable acceleration.
Above the 85% of normal acceleration an increase of 50%
is allowable in the local force gradient.
C. Speed of Response - The rate of response to
a pilot control input shall be such that the pilot shall not
be required to command inputs over and above normal
steady state input in order to increase the rate of response
286
during normal maneuvers. There shall be no excessive
overshoots or over control tendencies.
D. Speed Stability - For trimmed flight an in-
crease in sp-@ed shall result in a nose up pitching moment.
The pilot force required to maintain level flight shall be
aft for a decrease in speed and forward for an increase
in speed. The long period phugoid damping shall be posi-
tive at all flight conditions.
E. Augmentation System - The augmentation
system shall in addition t_ its normal function of damp-
ing add to or subtract from the pi!otq input to provide
uniform response characteristics without restricting
pilot authority. Further the system shall allow maneuver
capability up to the limit load, and shall provide the neces-
sary shaping and limiting for automatic hold modes and
navigation inputs. The augmentation system shall have
adequate authority to adequately control the vehicle in
the event of primary control system failure.
F. Gust Disturbances - Definition of gust re-
sponses is beyond the scope of this paper but, the system
shall have the capability to damp such disturbances to
less than 1/4 amplitude in one cycle.
The above represent the basic performance require-
ments for a supersonic transport flight control system.
FEASIBLE AUTOMATED IMPLEMENTATION CONCEPTS FOR SST
With the increased performance characteristics of the SST con-
sensus seems to indicate the use of automation in large portions of the
flight control system. As has been indicated, the basic system will, in
all likelihood, be a full powered electro-mechanical system. To this
will be added an auto-pilot system similar to that found in today's oper-
ations, partial use of an on-line computer to perform in accordance
with a pre-programmed flight profile, and an all-weather landing system
capability. As in current operations there does not appear to be any off-
line equipment which will be utilized to obtain the required flight control
performance.
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An important area of concern will be the crew-equipment interface.
In an automatic mode of operation, the crew will perform primarily as
a monitor and will require instrumentation to present a concise picture
of system operations. Currently, many flight parameters must be ana-
lyzed to gain insight into automatic system operation. This is time con-
suming and leads to crew error. Research will need to be conducted in
this area to develop displays which integrate multiple parameters to give
a concise situation picture which can be readily utilized by the crew.
In the automatic mode of operation, the first place in which auto-
i_atiun appears is the takeoff roll. An on-line computer analyzing pre-
programmed data versus dynamic parameters could abort the takeoff
and aid in maintaining directional control. If takeoff is continued, assis-
tance could be given the crew in optimizing their rotation rate and amount
of rotation. Once this is completed and air traffic control has given clear-
ance for unrestricted climb, the flight control system could receive com-
mands from either a pre-programmed flight profile, or from an internally
generated optimum profile (see Enroute Navigation}. Pre-programmed
level-off procedures could be utilized to gain optimum performance with-
out great discomfort to the passengers. Finally, in the landing phase,
auto-throttle coupled with the auto-pilot could give touchdown capability.
This, to a great extent, is the ideal concept, and must be degraded
as snags are encountered. Although the guided missile concept may not
be completely realistic, the SST could be almost all automatic.
Ostgaard (ref. 35) describes some typical mechanization charac-
teristics for SST flight control systems. Excerpts from this paper are
presented below, but they also apply to manual concepts.
The flight control system for the supersonic transport
is rather impressive in various respects when compared to
systems for conventional transports. The most obvious as-
pects are those associated with the size of the system and
related power sources. Approximately 150 foot cable runs
can be expected for a typical mechanical system from the
pilot control back to the elevon system.
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Somewhere in the order of 25-30 hydraulic servo actu-
ators are anticipated for the longitudinal control system. Of
these, approximately 20-24 would be elevon actuators which
are common to both the pitch and roll controls. Although not
as obvious but equally impressive are some of the perfor-
mance characteristics required in a system of this type.
The column friction must be held to not greater than 2 pounds.
The average h/_steresis bandwidth at the control column must
be held to 0. 1U equivalent elevon motion or less. To provide
the necessary performance, frequency response characteris-
tics of this must approach five cycles per second. To achieve
this type of performance, mechanical systems will require
hydraulic power boosters in the primary control system at
an attendent weight and complexity penalty.
The surface actuators are conventional in design except
for temperature requirements, but then hinge moment capa-
bilities will be high. Estimated values for elevon actuators
can range as high as 400,000 in. lbs. /actuator with stiffness
requirements in the same range. A functional schematic of
this typical system is shown in(Figure 23}.
(Figure 24) shows a functional block diagram of a typi-
cal augmented flight control system. A normal accelerome-
ter and a pitch rate gyro are used as air vehicle feedback
transducers for this application. The accelerometer func-
tions to tighten the aerodynamic servo loop resulting in im-
proved aerodynamic stiffness, or speed response, and
accelerated stability. Increasing aerodynamic stiffness
with the accelerometer however results in a lower dynamic
stability. To increase the dynamic stability to an accept-
able level a pitch rate gyro is utilized to sense the air vehi-
cle pitch rate thereby providing the loop required for the
necessary dynamic stability. In order to achieve the desir-
able levels in pilot force required per unit of air vehicle
response, a transducer or pickoff is connected to the pilot's
controls, measuring his maneuvering commands in terms
of control displacement. These signals then are electrically
summed and amplified in such a manner that the net servo
displacement command is the sum of the pilot input less the
amount proportional to the air vehicle normal acceleration
and pitch rate. In order to achieve optimum performance
over the entire flight envelope, the augmentation system
electronic gain must be adjusted, This can be adjusted as
a function of measured aerodynamic parameters such as
roach number, altitude, and so forth, or through adaptive
techniques wherein the servo response is used to achieve
the proper gain setting. This capability is required in
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order to provide constant aerodynamic servo loop gain as
the control surface gain varies with altitude, mach number
and dynamic pressure...
Since these more modern design concepts have now
resorted to using electrical control system as an auxiliary
or backup to a mechanical control system, the question
now arises as to why cannot this system be designed elec-
trically to overcome the weight and other associated penal-
ties of the mechanical control system. Such a system has
been designed and is shown in (Figure 25) for the same
problem in which mechanical flight control system has
been designed. This configuration is the result of numer-
ous studies and as indicated basically a triple control
o_ro 4" _v_ T4-
_ •_j .... _ cor.sists of a three chamber valve and a unit
with three separate electrical torque motors mechanically
connected in parallel and three mechanically connected
second stage spools. Pilot commands are obtained from
three separate stick position transducers. Each trans-
ducer supplies a high power level signal to one winding
of each torque motor. Stability augmentation or auto-
matic flight control inputs are applied to a second wind-
ing in each torque motor. The automatic flight control
system inputs are thus effectively in series with the pilot
inputs; that is, automatic flight control commands produce
surface motion with no corresponding stick motion. In the
past, it has been generally required that automatic control
inputs be parallel; however, recent studies on flight tests
indicate that with the increased performance of advanced
vehicles this may no longer be required.
FEASIBLE MANUAL IMPLEMENTATION CONCEPTS FOR SST
Manual flight control is feasible for the crew, but at the cost of
increased workload. Manual feasibility really means the down-graded
automatic mode of operation to the extent that any further decrease in
performance capability will result in a man-machine relationship which
does not fulfill the basic system requirements. In this condition the
crew would be forced to abort the flight or to continue the flight subson-
ically. In the case of the flight control system and its associated activi-
ties, almost any non-destructive malfunction of the automatic system
will still leave the system within the capability of the crew. However,
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in certain cases (e. g., runaway trim, loss of auto-stabilization, etc. )
safety usually dictates an abort procedure.
The basic system will be the same as that incorporated into the
completely automatic system, however, the first order of automation
will be eliminated. The crew will have to utilize the conventional yoke,
wheel and rudder pedals, and will require a presentation of navigation-
al parameters to fly a flight profile. Without the automatic modes of
compensationj gross estimates will have to be used to accomplish the
Whether a complete malfunction of the automatic mode of oper-
ation would be tolerable is still the subject of many simulator studies.
It would appear that in order to obtain the navigational tolerances, a
portion of the automatic flight control system would need to be opera-
tive. If as designers propose, the SST will have the capability of com-
pleting the flight subsonically from any point, it may be more feasible
to accept this alternative procedure instead of attempting to fly without
the automatic mode.
In terms of responsibility nothing will actually change but the
restrictiveness to the crew. Whereas the crew participates as a moni-
tor in automatic modes of operation, they are required to become the
actor in less automatic modes. This of course increases crew work-
load. When the manual concept is utilized for supersonic flight control,
the crew equipment interface becomes more critical. Methods of pre-
sentation will need to be developed and evaluated to give the crew the
capability of obtaining acceptable if not optimum performance.
The procedures used by the crew will be essentially comparable
to what is experienced by current subsonic carrier crews. Control sur-
faces are manually positioned, and then aerodynamically held in place
(trim tabs). The crew will position and then reposition the control sur-
faces in response to flight parameters (e.g., airspeed, vertical speed,
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altitude, direction, etc. ). The navigational requirements will also be
in terms of such parameters and the crew will attempt to fly acceptable
horizontal and vertical profiles. Economics may dictate flying a chang-
ing Math]altitude climb schedule, but the crew would be unable to fly
the smooth curve (without special instruments) and would have to resort
to a series of approximate segments.
It appears that because of the speeds involved and because of the
accuracies required, the automatic mode of operation will be a necessity,
at least for operations in the supersonic regime.
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5. 1 FUNCTION 5. 1 TAXI FROM LINE
Purpose
The purpose of this function is to supply the directional control
needed by the system to move from the loading area to the operational
runway. Because of the width of the current taxiways, the aircraft
must be almost centered on the taxiway at all times, especially when
making turns.
Current Jet Operational Requirements and Constraints
The following specific regulations apply:
FAR 91. 87 (h), ref. 13:
Clearances required.
No pilot may, at
an airport with an operating control tower,
taxi an aircraft on a runway, or take off or
land an aircraft, unless he has received an
appropriate clearance from ATC. A clearance
to "taxi to" the runway is a clearance to cross
all intersecting runways but is not a clearance
to "taxi on" the assigned runway.
ICAO Reg. 3. 2.6. I, ref. 14:
Operation On and In the Vicinity of an Aerodrome
An aircraft operate,l on
or in the vicinity of an aerodrome shall,
whether or not within an aerodrome
tiaf_c zone :
a) observe other aerodrome traffic
for the purpose of avoiding collision;
b) conform with or avoid the pattern
of traffic formed by other aircraft in
operation ;
c) make all turns to the left, when
approaching for a landing and after
taking off, unless otherwise instructed;
d) land and take off into the wind
unless safety or air traffic considera-
tions determine that a different direc-
tion is preferable. 296
Current Jet Implementation Concepts
In current operations, once it has been determined that the air-
craft system is in a "go" condition and clearance has been obtained
from the Air Traffic Control facility (ground control), the crew utilizes
the power plant system and the flight control system to maneuver the
aircraft from the loading area to the end of the operational runway.
The Boeing Operations Manual for the 720 (ref. 22) describes this per-
formance,
... maneuvering the airplane on the ground is accomplished
in most respects similarly to other conventional tricycle
geared aircraft. Nose wheel steering and engine thrust are
used for directional control. Always use the largest radius
of turn possible and do not attempt to turn until the airplane
is moving. Make all turns at a slow taxi speed to avoid skid-
ding the airplane nose wheel. If the hydraulic system fails
while taxiing, the engine reversers and emergency air brakes
can be used for stopping the airplane. While taxiing in con-
gested areas the antiskid switch must be turned OFF.
NOTE: Because of the swept wings, the ground crew
should watch the wing tips carefully for clearance of equip-
ment on the ramp (loading area)*, especially while making
turns.
After a turn has been completed, the airplane should
be taxied in a straight line for a short distance to relieve
torsional stresses in the main landing gear structure.
CAUTION: Do not use brakes to aid in making a turn
while maneuvering the airplane on the ground. The mini-
mum radius turn is made with maximum nose wheel steering
and outboard engine thrust only. Any braking will result in
excessive scrubbing of main gear and nose gear tires...
SST Potential Operational Requirements and Constraints
Current principles should continue into the SST era, with the major
change occuring in the nature of the task. The physical dimensions of
L
Parenthetic insertion made by authors.
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the proposed SST will make operating out of current facilities (i. e., cur-
rent ramps and taxiways) more exacting. The major difficulties which
will be encountered by the SST crew will be the visibility restrictions
coupled with attempting to maneuver this large aircraft in the area pro-
vided for today's subsonic aircraft. Horonjeff, in a presentation before
the IATA Fourteenth TechnicalConferenoe (ref. 36) stated,
... In discussions anticipating the advent of supersonic trans-
ports, airport authorities have steadfastly maintained that
these npw aircraft m,,st _'e _= to operaL_ aL airports now
serving large subsonic jets. Aircraft manufacturers have
expressed their optimism that such a requirement can be
met...
Figures 26 and 27 (from ref. 36) illustrate a typical SST configu-
ration maneuvering on various existing taxiways. A few of the difficul-
ties due to the aircraft's size are apparent when the aircraft attempts
a turn. Figure 28 illustrates the type of taxiway widening which might
be utilized to alleviate some of the maneuvering problems.
Feasible Automated Implementation Concepts for SST
No automatic implementation concepts have been introduced in
this area.
Feasible Manual Implementation Concepts for SST
In the early days of aviation when aircraft were light weight,
maneuvering on the ground was accomplished by the use of the thrust
and the basic control surfaces. As the weight increased and the air-
craft became larger, differential braking coupled with the control
surfaces became the method for taxiing on the ground. Finally, with
advent of the large transport, and with improvement in hydraulic
systems, nose wheel steering came into practice. There is no indi-
cation that the SST will employ any different means of directional control
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Figure 26. Supersonic transport maneuvering on 200-ft radius
taxiway (taken from ref. 36).
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for its ground maneuvering operations. The power plants are utilized
to overcome inertia and nose wheel steering guides the aircraft.
If nose wheel steering is incorporated into the rudder, it will
allow the pilot two-handed operation instead of the three-handed
maneuvers caused by some present nose wheel steering mechanisms.
One new perceptual problem will be encountered because of the distance
from the flight deck to the main gear. Obviously the main gear should
track the taxiway centerline and this may result in unusual perspective
from the flight deck during turns (Figure 26). In the event that visibil-
•L_ L_ too poor to allow safe operation, some form of optical system
may have to be added to supplement the vision of the crew. It is not
anticipated that the introduction of the SST will bring associated prob-
lems which are outside the scope of present day subsonic crews,
although attention and more care will need to be given to the taxi
functions.
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5. 2 FUNCTION 5. 2 INITIAL ROLL CONTROL; TAKEOFF
Purpose
The purpose of this function is to maintain a wings-level attitude,
and minimum lateral displacement from the runway centerline during
the takeoff roll.
Current Jet Operational Requirements and Constraints
The following specific regulation applies:
ICAO Reg. 4. 4. 4, reL 12:
Pilots at controls.
At least one pilot shall remain at the
controls at all times during flight. Two
pilots shall remain at the controls during
takc-off and landing if the certificate of
airworthiness or other documents asso-
ciated with the certificate of airworthiness
of the aircraft require the carriag-, of two
pilots.
Current Jet Implementation Concepts
Takeoff is that performance accomplished in the time lapse from
release of brakes on the runway, until the predetermined lift-off speed
has been attained. During this relatively short period of time the crew
is required to make many decisions based on data inputs from both
exterior and interior sources. In early aviation the pilot was not con-
cerned with other factors and was able to utilize both kinesthetic and
visual cues to achieve the proper aircraft attitude for takeoff. Today,
the complexities of the aircraft and the increased weight and speed of
the aircraft make this very difficult; in the near future it may be impos-
sible. Nowadays most flights are handled as if they were instrument
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flights. Directional control, wings-level attitudes, and cross-wind
corrections are all maintained by reference to internal instrumentation
(e. g., artificial gyro horizon, needle-ball indicator, and radio magne-
tic compass). This is especially important when the flight will be flown
in actual instrument weather conditions. The transition from contact
to instrument flying often is accompanied by disorientation, or at least
by a time lag during which time the plane could, conceivably, enter a
dangerous attitude.
SST POt_K,Lial Operational Requirements and Constraints
The flight control performance by the crew during the takeoff will
be critical, and will require precision. Jameson and Chaplin (ref. 37)
argue,
... that the distance and height margins that need to be
added to this nominal (that is, "when everything is going
exactly according to the book") takeoff run and flight path
may well be quite inadequate for a supersonic transport,
unless great care and ingenuity is taken to avoid or satis-
factorily deal with certain pitfalls, which we are going
to discuss. We do not believe that it is safe at this stage
to assume that, even with greatest care, no increase in
margins will be necessary. However, this does not mean
that we are necessarily despondent about being able to
achieve safe and practical net performances; for example,
for factored field lengths.
Let us now consider the causes of variability in take-
off performance, namely, the variations of thrust, drag,
weight and center of gravity, and handling (including the
effect of instrument errors and other errors)...
It is handling variations to which takeoff field length
is most sensitive .... we should like to summarize some
possible characteristics of Mach 2 to Mach 3 SST's.
These, though reconcilable with takeoff from existing
international airfields with the usual or better than usual
clearances, could lead to a bigger dispersion of distances
arising from the day-to-day technique when the intended
takeoff maneuver is performed exactly:
3o#
These contributing characteristics include: (1)
Inability to hold a large proportion of the takeoff thrust
on the wheel brakes, thus giving rise to greater thrust
variability in the early part. of the takeoff run; (2) high
horizontal acceleration during the takeoff run, giving
greater scatter of speed at start of rotation even if the
scatter in time, from rotating at the correct moment
is no greater; (3) large change of attitude during rota-
tion; (4) unless the cockpit is placed in some highly un-
orthodox position, a large vertical displacement of the
pilots during rotation; (5) pitching inertia at least equal
to that of current large jets, and probably greater; (6)
unless the canard arrangement is adopted, very possi=
tr?%biy a small reserve of elevator power; _., as a conse-
quence of items 4 and 3 but possibly less important, a
larger change of view through the windshield during
rotation; (8) more sensitive cross=wind behavior; and
(9) possible increase in the likelihood of inadvertent
rotation due to variations in runway slope.
In addition to accurate handling being (at least
without special aids} more difficult to achieve, the
effects of incorrect technique are magnified by the
large induced drag coefficient of low aspect ratio air-
planes and by the elevator drag effects previously
mentioned.
... while we believe that the variabilities of
thrust, lift independent drag, and weight and center of
gravity are things that will require watching, the aspect
requiring most careful watching is the handling varia-
bility, also aggravated by induced drag effects. If no
special steps are taken to control this variability, then
a large increase in field length factors would appear to
be necessary. They would also be difficult to predict
with exactitude, and of course would not necessarily be
the same for different airplanes.
However, we believe that the variability of con-
tinued takeoffs can be kept under control by the use of
suitable takeoff directors which have the necessary
high degree of reliability, taking account of the correct
parameters (including loss of thrust} and presenting
the information to the pilots in a way they can easily
assimilate and which is compatible with the other flight
information they must have...
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Feasible Automated Implementation Concepts for SST
During the takeoff roll many parameters must be assimilated and
assayed, and then decisions and control movements must be made• The
faster these events occur, the more critical the performance require-
ments become• Few experts have actually advocated a completely auto-
matic takeoff for the SST, most are thinking in terms of a takeoff monitor
and some visual display (flight director} which will optimize the takeoff
control performance.
Richardson, in discussing the "Integrated Crew-Computer Team:
Its Role in the Supersonic Transport" (ref• 38) points out that,
•.. it should be noted here that the introduction of the central
computer system into the supersonic transport is not consi-
dered by the writer to be a cure-all or panacea for all of the
suggested operational problems• It is, however, considered
to be an extremely useful tool, designed to fulfill a specific
and unmistakable need in the operation and control of these
air craft•..
... starting, of all places, at the beginning, the problem of
safe takeoff operation has been considerably complicated by
the increased gross weight of jet transports and the sensiti-
vity of engine thrust to variations in ambient atmospheric
conditions such as temperature•.. For this reason several
manufacturers and users are considering different types of
takeoff performance being achieved by the aircraft to a selec-
ted set of predicted data...
The crew will continue to function primarily in the same manner
as at present, but will have an off-line means assisting in decision
making. Crew responsibility will not change, nor will the degree of
restrictiveness. Greater concentration can be devoted to the actual
instrument flying of the SST if some of the data evaluating tasks per-
formed by the crew are taken over by an on-line computer•
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Feasible Manual Implementation Concepts for SST
The directional control connected with the takeoff will not vary
appreciably from what it has always been. The major changes which
have taken place with the advance of aviation have been principally in
the means employed. Therefore, the basic performance required by
the SST crew will be quite similar to that experienced by the crews of
today's subsonic jets. Assuming that the aircraft is lined up with the
centerline of the runway, has clearance for takeoff, and that takeoff
power is applied, nose wheel steering is utilized to maintain directional
control until a speed of approximately 60 knots has been attained. At
that time the aerodynamic forces are sufficient so that the rudder can
be used to maintain the directional control.
The only differences between this mode of implementation, and
the automatic mode will be the use of the takeoff monitor. Without
such a capability, the crew will have to depend on pre-flight computed
data, as in current operations to make any critical decisions.
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5. 3 FUNCTION 5. 3 TAKEOFF ABORT CONTROL
Purpose
The purpose of this function is to provide directional control to
the SST in the event a takeoff is aborted, and the aircraft must be de-
celerated in the runway remaining. The optimum performance is to
keep the lateral displacements from the runway centerline to a mini-
mum.
Current Jet Operational Requirements and Constraints
No requirements have been identified.
Current Jet Implementation Concepts
Kinetic energy increases as the square of velocity, and thus the
problem of stopping the aircraft in the runway remaining becomes a
problem. Current techniques are thrust reversal and the conventional
braking system to decelerate the aircraft, but then keeping the aircraft
on the runway becomes a critical problem. Unless braking is judicious,
the crew could lose all directional control of the aircraft. Just as an
automobile might lose its traction on an icy pavement and go into a
skid, a heavily loaded aircraft subject to loss of a tire, unsymmetrical
thrust reversal, or loss of traction, could conceivably veer away from
the runway centerline.
The crew's responsibility is to abort the takeoff roll, and then
to decelerate the aircraft to a safe taxi speed within the limitations of
the runway remaining.
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SST Potential Operational Requirements and Constraints
The decision to abort takes place in the flight management function.
Then the flight control system is utilized to obtain abort performance.
Some reasons for takeoff aborts and aircraft requirements to optimize
the abort function are discussed by Jameson and Chaplin (ref. 37),
•.. in all airplanes, takeoffs may be discontinued for a
variety of reasons, and a substantial proportion of dis-
continued takeoffs arises from causes other than engine
failure. In the authors' minds, all discontinued takeoffs
can be put in two classes, namely, voluntary stops and
involuntary stops.
Voluntary stops are those initiated at or before a
decision point (however imperfectly identified; for exam-
ple, in terms of airspeed) and for which current field
length requirements make some provisiorL Involuntary
stops, fortunately more rare, occur sufficiently after
the decision point for them not to be allowed for in field
length requirements.
Influences on Accelerate Stop Distance Required--
The S_T may have a higher lift-off speed than the sub-
sonic jet, but there will be pressure to keep the decision
speed down as far as possible so as to ease the problem
of providing good wheel braking (having regard to both
kinetic energy absorption and to the low coefficients of
friction on wet runways at high speeds) and to reduce the
demands made on the tires• It will, however, be desir-
able to assess the influence on accelerate stop distance
factors of: (1) Greater variability in the acceleration
stage (discussed under takeoff without malfunctions);
(2) Reduced accuracy in identifying the decision speed,
owing to greater acceleration; and (3) Influence, if any,
of greater airplane complexity on the frequency of volun-
tary stops•
It is questionable whether or not depression of the
decision speed would cause a significant increase in the
frequency of involuntary stops, which are likely to be
associated with rotation and lift-off. If emergency thrust
(for example, afterburning) is available, emergencies
occurring between the decision point and start of rotation
may be better covered than on subsonic airplanes.
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In time, involuntary decisions to stop may also be
catered for {without increase in field length requirements)
by arrester gear, research on which has been pursued
with some vigor by FAA and should benefit other transport
air cra ft.
Monitors-- Some form of takeoff monitor has long
been advocated for providing pilots of subsonic airplanes
with better information on which to decide whether to make
a voluntary stop. This function is, of course, distinct
from that of a takeoff director, which should give informa-
tion to assist the pilot to use the elevator control correctly
from the start of rotation up through the takeoff climb.
While the more recent accidents have suggested that devei-
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monitor, the case for at least a crude monitor should be
examined in relation to the SST, for the following reasons:
(1) Variabilities at the start of takeoff may be greater; and
(2) Adverse indications from the monitor up to rotation
speed could be usefully acted on if emergency thrust (for
example, afterburning) is available•
A monitor would, of course, be particularly useful
for both subsonic and supersonic airplanes, for takeoffs
out of critical airfields in lower visibilities, or for decid-
ing whether or not to make use of arrester gear. For the
latter purpose, the monitor should indicate important per-
formance deficiencies even if they occur at the very end
of the ground roll.
•.. to maintain current levels of accelerate stop
safety, without improved instrumentation or arrester
gear, it is possible that margins would need to be in-
creased to cover a greater number of possible causes of
stopping and greater performance variability. However,
the development of a sufficiently accurate, reliable, and
suitably discriminating monitor, in conjunction with
earlier decision points made possible by (for example,
emergency afterburning) may prevent this affecting net
accelerate stop distances. The provision of arrester
gear would be advantageous, and not only to SST's...
Feasible Automated Implementation Concepts for SST
As of yet, no one advocates automating this function. However,
that portion of the proposed landing system which deals with maintaining
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directional control on the roll-out, could conceivably be utilized to assist
the crew in obtaining optimum performance.
Feasible Manual Implementation Concepts for SST
The SST crew should be prepared for the abort directional control
and judiciously utilize braking mechanisms in conjunction with direction-
al control devices. Above about 60 knots the rudder system will be effec-
tive because of the aerodynamic forces. Below that speed the nose wheel
steering mechanism will provide the directional control 11_.--o_ to
maintain the runway centerline.
The crew will continue to utilize that equipment described previ-
ously. The particular performance required is similar to any mainte-
nance of ground directional control. The optimum performance will be
to avoid lateral deviation from the centerline, and to decelerate the air-
craft to taxi speed within the runway remaining at the time abort proced-
ures were initiated.
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5. 4 FUNCTION 5. 4 TAKEOFF CONTROL,; ROTATION,
CONFIGURATION CHANGE
Purpose
The purpose of this function is to change the attitude of the aircraft
so as to change the direction of the force generated by the power plant
system, and to take advantage of the lift component of force which is
generated. Once the initial attitude change has been accomplished, and
the lift vector (less the drag vector) is holding the weight of the system,
then the performance requires the elimination of some of the drag pro-
ducing devices (e. g., the landing gear, and the flaps), so as to obtain
an optimum climb speed and profile.
The decision to change the attitude of the aircraft for takeoff is
made in the flight management function. Once the command is issued
to takeoff, the performance of the crew becomes critical. The rate of
rotation and the amount of rotation are important parameters of the take-
off control performance.
Current Jet Operational Requirements and Constraints
No specific requirements have been identified.
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Current Jet Implementation Concepts
Current subsonic aircraft operations link their performance on the
takeoff to the three precomputed reference speeds, V1, VR, and V 2. *
According to the Boeing Operations Manual for the 720 (ref. 22),
•.. at V R speed, rotate the airplane smoothly to the takeoff
attitude, reaching V 2 speed at a height of 35 feet above the
runway. If the takeoff is limited by obstacles, do not per-
mit the maximum speed during the takeoff climb to exceed
V2 + 10 knots. Maintain this speed to the height above the
runway selected for the three engine level flight accelera-
tion where flap retraction shall be initiated. Accelerate
to the final takeoff climb speed and continue climb until
reaching 1500 feet or obstacle clearance limits have been
exceeded.
WARNING: Landing gear must not be retracted un-
til positive rate of climb has been established...
* These values are defined as follows: (reL 22)
Critical Engine Failure Speed - V 1
Critical engine failure speed V 1 is the speed at which, if
an outboard engine fails, the airplane may either continue
to accelerate and climb to a 35 foot height on the three
remaining engines or it may be brought to a stop on the
runway.
Rotation Speed - V R
Rotation Speed, VR, is a speed which permits attainment
of V 2 speed prior to reaching a height of 35 feet above the
runway. V R can not be less than V 1 and must be equal to
or exceed 1]J5 per cent VMC A. (Air Minimum Control
Speed. )
Take-Off Speed - V 2
The take-off speed, V2, is the stabilized speed which can
be held in the take-off-climbout. V 2 is achieved by the
time the airplane is 35 feet above the runway. Certain
minimums are specified to insure safety of flight• The
first is that V 2 must be at least 120% of the Stall Speed,
Vs. The second minimum is that V2 must be at least
110% of the Air Minimum Control Speed, Vmca, to insure
that adequate directional control can be maintained during
the critical climbout portions of the take-off profile. Vmca
is the speed at which the airplane heading can be maintained
with a 50 bank angle.
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The crews of today's subsonic carriers utilize the basic control system
to accomplish this takeoff performance. The wings are kept level, and
the pitch of the aircraft is changed in accordance with desired rotation
rates.
In the event that a portion of the power plant system failed, and
it was too late to abort the takeoff, then the performance of the crew
will be slightly different than described above. Jameson and Chaplin
(ref. 37) discuss this situation,
_£' A.L_ z,, .i
... L_ _z,_ zauure of one engine does not lead to large
lateral directional handling difficulties (which would be
undesirable in their own right), the engine failure case
could prove to be noncritical (given factors appropriate
to its rare occurrence) because the reduced perfor-
mance during the flare-up could make the problem of
handling the elevator correctly somewhat easier than
in the "all engines operating" case.
However, the need to handle the elevator correct-
ly so as to avoid large drag increments will be of much
greater importance than in the "all engines operating"
case and would place emphasis on choosing a takeoff
director that would, without attention from the pilot,
give proper guidance during and after any such loss of
per formanc e...
SST Potential Operational Requirements and Constraints
The SST will be required to operate out of current sized facilities.
Considering the increased size of the aircraft this may bring with it some
problems. In order to stay within safety margins as to runway lengths,
the rate and amount of rotation during the takeoff must be as close to
optimum as possible. Underrotation results in increased runway length
requirements, while overrotation generates a considerable amount of
induced drag.
One other area of concern which will affect the performance
requirements of the SST crew is acceptable acceleration for the passen-
gers. ICAO points out (ref. 39) that,
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•.. the high acceleration during takeoff and the high rate of
climb, as compared with subsonic jet aeroplanes, will be
noticed by the passengers. Associated with the high rate
of climb will be the steep attitude of the aeroplane and the
resulting high angle of the floor in the passenger cabin.
During the short time of takeoff and initial climb the cabin
floor angle may exceed 10 ° for a period of about three min-
utes, and the maximum angle is expected to be between 12 °
and 1 5 °. During descent the maximum floor angle is likely
to be between -6o and -10o. During the periods of relatively
_;,_h ar,,'-_l,_-r_t-'inn _nd ._teep floor angles passengers will have
their seat belts fastened and the effects should not be injuri-
ous even to those who are aged or not physically fit. While
the tolerance of passengers to increased acceleration and
steep increase of climb and descent is likely to be function
of comfort rather than fitness, it is believed that, once the
passengers know what to expect, the particular accelera-
tions and steep angles involved in takeoff, climb or descent
will not cause them discomfort or anxiety. During takeoff
and climb the maximum acceleration will be of the order of
0. 3 g to 0. 4 g, and most of the time it will be substantially
less than this; it has been pointed out that the passenger
will be subjected to an acceleration lower and far more
regular than would be experienced in some city buses...
Feasible Automated Implementation Concepts for SST
Although one or two authorities have hinted that a pre-programmed
automatic takeoff is feasible, most feel that this function should be kept
in the hands of the crew.
Feasible Manual Implementation Concepts for SST
Most experts agree that with the increased performance charac-
teristics of the SST, the crew will need to have some form of flight
director to assist in obtaining rotation rates and amounts during takeoff•
The basic flight control system would be used, with the main control
being in the vertical (pitch).
Of course the final design of the SST will greatly influence the
performance parameters. However, it is anticipated that adequate
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instrumentation will be made available to the crew to obtain the perfor-
mance accuracies necessary to operate out of current facilities• With
the aid of a takeoff director, the performance required by the crew of
the SST should not appreciably change from today's operations.
The variable incidence wing configuration should have handling
performance which actually outperforms today's subsonic aircraft.
Although some form of takeoff director will probably still be utilized,
the criticality of this performance will be greatly reduced.
In describing the implication of performance variations during
rotation and flare-up, (ref. 37) it is pointed out,
• .. However, we believe that the variability of continued
takeoffs can be kept under control by the use of suitable
takeoff directors which have the necessary high degree
of reliability, taking account of the correct parameters
(including loss of thrust) and presenting the information
to the pilots in a way they can easily assimilate and which
is compatible with the other flight information they must
have...
The crew's main responsibility will be the same as in current
operations, namely, rotating the aircraft to a pitch angle consistent
with its optimum climb schedule• The performance of the crew will
be influenced by the rotation factors, the runway constraints, the avail-
able power, and the passengers' tolerance to acceleration forces.
In the situation of a partial power plant failure, the performance
of the SST crew will be required to be very exact, but no more so than
is expected of today's subsonic aircraft crews. More care will haveto
be taken to insure that overrotation does not occur, thereby introducing
large increments of induced drag. With the engines sized for transonic
acceleration there should be no problem with a deficiency of power in
the case of a partial failure. However, even though most designers are
attempting to locate power plants as close to the longitudinal axis of the
aircraft as possible, there will continue to be trim changes associated
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with the assymmetric thrust. These, however, should not be appreciably
greater than those experienced today.
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5. 5 FUNCTION 5. 5 INITIAL CLIMB CONTROL; INITIAL PORTION
OF THE STANDARD INSTRUMENT DEPARTURE
Purpose
The purpose of this function is to provide three dimensional control
for the aircraft so as to maintain required airspeeds, climb schedules,
and any navigational requirements. Jameson and Chaplin (ref. 37) des-
cribe the takeoff climb, and point out some of the problems which might
be encountered with the intrnduction of the SST.
... the takeoff climb from the end of flare-up may be
divided for our purpose into the following major ele-
ments: (1) The early climb at high thrust with gear
retracted ("second segment"); and (2) The noise-
throttled climb.
Either of these two elements may have to include
turns, though preferably not at a low height.
Current Jet Operational Requirements and Constraints
Besides those regulations pertaining to the basic control system,
the crew must comply with ATC procedures during this initial climb.
Current Jet Implementation Concepts
In current operations once the aircraft is airborne and the neces-
sary configuration changes have been made (e. g., the landing gear
raised and the flaps raised), the crew's main concern is to comply with
navigational inputs. These inputs will be either in the form of radar
vectors or as published in the standard instrument departure (SID) being
followed.
All the three dimensional positioning is accomplished by use of the
basic flight control system, i. e., the yoke, wheel, and rudder pedals.
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Once desired parameters are reached, and are changing in accordance
with desired schedule, the crew's responsibility is then to monitor the
positioning, and to comply to any extraordinary directions.
In almost all instances this is accomplished manually, with the
crew utilizing merely the basic system plus the trim system.
_5'1 Potential Ope,'atior_al " .... "..... +_
_=,_,,., = ........ and Cor_ traints
It would appear that the performance requirements of the SST crew
during this initial portion of the standard instrument departure (SID) or
radar vector as the case may be, will be quite similar to that experi-
enced by the crews of today's subsonic aircraft. It must be remembered
that the aircraft is maneuvered from about 1500 ft. to about 8, 000 ft.
and is kept at a relatively slow airspeed; one which is consistent with
other traffic {subsonic).
Although it would be more economical for the SST to climb unre-
strictedly, it must be compatible with the majority of the traffic which
will be subsonic. In addition the higher densities of traffic will be found
in the terminal areas and at these lower altitudes.
Thus, it appears that the SST will be required to comply with cur-
rent regulations pertaining to initial climb speeds, and controllability.
Feasible Automated Implementation Concepts for SST
If the SST were not constrained by the Air Traffic Control system,
the entire climb-out could conceivably be pre-programmed and the auto-
matic system would control the aircraft during this initial climb phase.
Since this will not be the case, the feasibility of such a concept is not
being considered.
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Feasible Manual Implementation Concepts for SST
Because of the constantly changing traffic situation, a completely
automatic implementation concept does not seem feasible. It would
appear that portions of the automatic system could be utilized during
this initial climb (e. g., the auto-throttle, the course hold, etc. ). The
amount of the auto-pilot system which could be utilized will vary, and
will be dependent upon the particular facility or area in which the air-
craft is operating. It should be safe to assume that the performance
of the SST crew will change slightly as to the amounts of man-machine
utilization, but that the overall workload should not appreciably change
over what is currently experienced.
In this particular mode of operation the crew will perform simi-
larly to what is experienced currently. This is a very dynamic flight
phase in that the attitude and directional parameters are changing
rapidly. For those areas in which the number of variables has been
decreased, (i. e., some of the parameters are held constant}, the crew
can utilize the auto-pilot coupled with an on-line profile generator (see
Function 7. 11).
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5. 6 FUNCTION 5. 6 SUBSONIC CLIMB MANEUVERING
Purpose
The purpose of this function is to provide directional control to the
SST during the latter portion of the standard instrument departure (SID),
through the trim changes accompanying the changes in airspeed, and
maintaining the constant Mach airspeed climb schedule demanded by
the navigational system.
Current Jet Operational Requirement and Constraints
The main factors which influence current operations are, Air
Traffic Control procedures, and operating limitations of the aircraft.
Also, as the speed of the aircraft increases, the amount of airspace
required to perform a maneuver increases.
Current Jet Implementation Concepts
The equipment which is currently utilized to obtain the subsonic
climb maneuvering is the same as has been described for the other
flight control functions. The basic system is used to obtain a desired
pitch attitude consistent with the desired airspeed and then held steady
with the trim system.
In most cases the initial climb is made at a constant indicated
airspeed. As altitude is gained equivalent Mach speed increases, until
such time as the optimum Mach climb speed is attained. The crew then
utilizes this to continue their climb schedule to their assigned cruise
altitude.
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SST Potential Operational Requirement and Constraints
The SST crew will experience a little more difficulty in obtaining
the optimum performance required during the takeoff and subsequent
climb. The high performance characteristics of the SST restrained in
a subsonic aircraft Air Traffic Control environment, will cause a few
problems both for the crew and for the Air Traffic controller. The
NASA Flight Research Center at Edwards, using an A5A aircraft as a
simulated SST found some interesting problem areas when they tried
to introduce the aircraft into the Los Angeles Air Traffic Control area.
... the Air Traffic controllers experienced no difficulty
in descending, integrating, and landing the A5A at Los
Angeles International Airport along with all other traffic.
The takeoff, climbout, and acceleration of an SST pre-
sents more of a challenge to the Air Traffic controller
because of the tremendously increased performance
over present subsonic jets... The only problems en-
countered in this study concerned the takeoff, climbout,
and departure. ATC will have to give special consider-
ation to the SST departure to allow for increased engine
noise during acceleration and takeoff, routing of the SST
out of metropolitan areas to minimize sonic-boom effects,
and critical fuel usage during takeoff, climbout, and
acceleration at altitude. Speed restrictions will have to
be imposed on the SST, or special instrument departures
will have to be devised to properly control the departing
SST.
Feasible Automated Implementation Concepts for SST
Coupling of the proposed flight computer with the flight control
system can result in an automatic climb-out profile capability. The
profile selected could either be based on minimum fuel consumption,
or minimum time to climb to altitude.
Richardson (ref. 21) points out that a central electronic manage-
ment system (CEMS) could be coupled with the flight control system in
the SST to provide automatic climb-out control. He feels that the CEMS
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concept using a computer can perform a system function of "vertical
profile (speed/altitude) scheduling, " in that it will provide automatic
continuous control of climb-out and descent trajectory. With auto-
matic throttle control, both speed versus altitude and distance versus
altitude may be controlled. It will also allow accurate airspace assign-
ment.
The crew would be required to select the desired profile, and
then to actuate the mode of operation. Once the automatic system was
feeding control-commands to the flight controls, the crew's responsi-
bility would be to monitor the performance via the various displays.
Any unprogrammed maneuvers could be performed by the crew utilizing
some override capability.
If a CEMS type concept is utilized in the cockpit, it is quite feas-
ible to couple it with the flight control system.
Feasible Manual Implementation Concepts for SST
When the SST is introduced into service, the crew's involvement
in this particular phase of the flight will be dependent on various situa-
tions. In most cases the crew will be required to manually fly this por-
tion of the flight. The term, manually, implies that the entire automatic
system will not be able to be utilized, instead only selected modes of
operation of the system will be automated, (e. g., Mach hold, course
hold, etc. ). The major problem to overcome will be the minimization
of overshoots with their possible associated negative g. That is to say,
while climbing at subsonic speeds, sufficient time will need to be given
the crew by the ATC controller if a required maneuver is desired.
In all likelihood the performance and responsibility of the crew
will be similar to current operations. The higher performance of the
SST will make the vertical component of control a more critical area,
but not really outside the capability of present crews.
32)
There will be a need to develop an adequate gauge for the crew to
utilize when operating in the manual mode. High rates of ascent plus
changing Mach with altitude necessitate an integrated tracking display
for the crew, or at least a rough climb schedule to follow. Studies are
currently being conducted to determine the type of integrated instru-
mentation which would optimize crew performance in this manual mode.
324
5. 7 FUNCTION 5. 7 TRANSITIONAL ACCELERATION CONTROL
Purpose
The purpose of this function is to provide directional and stability
control during transonic acceleration and penetration of the sonic bar-
rier. Also, depending upon the final design configuration selected, it
might entail altering the configuration of the aircraft in the case of the
variable sweep configuration.
Current Jet Operational Requirement and Constraints
No current requirements are applicable.
Current Jet Implementation Concepts
No current concepts are applicable.
SST Potential Operational Requirements and Constraints
Since there are no regulations currently in effect, requirements
and constraints may need to be developed. The major factor which will
influence control activities will be the sonic boom problem. The gen-
eration of undesirable overpressures must be avoided. This can be
most easily accomplished by executing the transition at a higher altitude.
However, as the transitional altitude is increased, the acceleration cap-
ability of the aircraft decreases because the aircraft must fly at a higher
lift coefficient due to the reduced dynamic pressure at the higher alti-
tude. The increased lift coefficient produces an increased drag due to
lift, and thereby a relatively lower excess thrust.
The aerodynamic forces experienced during this transition are
quite different from those experienced by today's current subsonic air-
craft. Thus, for the most part, the SST crews will be dealing with a
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new factor. Some of the problems which will be experienced are outlined
in a Space/Aeronautics Staff Report on the "Supersonic Transport" (ref.
29),
•.. the critical factor in selecting the configuration is not,
simply as it has been in the past, providing the optimum
system to match the mission profile. Instead, one of the
prime considerations must be minimizing the effects of
sonic boom. In the long run, in fact, the SST may live
or die depending on how well it meets the sonic boom prob-
lem.
To minimize boom effects_ the FAA proposal set
firm limits of 2 psf overpressure during transonic accel-
eration and 1. 5 psf in cruise. This required (sic) that the plane
crack the sound barrier at an altitude no lower than 40, 000
ft. established the maximum power requirement for the
engines•..
Aerodynamically, the SST requires a very-hard-to-
achieve compromise. The plane must have good handling
qualities and reasonable efficiency at subsonic speeds, yet
good aerodynamic and propulsion efficiency at supersonic
Mach numbers where it will be most of the time.
This means, in effect, that the plane must work in
two completely different aerodynamic flow regimes. The
main difference is in the character of the drag. At sub-
sonic speeds, two drag components are considered: in-
duced drag due to lift and profile drag which is caused by
friction effects between the air and the aircraft surfaces.
At supersonic speeds, an additional, very important drag
component arises, which is the wave drag due to the shock
wave pattern in the air surrounding the vehicle...
Another area of concern will be the rise in trim drag associated
with the characteristic shift in aerodynamic center which accompanies
increased Mach. If stability management is to be helpful in the low
excess thrust region, its full capability must be realized very early in
the acceleration. This requirement makes it absolutely necessary that
the management system be fail-safe and reversible at all loading condi-
tions so that emergency deceleration speeds do not result in a serious
loss of longitudinal stability.
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Feasible Automated Implementation Concepts for SST
Those concepts introduced previously for the control of the SST
over the entire flight regime will continue to be utilized during this par-
ticular portion of the profile (see Function 5. 6). A major portion of
transitional acceleration control can be assigned to the automatic con-
trol function.
The SST crew will be looking for optimum performance during
this particular phase of the flight, since marginal performance could
conceivably result in an aborted flight. The extremely high fuel con-
sumption rates during transitional acceleration will require that opti-
mum performance in all areas of operation be the rule rather than the
exception.
The crew's responsibility will be to maintain both directional and
stability control over the SST during its transonic acceleration. Using
the automatic mode of operation the crew will be chiefly involved in
monitoring the operation of the computer-flight control coupled system,
and insuring compliance with sonic boom constraints.
Feasible Manual Implementation Concepts for SST
Although the consensus of opinion seems to be that stability and
control solutions will be built into the system, the crew will still have
the capability to manually control the aircraft in the event of some mal-
function. This transitional acceleration with its stability and control
problems is not familiar to today's subsonic aircraft crews. This may
be an initial problem area for the SST crew.
Most indications are for either a level transition, or one with a
slight climb attitude. In the manual mode of operation the crew will
continue to trim the aircraft as the aerodynamic characteristics change.
The chief area of concern will be any maneuvering required while accom-
plishing this portion of performance. It will be assumed that the portion
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of the flight control system concerned with the sensitivity of the controls
with increased speeds is a portion of the basic system. The main respon-
sibility of the crew will be to maintain a trimmed aircraft over the speed
range.
.528
5. 8 FUNCTION 5. 8 SUPERSONIC CLIMB CONTROL
Purpos e
The purpose of this function is to provide three dimensional control
for the SST during the supersonic climb phase of the flight profile. The
aircraft will be receiving optimum navigational data from Function 7. ll,
optimum profile generation, which will command three dimensional cor-
rections using the fliaht control system and the power plants.
Current Jet Operational Requirements and Constraints
None are applicable.
Current Jet Implementation Concepts
No current concepts are applicable.
SST Potential Operational Requirements and Constraints
The climb profile should not cause any unsolvable problems once
the desired Mach is attained, but there are still problems in the area
of supersonic maneuvering. It will be desirable for ATC to foresee any
possible conflicts early in the profile and make provisions for adequate
separation.
In the description of transonic acceleration control, it was indi-
cated that only a narrow altitude band was available for the transition,
because of the overpressure considerations and the decreases of excess
thrust with increased altitude. It should be pointed out that the attain-
ment of the desired Mach will also force adherence to a climb profile
which takes these two factors into consideration.
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Feasible Automated Implementation Concepts for SST
Use of the computer coupled flight control system seems to be
advocated by most experts for flying the climb profile. The computer
would receive its data either via a selected family of curves, or from
a profile generator (see Function 7. 11). This three dimensional profile
would be derived in terms of commands to all axes of the SST flight
controls. The crew's responsibility will be to monitor the system, and
to override it in the event of a malfunction outside the capability of the
automatic system.
Once the climb profile has been selected (if the family of curves
concept is utilized), or the profile generator is feeding its commands to
the flight controls, the crew will be required to monitor displays to as-
certain the adherence to such a climb profile. This display should inte-
grate the data usually used by the crew for routine subsonic climbs with
the new parameters introduced by sonic boom considerations. The inte-
grated data should then be displayed in such a manner that the crew would
be able to manually duplicate the automatic system's performance.
Feasible Manual Implementation Concepts for SST
Although many U.S. experts rule out the use of manually flown
climb schedules (more for economic rather than safety reasons), most
airline officials require this back-up feasibility. The Concorde will not
utilize an automatic mode of operation, but will depend upon the capabil-
ity of the crew to follow the climb schedule. Thus there will be provi-
sions for the crew to manually fly this profile, but it is not yet really
known how effectively this can be done. Simulator studies are being
conducted, but more studies of man's capabilities will have to be com-
pleted to determine exactly which portions of the climb profile can be
manually flown, and which portions must be flown automatically. In any
event it appears that the major problem of concern to the crew, will be
the malfunctioning of some portion of the flight control/stability systems.
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Flower (reL 41) indicates that,
... for airline operation, it is my opinion that the industry
will demand adequate handling qualities for SST's with any
single most critical axis damper or stability augmentor
inoperative, while flying on its supersonic roach schedule
at maximum altitude and carrying passengers. The air-
craft must have the ability to complete the trip to its ter-
minal destination through intermediate stops and/or to a
schedule stop where repairs can be made, with minimum
loss of scheduled time. In fulfilling this requirement con-
sideration must be given to turbulence, engine failure,
and the possible loss of an aug rne[itor or damper on another
axis as well as a boost control...
A secondary method of achievement of the above
requirement, if the basic characteristics are such as to
deteriorate passenger comfort at supersonic speed at
maximum altitude is descent to, or dispatch at, a lower
Mach number and altitude where the flight characteristics
are acceptable...
... Commercial passenger carrying aircraft cannot
be subjected to the same acceleration that would be toler-
ated in military aircraft relative to the motions generated
by engine failure or loss of damping augmentation. There-
fore, in the interest of passenger comfort, and conside,ring
the elderly couple who have the money to travel but who in-
cidently have the susceptibility towards the debilities of ad-
vancing age, it is suggested that side forces be limited to
approximately 0. 2 g or 6 deg/sec 2 yaw rate and vertical
forces to 0. 3 g for extremely short periods if at all possi-
ble. Lower values, of course, will be appreciated.
In summary, the SST crew should not, under normal operating
conditions, experience any appreciable increase in workload during the
supersonic climb phase of the flight. In all likelihood the climb itself
will be automatically flown with the crew functioning as a monitor. The
critical areas which will require exact coordination with the ground con-
troller will include any "large" maneuvering, and any traffic avoidance
maneuvers.
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5. 9 FUNCTION 5.9 TRANSITION TO CRUISE CONTROL
Purpose
The purpose of this function is to provide vertical control for the
SST during the transition from supersonic climb to the level cruise atti-
tude. As was pointed out earlier, the function of the flight control system
is to position the aircraft in three dimensional space so as to comply with
navigational commands, and to gain optimum performance from the power
_,..... system. Changing the direction of force of the power plant system
results in new performance parameters.
At the end of supersonic climb the SST will have an airspeed close
to the cruise Mach number desired, but will have a high rate of climb.
As the assigned cruise altitude is approached, the crew must decrease
this vertical component of the airspeed to a rate consistent with the
cruise climb profile, (i. e., approximately 100 fpm). The major prob-
lems here are the amount of negative g which could conceivably be gen-
erated if this transitional performance is not anticipated, and the altitude
overshoot possibility. Sisk and Andrews (ref. 40) suggest that,
•.. the SST will have to be given a 4, 000- to 5,000-foot
altitude advance warning for a hold or level-off during
climbout, and even this much warning may produce an
overshoot in altitude accompanied by an undesirable
amount of negative g imposed on the passengers. It
should be pointed out that even though the pilot reduced
power during this hold, as evidenced by the decrease
in longitudinal acceleration, the altitude requested was
passed and the airplane was subjected to a load approach-
ing 0 g. Altitude and speed overshoots can also be ex-
perienced during level-off at the acceleration altitude,
but these effects will be minimized as the SST pilots
gain experience with the new vehicle...
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Current Jet Operational Requirements and Constraints
Air Traffic Control procedures and passenger comfort dictate the
limitations on this performance. Overshoots in altitude (i. e., passing
through the assigned altitude and then having to return) cannot be toler-
ated in areas of high traffic density where only 1000 to 2000 feet of ver-
tical separation is employed. If the crew is late in initiating the transi-
tion and complies with the ATC restrictions, then the attitude of the
aircraft must be changed abruptly. This results in the generation of
negative g which is quite discomforting to the passengers.
Current Jet Implementation Concepts
Although in current operations there is no transition from a super-
sonic climb to a level cruise attitude, the nature of the performance is
quite similar to any level-off maneuver currently utilized. In most cases
as the assigned altitude is approached, the angle of attack of the aircraft
is changed, (usually accompanied with a decrease in rate of ascent and
an increase in airspeed), and the power is readjusted. As the assigned
altitude is intercepted, the rate of ascent should equal zero, and the
angle of attack of the aircraft should be consistent with the cruise atti-
tude and cruise speed.
SST Potential Operational Requirements and Constraints
Constraints will be the same as at present, but with the increased
speed and other performance characteristics of the SST, and the new
operating environment, more care will need to be taken to insure perfor-
mance within tolerable limits.
Feasible Automated Implementation Concepts for SST
It is anticipated that the automatic system will be utilized to obtain
the optimum transition to cruise control. The pre-programmed transition
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will take into account such parameters as, altitude, airspeed, rate of
climb, and g loading. A portion of the computer coupled flight control
system could be utilized for this transitional performance. The data
inputs can either be in the form of a pre-programmed schedule, or
inputs from accelerometers which would be transduced into control
s ignals.
The crew's responsibility would be to select a commanded altitude,
and then to monitor the performance of the system. It is still their re-
sponsibility to comply with ATC instructions, and to operate within an
envelope which take._ n_.q.q_ncr_'r' +r_l_._,_=o ;._* ..... ideraLioii.
The transition to cruise for the SST will be slightly different than
in current operations. Because of cruise-climb considerations it may be
necessary to maintain a vertical ascent of approximately 100 fpm. This
will be a function of the burn-off rate. As the fuel is used, the change
in aircraft weight will result in an increasing energy state. This energy
will be accepted as an altitude increase instead of an airspeed increase.
Feasible Manual Implementation Concepts for SST
The crew should be able to handle this performance, but may not
be able to consistently obtain the same degree of accuracy. At the speeds
used by the SST, and in the new environment, many parameters must be
considered to obtain an optimum transition. However, taking into account
only passenger comfort and compliance with ATC instructions, the crew
should be able to perform acceptably. The procedure utilized by the crew
would be quite similar to current operations. The only noticeable differ-
ences would be in initiation point and rates of change of attitude necessi-
tated by the higher performance characteristics of the SST.
This is one area which can be first experienced in the simulator,
so that the crew will be aware of the new performance characteristics
of the SST, and will be ready to cope with them. From simulator studies
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being conducted, and from proposed studies, it appears that new forms
of instrumentation will be considered to assist the crew in this function.
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5. i0 FUNCTION 5. I0 CRUISE CONTROL
Purpose
This function provides directional control in all three dimensions
during the cruise portion of the SST flight profile. Acting with the power
plant system, the flight control system is the means for accomplishing
the commands from the enroute navigational function.
Current Jet Operational Requirements and Censtraints
Current aircraft are required to remain within designated airspace
while maneuvering, and to maintain assigned altitudes. Current physi-
cal dimensions of airways, holding patterns, and other ATC separation
patterns are predicated on the aircraft maneuvering capabilities.
Current Jet Implementation Concepts
Although current subsonic carriers operate at lower speeds and
altitudes, the cruise procedures used are similar to those which will be
utilized in the SST. Once the assigned altitude is intercepted, the auto-
pilot will provide altitude and course hold. The speed must be set by
the crew manually.
SST Potential Operational Requirements and Constraints
In current operations, the high density of traffic, the inaccuracies
of navigational equipment, and the constraints of the ATC system require
the assignment of specific cruise altitudes. For jet aircraft these strict
procedures result in some reduction in range and increase operating costs.
With the SST, constant altitude cruise penalties will be even more severe
and for this reason either a step climb or constant climb cruise is being
considered. If ATC can accept this type of cruise profile then specific
new regulations will have to be developed.
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Feasible Automated Implementation Concepts for SST
Those systems previously discussed for probable implementation
into the SST will also be utilized throughout the cruise portion of the
flight profile. The auto-throttle will continue to command a constant
Mach cruise speed; the auto-stabilization will maintain the center of
gravity and stability of the aircraft throughout the wide speed range;
and the auto-pilot will be working in conjunction _vith the on-line com-
puter to comply with the navigational commands• The crew's main
function will be to monitor the automatic performance, and insure
operation within tolerable limits.
Feasible Manual Implementation Concepts for SST
In the event of a malfunction of the flight control system (automatic
mode), the crew will be responsible for manually controlling the aircraft.
If further studies indicate that the crew is unable to effectively control
the aircraft at speeds in the vicinity of Mach 3, the final procedure may
be to decelerate in the case of a malfunction of the control system, to a
speed within the capability of the human controller.
This performance required of the SST crew will be somewhat
similar to that performed by current subsonic aircraft crews• The
major difference will be in the operational speeds and the sensitivity
of the control operations. White (ref. 42) points out that,
•.. the apparent sensitivity in pitch to which he has
referred--the increased effort required to hold alti-
tude accurately--really came about because the pilots
of current military high speed aeroplanes did not have
adequate information fast enough, and he was definitely
of the opinion that, given anticipatory information, the
holding of altitude presented no real problem. Simula-
tor experience had shown that, when using altitude con-
trol function, pilots made a much better job of maintain-
ing altitude at a much reduced workload. Corrections
were made more smoothly and quickly and G loadings
were consequently less...
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The implications of flight control sensitivity based on results of
simulator studies are discussed in ref. 43,
•.. one of the impressions that I get from my own Mach 2
flight experience and many hours in our Mach 3 XB-70
simulator is that altitude control becomes increasingly
difficult with increasing speed• This is understandable
when you consider that for a given error in pitch attitude,
you get nearly four times the change in altitude in a given
time period at Mach 3 as you do at. 8 Mach. (See Figure
29.) This imposes a more stringent requirement on the
_utopi!ot, and requires maximum concentration on the
part of the pilot if he has to "hand fly" the airplane and
maintain a hard altitude using the attitude gyro, rate of
climb, or altimeter, or any combination of these. What
is really needed, in my opinion, is a flight director com-
puter function that gives vertical steering information to
the pilot with sensitivity and lead optimized for the parti-
cular type of aircraft and for the speed range in which it
is operating.
The secret of precise high-speed flying is antici-
pation--and this can best come from a flight director
computer function which feeds its information to the auto-
pilot and/or to the human pilot via the instrument panel.
The airspeed indicator, Mach meter, rate-of-climb in-
dicator, and altimeter are instruments that tell you
where you are at any given instant. Good steering infor-
mation tells you where you should be to accomplish a
selected task. This kind of information is extremely
important in establishing and maintaining a climb schedule
and establishing and maintaining a given altitude--parti-
cularly so if step climbs are a requirement for cruise
efficiency...
Although it would appear that an automated system will be utilized,
the crew will still have the capability of obtaining the required perfor-
mance. However, whether the crew will be able to keep the aircraft
within the navigational limits required by ATC is still to be determined.
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5. Ii FUNCTION 5. II SUPERSONIC DESCENT CONTROL
Purpose
This function provides three-dimensional control to the SST during
deceleration and initial descent portions of the flight profile, and while
the aircraft is in the supersonic speed regime.
Current jet Operational Requirements and Constraints
There are no applicable requirements.
Current Jet Implementation Concepts
This function is not encountered in current operations. However,
aside from supersonic speed and its characteristic effect on sensitivity
in the control system, performance requirements are similar to those
for any descent type flight control activities which are accompanied with
rapid speed (and thus trim} changes.
SST Potential Operational Requirements and Constraints
Air Traffic Control procedures, sonic boom considerations and
passenger comfort will impose constraints on the SST during its descent
performance. The aerodynamics of supersonic flight should pose no new
problem area not already discussed in previous functional descriptions.
To eliminate passenger discomfort the rate of change of cabin altitude
would be limited to about 300 it/rain which then establishes a minimum
descent time of about 27 minutes (assuming cabin pressure at 8, 000 ft. ).
To minimize sonic boom overpressures a descent schedule using a linear
variation of Mach with altitude will probably be followed until Mach. 95
at around 55, 000 feet is reached. This constant Mach will probably be
maintained until about 300 knots EAS is attained and then this will be
held constant.
34O
From an economics standpoint, clearance to descend should be
obtained only after assurance is given that an approach to landing is
feasible without lengthy delays in low altitude holding patterns.
Feasible Automated Implementation Concepts for SST
The control of the SST during the descent and deceleration phase
can be primarily an automated function with the crew participating as
a monitor and a back-up system. The descent profile will be very simi-
lar to that flown by todayts current subsonic aircraft. As has been pre-
viously discussed, a combination system which incorporates an on-line
computer and the automatic control system will in all likelihood be uti-
lized on the SST. The sophistication of such a system and the final role
which the crew will actually play have yet to be determined, but without
doubt an economic trade-off will be reached to gain consistently optimum
performance. Richardson (ref. 21), describes the automatic descent
function of such a system,
•.. considering the descent phase of the vertical profile,
a slightly different technique was used. * In order to
achieve proper terrain clearance on approach, and to
insure accurate spatial positioning of the aircraft, a
trajectory of altitude versus distance was used as a
control law. Again, for this specific application, the
let-down trajectory was stored in the computer memory.
As the aircraft passed through the upper homing point,
designated by altitude, geographical location (latitude
and longitude), and ground track heading, the computer
pitched the aircraft over to follow the specified trajec-
tory. As in the climb-out case, the actual control of
the vehicle was accomplished by the digital computer
driving the autopilot. The only pilot function was the
positioning of the throttle to a nominal idle position.
In this case the pilot provided a type of vernier adjust-
ment through small manual throttle manipulations. For
precise, complete control of the trajectory, automatic
throttle control could be used as an airspeed/rate of
descent control• A pilot override of automatic throttle
* See Function 5. 6.
control would provide for immediate takeover by the pilot
in the event he visually or otherwise determines the need
for a pullout or course change.
In this specific case, as in the previous climb pro-
file, computer inputs from a separate central air data
computer subsystem were used. In general the digital
computer quantization is such that the input signal accu-
racy becomes the governing factor in the overall accura-
cy of the CEMS. The digital computer does not contribute
any measurable additional inaccuracies.
The use of the digital computer controlled automatic
speed-altitude scheduling of this aircraft has met with
complete acceptance by the operational personnel, both
traffic controllers and pilots. Automatic climb-outs
through restricted climb corridors, and automatic let-
downs right to the ILS gate have become standard oper-
ating procedures. The requirement for automatic
throttle control during these phases of flight is still a
matter of some conjecture which probably should be
resolved by particular analysis of the SST aerodynamic
performance characteristics...
Utilizing the automatic mode of operation the crew, after initial
data insertion and system checkout, would function primarily as a
monitor to insure that the system was operating within acceptable toler-
ances. In the event of a malfunction they would be able to override the
system immediately with as little transitional delay as possible.
Feasible Manual Implementation Concepts for SST
There is no indication at this time that the crew will be unable to
manually fly the SST throughout supersonic deceleration and descent.
In fact, most aviation companies are demanding the ability to have a
manual back-up to the automatic systems. In the event that a portion
of the automatic system were to malfunction, the SST crew should be
capable of handling the performance with a basic flight control system.
Of course, more attention will have to be given to the area of control
sensitivity. To control the SST during its initial descent and deceler-
ation the crew will need some descent placard as a guide to obtaining
optimum performance.
3_2
Although this concept is feasible, itdoes not appear to be the
best one. The automatic mode of operation seems to be able to handle
the myriad of changing parameters which must be considered, in a more
efficient manner.
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5. 12 FUNCTION 5. 12 TRANSONIC DECELERATION CONTROL
Purpose
The purpose of this function is to provide three dimensional control
for the SST vehicle during the transitional deceleration and descent. The
required performance will be essentially a reversal of the performance
i_equired during the transitional acceleration and subsequent climb. The
stability and controllability problem areas associated with the high-drag
sonic barrier will again be encountered, but in the reverse direction.
The trim speed of the aircraft will be changing rapidly, and with the
decrease in speed will come an increase in the available maneuverability.
Current Jet Operational Requirements and Constraints
There are no applicable current requirements.
Current Jet Implementation Concepts
There are no applicable concepts.
SST Potential Operational Requirements and Constraints
One factor which will be considered both in the navigational func-
tions and in the flight control operations, is the problem of sonic boom
during the descent phase. More care must be taken during the descent
than the ascent because the downward direction of the plane has a ten-
dency to increase the intensity of the overpressures generated. However,
navigational outputs should take this factor into consideration when com-
puting the optimum descent flight profile. To minimize sonic boom
problems,
•.. in the deceleration and descent phase of the flight,
it is desirable to decelerate to subsonic speeds at as
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high an altitude as possible, and furthermore steep
descents at supersonic speeds should be avoided.
Maneuvers at supersonic speeds should be avoided
in all phases of the flight because of the possibility
of intensifying the sonic boom pressures over localized
areas on the ground... (ref. 44).
Feasible Automated Implementation Concepts for SST
This particularly short portion of the flight profile can be handled
either by the SST crew or by the automatic portion of the flight control
system. If the aircraft was cleared all the way into the destination in
accordance with a pre-programmed descent profile, the completely auto-
matic mode of operation could be utilized. However, if revisions must
be made to the original clearance, or if ATC decides to vector the air-
craft via a circuitous route, then the crew has the ability to override
the automatic system and to manually control the SST through this por-
tion of the flight.
As the SST decelerates into the transonic speed regime, the high
drag characteristic of the area will again appear as discussed in Func-
tion 5. 7. This will require compensation from both the auto-stability
and the auto-trim systems. The chief concern of the crew will be to
attain subsonic flight at an altitude which would preclude the generation
of sonic boom.
In the automatic mode of operation, the crew would select the
descent/deceleration profile, and the computer would issue control and
stability commands to the aircraft. The crew would then be chiefly con-
cerned with monitoring the system and perhaps entering new data into
the system.
3#5
Feasible Manual Implementation Concepts for SST
The use of descent placards in conjunction with the basic control
system is well within the capability of the crew, although it is not quite
as precise an operation as the automatic mode. The descent schedule
used should minimize the sonic boom effects and should be consistent
with the requirements of the other systems (e. g., pressurization).
In most cases the deceleration and transonic portion of the flight
w'i11 h_ p_T'f'r_-','_ed _- - ,4^_---*--,................... _,=o_s,,,_=u ai_eet, and will not require any maneuver-
ing by the crew. Thus, the main area of concern will be establishing a
vertical profile which is consistent with sonic boom considerations,
passenger comfort, and ease of achievement. If the crew is required to
fly the descent profile, in all likelihood a constant Mach, then constant
airspeed schedule would be utilized.
The descent placard with attainable parameters would serve as a
guide to crew performance. (For example, Mach 2. 5 to 60, 000 at a rate
of descent of 5, 000 fpm, then 250 knots I.AS until reaching 50, 000 ft. and
Mach 1.3). Under normal conditions the use of a descent placard would
give the crew the capability of staying within its restriction envelope.
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5. 13 FUNCTION 5. 13 SUBSONIC DESCENT CONTROL
Purpose
This function provides directional control for the SST in that flight
regime from the time it passes through the sonic barrier and maneuvers
at some subsonic speed, until it is established in its standard instrument
approach (SIA). During this particular phase of the flight the SST will be
operating in an environment with other subsonic aircraft, and must be
able to do so economically.
Current Jet Operational Requirements and Constraints
There are no special requirements and constraints connected with
this area of operation, other than compliance with ATC procedures.
Current Jet Implementation Concepts
Current jets cruise at the altitudes slated for the SST's return to
subsonic speeds, and start their approaches and let-downs at lower alti-
tudes. When cleared by ATC, a power reduction consistent with the
desired rate of descent is utilized to descend. If higher rates of descent
are desired, speed brakes and/or spoilers provide this capability. In
almost all situations this is a manual operation.
SST Potential Operational Requirements and Constraints
When the SST returns to subsonic operations, it must be compatible
with existing regulations for current jets.
Feasible Automated Implementation Concepts for SST
In the case of the straight wing (fixed-wing) configuration, the
crew of the SST will operate the aircraft in accordance with procedures
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which are similar to today's operations. Portions of the automated
flight control system may be utilized, or the entire subsonic maneuver-
ing may be manual.
However, if the variable sweep aircraft is the chosen configura-
tion, the crew will be required to reconfigure the aircraft to its optimum
subsonic configuration. This should not present any problems for the
crew, for in all likelihood reconfiguration will be a pilot initiated,
hydraulically actuated function• The Boeing SST design has a single-wing
sweep and flap lever on the pedestal with detents at the desirable positions
(see Figure 30). The change of configuration will cause some trim changes,
but these will be within the capabilities of the flight control system and
the crew.
Any problem areas during this and subsequent phases of the flight
profile will result largely from the attempt to integrate the SST into Air
,Traffic Control patterns. It has been pointed out that (ref. 28),
•.. during the subsonic phase of flight, the supersonic
transport will have characteristics similar to the pres-
ent day subsonic jet aircraft. During routine operations,
it is expected that the aircraft will be cleared without
delay and that holding will not be necessary. Provision
must be made, however, for unexpected situations, and
some holding capability must be included in the operating
characteristics of the aircraft. Holding when necessary
will probably be accomplished at altitudes from 30,000
to 40,000 feet. Approach clearance will be issued from
this range of altitudes when the aircraft is ready to enter
the landing sequence. It should not, however, be cleared
to descend below these altitudes unless there is a high
probability of landing at the scheduled terminal. Separ-
ate inbound tracks should be provided to keep to a mini-
mum the time between approach clearance and landing...
No new equipment will be utilized during this phase of flight. In
the most automatic mode of operation, the pre-programmed descent
schedule will maintain directional control through the flight control
system, and speed control through the auto-throttle subsystem. The
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Figure 30.
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Illustration of detent positions for combined wing sweep
and flap lever.
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crew's primary function during this phase of the flight will be to
monitor performance.
In the event of changes in the original clearance, such as holding,
or radar vectoring, the crew can either override the automatic function,
or can re-enter the new data into the on-line computer for continued auto-
matic operation. When the automatic mode of operation is overridden
by the crew, they will still have the capability for semi-automatic flight
operations. In other words portions of the automatic flight control system
_,_n _f'[11 h_ ',',f'i1"i_o d +_" _el"" .I-I.._ L--I ,-"...................... j _,,=,u_ulng patterns or to comply with the radar
vectoring.
Feasible Manual Implementation Concepts for SST
In the most manual mode of operation the SST crew will have the
capability to actually fly the SST throughout its subsonic flight operations
_Since the emergency back-up system to the power controls envisioned
for the SST will be similar to that found in today's subsonic aircraft,
the crew should experience the same degree of restrictiveness that they
do today in flying similar patterns. Once the SST has passed through
the sonic barrier, aerodynamic characteristics are such that any phase
of the flight should be within the capability of the crew. Directional
control, pitch control, airspeed and altitude control are all performed
in current operations. It will be the crew's responsibility to position
the aircraft so as to conform to ATC procedures.
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5. 14 FUNCTION 5. 14 LETDOWN CONTROL
Purpose
This function provides the directional control necessary to position
the aircraft in three dimensional space in accordance with the commands
of the generated descent profile and in compliance with the instructions
of the published standard instrument approach (SIA), or ATC instructions.
Within this parLicular _,,.,,_'-_'-'_,_he__flight there may be the requirement for
flying hoiding patterns and descent maneuvers (e. g., an instrument
approach or a radar vectored approach).
Current Jet Operational Requirements and Constraints
The main regulations stem from ATC procedures. Such regulations
include obtaining of clearances and complying with published procedures.
These procedures indicate methods of flying holding patterns, and infor-
mation concerning approach patterns which make them consistent for all
traffic (e. g., speeds through the patterns, crossing altitudes, minimum
altitudes, etc. ).
Current Jet Implementation Concepts
Current initial approaches begin at approximately 20,000 feet.
However, once a clearance has been received, the aircraft begins the
standard instrument approach. The navigational information is found
on the SIA plates and the navigational system gives a relative position
display. The aircraft descends at a constant airspeed (approximately
300 kts) and a vertical speed of 3, 000-5,000 feet per minute. To attain
this descent profile, such external devices as speed brakes or spoilers
are utilized in conjunction with an idle thrust profile. The letdown
varies with the particular facility. Some allow a long descending pattern,
while others use penetration type approaches with steeper profiles.
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For air traffic control purposes it is necessary to restrict aircraft
to certain space areas in their approaches so that minimum traffic separ-
ation can be maintained. To attain the type of descent profile required
by ATC, high drag devices are utilized so that the aircraft can make a
descent at a maneuverable speed (approximately 300 kts) and still remain
within a given area. Speed brakes and/or spoilers give this capability;
that is, a suitable rate of descent can be attained while maintaining a
constant descent speed. (For those unacquainted with descent profiles,
it might be interesting to note that if an idle descent is made, and a con-
stant airspeed is selected, then the r_te of descent becomes nearly a
constant, or a function of the aircraft's configuration. ) In current oper-
ations most of the SIA is flown manually, and only occasionally will por-
tions of the auto-pilot system be utilized.
SST Potential Operational Requirements and Constraints
Some provision will have to be made to establish holding patterns
at as high an altitude as possible because altitude will be critical for the
SST as far as fuel burn-off is concerned. In setting up such patterns,
the maneuvering space will also need to be recomputed to take into con-
sideration the sensitivity of the SST.
Feasible Automated Implementation Concepts for SST
The equipment and implementation concept described in Function
5. 12 would be utilized for this portion of the flight. SIA information
could be fed through the computer into the flight control system to obtain
required three-dimensional positioning and speed control. In the event
of a hold, the crew could utilize portions of the automatic system to
obtain speed and altitude control. The crew's main responsibility would
be to enter the required data, and then to monitor the performance to
insure compliance with the ATC procedures. Although the automated
concept is quite feasible, it is more likely that the crew will manually
552
fly this portion of the profile. There are many variables encountered
during this phase and the crew would be better able to assimilate and
act on this data.
Feasible Manual Implementation Concepts for SST
The following of a constant subsonic descent speed profile should
be well within the capabilities of the crew, even using strictly manual
means. The procedures will be similar to current operations, and thus
the restrictiveness of the task should be similar. In most cases once
the descent speed has been trimmed for, the aircraft will almost fly
itself and the crew's responsibility will be to comply with approach
procedures by utilizing drag devices judiciously.
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5. 15 FUNCTION 5. 15 LEVEL-OFF MANEUVER
Purpose
The purpose of this function is to change the attitude of the aircraft
from a descent in compliance with a standard instrument approach or
ATC radar vector instructions, to straight and level flight at an altitude
consistent with completing the initial landing approach. Aircraft conform-
ing to descent procedures have a constant airspeed (approximately 300 kts.
EAS), have a shallow apparent tilt angle with the vertical, and have a rate
.......... =_,_ul._[leu of around 3000-5000 feet per minute.
Since neither the aircraft nor the passengers can tolerate square
corner transitions, a smooth and gradual transition must be made from
the stated vertical descent to level flight. This maneuver requires a
coordinated power plant/flight control performance which must take
passenger and aircraft limitations and tolerances into consideration.
Current Jet Operational Requirements and Constraints
Although no regulations bind the crew to specific parameter per-
forrnance, standard operating procedures and aircraft and passenger
limitations usually dictate the limits on this performance. ATC pro-
cedures require maintenance of assigned altitudes for sufficient separ-
ation between aircraft.
Current Jet Implementation Concepts
No equipment not previously mentioned is utilized for this particular
phase of flight. As the final approach altitude is neared, the rate of des-
cent is decreased, so that upon arrival at assigned altitude, the attitude
of the aircraft will be such as to maintain straight and level flight at the
desired airspeed. That is, the established rate of descent of 3000 to
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5000 feet per minute is decreased to zero. This maneuver requires
coordinated power/flight control performance which must take passen-
ger limitations and tolerances into consideration. The crew is respon-
sible for intercepting an assigned altitude and uses the pitch control
either on the primary system (yoke) or on the auto-pilot system to attain
the altitude required. This results in directional change of the aero-
dynamic vector, which in turn decreases airspeed and vertical speed.
SST Potential Operational Requirements and Constraints
The SST will continue to be governed by those factors discussed
for current operations.
Feasible Automated Implementation Concepts for SST
In the description of Function 5.9, Transition to Cruise Control,
reference was made to a concept wherein existing parameters were
analyzed and an optimum level-off schedule was generated and fed
directly into the flight control system. This particular portion of the
system could again be utilized for accomplishing a level-off from a
descent profile. Data in the form of assigned altitude, airspeed, verti-
cal rate of descent, and passenger tolerances could be called upcm to
generate a transitional profile which would in turn feed command_ to
the flight control and auto-throttle systems. The crew would maintain
all responsibility, and would need to insure that this mode of operation
was functioning normally.
Although this concept is quite feasible, whether any advantage
would be gained by utilizing it has still to be determined. The crew is
quite capable of performing as well as the automated function.
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Feasible Manual Implementation Concepts for SST
As is the case with almost all of the flight control system activities,
especially in the subsonic regime, the crew is well within their capabil-
ity to perform any activity utilizing only the basic system offered. In
that sense the procedure would be quite similar to that performed by
today's subsonic carrier crews.
The basic control system (yoke) or the pitch control on the auto-
pilot would be utilized to change the attitude of the SST. Data in the form_
of altitude, altitude assigned, rate of descent, and airspeed, would be
analyzed by the crew, and then control commands would be made to
obtain a tolerable performance. In these and all cases where the crew
will actually fly the aircraft, the need exists for furnishing them with
relevant and tim ely inform ation.
Unless it can be shown that a pre-programmed transition is man-
clatory, the flying of this portion of the flight profile by the crew appears
to be the most practical concept.
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5. 16 FUNCTION 5. 16 INITIAL APPROACH CONTROL
Purpose
The purpose of this function is to provide three-dimensional
control and aircraft reconfiguration consistent with the reduced speeds
associated with the landing approach. Upon descending from altitude,
and leveling at some initial approach altitude, the aircraft is slowed
to final approach speed. To accomplish this the aircraft must be re-
configured and then established in an attitude consistent with the new
speed. When the aircraft levels at the approach altitude, the attitude
of the aircraft continually changes as the excess in airspeed is conver-
ted to maintaining constant altitude. As the aircraft's speed decreases
it becomes necessary to utilize high lift devices, such as flaps, to obtain
adequate low speed flight characteristics.
Once the approach speed has been attained, power is added to
maintain the altitude and the airspeed. The flight control task involved
is a function of the airspeed and the required angle of attack. It must
be remembered that to obtain a certain lift-to-drag ratio (L/D) a cer-
tain angle of attack must be maintained, and the only way to establish
this is to change the attitude of the aircraft with regard to the relative
wind.
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Current Jet Operational Requirements and Constraints
The following regulation applies:
FAR 91. 117, ref. 13:
Inoperative ILS components.
The com-
ponents of a complete ILS are localizer, glide
slope, outer marker, middle marker, and ap-
proach lights. However, a compass locator at
an outer or middle marker site may be substi-
tuted for the outer or middle marker, respec-
..... _. Unless otherwise specified in Part 97
of this chal)ter , no l)erson may begin an ILS
al)l)roach when any component of the ILS is
inoperative, or the related airborne equipment
is inoperative or not utilized, except as
follows:
(1) When only one component (other
than the localizer) is inoperative and all
other components are in normal operation, a
straight-in approach may be made if the
ceiling and visibility at the airport are at
least equal to 300 feet and 3/_ statute mile,
respectively.
(2) When the localizer and the outer
marker are the only components in normal
operation-
(i) A circling approach may be made
if the ceiling and visibility are equal to
or higher than the minimums prescribed
for a circling approach; or
(ii) A straight-in approach may be
made if the ceiling and visibility at the
airport are at least equal to 300 feet and
one statute mile, respectively.
(3) In the case of an alternate airport,
when only one component (other than the
localizer) is inoperative and all other com-
ponents are in normal operation, a person
may make an approach if the ceiling and
visibility at the airport are at least equal to
the minimums prescribed for use of the air-
port as an alternate airport.
358
Current Jet Implementation Concepts
In current aircraft this portion of the approach is flown by the
pilot. However, in straight and level portions of the pattern, the pilot
can activate the auto-pilot and at least utilize the altitude hold and the
directional controls. All configuration changes are initiated by the crew
in accordance with standard operating procedures and aircraft charac-
teristics relative to certain airspeeds. Landing gear and high lift devices
(flaps, droops, boundary layer control, etc. ) are used to maintain slow
flight. These devices essentially help to increase the L/D ratio (that is,
establish a new L/D versus angle of attack curve) whereby a certain
desired amount of lift can be obtained at a lower angle of attack.
During this particular phase of the flight (level flight) the airspeed
will dictate the vertical attitude of the aircraft (pitch), and the naviga-
tional inputs will determine the amount of directional control necessary
for the approach (roll and yaw). Directional inputs will probably be in the
form of radar vectors given by the local ATC facility, or as directed
in the final portion of the standard instrument approach.
Figure 31 depicts the final portion of the standard instrument
approach (SIA), and is utilized during the final approach to the landing.
Another set of charts depicting the let-down procedures are utilized
with these final approach charts to make up the standard instrument
approach. These instrument approach procedures are published for
each of the usable runways at a facility, and show the minima for each
of the approaches.
As in any control maneuvers connected with the three dimensional
positioning of the aircraft, the basic flight instrumentation (i. e., the
altimeter, airspeed indicator, directional indicator, attitude gyro, etc. )
will be utilized to obtain an indication of performance.
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SST Potential Operational Requirements and Constraints
There do not appear to be any modifications necessary to current
operational procedures with regards to the SST. However, because of
the size of the aircraft and its slower control response, some attention
might be paid to establishing procedures which will reduce excessive
maneuvering in this regime.
Feasible Automated Implementation Concepts for SST
This phase of flight will be very similar to current operations with
the exception that approach speeds may be slightly faster. Also, because
of longer proportions, longitudinal response of the SST may be somewhat
slower than on current aircraft which will necessitate a little more anti-
cipation by the crew. Depending on the final design chosen, there is the
possibility that the approach will be made at high angles of attack, which
could make visibility a critical factor.
Aside from these inherent characteristics of the proposed SST,
there is no indication that the control activities in this initial approach
phase will change significantly with the introduction of the SST. The
crew will still be responsible for reconfiguring the aircraft and maneuver-
ing to comply with the approach instructions. The crew will be able to
utilize portions of the automatic control system, but will not have a pre-
programmed approach pattern feeding command inputs to the control
system.
Feasible Manual Implementation Concepts for SST
The concept illustrated above is essentially that which will be
employed in the manual feasibility concept. However, in all those por-
tions of the pattern wherein the automatic modes of operation could be
utilized (i. e., altitude hold, course hold, etc. ) the crew would be required
to manually hold the aircraft. This would be quite similar to current
%1
jet flight control. Either the flight control system via the control column
and rudder pedals will be utilized, or the flight control system via the
auto-pilot will be used. In either situation responsibility will remain
with the crew. In this particular regime of flight the characteristics
of the SST will be comparable to current subsonic jets, and the control
necessary will be the same.
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5. 17 FUNCTION 5.17 FINAL APPROACH CONTROL
Purpose
This function provides directional control to the SST during the
final phases of the landing maneuver; in partic.ular, during the portion
of the flight that the aircraft has entered the final approach course and
has started a descent towards the runway. The main responsibility of
the crew will be to insure minimum excursions from the optimum ap-
proach profile.
Operational Requirements and Constraints
In most cases the carriers of today are restricted to certain man-
euvers because of safety factors and because of demonstrated state-of-
the-art concepts. ATC procedures also dictate to some extent the limits
of some maneuvers. High traffic density found in terminal areas must
be directed in an orderly and precise method. Thus both in visual and
instrument conditions, the ILS approach is usually employed. Flying
the "beam" requires control in both the vertical and lateral planes, and
speed control to operate within structural limits upon landing. The fol-
lowing specific regulation applies:
FAR91.117, ref. 13:
.Inoperative ILS components
The com-
ponents of a complete ILS are localizer, glide
slope, outer marker, middle marker, and ap-
proach lights. However, a compass locator at
an outer or middle marker site may be substi-
tuted for the outer or middle marker, respec-
tively. Unless otherwise specified in Part 97
[New] of this chapter, no person may begin
an ILS approach when any component of the
ILS is inoperative, or the related airborne
equipment is inoperative or not utilized, except
as follows:
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(1) When only one component (other
than the localizer) is inoperative and all
other components are in normal operation, a
straight-in approach may be made if the
ceiling and visibility at the airport are at
least equal to 300 feet "md 3/_ statute mile,
respectively.
(2) When the localizer and the outer
marker are the only components in normal
operation-
(i) A circling approach may be made
if the ceiling and visibility are eq,al to
or higher than the minimums prescribed
for a circling approach; or
(ii) A straight-in approach may be
made if the ceiling and visibility at the
airport are at least equal to 300 feet and
one statute mile, respectively.
(3) In the case of an alternate airport,
when only one component (other than the
localizer) is inoperative and all other com-
ponents are in normal operation, a person
may make an approach if the ceiling and
visibility at the airport are at least equal to
the minimums prescribed for use of the air-
port as an alternate airport.
Current Jet Implementation Concepts
Having intercepted the ILS final approach course, the aircraft is
slowed to final approach speed. The ILS coupler may be actuated to
utilize a portion of the auto-pilot for course and glide slope hold. The
crew varies the power to maintain the required airspeed. Current jets
also have flight directors which are used to manually fly the aircraft
following a computed display (Figure 32). Consideration is being given
to a wind screen, heads-up display to assist the crew in making the
transition from instrument conditions to visual conditions.
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SST Potential Operational Requirements and Constraints
Some of the problems in trying to integrate the SST into the Air
Traffic Control system have already been pointed out (ref. 45) for the
approach and landing phase of flight,
•.. approach angles of supersonic transports and
touchdown angles will be high whic5 may limit direct
vision by the pilot. Wake turbulence due to wing-tip
vortices and jet exhaust will be stronger than the
commercial subsonic jet. New procedures for spac-
ing of these aircraft in the terminal area and ap-
proaches may be necessary.
The terminal area will require an automatic
landing system. Go-arounds are costly. In the
event of a go-around, a new approach must be set
up in the minimum time by ATC...
There have been many attempts to handle the stringent demands
of the SST landing and approach in an integrated system which will take
advantage of the latest advances in the state-of-the-art, but will main-
tain the crew somewhere within the loop. The introduction of the SST
will bring with it several new flight requirements which will to some
degree be foreign to the current subsonic aircraft crews. The SST land-
ing requirements have been described (ref. 31) as follows:
... the landing requirements for a supersonic trans-
port can also be extremely critical, although the vari-
able-sweep concept reduces these problems considerably.
The landing gross weights for the supersonic transport
will be higher than for p_esent turbine-powered trans-
ports. Therefore, wing areas for the SST will be greater
and/or the available lift coefficient will be increased for
landing to prevent the landing distance required from be-
coming excessive. For the low-aspect-ratio wings
required for a fixed-wing SST, it is difficult to obtain
sufficiently high usable lift coefficients to reduce the
landing speeds to an acceptable level; therefore, it is
usually necessary to size the wing larger than otherwise
desired for vehicles cruising in the 65, 000 to 75, 000
foot region.
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•.. the rate of descent characteristics during approach
for a typical fixed-wing SST are such that the steady
state approach condition of 130 knots at 600 feet per
minute rate of descent falls weli on the "back side" of
the (power)* curve. This condition will have an unde-
sirable effect on flareout and touchdown maneuvers.
The ability to control approach speed and angle along
the glide slope becomes a problem because of the result-
Lug inverse speed-attitude relationship for trim at any
given altitude and rate of sink. For example, if the pilot
desires to increase speed while holding a given glide slope.
he must first drop the nose and increase throttle settings;
however, as the transport speed increases, he must re-
verse the throttle direction to lower and lower power
while easing on the wheel until the desired speed is stabil-
ized. Although control motion is essentially normal, oper-
ation of the throttle must be reversed to attain the new
trim position. Many high performance military aircraft
operate in this manner, however, more study is required
before this could be considered practical for commercial
operations.
In addition to ATC procedures and SST handling characteristics,
some thought should also be given to crew and equipment capability.
IATA and the FAA are striving for automatic landings. To achieve this
a three step program has been devised:
lu Category I -- 200 feet ceiling and runway visual range (RVR)
of 1 / 2 mile.
e
e
Category II -- 100 feet ceiling and a RVR of 1,200 feet.
Category III -- Hands off landing
a. The landing
b. The rollout
c. Taxi
*Parenthetic insertion by the authors.
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Currently jet aircraft are permitted Category I and in a few cases
Category II operation. The SST should be equipped to meet Category III
requirements.
Feasible Automated Implementation Concepts for SST
It appears that an automatic landing system will be utilized not
only by the SST, but by most subsonic carriers operating in the SST
era. The system would provide course hold, glide slope hold, air-
speed control, flare initiation and decrab maneuvers. This system
would be a portion of the auto-pilot system and would employ data re-
ceived from the on-line computer, the navigation system, and the ILS
system. Since the crew would continue to maintain all responsibility
for the approach to landing, displays which would allow instantaneous
take over by the crew are essential. This probably means some form
of pictorial presentation.
In most concepts the crew may accept whatever degree of involve-
ment it desires. In other words, the overriding of one particular functior
of the system will not eliminate the capability of the system to perform
its other functions.
Although airlines and pilots demand the capability for a manual
landing, it appears that the automatic mode of operation will provide
the routine method of operation. This is primarily because optimum
performance is required at all times.
Feasible Manual Implementation Concepts for SST
The SST will be able to be landed and controlled throughout its
approach just like any aircraft currently being flown. However, like
current aircraft, higher landing minima may restrict the aircraft
under such modes of operation.
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If the crew's responsibility is only to maintain three dimensional
positioning in accordance with a computer flight director display, then
such a tracking task is well within their capability. In that situation
the crew would utilize the basic control system to maintain the "bug"
on the display placard. The crew would have to maneuver the aircraft
into a position to intercept the final approach course. Then as it started
inbound towards the runway, they would select a heading which would
keep them centered on the iocalizer course and ,_u,,,_,=,,==_*_ ,w_"_ =,-J_n_"
wind components. As the glide slope was intercepted, the crew would
need to change the power and altitude of the aircraft so as to maintain
the glide path angle.
The performance would be similar to current operations, except
that there may be operation on the back side of the power curve. This
is certainly new to commercial pilots yet several current military air-
craft have to be operated on the back side of the power curve during
final approach and they at least do not seem to present a problem.
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5. 18 FUNCTION 5. 18 MISSED APPROACH EXECUTION
CONTROL OPERATIONS
_urpose
This function provides directional control for the SST in the event
that the landing and/or approach is abandoned for some reason decided
upon by the crew. The aircraft on final approach is in all likelihood
coupled to an inbound approach course, and descends in accordance with
the glide path. Once the decision has been made to abort the landing,
the aircraft must be repositioned from its descending trajectory to es-
tablish either a level flight or a climbing attitude.
This activity has been part of aviation since the beginning. With
the introduction of higher performance aircraft, however, the maneuver
has become more critical. Longer aircraft, heavier aircraft, swept-
angled configurations, and some of the other characteristics of the high
performance aircraft have introduced new problem areas into the missed
approach performance requirements. This is particularly true in the
latter stages of the landing approach.
Current Jet Operational Requirements and Constraints
Safety is the main underlying factor in the requirements concerning
missed approaches. This section on flight control is merely the means
for complying with command requirements made in the flight management
function. By regulation the crew is required to execute a missed ap-
proach if certain weather minima are not met, if the runway is not vis-
ible, or if the crew feels that the safety of the aircraft or its passengers
is in jeopardy. The following specific regulation applies:
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FAR 91. 117, ref. 13:
Descent below IFR landing minimums.
No person may operate an aircraft below the
applicable minimum landing altitude unless
clear of clouds. In addition, no person may
operate an aircraft more than 50 feet below
that minimum altitude unless-
(l) The landing minimums are at least
ceiling 1,000 feet and visibility two statute
Jiixt,_, Lur_
(2) The aircraft is in a position from
which a normal approach can be made to
the runway of intended landing and the
approach threshold of that runway or the
approach lights or other markings identifi-
able with that runway are clearly visible to
the pilot.
If, after descent below tile minimum altitude,
the pilot cannot maintain visual reference to
the ground or ground lights, he shall immedi-
ately execute the appropriate prescribed missed
approach procedure.
Current Jet Implementation Concepts
The execution of the missed approach combines a flight control
and power plant operation. The performance is actually an extension
of the takeoff performance (Function 5. 4) and the initial climbout con-
trol (Function 5. 5). The crew's main responsibility is to abort the
landing attempt, and re-establish the aircraft in a safe flying regime.
In general, the performance described in the Boeing 707 operations
manual (ref. 17) will hold for most missed approach procedures.
It states,
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•.. the missed approach procedure consists of partially
retracting the flaps immediately after takeoff thrust is
applied, and then after a positive rate of climb is
established, the gear is retracted. The same climbout
considerations ___1_. ,A ,L^ • ....•-I1 ILL
around as were discussed under TAKEOFF AND
CLIMBOUT. Speeds should be controlled quite care-
fully so that the climbout path is assured. Again, after
reaching approximately 1,000 feet, airspeed should be
increased to the minimum speeds for maneuvering with
partial flaps, or the airplane may be accelerated straight
ahead to the flap-up configuration, and then pick up the
airspeed for maneuvering with flaps up...
In today's jet operations certain operational factors will influence
the missed approach performance. One of these is the slower response
of jet engines to commands for more power. This in turn affects the
decision to abort a landing attempt because a significant amount of alti-
tude can be lost during this maneuver (relative to the height of the air-
craft above the ground}. Litchford (ref. 46) indicates that,
Because jet engines usually respond more slowly
than propeller engines, the pilot will leave on a few
extra knots of speed when the visibility is low ("for
the wife and kids"). Then, if the approach must be
abandoned near the ground, he is at a more suitable
speed to intitate climbout than if he was flying at the
lowest permissible speed...
... Simulation tests by NASA indicate that when
the pilot decides he must abandon the approach, he can
still lose up to 60 or 70 ft of altitude. Therefore, it
is not prudent to postpone such a decision below 100 ft...
SST Potential Operational Requirements and Constraints
The only modification to current procedures would be due to the
factor of decreased control responsiveness. This would necessitate a
re-evaluation of current thinking with regards to lower limits on a
safe missed approach envelope.
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Feasible Automated Implementation Concepts for SST
In actuality there does not appear to be an automatic concept being
considered. It must be remembered that this performance is the deacti-
vation of the automatic mode of operation or the manual mode as the
case may be. So, although a programmed missed approach profile is
feasible, it does not appear to be practical.
Feasible Manual Implementation Concepts for SST
At this time no new pieces of equipment will be introduced. Rather,
the concepts behind some of these systems will be looked at to determine
the role whict_ the crew plays in the landing and the missed approach. It
has already been pointed out many times that in all likelihood the SST
will incorporate some form of all-weather landing system which will
work through the flight control system, and in some cases through the
power plant system.
In England a system developed by the Blind Landing Experimental
Unit (BLEU) is a triplicated electronic system, which is quite bulky,
and ". •. with the pilot excluded from a say in its operation... " The
British group compute the chance of human error at one in 10, 000,
while the chance of mechanical error, they Say, works out to one in
100,000.
"In U.S. systems, the pilot is in effect the commander of the
landing, " according to Business Week (ref. 47),
•.. he can take over at any time simply by moving
the throttles• Meanwhile, both he and the co-pilot
are monitoring the autopilot by means of flight
directors, hooked on to separate computers, that
provide another source of flight data and describe
what should be happening...
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The crew would use the basic control system (yoke) or a portion of the
autopilot system, and would command full power in the same manner as
in the takeoff power plants operations (Function 4.3). The responsibility
of the crew would continue to be based on safety, and would not change
as a consequence of the means employed to perform this maneuver.
However, there will be a need to augment the flight director sys-
tem so that the crew will have the capability to take over at any period
in the landing approach, and obtain optimum performance• As Manning
(ref. 48) points out,
•.. the need to augment a flight director system to
provide stand-by monitor and take-over information
for aircraft approach and landing is becoming in-
creasingly important. With the advent of semi-
automatic and automatic approach and landing systems
the pilots' task has been greatly simplified; however,
several obstacles present themselves in the complete
utilization of the technical advances now being offered.
We must augment the reliability safety factor. It is
mandatory that we provide the pilot with sufficient,
readily interpretable, easily tracked information so
that he has no reservations about the proper function-
ing of his automatic control equipment. Should he be
required to take over because of equipment failure,
approach controller directions, or personal desires
or intuition, he shall have complete command of his
exact condition and position so that the transition
from automatic or semi-automatic to full manual
control can be accomplished safely, rapidly and
calmly...
Although the missed approach is not really a phase of the normal
flight profile, its frequent occurrence necessitates some discussion of
missed approach performance. In a strictly optimum case, this per-
formance could be done away with. However, in considering a system
which utilizes both man and machine, the missed approach performance
becomes something other than non-routine. Since the landing phase is
probably the most critical, the crew will attempt to minimize deviations
from what they consider optimum and in the event of a large variance
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will in most cases choose a missed approach rather than attempt a
questionable landing.
The performance characteristics of the SST may need more study
to determine just how critical a missed approach will be, especially in
the latter portions of the landing maneuver. It must be remembered,
that the combination of flying on the back-side of the power curve,
heavier aircraft, larger rates of descent, and slower longitudinal re-
sponse due to the longer aircraft, may mean that once the aircraft has
passed a certain altitude on its descent, it is committed to land. This
could put a final limit on the landing minima for the SST.
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5. 19 FUNCTION 5. 19 FLARE MANEUVER EXECUTION
Purpose
This function changes the attitude of the aircraft so that the estab-
lished rate of descent will be altered sufficiently to allow a safe rate of
descent upon touchdown, i.e., 2 to 5 feet per second.
Current Jet Operational Requirements and Constraints
Although not constrained by regulation, design and passenger com-
fort dictate the performance of this operation. Most landing aids utilize
a glide angle of approximately 3 °, which means that the aircraft must
utilize a rate of descent between 500 and 1000 ft. /min. (depending upon
wind conditions) to touchdown at the desired point on the runway. How-
ever, this would result in damage to the landing gear struts, not to
mention discomfort to the passengers. Thus, a flare maneuver is
necessitated to change the rate of descent to 120-300 ft. /min.
Current Jet Implementation Concepts
The basic control system described for current aircraft is used
to perform the flare maneuver. The crew, responding to visual cues
decides to flare, and initiates a change in the vertical attitude of the
aircraft using the yoke. The result is a decrease in the rate of descent.
Once the decision has been made to flare, the crew can check the rate
of rotation to perform the flare, by checking the verical speed indi-
cator, the airspeed, and the altimeter.
SST Potential Operational Requirements and Constraints
Since for the most part it has been ascertained that the SST will
continue to utilize 3 ° glide slopes, and since heavier weights and faster
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speeds could result in larger rates of descent during approach, there
will definitely be a requirement for a flare maneuver. In fact because
of the estimated slower longitudinal control response, and the increased
length of the SST, the flare may have to be initiated at a higher alti-
tude than currently.
Feasible Automated Implementation Concepts for SST
One of the functional requirements for the all-weather landing
system is an automatic flare. Upon receiving precise altitude infor-
mation from a radio altimeter, the aircraft would respond with the
required change in attitude. This particular form of all-weather land-
ing system has two main concepts. One is the completely automatic
system where the crew is not in the loop, and acts only as a monitor.
The other, favored by U. S. manufacturers and airlines, retains the
crew in the loop, and allows them to utilize whatever portion of the
system they require.
Thus, in the SST it would appear that a portion of the all-weather
landing system would provide an automatic flare capability. The crew's
role would be to act primarily as monitor under routine conditions. It
should be pointed out that although the equipment would be performing
the approach, the crew would continue to maintain full responsibility
for the safety of the aricraft and its passengers. It is also clear that
because of this responsibility, the crew will be mentally and perhaps
almost manually flying the aircraft in anticipation of a malfunction.
This degree of involvement in monitoring will make the task just as.
restricted as current procedures.
Feasible Manual Implementation Concepts for SST
In performing a manual flare, if the crew were required to respond
to visual cues to initiate the flare, then the prevailing weather conditions
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would need to be at or above 100 feet (ceiling). This would allow time
for the crew to react, the controls to respond, and the attitude of the
aircraft to change sufficiently prior to touchdown. Thus the weather
becomes a constraint. However, it aDDears feasible for the crew to
take over that portion of the all-weather landing system which performs
the flare maneuver, and to utilize data from the radio altimeter to ac-
complish this flare. If the rest of the landing system is functioning
normally (i. e., the auto-throttle and the glide slope and localizer holds)
then the crew should be able to flare the SST.
If the crew is expected to utilize data from the radio altimeter,
instrumentation will need be integrated into the system to give the crew
this information along with the other vital landing parameters.
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5.20 FUNCTION 5.20 ROLLOUT CONTROL
Purpose
This function provides directional control for the SST while it is
on the operational runway, decelerating after the completion of its land-
ing. The optimum performance is to keep the lateral displacements
from the runway centerline to a minimum.
Performance will be very similar to that described in Function 5.3,
Takeoff Abort Control. In that situation the decision is made not to con-
tinue with the takeoff roll and to abort the flight. Since the aircraft will
have already gained a certain amount of kinetic energy, the crew's task
is to keep the aircraft on the runway as the decelerating devices are
employed.
In roll-out control, the aircraft will have just landed and will again
have a certain amount of kinetic energy. Depending upon the landing and
touchdown, there will be a certain amount of runway in which to decel-
erate to a suitable taxi speed. With the aircraft no longer airborne, con-
trol becomes primarily two-dimensional. As in Function 5. 3, the main
responsibility of the crew will be to maintain minimum lateral displace-
ment from the runway centerline during the deceleration.
Current Jet Operational Requirements and Constraints
No specific regulations are applicable.
Current Jet Implementation Concepts
The flight control system is effective with ground speeds above
about 50 knots. The crew can maintain directional control by using
the rudder system, or can compensate for crosswind using a coordinate
rudder-aileron procedure. Below 50 knots the nose wheel steering can
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be utilized. As a last resort, differential braking can be utilized to
maintain directional control of the aircraft.
SST Potential Operational Requirements and Constraints
There are none applicable.
Feasible Automated Implementation Concepts for SST
As was indicated in Function 5. 3, a form of automatic control is
feasible for accomplishing roll-out performance. It would be an exten-
sion of the all-weather landing system. Business Week (ref. 47) points
out,
... for the landing, the autopilot is actually programmed
to guide the plane a dozen or more feet into the ground.
This drops it on the runway at the proper two or three
feet per second, so the wheels catch early enough to
start the roll-out. "Otherwise", explains a pilot, "we'd
run out of roll-out room. Or we might float about three
,I
inches off the ground the entire length of the runway.
"During the roll-out, the localizer beam guides the
rudder until the plane slows to 50 knots. Below that
speed the pilot can steer with the front wheels...
In utilizing such a system, the crew would still maintain the responsi-
bility for keeping the aircraft on the runway.
In 1963 the FAA issued an RFP for a study of "Aircraft Ground
Guidance Techniques". This indicates that consideration is at least
being given to new techniques for roll-out guidance. The specific tasks
listed in the RFP for study were as follows:
i.
2.
Aircraft directional gyro systems
ILS localizer techniques
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.4.
5.
6.
Infra-red detection
Guidance using magnetic fields
Aircraft radar
Lines and/or line patterns
Feasible Manual Implementation Concepts for SST
As in current operations, during the roll-out control the flight
system will be used to control lateral deviations from the optimum
line of direction. On the other hand, the power plant system in the
form of thrust reversal will be utilized to control the longitudinal
deviations.
The crew of the SST should not require any new training in this
area, and there should be no appreciable increase in either workload
or restrictiveness over what is experienced by today's subsonic car-
rier crews.
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Feasible Automated Implementation Concepts for SST
There are none applicable.
Feasible Manual Implementation Concepts for SST
As pointed out in the description of Function 5. 1, the major prob-
lem to be overcome by the SST will be operating on present taxiways
and ramps. Reduced visibility, coupled with a larger aircraft will tend
to make obstruction clearance most critical. The crew will continue to
utilize the nose wheel steering, differential braking, and power plant
operation to accomplish the required taxi performance. However, be-
cause of the size constraints the crew will have a greater responsibility
to avoid obstructions.
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5.21 FUNCTION 5.21 TAXI TO LINE
Purpose
The purpose of this function is to supply the directional control
for the system in moving from the end of the operational runway to the
designated unloading area. The performance requirements and imple-
mentation concepts will be the same as described in Function 5. 1,
Taxi from Line.
To reiterate what has already been discussed, the major problem
to be encountered in any ground maneuvering operations will be handling
the larger aircraft on present taxiways, and maintaining adequate clear-
ance from all ground obstructions. These problems will increase the
restrictiveness of the task, but can be considered to be occurring in a
non-critical phase of the flight.
Current Jet Operational Requirements and Constraints
The requirements and constraints will be the same as those listed
under Function 5.1.
Current Jet Implementation Concepts
As discussed in Function 5. 1, the crew utilizes nose wheel steer-
and/or differential braking with coordinated power plant operations to
move the aircraft from the end of the operational runway to the passen-
ger unloading area.
SST Potential Operational Requirements and Constraints
Potential requirements and constraints will be the same as those
listed in Function 5. 1.
_3
ACTIVITY 6, 0 INLET DUCT/EXHAUST NOZZLE CONFIGURATION
PURPOSE
The introduction of a supersonic commercial transport will bring
several new functional requirements to the crew. One, which is related
to the new aerodynamics, is the matching of the inlet duct and exhaust
nozzle system to the requirements of the engine.
The critical thrust margin is in the region of Mach 1.2 to 1. 3.
Unfortunately, this is also the Mach region in which the losses in thrust
due to inlet and nozzle are large. These losses can approach the thrust
margin (excess thrust/drag) in magnitude. They are primarily a function
of the relationship between inlet flow capacity and engine flow require-
ments. Reduction of these losses by matching the inlet and engine flow
characteristics is obviously very important since they can directly influ-
ence the propulsion system size and base weight.
The losses attributable to the inlet and nozzle are also of concern
during subsonic operation of the propulsion system, for the subsonic-
hold and subsonic-cruise-to-an-alternate-field reserve fuel require-
ments. The amount of reserve fuel required is dependent on many
variables, but in general, is approximately 16% of the fuel load or 8%
of the airplane takeoff gross weight. This is a dead weight and is of the
same order of magnitude as the payload and engine weights. Reductions
in the reserve fuel load can therefore be as significant as reductions in
propulsion system weight. For a supersonic propulsion system, it can
be seen that the inlet and nozzle losses can increase the TSFC (Thrust
Specific Fuel Consumption) by as much as 40% at typical cruise-power
settings.
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For the SST, the cruise fuel weight is 62 to 65% of trip fuel
weight. It is therefore important that inlet-engine-nozzle systems
operate efficiently during the supersonic cruise. This requires that
the inlet capture area and the nozzle area be matched as closely as
possible to the requirements of the engine in order to provide mini-
mum propulsion system TSFC during supersonic cruise.
The problem at supersonic speeds is that the intake compressor
is unable to accept _he high velocity, _-_--*- _-nnw As theL, s,, pressure ...........
Space/Aeronautics Staff Report (ref. 29) indicates,
At high Mach numbers the speed of the aircraft
appreciably precompresses air at the lip of the engine
intake (36:1 at Mach 3.0). Axial velocity of this air is
essentially equal to airplane speed. At this speed, the
air mass cannot be accepted by the engine compressor.
The engineer must therefore design the intake to decel-
erate this air with a minimum loss in the potential energy
represented by the original ram pressure.
Deceleration down to Mach 1.0 + speeds is accom-
plished by inducing a shock pattern--bouncing the shock
waves back and forth between the walls of the intake. A
contraction at the throat of the intake just beyond the
plane of the last shock reduces air axial velocity to
slightly below Mach 1.0. The air is then diffused to a
velocity which is at the designed acceptance level of the
compressor--about Mach 0. 5.
The higher the initial airspeed, the more shocks
are needed to bring engine pressure down to the opti-
mum level. According to studies made by Bristol-
Siddeley, at least five shocks are needed at Mach 3. 0...
Thus, the cockpit will have the additional concern of insuring
optimum positioning of the shock wave so as to match airflow to the
engine.
Just as the inlet duct can be reconfigured to decelerate air, at
supersonic speeds the outlet nozzle must effectively translate the high
pressures and high temperatures of the exhaust gases into kinetic energy
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by accelerating these gases from low to high velocities. The convergent
nozzle presently used on subsonic aircraft permits airflow velocities
only up to sonic speeds. At Mach 3.0, such a nozzle would allow the
high pressures to degenerate through uncontained expansion, reducing
the possible internal thrust considerably. This loss can be avoided by
permitting controlled expansions of airflow to supersonic velocities.
Insuring that optimum performance is being achieved via the inlet-engine-
exhaust nozzle system will be another area of concern for the SST crew.
CURRENT JET OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS AND CONSTRAINTS
In current operations the basic requirements are for an inlet duct
configuration and an exhaust nozzle which will optimize the performance
of the subsonic engine throughout the entire flight. This requirement is
fulfilled by the aircraft and power plant designers, and the crew does not
become involved. Thus, the requirements and constraints for this func-
tion are associated with supersonic flight, and will need to be developed
and set accordingly.
CURRENT JET IMPLEMENTATION CONCEPTS
The only analogous concern for engine airflow requirements in
current aircraft is the operation of "blow-in" doors via cockpit switch-
ing. However, blow-in doors are rarely used in commercial aircraft.
In actuality, there is no concern for reconfiguring inlet ducts or exhaust
nozzles, and as a result there is no need for implementation concepts.
Since military aircraft use blow-in doors and when utilizing the after-
burner reconfigure the exhaust nozzle, crews are at least familiar with
the need for such operations.
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SST POTENTIAL OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS AND CONSTRAINTS
The engine which the designers finally choose for the SST will have
to be two engines in one; a subsonic engine and a supersonic engine. As
a subsonic mechanism, the engine will operate as a straightforward com-
pressor-turbine gas generator. As a supersonic mechanism, the power
plant will not only exist as a gas generator, but will have to handle extra-
ordinarLty large masses of air at extremely h_,,h,._S..,_oln,-_t_,._. ........ pressures
and temperatures.
If anything, the SST inlet is probably misnamed since its function
will be much broader than just admitting air to the engine. During flight
at three times the speed of sound, the inlet must pre-compress the incom-
ing air to 30 times its original pressure with an efficiency of up to 95%'
Studies to date indicate that this can be achieved although the hardware
becomes relatively sophisticated and complex.
Unlike a subsonic inlet, the airflow of an efficient supersonic inlet
must be held to one specific value for a particular flight altitude and speed.
Deviations from this discrete value generally lead to catastrophic results
like shock expulsion or swallowing; both of which result in a violent reduc-
tion in engine performance. Consequently, it is desirable that the SST
engine be closely matched to the inlet with a high degree of reciprocal
control. Further, since inlet performance is dependent on the airflow,
required thrust variations will need to be made by means other than
changes in engine airflow and hence engine speed. Appendix 4. 0 dis-
cusses means for controlling power plants during the supersonic portion
of the flight. In all likelihood, the SST engine will be operated at maxi-
mum RPM throughout this regime so as to accommodate the airflow.
The importance of the inlet system cannot be overemphasized. At
relatively high supersonic speeds, the thrust of the power plant acts on
the internal surfaces of the inlet and the inlet literally pulls the aircraft
through the air. The engine's function in this case is just to set up the
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flow field and inject energy into the passing air. This is typified by
today's ramjet which consists only of an inlet, burner, and jet nozzle.
Assuming the inlet duct is x econfigured to recover a large per-
centage of the high energy pre-compressed airflow, a second source
of thrust loss is the exhaust nozzle. If the high pressure, high tem-
perature gases generated in the engine are allowed to expand unre-
strictedly to reach ambient levels, drag induced between the differences
in velocity will result in appreciable thrust losses. Therefore, recon-
figuring of the exhaust nozzle to increase the velocity of the exhaust
gases will be necessary. One way to provide optimum exit velocities
for Mach 3. 0 operation is by use of a convergent-divergent nozzle which
has overlapping fingers at both the throat and exit. These fingers can
be closed or opened as appropriate for subsonic or supersonic flow.
There are many methods advocated for performing this function, but
basically they are all the same; the area of the exhaust nozzle is varied
so as to regulate the velocity of the exhaust gases.
FEASIBLE AUTOMATED IMPLEMENTATION CONCEPTS FOR SST
The duct system must maintain an airflow at a degree of constancy
acceptable to the engine. To do this the duct must interpose its airflow
function between the engine and all external conditions tending to affect
airflow. When the aircraft speed is supersonic there will necessarily
be a shock wave or system of shock waves in the duct. For best pres-
sure recovery it is desirable that the shock wave pattern be carefully
regulated. Atmospheric and aircraft variables such as temperature,
turbulence, airspeed, pitch, and yaw tend to disturb the shock wave
pattern. The control system should as necessary detect such distur-
bances and make accommodations for them.
Various groups within the aircraft industry hold the opinion that
the operation of the inlet duct variable geometry will have to be automatic.
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This position is based on the belief that the variables that must be
accommodated are too rapid and numerous for a crew member to be
able to handle the task. With an automatic system the crew's respon-
sibility would become one of monitoring the operation of the system
and reconfiguring it if possible in the event of a malfunction. In this
particular case most designers are hoping for a fail-safe system
because economic flight will be predicated on the ability to keep the
airflow matched to the engine requirements.
Since it appears that the automatic mode of operation will only
be concerned with the supersonic regime, the crew will probably be
required to activate the system during transonic acceleration and then
deactivate it after transonic deceleration.
FEASIBLE MANUAL IMPLEMENTATION CONCEPTS FOR SST
As has been stated, evaluation of many dynamic parameters to
determine the optimum duct and exhaust nozzle configurations appears
to be outside the capability of the crew. However, there does appear
to be a sort of manual back-up which would allow the crew some degree
of control in the event of malfunction. The main function of this manual
control would be the maintenance of safety (disregarding economics).
The situation in which the inlet control system malfunctions and
allows the normal shock to go out of the inlet is called an "inlet unstart. "
It changes the pressure field in front of the inlet, changes the air flow
around the inlet, and decreases the thrust. Depending on how the inlet
and engine are mounted on the aircraft, this can cause pitch, yaw, or
roll trim changes, or a combination of any of these. If the position of
the normal shock becomes unstable, the inlet will "buzz. " An "unstart"
allowed to go uncorrected will probably develop into buzz, which can be
destructive after some period of time.
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The manual manipulation of a lever to control the duct geometry
will only allow rough approximations and would be used solely to get
the aircraft back to the subsonic environment. To use this means
some instrumentation will liave to be provided which will show where
the shock wave is positioned. It does not appear feasible to use this
manual back-up concept for normal operations.
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6. 1 FUNCTION 6. 1 DUCT SYSTEM CONFIGURATION FOR
SUPERSONIC CLIMB
Purpose
This function is to insure that the inlet duct and exhaust
nozzle systems are appropriately configured to provide acceptable
precompressed air to the power plant system and to control exhaust
gas expansion. This matching of the inlet s3_tem to the engi, e is a
characteristic which accompanies supersonic flight and exhaust.
As the Space/Aeronautics Staff Report (ref. 29) indicates,
At high Mach numbers the speed of the aircraft
appreciably precompresses air at the lip of the engine
intake (36:1 at Mach 3. 0). Axial velocity of this air is
essentially equal to airplane speed. At this speed, the
air mass cannot be accepted by the engine compressor.
The engineer must therefore design the intake to decel-
erate this air with a minimum loss in the potential ener-
gy represented by the original ram pressure.
Another inherent characteristic of supersonic airflow is the con-
figuration of the nozzle. Just as the inlet duct configuration is in a sense
a mechanism for decelerating air, the outlet nozzle at supersonic air-
craft speeds must effectively translate the high pressures and high tem-
peratures of the exhaust gases into kinetic energy by accelerating these
gases from low to high velocities.
Current Jet Operational Requirements and Constraints
Reconfiguring of the inlet duct and the exhaust nozzle is not a
consideration in subsonic operations. Currently the designer must
match these designs to the engine requirements, but only for the one
regime.
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Current jet Implementation Concepts
Current subsonic aircraft are not concerned with reconfiguration
of the intake duct system or the exhaust nezz!e system.
SST Potential Operational Requirements and Constraints
Although certain types of engines (e. g., ramjets} can accept high
velocity, precompressed air, the axial flow jet engine has its limitations
and in most cases these are subsonic velocity airflows. Since the SST
will be operating in both subsonic and supersonic speed regimes, the
engine must be capable of operation in both regimes. In the case of the
axial flow jet engine (i. e. , the turbofan or turbojet}, the compressors
are unable to accept the precompressed air (36:1 at Mach 3} caused by
the aircraft's speed. Therefore, some method must be available for
decelerating the axial velocity of the airflow without too large a loss in
potential energy. This is accomplished by means of an inlet duct system.
Along the same line, the current exhaust nozzles permit airflow
velocities only up to sonic speeds. At supersonic speeds this nozzle
would allow the high pressures to degenerate through uncontained expan-
sion which would appreciably reduce internal thrust. This loss can be
prevented by controlling exhaust expansion.
Thus a system is required which will be able to vary both the inlet
duct and the exhaust nozzle configurations throughout the various speed
regimes. The system which controls these reconfigurations will need
to take into consideration atmospheric and aircraft variables, such as
temperature, turbulence, airspeed, pitch and yaw in accomplishing the
performance requirements.
Feasible Automated Implementation Concepts for SST
The SST will bring a new procedure to the flight deck which may
mean the difference between a successful flight and a failure. The SST
392
crew will be responsible for insuring that the position of the shock wave
induced by the precompressed air is focused within limits to cause the
required number of shock patterns and the ultimate Mach O. 5 velocity
air.
Reference 29 explains that
•.. deceleration down to Mach 1.0 + speeds is accom-
plished by inducing a shock pattern--bounding the shock
waves L_^,..__ r....+_, _,o÷,,,,_,_n +_,_ w_ll._ nf the intake. A
contraction at the throat of the intake just beyond the plane
of the last shock reduces air axial velocity to slightly be-
low Mach 1.0. The air is then diffused to a velocity which
is at the designed acceptance level of the compressor
--about Mach 0. 5 ...
Most designers agree that this function will be accomplished auto-
matically with the crew acting primarily as monitors• Many diverse
parameters must be analyzed to obtain the optimum position of the shock
patterns. These are, at least for the precision required, outside the
realm of the human. One manufacturer is making provision for a manual
mode, but most are aiming for a fail-safe automatic system. When the
shock wave is not positioned correctly, the terminal shock can move
away from its normal position at the intake throat as a result of even
relatively small variations in airflow. The terminal shock then becomes
unstable and is instantly expelled (i. e., "inlet unstart" occurs)• Com-
pressor stall can follow unless the shock is quickly repositioned by a
rapid change in intake geometry. Thus, to keep the shock pattern
focused, it must be possible to vary the cross section of the intake
ahead of the throat.
For the SST crew the performance required by this set of functions
will be mainly a monitoring function• Temperature and pressure sensors
will be located so as to give optimum shock wave positioning.
It is not anticipated that any problems outside the state-of-the-art
will arise. Since this particular design area will be critical in the event
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of malfunction, the final design will be as close to fail-safe as is
feasible. And, because of the myriad parameters which affect the
idea1 positioning of both the inlet duct and the exhaust nozzle, the
chosen system will be completely automatic. Some organizations
are demanding a manual mode of operation, but due to the severity
of the problem it is felt that with the proper presentation this could
be eliminated as a basic requirement.
In all probability the duct system which is incorporated will be
sensor operated, and will present a certain configuration relative to
the existing airspeed requirements. However, for subsonic regions
of flight, it will probably be the crew's responsibility to actuate the
duct system configuration for one optimum subsonic regime. Then,
upon approaching the transonic regime, the automatic mode of the
duct system configuration system will be actuated. Once this is per-
formed, the crew's role will be one of monitoring.
Feasible Manual Implementation Concepts for SST
If demands become great enough there will probably be a manual
means for varying the inlet duct configuration. However, it appears
that this will be an emergency back-up system to alleviate danger to
the aircraft. If the automatic mode were to malfunction, the manual
positioning might be utilized to reconfigure the aircraft for subsonic
flight.
In the event of a malfunction with a resulting inlet unstart it will
be the responsibility of the crew to change the attitude of the aircraft
and manually vary the inlet capture area so as to recapture the optimum
shock wave pattern, and eliminate any compressor stalls. A significant
characteristic of this supersonic inlet will be its airflow relationship.
Unlike a subsonic inlet, the airflow of an efficient supersonic inlet must
be held to one specific value for a particular flight altitude and speed.
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Deviations of the airflow from this discrete value generally lead to
catastrophic results like shock expulsion or swallowing, both of which
result in a violent reduction in engine performance.
For normal operations there does not appear to be manual concept
which is feasible.
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6.2 FUNCTION 6.2 DUCT SYSTEM CONFIGURATION FOR
TRANSITION TO CRUISE
Purpose
This function is to insure that the inlet duct system is matched to
the engine airflow requirements, and that the area of the exhaust nozzle
is regulated to obtain the most advantageous gas expansion and minimize
drag losses.
Since it has ,been accepted that the configuring of the duct system
will be primarily an automatic function, the main reason for calling this
out on the flow diagram is to indicate the requirement for such a function,
and to indicate what consequences might result if a malfunction occurred
in this performance. As was previously stated, once the automatic mode
of the system has been actuated, the main responsibility of the crew will
be to monitor the performance and to take those steps available to insure
that performance is held within normal operating limits. It might be well
at this point to indicate that with such an automatic mode of operation,
most of these monitoring tasks will be handled by the flight management
function. Any decisions concerning the manual manipulation of the duct
system configuring would be part of the flight management function. The
actual performance would be within the inlet nozzle configuration opera-
tions function.
The main task of the crew in such a highly automated system is to
act as a monitor. Although most of the systems envisioned will provide
a manual back-up to the automated system, the complexity and sophisti-
cation of the SST will probably make it almost impossible for the crew
to function economically in the manual mode. The manual back-up will
give the passengers and crew a safety factor. In most instances the mal-
functioning of an automated mode of a major subsystem will require either
an aborted flight or a diversion to an alternate for repairs. With this idea
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in mind it can be seen that this establishes a very strict requirement on
the proven reliability of the major subsystems.
Since the positioning of the shock wave to obtain the required air-
flow is sensitive to attitude changes, the transition to cruise will influ-
ence the operation of the automatic system. The automatic concept
should be able to handle this performance, but it is still an area of con-
cern to the crew.
Current Jet Operational Requirements and Constraints
There are no current applicable functions.
Current Jet Implementation Concepts
There are none applicable.
SST Potential Operational Requirements and Constraints
The requirements are the same as described in Function 6. 1. For
this particular phase of the flight, the major area of concern will be the
change of attitude which could possibly disrupt the operation of the auto-
matic system. The system chosen must be able to cope with these vari-
ables.
Feasible Automated Implementation Concepts for SST
A sensitive automatic system will be utilized to maintain the con-
figuration of the inlet duct such that acceptable airflow is presented to
the engine compressor. The mechanism should be such that the intake
will be matched to the engine when operating at full thrust. The position
of the variable geometry intake will be controlled solely by the Mach
number of the aircraft. A closed-loop system will be used in which the
actual position of the variable surfaces is compared to the pre-determined
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position appropriate to the given Mach number. If the system senses
any differences between these positions an error-signal is sent to the
control and jacks move the surfaces until the error signal is zero.
The involvement of the crew will be as described in Function 6. 1.
Feasible Manual Implementation Concepts for SST
As pointed out in the activity description and in Function 6. 1, the
main function of the manual manipulation of the inlet duct geometry
would be to maintain safety. More than likely, the manual mode of the
duct system configuring will consist of an integrated flight control-
capture area performance. Instrumentation will probably be provided
which will indicate the optimum position of the shock wave pattern for
any desired Mach speed. The means will probably consist of a position-
ing lever which will manually (hydraulically actuated} position the appa-
ratus to vary the inlet capture area and allow focusing of the shock wave
pattern.
It must be repeated that although a manual means will be available
to the crew, this will not give them the capability to operate effectively
throughout the entire profile. The manual mode gives the crew a means
for reducing possible engine damage, and allows them to return to sub-
sonic operations.
398
6. 3 FUNCTION 6. 3 DUCT SYSTEM RECONFIGURED AS REQUIRED;
CRUISE PHASE
Purpose
This function is to insure the maintenance of low velocity, high
potential energy airflow to the engines, and the controlled expansion
of the exhaust gases. As was previously stated, the constant recon-
figuring of the inlet duct capture area. and the associated exhaust
nozzle will, in all likelihood, be a completely automatic function.
As such, the performance required by the crew of the SST will be
the same as that found in all of the inlet nozzle configuration opera-
tions functional descriptions (see Function 6. I}.
Current Jet Operational Requirements and Constraints
There are no current functions which are comparable.
Current Jet Implementation Concepts
As stated in previous functional descriptions,
of concern with current subsonic carriers.
this is not an area
SST Potential Operational Requirements and Constraints
The parameters which will be changing with the different phases
of the profile include altitude, dynamic pressure, temperature, and
Mach speed. These all affect the ultimate position of the duct system
configuration, and need to be analyzed to maintain the appropriate posi-
tion.
Any malfunction of the system in this phase of the flight will intro-
duce procedures which may be characteristic of only this area of the
flight. This analysis will be presented in another section and will show
the relationship of the various systems and the amount of crew involvement
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associated with the various malfunctions. During the cruise phase of the
flight the environment will be the most adverse, and aircraft performance
will be approaching the limits of the maximum performance envelope.
This seems to indicate that any malfunction occurring at this time would,
in all likelihood, introduce the severest constraints into the system.
Feasible Automated Implementation Concepts for SST
The means for insuring this performance will be identical, as will
the performance required, as that described in Function 6. i. An auto-
matic system seems to be the only solution to efficient and practical oper-
ation in this speed regime. As with most automatic systems the amount
of crew involvement with monitoring tasks will be dependent upon the cri-
ticality of the phase and the reliability of the system.
Feasible Manual Implementation Concepts for SST
The manual implementation concept is only discussed as a possible
emergency back-up to the automatic system. The crew's role and involve-
ment will be primarily as discussed throughout Function 6. 1. As stated
previously there is no manual concept feasible for accomplishing a con-
tinuing, acceptable performance.
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6.4 FUNCTION 6. 4 DUCT SYSTEM CONFIGURATION FOR SUPERSONIC
DESCENT / DECELERATION OPERATIONS
Purpose
This function is identical to the inlet nozzle configuration functions
in other phases of flight; that is, insuring that the inlet duct configuration
reduces the axial velocity of the inlet airflow to an acceptable compressor
speed, a,d ..... the configuration of *_".... _-.... * .... 1,_ • ,,,,÷;,.,,_,o,_ _,_
reduce drag and uncontrolled gas expansion losses. While operating in
the supersonic regime it is essential that the power plant system be pro-
vided with low velocity, high energy airflow.
The descent phase will be characterized by rapid changes in those
parameters which affect the positioning of the duct system capture area.
It must be remembered that in anticipating the problems associated with
inlet duct systems first consideration must be given to magnitude of the
problems that must be resolved by the system. To maintain an airflow
at a degree of constancy acceptable to the engine, the duct must interpose
its airflow control function between the engine and all external conditions
affecting airflow. When the aircraft speed is supersonic there will neces-
sarily be a shock wave or system of shock waves in the duct. For best
pressure recovery it is desirable that the shock wave pattern be carefully
regulated. Atmospheric and aircraft variables, such as temperature,
turbulence, airspeed, pitch, and yaw tend to disturb the shock wave
pattern. The control system should detect such disturbances and accom-
modate them.
As in the other functions dealing with the reconfiguring of the inlet/
exhaust systems, the crew's main function will be to act as monitors, and
to provide the back-up performance which would be necessary in the event
of a malfunction. However, because of its criticality, it is not anticipated
that the automatic inlet/exhaust systems would be accepted until reliabil-
ity studies have proven their fail-safe capabilities.
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Current Jet Operational Requirements and Constraints
There is no comparable function in current aircraft.
Current .Tpt__. !mp!eme _-+_*=^-,,_v,iConcepts
As pointed out previously this is not an area of concern in sub-
sonic aircraft.
SST Potential Operational Requirements and Constraints
While the SST is operating in the supersonic speed regime there
will be a continual requirement for matching of the inlet airflow to the
requirements of the engine, and for controlling the expansion of the
high energy exhaust gases into the ambient air stream. Off performance
in either of these areas could result in marked deficiencies in power
output and make the SST economically unfeasible.
As the aircraft commences the supersonic descent, attitude
changes and changes in atmospheric conditions influence the inlet duct
configuring mechanism. These parameter changes must be within the
operating capabilities of the system.
Feasible Automated Implementation Concepts for SST
An automatic system responsive to many sensors would provide
the means for maintaining the optimum inlet duct and exhaust nozzle
configurations. The crew's role would be to monitor the performance.
Since the automatic system will have to be a fail-safe system the mon-
itoring function will be very limited.
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Feasible Manual Implementation Concepts for SST
As has been discussed in all the previous functional descriptions
pertaining to the inlet duct and exhaust nozzle, the only reason for a
manual mode would be as an emergency back-up. If a malfunction of
the systems were to occur during supersonic flight the crew would
require some means for maintaining system integrity as the aircraft
is decelerated to the subsonic regime. Most experts agree that a mal-
functioning of these particular systems will terminate supersonic oper-
ations. Thus, a decision to continue to the planned desLiK,ation implies
continuing subsonically.
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6. 5 FUNCTION 6. 5 DUCT SYSTEM CONFIGURATION FOR
TRANSONIC DECELERATION/DESCENT
Purpose
Except for the phase of flight and the values of parameters, the
performance required in this function will be essentially the same as
that for Functions 6. 1, 6. 2, 6.3 and 6.4. The automatic system will
be able to handle all of those parametric values which will be encoun-
tered and reconfigure the duct/exhaust system accordingly. If for
some reason the automatic mode is unable to analyze the varying par-
ameters effectively, the crew will have to be able to make the neces-
sary rough settings to maintain a safe system.
Current Jet Operational Requirements and Constraints
There is no comparable function in current aircraft.
Current Jet Implementation Concepts
This area of performance is not a requirement in subsonic oper-
ations, but is characteristic of supersonic flight.
SST Potential Operational Requirement and Constraints
During the transonic deceleration and descent the sensors feeding
data into the comparator for the automatic reconfiguring mechanism will
be recording rapid changes in the critical parameters. The system
must be able to handle these rapid parametric changes and continue
to supply low velocity airflow to the power plants. The system will
need to be able to cope with any adverse yaw which might result from
the loss of an engine.
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Feasible Automated Implementation Concepts for SST
Automatic reconfiguring of the inlet duct positions the incoming
shock wave, and causes a series of reflected shock waves. The last
of these is diffused and then accepted by the engine compressor. The
crew's chief concern will be to ascertain that the engine is receiving
adequate airflow. Instrumentation will in all likelihood be provided
to show the position of the initial shock wave relative to its optimum
position.
Feasible Manual Implementation Concepts for SST
Feasible concepts which would produce the same performance as
the automatic concept do not seem likely. Too many parameters are
involved and most of these are highly variable. However, for the sake
of safety a method of roughly positioning the shock wave while attempting
to decelerate to subsonic speeds is well within the crew's capability.
4o5
6.6 FUNCTION 6.6 DUCT SYSTEM RECONFIGURATION FOR
SUBSONIC OPERATIONS
Purpose
This function is to deactivate the automatic mode of operation of
the inlet duct/exhaust nozzle reconfiguration system, and to lock it in
its optimum subsonic position. Once the SST decelerates through the
sonic barrier, the requirement for furnishing low velocity, high poten-
tial energy airflow to the engine will no longer exist. As a result the
inlet configuration which optimizes the power plant performance in the
subsonic regime should be chosen.
Since up to this point the crew's main function is to act as a
monitor of the automatic system, it can be expected that once the air-
flow requirement has been eliminated and the inlet configuration set
for its optimum subsonic capture operations, the crew's responsibility
will also be eliminated. However, as was pointed out, the crew will
probably have the responsibility to switch the system from the automatic
mode to the off mode. Once this is accomplished and the duct system
is configured for subsonic flight, the crew's responsibility will cease.
Current Jet Operational Requirements and Constraints
There are no comparable functions in current aircraft.
Current Jet Implementation Concepts
As was discussed previously, current subsonic carriers have no
control over the configuring of the inlet duct geometry or the exhaust
nozzle system.
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SST Potential Operational Requirements and Constraints
Designers are being pushed to develop two engines in one; one
for supersonic and one for subsonic operations. This is best accom-
plished by matching the engine and its airflow requirements through
use of the inlet duct geometry. Once the SST is out of the sonic speed
area, and is operating in the subsonic speed regime, the inlet duct
system must be optimized for this area of operation.
Feasible Automated Implementation Concepts for SST
Once the aircraft has passed into the subsonic speed range, the
automatic inlet duct configuring mechanism will, or at least should be,
at the maximum airflow position consistent with subsonic operations.
The crew's task is then to deactivate the automatic system to maintain
this last position.
Feasible Manual Implementation Concepts for SST
In the event of an emergency in the supersonic portion of the flight,
the crew would have the manual capability to roughly position the shock
wave so as to lessen the possibility of damage to the aircraft while
decelerating to subsonic speed. Once in that speed area they would be
able to manually select the optimum subsonic inlet duct geometry. The
crew's responsibility would be to insure that the duct system configura-
tion was consistent with the speed of the aircraft.
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ACTIVITY 7.0 NAVIGATION
PURPOSE
The purpose of the navigation activity may be viewed as having two
primary aspects: (1) conflict avoidance which ensures safety in operation,
and (2) getting from the origin point to the destination within some accept-
able error limits.
Many parameters affecting navigation stem from either or both of
these aspects, since they are not mutually exclusive. The navigation
system and navigational accuracy must be such that the operating require-
ments and constraints associated with both safety and economical airline
operation can be adequately met.
Any and all parameters generally associated with the navigation
activity can usually be associated with one of two basic requirements
listed above, and in many cases with both. For example, the lateral
error component in a navigation system can be described in terms of
nautical miles displacement from desired track, circular error at way
point/destination, or probability of violating assigned air space, depend-
ing on the purpose for defining the lateral errors. In any case, lateral
errors are associated with both aspects of the basic navigation problem;
it is necessary to remain within some tolerable distance from the track
to ensure that airline economies are not unduely affected by fuel penalties
or schedule degradation, and to minimize the probability of collision.
It is sufficient to say that the purpose of the SST navigation activity will
be to satisfy these two basic requirements.
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CURRENT JET OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS AND CONSTRAINTS
Some specific regulations which apply to navigation follow:
FAR 91.79, ref. 13:
Minimum safe altitudes; general.
Except when necessary for takeoff or land-
ing, no person may operate an aircraft below
the following_ altitudes:
(a) Anywhere. An altitude allowing, if a
power unit fails, an emergency landing with-
out undue hazard to persons or property on
the surface.
(b) Over congested areas. Over any con-
gested area of a city, town, or settlement, or
over any open air assembly of persons, an
altitude of 1,000 feet above the highest obstacle
within a horizontal radius of 2,000 feet of the
aircraft.
(c) Over other than congested areas. An
altitude of 500 feet above the surface, except
over open water or sparsely populated areas.
In that case, the aircraft may not be operated
closer than 500 feet to any person, vessel, ve-
hicle, or structure.
FAR 91.97, reL 13:
Positive control areas and route segments.
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b)
of this section, no person may operate an air-
craft within a positive control area or positive
control route segment, designated in Part, 71
of this chapter, unless that aircraft is-
(l) Operated under IFR at a specific
altitude assigned by ATC;
(2) Equipped with instruments and equip-
ment required for IFR operations and is
flown by a pilot rated for instrmnent flight;
and
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(3) In the case of a positive control area,
equipped with-
(i) A coded radar beacon transponder,
having a Mode A (military Mode 3) 64
code capability, replying to Mode 3/A in-
terrogation with the code specified by
ATC ; and
(ii) A radio providing direct pilot/con-
troller communication on the frequency
specified by ATC for the area concerned.
(b) ATC may authorize deviations from
the requirements of paragraph (a) of this
section for operation in a positive control area.
In the case of in-fight failure of a radar
beacon transponder, ATC may immediately
approve operation within a positive control
area. In all other cases, requests for an author-
ization to deviate must be submitted at least
four days before the proposed operation, in
writing, to the ATC center having jurisdiction
over the positive control area concerned. ATC
may authorize deviations on a continuing basis
or for an individual flight, as appropriate.
FAR 91.99, ref. 13:
Jet advisory areas.
(a) No person may operate an aircraft
within a radar jet advisory area designated in
Part 75 [New] of this chapter unless-
(l) That aircraft is operated under IFR
at a specific altitude assigned by ATC; or
(2) If the aircraft is not so operated
and-
(i) That aircraft is equipped with a
functioning coded radar beacon trans-
ponder having a Mode A (military Mode
3) 64 code capability, that transponder is
operated to reply to Mode 3/A interroga-
tion with the code specified by ATC;
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(ii) If that aircraft is not so equipped,
it is operated under specific authorization
from ATC; or
(iii) If radio failure prevents the re-
ceiving of that authorization, he maintains
an appropriate VFR cruising flight level.
(b) No person may pilot an aircraft within
a nonradar jet advisory area designated in
Part 75 [New] of this chapter unless that
aircraft is operated under_
(1) IFR at a specific altitude assigned by
ATC; or
(2) Specifi '" " -:-- _-^-- ,_,r,C aUEIlOrlZa_lUlt J_luu. zx.L _j.
FAR 121. 121, ref. 11:
En route navigational facilities.
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b)
of this _ion, no supplemental air carrier or
commercial operator may conduct any opera-
tion over a route unless nonvisual ground aids
are-
(l) Ava'flable over the route for navigat-
ing airplanes within the degree of accuracy
required for ATC; and
(2) Located to allow navigatian to any
airport of destination, or altern_ airport,
wiOhin the degree of accuracy necessary for
the operation involved.
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FAR 121. 349, ref. 11:
Radio equipment for operations under VFR over routes not
navigated by pilotage or for operations under IFR
or over-the-top.
taj No person may operate an airplune
under VFR over mutes that cannot be navi-
gated by pilotage or for operations conducted
under IFR or over-the-top, unless the airplane
is equipped with that radio equipment neces-
sary under normal operating conditions to ful-
fill the functions specified in § 121.347(a) and
t_ receive satisfactorily by either of two in-
dependent systems, radio navigational signals
from all primary en route and approach navi-
gational facilities intended to be used. How-
ever, only one marker beacon receiver provid-
ing visual and aural signals and one ILS re-
ceiver need be provided. Equipment provided
to receive signals ell route may be used to
•receive signals on approach, if it is capable of
receiving both signals.
(b) In the case of operation over routes on
which navigation is based on low frequency
radio range or automatic direction finding, only
one low frequency radio range or ADF re-
ceiver need be installed if the airplane is
equipped with two VOR receivers, and VOR
navigational aids are so located and the air-
plane is so fueled that, in the case of failure of
the low frequency radio range receiver or
ADF receiver, the flight may proceed safely to
a suitable airport, by means of VOR aids, and
complete an instrument approach by use of the
remaining airplane radio system.
(c) Whenever VOR navigational receivers
are required by paragraph (a) or (b) of this
section, at least one approved distance measur-
ing equipment unit (DME), capable of receiv-
ing and indicating distance information from
VORTAC facilities, must be installed on each
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airplane when operated witl_in the 48 con-
tiguous States and the District of Columbia at
and above 24,000 feet, MS_ and must be in-
stalled on each of the foll6wing airplanes, re-
gardless of the altitude flown, when operating
within the 48 contiguous States and the Dis-
trict of Columbia after the indicated dates:
(1) Turbojet airplanes--June 30, 1963.
(2) Turboprop airplanes--December 31,
1963.
(3) Pressurized reciproeating engine air-
planes--June 30, 1964.
(4) Other large airplanes--February 28,
1966.
(d) if the di_'ice m_..s'aring equipment
(DME) becomes inoperative en route, the pilot
shall notify ATC of that failure as soon as it
OCCURS.
FAR 121. 355, ref. II:
Equipment for operations on which specialized means of
navigation are required: flag and supplemental air
carriers and commercial operators.
No flag or supplemental air carrier or com-
mercial operator may conduct an operation for
which specialized means of navigation are re-
quired unless it sho_s that adeqaate anborne
equipment is provided for the specialized navi-
gution authorized for the particular route to be
operated.
4i3
ICAO Reg. 5. 1.2, ref. 14:
Minimum heights.
Except when necessary fc, r take-off or
landing, or except when specifically au-
thorized by the appropriate anthnrity, air-
craft shall be flown at a height of at least
300 metres (1,000 feet) above the highest
obstacle located within 8 km (5 miles)
of the estimated position of the aircraft
in flight.
ICAOReg. 5. 3. 1.2.2. 1,
Inadvertent changes.
5.3.1.2.2.1 In the event that an air-
craft inadvertently deviates from its cur-
rent flight plan, the following action
shall be taken :
I) Deviation from track: if the air-
craft is off track, action shall be taken
forthwith to adjust the heading of the
aircraft to regain track as soon as
practicable.
ref. 14:
Additional navigation system requirements for current jets include:
lo The capability to detect the presence of hazardous
weather in the flight path and the means to arrange
to avoid such weather phenomena.
e The capability to ascertain the necessity for diver-
sion to an alternate destination, as well as the cap-
ability to make the decision to divert. (NeCessity
in this case is limited to those factors directly
associated with navigation, e. g., landing conditions
at the destination, or fuel remaining, etc. )
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The capability to assess the navigational situation,
and those parameters affecting it, and to optimize
the flight path accordingly.
The capability to provide clear, precise information
display of the navigational situation so that the crew
is capable of staying ahead of the aircraft at any
time during a flight.
CURRENT JET IMPLEMENTATION CONCEPTS
The navigation systems employed on current subsonic jets will
vary in implementation as a function both of the routes over which the
aircraft is employed, and the availability of ground-based navigational
aids along those routes.
Generally, the system must be considered as "bi-functional" in
that it must provide for terminal area navigation and enroute naviga-
tion, and, as Greenaway (ref. 49) has stated, "... there is no one
system common to both enroute and terminal navigation. " This may
not be entirely true since domestic carriers within the U.S. employ
VOR/DME as the basic aid for both terminal area and enroute airways
navigation. However, the statement certainly applies to navigation
along the majority of transoceanic and intercontinental routes. Departure
may be via VOR/DME, enroute via self-contained doppler radar with
LORAN A updating, and approach via ADF. The navigation system
employed and procedures utilized vary from airline to airline depend-
ing upon the particular needs of the airline, and as Powell and Willis
(ref. 50) suggest, "There are as many navigation procedures being
followed today as there are operators, probably more. "
To add to the diversity of navigational procedures, there is some
variety in the human element which includes specialist navigators,
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pilot-navigators, and to coin a phrase, "cockpit navigators. " It can be
seen that the concepts for accomplishing the navigational activity are
highly variable and cannot be accurately and inclusively described here.
The discussions which follow attempt to depict typical implementation
concepts for both terminal area navigation systems and enroute naviga-
tion systems.
Terminal Area. Terminal area navigation is generally accom-
plished by utilizing short-range, point-source navaids such as VOR/
DME, ADF, and LM/F radio ranges, for obtaining range and azimuth,
and thereby ascertaining position and determining course to steer com-
mensurate with the ATC controller's clearance. The controller's clearance
may be in terms of altitude changes, headings or holding requirements
on a real-time basis as the aircraft is radar followed during ascent or
descent; or such clearance may be in placard form in the case of stand-
ard instrument approaches and departures. In any event, the aircraft
is under positive radar control within the terminal areas. The naviga-
tion situation is inferred from standard instruments, such as the VOR/
DME readouts and the flight director, and correlated with the clearance
by checking the data with the approach chart (or placard). Airports cer-
tified to accept commercial jet traffic are equipped with ILS which is
the primary navigation aid for landings under IFR minimum conditions.
The airborne components of this system include the localizer and glide
slope receiver which provide azimuth and height information, respec-
tively. Range data is provided by marker-beacon receivers or Distance
Measuring Equipment (DME). There are other aids to landing under
IFR minimums which can be considered to be navaids, such as high-
intensity runway end lights. Moreover, there are imminent all-weather
landing systems which will permit significant reductions to the current
IFR minimums. These systems will be basically extensions of the cur-
rent ILS systems as far as navigational data are concerned. The airborne
component will still track the ILS localizer for azimuth control, and the
glide-slope receiver will be used for altitude data down to a given altitude
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at which point radar altimetry is to be employed. It appears that com-
plete automation may be feasible by tying navigational inputs directly
into auto-pilot and auto-throttle systems such that the aircraft is actually
navigated and altitude-speed controlled throughout the landing task includ-
ing decrab, flare, and touchdown. In any event, provisions will be made
for presenting the navigational data (i. e., range, azimuth, height, rate-
of-descent, data relative to the runway) by means of cockpit instrumen-
tation.
It is recognized that many airports (particularly outside the U. S. )
currently accepting commercial jet traffic are not equipped with oper-
ational ILS systems. It is assumed that under these conditions either
local traffic control applies, and/or airline procedures are such that
VFR or IVFR conditions must prevail for the aircraft to descend for
landing.
Enroute. Generally, there are two components of enroute naviga-
tion, (i. e., dead reckoning (DR), and position-fixing). Current imple-
mentation of DR in the subsonic jets ranges from various manually applied
techniques for DR to a semi-automatic DR system such as doppler radar.
The manual techniques are too numerous to describe. It is sufficient to
say that the use of manual DR techniques is essentially a full-time job
and requires specialized skills and knowledge which are generally ac-
quired through specific training programs. Furthermore, airlines em-
ploying such techniques provide a crew member with the necessary skills
for the job, as well as a special station on the cockpit deck for navigation
purposes. Moreover, some airlines retain this station and the crew mem-
ber even with a semi-automatic DR device installation. In view of the
high diversity in concepts in this area, the following paragraphs will
briefly describe three typical implementation concepts; enroute cockpit
navigation, enroute transoceanic navigation with manual DR, and enroute
transoceanic navigation with semi-automatic DR.
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1. Enroute Cockpit Navigation. For purposes of this discussion,
this concept is limited to enroute navigation within the United States.
Today's commercial jets navigate the airways using some of the same
basic tools utilized in the terminal areas. Airways are volumetric air
space over some ground track generally ex_ending between two standard
ground navaids, or passing through radial intersections from standard
ground navaids. These airways are clearly defined on charts, and within
the U.S. the subsonic jets are given their clearances in terms of num-
bered airways and altitudes. Azimuth and fix data are obtained from
bearing data readout directly in the cockpit which may then be correlated
to the appropriate navigation charts. Slant range to the monitored station
is also read out directly in the cockpit, and may be translated into distance-
to-go to a way point or the destination, depending upon the station being
monitored. Deviations from desired course are also directly read out in
the cockpit. The availability of such ground navaids (and airborne com-
ponents) within the United States has completely alleviated the require-
ment for specialized navigational techniques, such as dead reckoning in
the more sophisticated sense, or celestial position fixing. In addition,
all commercial subsonic jets are radar followed throughout their flights
by ATC which permits ground vectoring for collision avoidance. The
crew role is primarily one of navigation receiver channel switching as
appropriate, ground station identification, information readout from cock-
pit instrumentation, and correlation of the displayed information to appro-
priate navigation charts. There are no highly complex and specialized
skills involved, and the availability of this ground/airborne system per-
mits cockpit navigation by pilot/copilot personnel, and consequently,
specialist navigators or pilot/navigators are not required as a part of
the crew complement. The navigator's station has been deleted from
many cockpit deck configurations as a result.
2. Enroute Transoceanic (or Intercontinental) Navigation with
Manual DR. The limiting factor in employing the system described above
is an appropriate number and spacing of ground stations. Even with long
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range ground navaid stations, there are many routes being flown which
afford little, if any, effective radio coverage. As a result, the more
conventional navigation techniques are employed by the carriers. A
typical example would be manual dead reckoning employing grid navi-
gation techniques and utilizing pressure patterns for track keeping accur-
acy. The DR position is updated as regularly as is both practical and
possible by obtaining position fixes from external reference sources
such as long range hyperbolic systems (e. g., LORAN A) or celestial
f_es. Utilization of these techniques is essentially a full-time job and
requires one crew member. Moreover, the skills and knowledge involved
in this method of navigation are sufficiently complex and specialized that
the crew member must be certified competent to perform the tasks.
These skills are generally attained through specialized training programs.
When these techniques are employed by the carrier, it is necessary to
provide one crew member solely for the navigation task, and a crew
member's station on the cockpit deck properly instrumented for facili-
tating task performance.
3. Enroute Transoceanic (or Intercontinental) Navigation with
Semi-Automatic DR. As the speed and overall number of aircraft have
continuously increased, the result has been a rather severe compression
of time to perform the navigational task, along with a need for navigational
accuracy. These requirements have necessitated and motivated the evolu-
tion of the semi-automatic dead reckoning navigation system. Although
military aircraft employ several types of such systems, there is cur-
rently only one used in commercial jet aviation, (L e., the doppler radar
DR system). It should be pointed out, however, that certification of an
inertial DR system appears to be imminent. The impact on crew role
and complement is not expected to be significantly different regardless
of which of the two systems is employed.
The major impact of the advent of semi-automatic DR systems has
been the resultant change in crew complement and re-distribution of the
navigation task. Airline operators employing these systems distribute
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the navigational workload between the pilot and copilot and apparently
have been able to demonstrate navigational accuracy sufficient to prompt
certification for reducing the total crew complement by one member,
(i. e., the specialist navigator and/or pilot navigator).
Regardless of the hardware involved in the doppler radar system
and the inertial navigator system, the semi-automatic DR systems are
very similar in terms of their underlying operational concepts. Oper-
ational concept here is defined only in terms of the goals and objectives
of the installation_ and not in terms of how the equipment is operated
externally or how it operates internally. Both systems are the result
of a need to automate highly repetitive tasks, where task performance
time is increasingly compressed and significant portions of the perfor-
mance involve high speed computation, high speed data manipulation,
and other functions which are highly amenable to automation and highly
susceptible to human error when performance time is a constraint.
The semi-automatic DR system is designed to provide continuous
cockpit presentation of the aircraft's position either in earth coordinates,
or in terms of error components relative to where the aircraft should be.
The system is designed to provide this data independent of any external
data source. The aircraft crew then has a continuous referent to deter-
mine the correctness of aircraft directional movement and provide appro-
priate steering commands. Such systems, at least to date, are subject
to various types of errors, some systematic and cumulative in nature,
and some random in nature. As a result, it is present operational pro-
cedure to update such systems periodically based on information derived
from external sources (e. g., LORAN, celestial fixes, etc. ). However,
updating is being predicated to an increasing degree on ground-based
external radio aids to navigation. This appears to be due primarily to
the fact that the classic navigational techniques require highly specialized
skills and knowledge generally available only in specialist navigator or
pilot/navigator personnel, and these crew members are being eliminated
in favor of cockpit navigation.
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To provide reliability, it is general procedure to utilize dual
installations of the DR systems. Techniques for resolving differences
between the two systems are based upon crew judgments. That is to
say, a divergence between data readouts from the two installations
when indications are that both systems are in proper operating condi-
tion may be averaged if the divergence does not exceed some specified
magnitude, and the average data is considered the best estimate of
present position. This may be improved by an updating fix from external
sources. Obviously, a position fix from an external source can be uti-
lized to decide which installation is more nearly correct, and the second,
or more errant system can be brought back in line. Another method is
to examine readouts from both systems more or less logically on the
basis of such information as approximate distances traveled from last
good position fix and aircraft heading. This, of course, is conventional
or manual dead reckoning.
Differences between the two systems which are difficult or impos-
sible to resolve may force the crew to resort to other navigational tech-
niques which are diverse and depend upon the crew complement. For
example, the absence of navigator skills for celestial navigation and the
absence of equipment for and/or available effective coverage for obtain-
ing ground radio fixes, may force the crew to utilize rather crude dead
reckoning as the navigation means. Conversely, the availability of the
navigator skills permits the use of celestial techniques and/or more
sophisticated dead reckoning techniques. The availability of airborne
equipment and effective coverage, permits navigation by means of
position-fixing techniques utilizing externally referenced sources.
A more detailed discussion of these systems, and of the total
navigation task, is provided under the descriptions of the individual
functions in subsequent sections. In summary, the following conclusions
may be drawn:
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The choice of the navigation system for the subsonic jets
is influenced by many factors, some of which are involved
in individual airline operator needs, requirements, desires,
etc., and there is presently no standard system in use.
There is some apparent divergence of opinion as to the
required crew complement and composition on the flight
deck of today's subsonic jets, and as a result there is no
standard crew complement/composition for the navigation
task.
SST POTENTIAL OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS AND CONSTRAINTS
Estimates of the SST navigational system requirements range widely
from relatively simple to highly complex requirements. The full scope
of requirements for the navigational system must await the outcome of
several basic research programs examining problem areas for which
available data are inadequate and inconclusive. Our analysis proceeded
on the basis that problem areas would be researched and implementable
resolutions found. Moreover, it was assumed that this effort could
indicate potentially fruitful empirical research av.enues by defining an
optimum set of requirements and implementation concepts based on
opinions of some navigation experts.
It seems apparent that the absence of standards with respect to
present systems, procedures, and crew complement and composition
on today's subsonic jets, is a significant contributor to the divergence
in expert opinion regarding an optimum navigation system for the SST.
Probably the most significant indicator of this divergence is evident in
the broad range of means covered in the literature which reflect poten-
tial SST navigation systems. It must be concluded that a similar con-
tinuum exists with regards to the requirements for SST navigation.
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In this study, a combination of present-day navigation requirements were
analyzed along with stated problem areas of the SST which either directly
or indirectly affect navigation, or are affected by navigation. From this
analysis, the SST navigation system requirements have been extrapolated
and discussed with a view toward optimizing the system in terms of per-
formance only. Such real-world practical matters as cost analysis and
trade-off were not considered.
Summarily, navigation requirements are similar to those of sub-
sonic jets. A major exception in functional requirements is the treatment
of sonic boom phenomena. Navigation in the vertical plane could be con-
sidered a major exception except for the fact that it is also apparently
regarded as highly desirable for the subsonics. All of the remaining
functional requirements of the navigation system which were identified
and treated by this analysis are, to some extent, requirements for pres-
ent operations. The paramount difference lies in the accuracy require-
ments with which the SST system must adequately cope, along with the
constraints of severe time compression and economic penalties for less
than optimum aircraft performance. The impact of increased accuracy,
compressed time, economic penalties, and treatment of sonic boom, is
given individual treatment in each appropriate function description where
the function is obviously affected.
FEASIBLE AUTOMATED IMPLEMENTATION CONCEPTS FOR SST
Basically, all of the implementation concepts depicting a potential
automatic navigation system for the SST, which came under the purview
of this analysis, may be discussed conceptually as one concept, or one
typical system. Potential candidates for performing a given function are
discussed under the individual function descriptions. The following par-
agraphs represent an extrapolation of a typical automatic navigation
system based on the role of each major system component.
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Fundamentally, the system is divided into four major components:
.
2.
3.
4.
The primary navigation sensor
The secondary, or back-up, system
The navigation computer
The navigation situation display
The primary navigation sensor (duplex or triplex installation) will
provide the necessary data for continuous calculation of present position.
This system will either be an inertial system, a doppler radar system,
or some marriage of these two designed to minimize the weaknesses of
each system, or to perform in a complementary manner. The secondary,
or back-up system, will provide the necessary data for updating the infor-
mation being generated by the primary sensor. The purpose being served
is the minimization of cumulative error, and a check against insiduous
and/or blunder errors. The navigation computer will accept the inputs
of the primary sensor, the secondary system, and coupled with stored
information regarding the flight path, real-time information concerning
weather parameters and atmospheric conditions, fuel consumption data,
and a host of other parameters concerning the overall aircraft situation,
will generate an optimum flight profile, off-profile error components in
three-dimensional terms, and the required data to define the navigation
situation on a continuous basis. The navigation situation display will pro-
vide continuous cockpit presentation of the optimum flight profile, updated
aircraft present position, and other parameters describing the flight's
program and situation, in terms required by the flight management acti-
vity for assessing the navigation situation and staying ahead of the aircraft.
This system will be a fully integrated, automatic navigation system
with provisions for system monitoring, manual data entry, and manual
override. It will provide data suitable for display in the cockpit, and
provide required data in a form and format suitable for transmission to
appropriate ground stations via an automatic data link system. The
navigation computer will either be a central navigation computer, probably
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incorporating both analog and digital features into some specialized
hybrid form, or it will be a part of a central electronic management
system. The system would provide for direct tie-in with the flight
control and power plant systems through the flight management system
for automatic piloting and automatic throttling, during all phases of the
flight, including climb-out and acceleration, and descent/deceleration
through automatic all-weather landing.
The role of the crew will be primarily that of system monitor and
back-up. The interface is visualized as the data display in the cockpit.
along with provisions for manual override, data entry, and special data
call-up. Essentially, three kinds of displayed information would be in-
volved, i. e., real-time pictorial display, special call-up data, and fault
detector display. The pictorial display would provide continuous presen-
tation of the real-time navigation situation on a dynamic basis. The
special call-up data display would provide immediate readout of perti-
nent information regarding one parameter or a logical group of param-
eters affecting the situation, e. g., flight plan ETA destination, present
position, time and distance-to-go, predicted ground speed, and how good
is the flight plan ETA. Another example might include fuel remaining
on board, fuel flow rate, predicted fuel reserve over destination and any
prescribed alternates. The third type of display, fault detection, is self-
explanatory. This would be driven by self-check circuitry and a stored
test program which the computer would cycle through periodically to test
the system, while the system is on-line. Provisions for data entry would
include at least the capability for reconfiguring the system, placing the
system in standby but on-line, taking the system completely off-line
(manual override), and entering commands to the navigation system,
such as enroute flight plan changes, diversion action to alternate, and
enter information such as visually observed weather phenomena or
PIREPS monitored in-flight.
It is important to point out that this system description appears to
relegate man's role to that of a monitor, although empirical results
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indicate man's non-suitability for extended monitoring tasks. However,
the appearance is misleading. Man's role in the overall system is visu-
alized as one of managing the flight, and of bringing to bear his evalua-
tive, judgmental, and decision-making capabilities on the overall prob-
lems associated with flight management, which certainly include the
safety and economic aspects of supersonic travel. Consistent with the
flight management concept, the fully integrated, automatic navigation
system is visualized as freeing man from the repetitiveness of relatively
simple intellectual tasks associated with generating navigation data.
Thus, the crew can use the data automatically generated to integrate
with the myriad other pertinent parameters in order that the flight man-
agement activity may appropriately evaluate, assess and manage the
total aircraft as one entity, of which navigation is only a part.
FEASIBLE MANUAL IMPLEMENTATION CONCEPTS FOR SST
It is extremely difficult to visualize anything less than a fully inte-
grated, automatic navigation system for the SST. The requirements for
the SST navigation systems as extrapolated by this analysis, and based on
a thorough literature research along with the gathering of field data,
reflect a workload which seems beyond man's capabilities, if one starts
at the lower-most end of the continuum of means which begins with a
navigator and conventional tools and techniques. The constraints of the
desirable separation minima, the compression of time, and the severity
of economic penalties for less than optimum performance also strengthen
the argument for automatic navigation concepts. The next consideration
is the degree of automation to be provided. This is an area of widely
divergent opinions, and obviously, any assumptions made should be sub-
jected to critical empirical research. This analysis has assumed that
the inclusion of man in the navigation system loop, per se, would be
acceptable only in an emergency situation where either a catastrophic
failure in the navigation system precludes reconfiguring for operating
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in the automatic mode, or the SST must return to the subsonic speed
regime to continue its flight. In either of these instances, there are
ramifications which must be considered.
Considering the first situation, one of the paramount reasons for
automation of the navigation activity is the assumption that the workload
for manual implementation under the assumed constraints is beyond the
capability of man with standard tools and techniques. The loss of the
SST navigation system would make it highly probable that the aircraft
would violate the assigned air space. Th_ fact "_--* ".._1 _,,.1 4-_r_lav
installations of navigation systems are being contemplated is sufficient
evidence of the concern for system reliability. And these efforts to
increase reliability are being contemplated prior to any final judgments
as to crew complement and composition. It is probable that this navi-
gational redundancy concept is based on assumptions that the SST crew
complement will follow the current subsonic jet trend of eliminating the
navigator and navigation position in favor of cockpit navigation. However,
statements to this effect are lacking in the literature. Our analysis has
indicated that if the extrapolated requirements are to be met, redundancy
is justifiable for reliability alone, regardless of the crew composition
and complement, since the performance of the total navigation task does
in fact appear to be unfeasible with conventional techniques. In the event
the total automatic system capability is lost, it would appear to be neces-
sary to revert to subsonic speeds in order that acceptable navigation
standards could be met. At least, some acceptable procedure would
have to be identified to account for the resultant degradation in capabil-
ity to meet navigation requirements. This is obviously an area for empir-
ical simulation research.
If the SST returns to the subsonic speed regime there would appear
to be two major effects, (1) a probability that less stringent separation
minima would permit less accurate navigation, and (2) an extremely sig-
nificant increase in available time to perform navigation activity. Both
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of these conditions are sufficient to justify the manual navigation concept
utilizing techniques in current use on subsonic jet fleets. The adequacy
of manual navigation would be even further enhanced by the deletion of
the sonic boom control requirement.
This analysis has proceeded on the basis of feasibility, rather
than possibility, as far as implementation means are concerned. It
should also be pointed out that there may be functions which the analysis
has identified as navigation functions which may not be considered as
such by other analyses. The decision to place these functions in the
realm of the total navigation task was based on the relative effect of the
associated parameters on the navigation activity. The net effect is to
relegate manual implementation to the concept described above.
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7. 1 FUNCTION 7. 1 MAINTAIN TAKEOFF FLIGHT PATH
Purpos e
The purpose of this function is to provide flight management with
information describing (1) the desired takeoff heading to be followed by
the aircraft such that the execution of the standard instrument departure
(SID) is in accordance with the clearance, and (2) the measurement of
aircraft deviation from the desired heading along with the corrections
required to bring the aircraft back on course.
Current Jet Requirements and Constraints
For purposes of traffic control and conflict avoidance, ATC clears
current jets for takeoff on a specific runway, which generally carries a
number designator derived from the orientation of the runway to magnetic
north. Such clearances consider the weather conditions prevailing at
takeoff time, and the SID which the aircraft utilizes for traffic control
departure from the terminal area. Aircraft are required to maintain
the cleared heading on takeoff until that point specified in their SID for
turns. Some specific regulations follow:
FAR 91.87, ref. 13:
Departures.
(f) Departures. No person may operate an
aircraft taking off from an airport with an
operating control tower except in compliance
with the following:
(1) Each pilot shall comply with any de-
parture procedures established for that air-
port by the F AA.
(2) Unless otherwise required by the de-
parture procedures or applicable distance
from clouds criteria, each pilot of a large
airplane shall climb to an altitude of 1,500
feet above the surface as-rapidly as prac-
ticable.
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ICAO Reg. 3.9.. 6, ref. 14:
Operation on and in the vicinity of an aerodrome.
An aircraft operated on
or in the vicinity of an aerodrome shall,
whether or not within an aerodrome
traffic zone :
a) observe other aerodrome traffic
for the purpose of avoiding collision;
b) conform with or avoid the pattern
of traffic formed by other aircraft in
operation;
c) make all turns to the left. when
approaching for a landing and after
taking off, unless otherwise instructed;
d) land and take off into the wind
unless safety or air traffic considera-
tions determine that a different direc-
tion is preferable.
Current Jet Implementation Concepts
Current jets are equipped with flight director type displays (see
Figure 32 in Activity 5). The initial course to fly (in this case desig-
nated by the runway orientation) may be dialed into the flight director
manually. When the aircraft is lined up at the end of the runway ready
for takeoff, the pointer is lined up and indicates the heading of the run-
way. As the aircraft moves along the runway and becomes airborne,
itbecomes subject to the prevailing winds which may cause drift. Since
the flight director displays the aircraft's position relative to the desired
track, the pilot can determine how far off the desired track the aircraft
has drifted and the heading of the aircraft relative to the desired course.
This information allows the pilot to judge the amount of correction neces-
sary and the direction in which the correction should be applied. Air-
craft response is visible by means of the display which enables the pilot
to modify any over-correction and maintain the required path.
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SST Potential Operational Requirements and Constraints
There are no indications in the literature that the SST require-
ments for maintaining the takeoff flight path will differ from current
subsonic jets requirements. During this portion of the flight, the SST
will be in the subsonic speed regime, and while it will be operating at
considerably faster speeds than the current jets, there will still be an
operational requirement that the SST perform similarly in the terminal
control areas, Due to the higher operating speeds there may be a need
to modify the SID for such aircraft, however. This possibility is dis-
cussed in the following function description (maintain flight path for SID).
Feasible Automated Implementation Concepts for SST
Due to the criticality of the takeoff phase of the flight in terms of
fuel consumption, there have been some suggestions that full automation
be employed. This is envisioned as a stored computer program (or a
punched tape) with the precise speed-altitude schedule for the takeoff
run, along with the course to steer. After initial line-up with the runway
centerline, the aircraft would be placed under computer control. The
computer would exercise full control over the takeoff through automatic
throttle control, and auto-pilot control. The computer would supply the
necessary signals to the auto-pilot for maintaining the takeoff flight path,
and such would be monitored by flight management. An override capabil-
ity would be provided for manual take-over should the necessity arise.
Feasible Manual Implementation Concepts for SST
Should it be determined that the trade-off between automation and
fuel consumption does not warrant automated speed-altitude scheduling
and flight control, this function would be performed as described under
Current Jet Implementation Concepts above.
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7.2 FUNCTION 7.2 MAINTAIN FLIGHT PATH FOR SID
Purpose
The purpose of this function is to:
. Delineate the optimum flight path from the SID initiation
point to the transition area, considering:
a.
b.
C.
SID cleared by ATC
Speed- altitude scheduling
Meteorological conditions
. Provide continuous presentation of the navigational situation
in the following respects:
a. Parameters representative of the optimum profile
(SID) being followed suitable for pictorial display in
the cockpit, and for automatic transmission via data
link to appropriate ground installations.
b. Parameters representative of off-profile error com-
ponents in all three planes suitable for transduction
into flight control commands and throttle adjustments.
These parameters would be optimized in the sense of
regaining the track with the most acceptable aircraft
manipulation considering the maneuver limits imposed
by the aircraft performance envelope and passenger
cons ide rations.
Co Details of the requirement for track excursion exceed-
ing authorized limits for hazardous weather avoidance,
and for optimization of fuel flow considering ambient
temperature distribution.
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Parameters representative of profile modifications for
track excursions for reasons in (c) above suitable for
transduction into velocity scheduling commands (throttle
adjustments} and flight control commands (all attitudes
control).
Current Jet Operational Requirements and Constraints
ance for the SID which includes information necessary for the aircraft
to exit from the terminal area on a course consistent with the flight
plan and the destination. There are generally several SID's for any
given terminal and the assignment of a given SID to a given flight will
have considered such parameters as:
I.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
Flight plan and destination
Operational runway in use
Weather conditions
Aircraft performance characteristics
Surrounding terrain, obstructions, etc.
Noise abatement considerations
Conflict avoidance
The aircraft is required to execute the cleared SID with the great-
est possible accuracy and precision because of the relatively high density
traffic in terminal control areas. Deviations from the SID are not per-
mitted without prior ATC approval. The sole exception to this rule is
the exercise of pilot judgment in an emergency situation such as immi-
nent collision. Flights are under constant radar surveillance and may
have their respective SID's altered by radar vectors from ATC, in
which case they must follow the vectors assigned.
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The fact that an SID is issued and that the flight is under constant
radar surveillance does not relieve the crew's responsibility for know-
ing the location of the aircraft at all times. For example, an SID may
include instructions to remain at some fixed altitude on such and s__lch
a heading until some low-level airway has been crossed. It is clear
that continuous knowledge of aircraft position is an absolute require-
ment for compliance with such directives.
Some specific regulations follow:
FAR 91.87, ref 13:
Departures.
(f) Departures. No person may operate an
aircraft taking off from an airport with an
operating control tower except in compliance
with the following:
(1) Each pilot shall comply with any de-
parture procedures established for that air-
port by the FAA.
(2) Unless otherwise required by the de-
parture procedures or applicable distance
from clouds criteria, each pilot of a large
airplane shall climb to an altitude of 1,500
feet above the surface as rapidly as prac-
ticable.
ICAO Reg. 3.2.6, ref 14:
Operation on and in the vicinity of an aerodrome.
An aircraft operated on
or in the vicinity of an aerodrome shall,
whether or not within an aerodrome
franc zone :
a) observe other aerodrome traffic
for the purpose of avoiding collision;
b) conform with or avoid the pzttern
of traffic formed by ether aircraft in
operation ;
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c) make all turns to the left. when
approaching for a landing and after
taking off, unless otherwise instructed;
d) land and take off into the wind
unless safety or air traffic considera-
tions determine that a different direc-
tion is preferable.
Current Jet Implementation Concepts
Maintaining the assigned flight path in executing an SID involves
the use of fairly standard tools in current jet operations. A flight
director type display may be used to indicate aircraft heading and
relative heading to desired course to steer, as well as position of
the aircraft relative to the desired track. A bank indicator may be
used to indicate rate-of-turn, and an altimeter used for altitude and
rate-of-ascent. Position of the aircraft is obtained from the VOR/DME
display read-out. Means are also available for ascertaining fuel con-
sumption rates. With these tools, the pilot manipulates the aircraft in
accordance with his displayed navigational data such that the SID track
and altitude components are within acceptable limits of the assigned
values.
SST Potential Operational Requirements and Constraints
For purposes of this discussion, the SID phase of the SST flight
will terminate at that point when the aircraft has achieved cruise speed
even though it may have left the terminal area control zone and be under
the control of an ATC enroute center. The discussion will refer to that
portion of the flight under terminal area control as the "initial phase"
of the SID, and that portion of the flight between the exit point from
terminal area control and the IP for transonic acceleration as the
"second phase" of the SID, although execution of transonic accereration
will be included.
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The operational requirement for the SST during both phases of
the SID is to define precisely, and then attain the transition area with
a minimum time aloft and minimum fuel expenditure. The non-ATC
constraints, are the same as for other phases of the flight, execution
of all maneuvers within the safety margins required, and at those levels
of g forces acceptable to the passengers, and avoidance of adverse mete-
orological conditions, either hazardous weather or unfavorable winds
and ambient temperature distribution. ATC-imposed constraints will
be the normal constraints currently imposed for conflict avoidance.
In considering possible ATC constraints on this phase of SST
operations it is necessary to make two assumptions. Initially, it must
be assumed that no major modifications to the current ATC procedures
will be adopted. The constraints for the SST will be the same as those
discussed earlier for current subsonic jets. This could mean that the
SST may not be able to take full advantage of its superior acceleration
and rate of climb capabilities (see Figure 33) in the subsonic speed
regime in order to (I) assure acceptable g forces, (2) keep off-track
lateral displacement following turns at high speed within ATC-imposed
limits, and (3) comply with altitude restrictions.
6000 1
40OO
_ 2000
_ oE
0
-f_ 6000
4000 f
,°°iF
0
-- 2000 FT. ALTITUDE
..... 20,000 FT. ALTITUDE
----- 30,000 FT. ALTITUDE
B SU_ONIC _[ TR&NSPOAT
MAX
ANG_v,,,,.-,._-_,.\w_STRUCTURAL/
I_ 20O 300 400
TRUE SPEED (KNOTS)
M09
1.0
/ _/c supersonicrR_MSPORT
/ / /" I_ AFTERBURNER)
,oo +oo 4oo .oo .o ,oo
 ,EEO(,.o,s,
L"/ :
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transports (from ref. 51).
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It would therefore seem that some penalty in fuel consumption for less
than optimum performance could be expected. The restrictions also
keep the SST from taking advantage of more acceptable meteorological
conditions. (see Figure 34).
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The complexity of the SID navigational problem is probably best
summarized by Hooton (ref. 51),
Another aspect is shown in Figure 35. Here are the
ideal departure flows out of the three New York airports
during northerly wind conditions. Add the arrivals to
this, and change the wind direction, and the whole pic-
ture would change.
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The point is that we must guard against an over-
simplification of the problems involved. For planning
purposes one cannot draw a simple climb profile start-
ing at one runway and going out to 40,000 or 80, 000
feet and leave it at that. We are faced with turns after
takeoff, route deviations, intermeshing of airways and
the effects of the weather. Compromises are inevitable
but some careful thought should go into this problem.
I
cA,
Figure 35. Ideal departure flow-outs of New York Airports
(from ref. 51).
Hooton goes on to further define the problem as follows:
Basically the problem in air traffic control can be
summarized as one of prediction. Since this is diffi-
cult, traffic control today is done on a basis of airway
routes, radar monitoring, and vectoring, within a two-
dimensional system.
Figure 36 shows three typical problem areas as
they exist today. Figures 36-I and 36-II show two
alternatives for westbound departures from airport A
which conflict with traffic into and out of airport B.
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In Figure 36-I the departure from airport A must suffer
restricted climbs but are allowed to proceed on course
immediately after takeoff. In Figure 36-II the climb is
not restricted but departures must initially fly away from
their intended destination.
Figure 36-III shows a combination of problem areas,
the prime difficulty being that of the departures crossing
and joining an enroute airway.
Such procedures today are costly in time and fuel
and are complicated for pilots and controllers.
Is it practical to think in terms of airways defined
in the vertical plane as well as the horizontal plane to
overcome some problems? The answer is affirmative,
but there are qualifications:
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"Slant airways" (as they may be called) must
be defined and sited very carefully.
Since turns are inevitable, such airways will
require that navigational information is ade-
Navaid accuracy will require improvement
over present operational navaid standards.
Adequate radar monitoring facilities will be
necessary for the traffic controllers.
Flight planning will require greater accuracy
in the climb and descent phases than is pres-
ently demanded.
The second assumption regarding ATC constraints on SST operations
is that ATC will make modifications in their terminal area control zone
procedures for executing an SID. The most extensive modification would
be the introduction of area-coverage navigation techniques which would
essentially remove the requirement for so-called airways and permit
highly flexible navigation even within high density traffic areas.
There appears to be a need for the modification of ATC control pro-
cedures, or at least SID layouts, in the terminal area control zones. Fur-
ther, it seems practical to be able to vary the transonic acceleration area
while enroute, depending on meteorological conditions. Area navigation
to the transition area with enroute optimization of the profile will be a
requirement. This necessitates modifying the present ATC airway con-
cept constraint.
Feasible Automated Implementation Concepts for SST
Although SID has been defined earlier as that portion of the flight
from initial takeoff altitude to the IP for transonic acceleration, the dis-
cussion of the navigation requirements for this phase is extended to include
the acceleration phase to the point at which enroute navigation takes over.
4-4.o
It is clear that navigational system performance in this portion
of the total flight may well determine whether or not the SST is to be
economically feasible. This, coupled with the fact that for a large por-
tion of this flight phase the SST will be operating in high density traffic
areas, constrains the margin for navigational error. This constraint
is the basis for the assumption that the SID will be specified in terms of
data which can be stored and utilized by an airborne computer which will
actually control the aircraft's progress. Computer control will be accom-
plished by transducing the SID data into appropriate auto-pilot and auto-
throttle commands, taking into consideration noise abatement procedures
where applicable, and control parameters produced by the navigation
system concerning such things as fuel flow rates, safety margins and
m eteorological conditions.
Optimization of the flight path while enroute to the transition area
gives rise to a procedural problem in that deviation from the cleared
volumetric air space requires ATC sanction. The navigation situation
will be clearly displayed in the cockpit in such a manner that flight man-
agement is cognizant of any optimization required, and this same data
can be made available via data link to an appropriate ATC facility. The
navigation system would proceed with the optimization process as delin-
eated by the displayed navigational situation unless flight management
and/or ATC overruled the system.
The navigation system would function to bring the aircraft along
the optimized path such that it arrives over the IP for transonic accel-
eration on course for the destination (or initial checkpoint) at the pre-
scribed altitude. The control law utilized by the computer to accomplish
climb-out to the IP for acceleration will probably be as defined by Richard-
son (ref. 52) in his discussion of a central electronic management system
for the SST, wherein he defines such a control law utilized by military
supersonic craft as "variation of MACH with altitude, commonly referred
to as speed-altitude scheduling. " It may be necessary at this point to
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apply a different control law for the pure acceleration phase. Richardson
goes on to say, however, that "transition from one phase of the mission
to another, or from one control law to another, was accomplished auto-
matically by the computer with no action required by the pilot whatsoever. "
It seems reasonable to assume that the initiating signal to the computer
to begin the acceleration phase will be verification by the navigation
system that the aircraft's position in three-dimensional space and head-
ing is as prescribed earlier by the navigation system in deriving the IP
for transonic acceleration while enroute to the transition area. If the
computer receives no signal from flight management to delay the accel-
eration, it will automatically provide flight control and throttle control
commands to the auto-pilot and auto-throttle based upon the navigational
parameters received which describe the optimum profile for the accelera-
tion phase. This function (i. e., optimum profile generation} is discussed
fully under enroute navigation. As performed during this function, it will
consider basically the same requirements identified under the enroute
navigation description. The justification for such is very well demon-
strated by Figure 37 below (from Polhemus, ref. 53) which clearly illus-
trates the problems confronting the crew in the acceleration phase.
Polhemus describes this situation as follows:
The acceleration phase is characterized by a call for maxi-
mum engine output, extremely high fuel flow (as much as
4000 lb. per minute}, rapid change of all the velocity sensors
(C. A. S. , T.A.S., roach number and G.S. meters), rapid
change of altimeter, rate of climb meter near its limit with
initial climb values in excess of 6000 ft/min. , all of which
makes it extremely difficult to get a sense of the correct-
ness of what is going on. Confirmation of forecast or pro-
grammed conditions is an urgent requirement both from the
point of view of fuel management and from the point of view
of navigation accuracy.
Figure 37 illustrates three basic acceleration profiles. The
two lower paths are typical of B-58 maneuvers while the
upper trajectory depicts the path of a mach 3. 0 S. S. T. as
described in Aviation Week, 1 April, 1963. This latter tra-
jectory is designed to minimize the effects of sonic boom
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Figure 37. Three basic acceleration profiles (from ref. 53).
disturbance--and appears to be a very demanding schedule
to accomplish. The two lower trajectories compare the
filed flight path with that actually flown on 26 May, 1961 by
the B-58 aircraft which established the 3 hour 19 minute
record between New York and Paris. Though the A. T. C.
clearance was for the lower trajectory, labelled 2, the two-
step path was flown in an effort to minimize what appeared
to be an excessive fuel flow. The deviation in altitude and
position between the cleared flight path and the path actually
flown by the aircraft may be noted. It is this type of in-
flight decision that faces the aircrew during the critical
first minutes of the acceleration.
One further remark by Richardson (ref. 52) in his discussion of the
CEMS application further illustrates the versatility of automation to pro-
vide high-speed problem solutions at critical moments,
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The MA-1 computer, for instance, will not allow
the F-106 to automatically climb to its best cruise alti-
tude if its computations indicate there is not enough fuel
on board to climb along its climb schedule from present
altitude to cruise conditions and cruise for a specified
distance. The ASG-18 computer program has the cap-
ability of continuously telling the pilot how far he can
cruise towards an alternate base after he reaches his
future destination, taking into consideration the fuel and
distance required to: (1) accelerate and climb to super-
sonic cruise conditions; (2) cruise at best cruise altitude
for decreasing gross weight or cruise at present condi-
tions of Mach and altitude; (3) descent to subsonic hold
pattern over destination; (4) climb from hold conditions
to cruise for diversion.
There is obviously already a great deal of precedent in automating
navigation functions with integrated information concerning profile opti-
mization. The criticality of the climb-out and acceleration phase would
appear such that automatic navigation and flight profile optimization is
a certain requirement, and will be implemented in much the same manner
as discussed in enroute navigation.
Feasible Manual Implementation Concepts for SST
Maintenance of the flight for the SID and the acceleration phase of
the flight could be handled by more conventional techniques such as those
discussed under Current Jet Implementation Concepts. However, there
are several implications stemming from the use of conventional techniques.
An obvious result would be the difficulty in minimizing track excursions
in turns due to the higher subsonic speeds. Probably the paramount con-
sideration, however, would be the impact on the on-board capability for
optimization. In this area, it is a safe assumption that a considerable
degradation in optimum performance may result from a clear-cut decrease
in available means. It would appear almost a virtual necessity to rule out
requirements for sonic boom control and fuel optimization before anything
less than automatic implementation could be justified, even if the conflict
avoidance problem is resolved by extremely careful definition and execution
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7. 4 FUNCTION 7. 4 MONITOR DESTINATION/ALTERNATE
WEATHER CONDITIONS
Purpose
The purpose of this function is to provide flight management with
continuous cognizance of weather conditions affecting SST low-altitude
operations at the destination point and all prescribed alternates for that
6,-v _** ,..,.,._,-,.. J_,V, .-._.,.,.,.,.u= v_=._-_,.zu,_ are u,_lm_u a_ mu_u up_ra(luns
from the time the aircraft returns to the subsonic flight regime until
roll-out after landing.
It seems important to note that despite an all-weather landing
capability, there may be conditions at terminal points which will neces-
sitate diverting aircraft (including the SST) to an alternate. Strictly
defined, all-w eather landings are all ceilings -all visibility landings.
All-weather systems cannot be construed to include a capability for
landing an aircraft with wind shears of intolerable magnitude, for exam-
ple, or severe thunderstorm activity or squall line activity in a terminal
area. Therefore, the possibility of diverting to other terminals will con-
tinue to exist even though all-weather landing systems are being employed.
Hence, monitoring of weather conditions for the destination point and pre-
scribed alternates must also continue.
Current Jet Operational Requirements and Constraints
Current jets are required to prescribe alternates in their flight
plans. The following specific regulation applies:
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ICAO Reg. 4. 4. I, ref. 12:
Meteorological Minima
S A flight shall not be con-
tinued towards the aerodrome of intended
landing unless the latest available meteo-
rological information indicates that con-
ditions at that aerodrome, or at least one
alternate aerodrome, will, at the expected
times of arrival, be at or above the meteo-
rological minima specified for such aero-
dromes in the Operations Manual.
S Except in case of emer-
gency an aircraft shall not continue its
approach-to-land at any aerodrome beyond
a point at which the limits of the meteo-
rological minima :_SpeC..._ for I....t... aero-
drome in the Operations Manual would be
infringed.
NS A flight shall not be con-
tinued towards the aerodrome of intended
landing unless the latest available meteo-
rological information indicates that con-
ditions at that aerodrome or at least one
alternate aerodrome, will, at the expected
times of arrival, be at or above the
meteorological minima specified for such
aerodromes.
NS Except in case of emer-
gency, an aircraft shall not continue its
approach-to-land at any aerodrome beyond
a point at which the limits of the meteo-
rological minima specified for that aero-
drome would be infringed.
Current Jet Implementation Concepts
Currently, weather and landing conditions at destination and alter-
nate terminals are obtained via meteorological forecasts and reports
furnished by Flight Service Stations and other Air Traffic Control agen-
cies. Appropriate information is generally passed to the crew verbally
via the communications system (VHF/I-IFradio transceivers). Current
weather conditions, the forecast, and the general weather trend, are
used in deciding to continue to destination or divert to the alternate.
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.forecast and taken into consideration during the flight
planning stage. An additional consideration, during
periods of turbulence is passenger discomfort, either
physical or psychological, and its contribution to the
overall public acceptance of flying in general and the
SST in specific. Weather phenomena of the thunder-
storm variety are not anticipated to present many pro-
blems to the SST once the cruise/climb profile has
been attained. However, since cumulous buildups at
altitudes from 50, 000 to 75, 000 feet have been reported
by pilots and weather radar, their possible presence
cannot be disregarded.
Adverse winds. Adverse winds aloft may be of two
varieties: (1) head winds (or lateral cross winds) of
relatively high magnitude, and (2) wind velocity and
relative bearing such that sonic boom focussing effects
may materialize. Although it is generally believed
that winds are relatively light above 50,000 feet, there
is evidence that high winds can be experienced at SST
cruise altitudes (ref. 53). The possibility of experi-
encing winds aloft of magnitudes such as those indi-
cated in the 30 millibar chart (Figure 38) will have to
be considered in maintaining the optimum flight profile.
Undoubtedly more significant is the requirement for
continuous knowledge of the actual wind velocity and
relative bearing so that generation of excessive over-
pressures can be avoided. Either of these factors
could produce a change in the optimum planned profile
once the aircraft is airborne.
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Figure 38. Constant altitude (30 mb) chart (from ref. 53).
Adverse temperatures (ambient). It is quite clear in
the literature that a parameter of paramount impor-
tance in SST operations is the ambient temperature
aloft. It has been stated in essence (ref. 5,i), that
during the acceleration phase non-standard atmos-
pheric conditions can affect fuel consumption and
rate of acceleration by 20% to 30%, and can in rare
instances cause such high rates of fuel flow as to
require discontinuing the acceleration. It is evident
that continuous availability of ambient temperature
data is an absolute requirement and, moreover, that
temperature values must be known with the greatest
possible precision as far ahead on the aircraft's path
as possible. It seems a certainty that temperature
alonewill be sufficient cause for many modifications
to planned optimum profiles if the SST is to keep
within fuel reserves and operate economically. It
is also obvious that variations between actual and
forecasted temperature conditions can greatly affect
ETA validity and thus may present a significant
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problem in integrating the SST into the ATC system.
It has been stated that the SST true airspeed can vary
as much as 240 knots in a one hour period due to chang-
ing temperatures alone (ref. 54).
. Radiation hazards. Operational altitudes of the SST
will require consideration of altering or modifying
the optimum flight profile to avoid radiation hazards.
Although radiation levels at altitudes within the cruise
envelope for the SST az-_ =_uw,_ _L_u =_ = =,_,-_,..... ,
solar storms can cause those levels to increase rather
rapidly to levels unacceptable for passenger and crew
exposure. Currently solar bursts can be forecasted
about 15 minutes in advance. Meteorological services
could provide this data for the SST sufficiently before
increases in radiation levels occur, so that necessary
avoidance measures could be executed. Nevertheless
it seems likely that raidation levels will be monitored
during flight to insure safety.
The following regulations apply:
FAR 121. 357, ref. 11:
Airborne weather radar equipment requirements: passenger-
carrying airplanes.
(a) No person may operate any airplane cer-
tificated under the transport category rules (ex-
cept C-46 type airplanes), in passenger-carry-
ing operations; unless approved airborne
weather radar equipment has been installed in
the airplane.
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ICAO Reg. 4. 4. 2, ref. 12:
Meteorological Observations.
So far as possible, weather observed
en route shall be reported at prescribed
times or points as requested by the appro-
priate metenrnlogica! author,:ties.
Note.--The times and points mentioned
are usually in accordance with the recom.
mendations o/ Regional Air Navigation
Meetings.
Current Jet Implementation Concepts
Of the aforementioned weather parameters, only severe turbulence
significantly affects the capability of subsonic commercial airliners to
adhere to a given flight profile. Other factors that accompany thunder-
storm activity and other frontal movements, such as severe precipita-
tion and heavy icing are also important for subsonic jets. At the altitudes
frequented by these aircraft, radiation hazards are non-existent. Although
variations in standard day temperatures affect fuel consumption and econ-
omy of engine operation, subsonic jets are capable of maintaining signifi-
cantly greater fuel reserves since high altitude climb-out and acceleration
to supersonic regimes are not a part of their operational profile. Thus,
temperature has no appreciable effect on subsonic jet operations as far as
schedule maintenance is concerned. Commercial airlines try to plan their
flights to take advantage of prevailing jet streams and avoid head-winds.
All favorable wind conditions are taken advantage of to the extent that
ATC clearance can be obtained. Subsonic jets, obviously, are not con-
cerned with the sonic boom problem.
Meteorological forecasts, PIREPS, and search (WX) radar are the
three means available for recognizing turbulence associated with storm
activity. Included in PIREPS, of course, are visual sighting and avoid-
ance measures. Avoidance means usually consist of: (1) redirecting the
path of the aircraft--most generally used at cruise altitude when storm
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buildups are broken such that a path can be found through the fringe areas
and clearance can be obtained to deviate from the track to the extent neces-
sary; and (2} penetrating the storm front at slower speeds when the turbu-
lence encountered is not considered to be a risk to flight safety, or to
cause extreme discomfort (primarily psychological) to the passengers.
Clear air turbulence is of two varieties, that associated with parti-
cular terrain characteristics along with weather parameters, and that
_qqnci__ted with unstable air at altitude primarily due to mixing of warm
and cold air masses. The first type can usually be considered in flight
planning because it is relatively constant, (e. g., updrafts and down drafts
over mountainous terrain, or thermal drafts on a hot day over the desert
floor). Conditions conducive to the second type of turbulence can be fore-
cast, but there are still occasions when the conditions can be encountered
without having been forecasted. The general procedure in penetrating tur-
bulence of both varieties is to decelerate until an acceptable level of turbu-
lence is experienced. There is no instrumentation provided to indicate
turbulence severity or, particularly in the case of clear air turbulence, to
detect its presence before it is encountered.
SST Potential Operational Requirements and Constraints
In those portions of the SST flight regime which are similar to that
for subsonic jets, requirements for monitoring enroute weather phenomena
are basically the same. The SST design requirement for capability of oper-
ating within terminal areas in the same manner as subsonic jets also dic-
tates consideration of the same weather phenomena and, in all probability,
similar avoidance techniques. The severity of the penalties for less {han
optimum SST performance will undoubtedly necessitate more precise fore-
casts of certain weather parameters as well as for airborne measurement
of some of these parameters. For example, variations in standard day
temperatures in the transitional acceleration area are of critical importance
and will have to be more precisely forcasted, and undoubtedly will have to
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be measured in flight. Likewise, wind direction and magnitude will be
of primary importance at the transitional acceleration point and there-
after until transitional deceleration has been executed. These parame-
ters will also have to be more accurately forecasted than at present and
the SST must be able to obtain accurate mo_sures..... ,ithl]e..._ 4"_,... ,._.j.S,,_..l?14"_h4" g-11_----k._-t_tJ.
air turbulence and radiation levels at SST cruise altitudes are also
weather parameters for which accurate measurements must be available.
Feasible Automated Implementation Concepts for the SST
General weather conditions expected along a given route will be
known in terms of detailed meteorological forecasts. The monitoring
of enroute conditions will include gathering qualitative and quantitative
data suitable for display in the cockpit and comparison against the origi-
nal forecasts (for purposes of computing differential wind, differential
temperature, etc. ). Special parameters which affect critical functions
(e. g., wind velocity and relative bearing for overpressure control) will
have to be known enough in advance to permit correcting or avoiding a
given maneuver.
A general concept for SST follows. Temperature gradients would
receive more attention in the meteorological forecasting situation. An
airborne ambient temperature sensor has been suggested which would
detect temperature in the areas adjacent to the aircraft and 10 to 15 miles
ahead on the projected flight path (ref. 54). Wind velocity and relative
bearing will be calculated from other system sensors, such as the Doppler
sensor (indicates drift angle and ground speed), and true heading and true
airspeed indicators, as a normal output of Function 7. 7 (see Internal
System Position Generation). Greenaway (ref. 49) suggests that "search
radar, although not an integral part of the navigation system, will be
required primarily for storm avoidance in all supersonic transports. "
Winick (ref. 55), FAA design team spokesman, has indicated that avionics
problem areas for which no solutions are available include "airborne WX
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radar capable of detecting light rainfall at distances of 250 miles, means
for detecting clear air turbulence and sensing temperature gradients for
optimum flight paths. " King and Groves (ref. 56) indicate a requirement
for a suitable air/ground data link. A high speed digital data link would
permit rapid updating of the meteorological forecasts along the flight
route such that the SST would always have the latest information available,
including information on those areas out of range of the on-board weather
sensing devices.
The weather parameters discussed will be available to the SST crew
in one form or another. Depending upon the sensor design it appears
feasible that all these weather parameters could be provided in either
analog or digital form suitable for machine calculations. Although it
may not be feasible or practical to make the weather radar return signal
pattern or ATC reports direct inputs into the navigational computer, this
is not the case with temperature and wind velocity and relative bearing.
Moreover, temperature and wind are more critical in terms of require-
ments for immediately available data and continuous accurate measure-
ment.
Feasible Manual Implementation Concepts for SST
Temperature and wind velocity can be measured {or calculated) and
read out in the cockpit, as can radiation levels. Obviously, weather radar
can be displayed in the cockpit area. Changes in forecasted weather along
the flight path which are available at Flight Service Stations along the route
may be received in the cockpit by an appropriate verbal communication via
VHF net, or hard copy printout via data link. Monitoring enroute weather
conditions is certainly amenable to manual or semi-automatic implemen-
tation. However, a manual concept limits the rapidity with which these
data can be used. For example, consider the time required for a crew
member to take readouts of wind velocity and relative bearing, aircraft
heading, aircraft gross weight, aircraft altitude and attitude, and aircraft
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velocity, and compute the overpressure being generated and the conic
dispersion of the overpressure with respect to the movement of the
aircraft in space. The situation could seriously degenerate before the
first calculation was completed.
The point is that measurements of weather parameters, though
manually available through readouts or calculations, should be examined
in terms of the changing requirements for their utilization, including
considerations such as timeliness, accuracy and regenerativeness (or
cyclic in nature}. These requirements are not in essence compatible
with manual means without some degradation in performance, It is
probable, however, that there will be some degree of manual implemen-
tation in this area, particularly in monitoring weather radar and incom-
ing weather data forecasts, as well as visual sighting of storm clouds.
454
of SID's at possibly lower speeds than those achievable or optimum for
this phase. Slower speeds mean higher block times which lead to fuel
penalties. All in all, it appears that the application of conventional
techniques during this phase of the flight is questionable.
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7. 3 FUNCTION 7.3 MONITOR. ENROUTE WEATHER CONDITIONS
Purpose
This function is the gathering of necessary data concerning weather
phenomena along the flight route which may have direct or indirect im-
pact on the flight operations. A direct impact on the operation of the
flight is considered to result from individual or sets of weather parame-
ters along the flight route which in and of themselves necessitate alter-
ing the optimum profile planned prior to the flight (e. g., radiation hazard
avoidance at altitude, thunderstorm avoidance in the transition phase).
An indirect impact refers to individual or sets of weather parameters
along the flight route which sufficiently affect some other critical oper-
ating parameters to the extent that it is necessary to alter the optimum
profile planned prior to the flight (e. g., large deviations in temperature
from standard atmospheric variations with altitude which result in higher
fuel consumption).
At least the following set of weather phenomena may result in the
necessity to alter the optimum planned profile for the reasons indicated.
. Severe turbulence. The unforecasted presence of severe
turbulences, both the clear air variety and that normally
associated with frontal movements, i. e., thunderstorm
and squall lines, usually results in a rather severe modi-
fication to the planned flight path for any aircraft, and
the SST will apparently be no exception. The most com-
mon method for negating the effects of severe turbulence
is to avoid it. However, sometimes when the turbulence
is moderate to severe, its effects can be minimized by
decreasing the speed of the aircraft. In either event,
there would appear to be a penalty to the SST in terms
of fuel consumption unless the situation were correctly
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SST Potential Operational Requirements and Constraints
The SST is not expected to initiate new requirements in this area.
However, it seems likely that the decision to divert to an alternate may
have to be made earlier in SST operations than in current jets due to the
criticality of the fuel reserve problem. Consideration is also being
given to the requirement for increased accuracy and frequency of meteo-
rological forecasting and measurement (ref. 57).
Feasible Automated Implementation Concepts for SST
Forecasted weather conditions for destination and prescribed
alternates are a required portion of any flight plan. As such, these data
will be available in some form for flight management perusal; as written
narrative or hard copy, appropriate charts for display, or stored in
some central data computer available for retrieval upon demand. Up-
dated forecasts and current measurement of appropriate parameters will
be supplied to the SST by Flight Service Stations or other ATC functions
via the data link. This information would be in form suitable for direct
comparison with the original forecasted conditions such that differentials
could be readily calculated. The original data, revised data, and differ-
ential solutions would be available for flight management perusal upon
demand.
Feasible Manual Implementation Concepts for SST
This function could be performed by manual means much as it is
in current jet operations (i. e., the pertinent data is passed verbally and
hand recorded).
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7. 5 FUNCTION 7. 5 PROVIDE DIFFERENTIALS IN FORECAST
TO ACTUAL WEATHER CONDITIONS
The purpose of %his function is to provide the essential weather
information required for:
I. Insuring the continued integrity of the optimum flight
profile being flown (from an acceptable WX condi-
tions viewpoint ).
. Providing the basis for optimum profile modifica-
tion as a direct result of the weather situation either
enroute or at the destination point.
0 Establishing and maintaining the integrity of the
optimum profile following its modification for any
reasons (from acceptable WX conditions viewpoint).
The input data to this function, in general, consists of "what was
expected" and "what is" in the sense of forecast to actual weather con-
ditions, both enroute and at the destination and prescribed alternate ter-
minals. In this function weather parameters are accepted from the
monitoring functions, parameter magnitudes being experienced are com-
pared to those which were forecasted, any differential solutions required
are calculated, and trends in parameter variance are developed where
required. So, in a sense, the function will output a best estimate of
"what will be" for specific parameters, based upon the forecast, the
actual, and the trend developed. It will also output the instantaneous
values of specific parameters being measured along with the difference
in forecast, e.g.
_Vwindactual ,, : 10 Kts., Vwind = Vwindactual + Vwindfcst.
_he sign of the wind parameter indicates either a quartering tailwind (+)
or a quartering headwind (-).)
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At least the following parameters will be treated by this function:
o Wind velocity, relative bearing; (enroute, terminal
areas)
2, Ambient temperature, temperature gradient (enroute,
terminal areas)
3. Radiation level (cruise altitudes only}
o Turbulence (clear air, thunderstorm, squall lhlv,
hurricane, tornado, etc. ) (enroute, terminal areas)
e Precipitation (rain, sleet, snow, hail)(enroute,
terminal areas)
1 Freezing levels (icing conditions) (enroute, terminal
areas)
, Cloud cover, type, etc. (base, height, amount)
(enroute, terminal areas)
8. Runway accumulations (type, depth) (terminal areas)
, Visibility, slant visual range, runway visual range.
(terminal areas)
10. Obstructions to vision (smoke, haze, fog) (terminal
ar eas)
These requirements are detai.led in ref. 58, "National Aviation Meteoro-
logical Requirements through 1975. "
Current Jet Operational Requirements and Constraints
Current jets are required to compare the enroute weather condi-
tions with those forecasted and to be cognizant of any and all differences
in parameter magnitudes and phenomena to the extent that flight manage-
ment may request clearance for course deviations should that be required
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and that flight safety is assured. Destination weather must also be
continuously compared with the forecast to determine the necessity
for possible deviation to an alternate. (FAR 97 governs the landing
minima, and ATC has the authority to close terminals as well as desig-
nate specific airways "blocked° ")
Current Jet Implementation Concepts
In current jet operations the practice of noting differences in the
forecast to actual weather is rather unsophisticated, and often a by-
product in the performance of associated functions. For example, if
no thunderstorm activity had been forecasted, and yet the crew visually
sights heavy cumulus buildups and anvil irons indicative of thunderstorms,
no special task was performed in noting this differential. A difference
is noted and with that the data is in the appropriate channel for decision
making. Also, current practice is to check the destination terminal
weather at each reporting point, and in some cases at closer intervals
when the weather situation is marginal and forecasted to reach the minima,
or below; or when the weather situation is below the minima, but fore-
casted to improve. So, differences are noted by the crew member re-
ceiving and recording the latest weather report regarding the destination
and alternate situation, and this is actually a product of weather monitor-
ing.
SST Potential Operational Requirements and Constraints
Weather parameter differentials will have a pronounced effect on
SST operations from the viewpoints of fuel management, sonic boom
control, schedule maintenance (i. e., ETA validity), air space control,
flight safety, and passenger accommodation. Polhemus (reference 53)
has stated that "confirmation of forecast or programmed conditions is
an urgent requirement both from the viewpoint of fuel management and
from the point of view of navigation accuracy. " Considerably more
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emphasis is necessary in this area in view of the many facets of SST
operation which weather parameters may affect to a much greater extent
than in current jet operations. Hence, the requirements in this area are
considered to be significantly more stringent for SST efficiency.
The following paragraphs discuss the specific SST requirements
in terms of the parameters needed and their utilization. It is important
to keep in mind that this discussion is concerned only with differentials
between forecasted and actual weather conditions. For purposes of this
critical weather parameter is encountered which is sufficiently different
from that which was forecasted to:
l* Require discontinuation of the acceleration to super-
sonic speeds.
2. Require returning to the flight origin point.
. Require diversion of the flight to an alternate des-
tination.
. Require discontinuation of the flight at supersonic
speeds prior to the planned deceleration point.
. Require imme dict, landing of the aircraft at the
nearest adequate facility while enroute.
. Require major modification to the planned enroute
pro file.
In general, the above alternatives are assumed to embrace all facets
of flight tactics which may be employed to assure flight safety, passen-
ger accommodation (or passenger acceptance of the SST), and general
public acceptance of the SST (e. g., sonic boom problem}. By this defi-
nition, it can be stated that in an ideal weather situation, weather par-
ameter differentials are essentially equal to zero plus or minus an
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acceptable tolerance, and "ideal" may range from minimal (that which
was forecasted) to maximal (the best possible combination of weather
conditions for a given flight).
1. Wind velocity and relative bearing. This information is neces-
sary in all phases of the flight, including takeoff and landing. The infor-
mation is necessary during takeoff and landing for safety in directional
control of the aircraft. During the climb-out and acceleration phases
which are in the pre-transonic speed regimes, this data is necessary
for flight control of the aircraft, as well as in predicting fuel consump-
tion rates. During the acceleration and deceleration phases of the flight,
and during supersonic cruise, this information is critical for calculating
overpressure being generated, for avoidance of sonic boom focussing
effects and for predicting fuel consumption rates. During all phases of
flight it is also necessary to navigation for schedule maintenance and to
assure valid steering commands for the track being flown.
2. Ambient temperature and temperature gradient. This infor-
mation is necessary in all phases of the flight for the primary purpose
of predicting and controlling fuel consumption rates. It is assumed that
the SST will maintain schedule integrity by cruising at a constant Mach
number. It is also assumed that the SST will fly an airspeed value when
operating in the subsonic speed regimes. If airspeed were to be utilized
as a back-up for Mach values in the cruise phase in the event of Math
indicator failure, this data would be critical to navigation and flight con-
trol for maintaining schedule integrity due to the possible extremes in
airspeed variation as a function of ambient temperature.
3. Radiation level. This information is necessary during those
phases of the flight where sudden, appreciable changes in the radiation
level due to solar storms could produce conditions of overexposure for
the crew and passengers. It also seems likely that a record of the
radiation level variance during the cruise portion of a given flight would
be necessary in determining the cumulative exposure magnitudes for the
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crew (and/or passengers) over a period of time, as well as in substan-
tiating radiation level standards.
4. Turbulence magnitudes. This information is necessary during
all phases of the flight. It is required to determine the necessity for,
and appropriate action for, avoidance of weather hazards to flight safety.
5. Other phenomena. Data concerning weather phenomena, and
conditions which are directly attributable to weather phenomena, listed
as items 5 through 10 under Purpose will be necessary primarily in the
terminal areas and during subsonic operations. These data will be used
in assuring flight safety, anticipating possible problem areas and appro-
priate corrective action for the conditions in which the flight is operating,
determining the necessity for diversion to an alternate, and determining
the utilization of and potential necessity for override of the all-weather
landing capability.
Feasible Automated Implementation Concepts for SST
The task of providing differentials between forecasted and actual
weather conditions would appear to be such that some distinctions among
requirements are necessary in order to better discuss potential imple-
mentation concepts. Some requirements appear to call for a significantly
high degree of sophistication, while for others an extension of present
methods/techniques may be adequate. For purposes of this discussion,
the requirements will be viewed as being of two kinds, and the reader
is free to assume some reasonable and practical combinations of the
implementation concepts for both kinds. Those requirements for which
greater sophistication seems warranted will be discussed in terms of
why the sophistication is necessary, and some potential means for ob-
taining it. It is again useful to present these discussions in terms of
individual parameters.
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I. Differentials in wind velocity and relative bearing. Although
the need for this information has already been presented, it should be
stressed that the accuracy and timeliness of these data is of critical
importance. Viewed as parameters affecting navigation from the stand-
nn_n÷ n_ :_h_A,,lp m_in#pn_nep _nd _ir _p_ep utilizntion wind veloc:'tv
and relative bearing can be treated by present day techniques and hence
no new problems are generated for the SST. On the other hand, viewed
as significant components of ground overpressure magnitude (focusing
effects), they are highly critical, particularly because they are uncon-
trollable variables for which highly accurate and reliable prognostic
techniques are still beyond the scope of meteorological forecasting.
An estimate of the operational weather information which will be re-
quired by the ATC system by 1975 (ref. 58) indicates that forecasts of
enroute winds (assumed to include winds above the tropopause) will need
to be accurate to within ± 5 knots or 5% speed, and + 10 ° magnetic direc-
tion. Figure 39 indicates that these accuracy requirements could pre-
sent a serious problem to the SST in predicting the likelihood of over-
pressure focusing. It seems highly likely that the SST navigation system
must provide the capability for extrapolating predictive curves of focus-
ing effects. These curves will need to be based in part upon data derived
from constant measurement of actual velocity and direction of the winds
aloft, a comparison of these curves to the predicted curves, and develop-
ment of the trend of wind variation. These are the wind data which are
to be developed in this function.
It is assumed that any internal system for position fixing adopted
for SST use will have the capability to provide either direct values of
wind velocity and relative bearing, or the raw data necessary to com-
pute wind velocity and relative bearing values. Since it is obvious that
the internal system for position fixing will be continuous in nature, it
will be possible to calculate wind velocity and relative bearing values
during each (or following each) computational cycle of position. Thus
updated values will be available essentially continuously. Further, an
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Figure 39. Determination of boom focusing--in standard
atmosphere temperatures for various flight altitudes, head-
ings and mach numbers, and wind-speeds and direction.
The intersection of relative wind direction from abscissa
and wind velocity from ordinate, when above altitude curve,
indicates focused boom likely. (From ref. 53. )
externally-referenced system will supply corrective data for the internal
system periodically, and some measure of wind data accuracy and reli-
ability from the internal source can thus be determined (assuming that
errors associated with both position fixing systems are random with
respect to frequency and magnitude, and that some mean error value is
available). These wind data values will be inputs to Function 7. 5.
_6_
Predicted values will be available from meteorological forecasting
services. The wind data in the forecast utilized in the planning stage
immediately prior to takeoff would serve as the initial referent for com-
parison of actual and forecasted conditions. Since it is assumed that
data link equipment will be a portion of the _'i communications sy_t_rn
with ATC, it will be possible for the latest meteorological forecasts to
be automatically transmitted and stored in the SST navigation system.
The referent then would always represent the latest available forecast
(consistent with equipment range).
Since data points representing wind values will be generated and
available at an essentially continuous rate, it would appear feasible to
extrapolate trend curves for the wind values, and correct these curves
on the basis of PIREPS and up-to-date weather forecasts. The desired
output would be such that the relatively more fixed parameters which
contribute to sonic booms could be combined with the wind values and
us ed to determine the necessity for altering the flight profile to avoid
generating excessive overpressures. This would of necessity involve
rather complex and sophisticated calculations at extremely high speeds,
and would undoubtedly have to be accomplished by an airborne computer.
A natural product of determining the wind values for sonic boom
control will be wind values associated with more classic navigation
* There would also appear to be a potential data input to this function
which could (for some routes) conceivably be the best data available,
i. e., PIREPS (or just plain weather monitor reports) for other aircraft
operating along essentially the same routes at some short time interval
earlier than a given flight. It would appear technically feasible for cri-
tical wind values and temperature values to be measured, coded, and
transmitted on a certain frequency such that any aircraft operating within
equipment (transmission) range that would have a requirement for such
data, would have it available essentially instantaneously. And it would
also appear to be highly desirable for all SST operators in view of the
common problem and criticality for its solution.
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problems (L e., making good the track and maintaining schedule integrity).
Differentials in these values from those forecasted will permit flight con-
trol to calculate those corrections necessary to bring the flight back to
the optimum profile with minimum penalties in fuel consumption. Fur-
ther, extrapolation of a trend in the wind values will permit continuous
and more complete evaluation of the fuel consumption profile from a
predictive point of view.
2. Temperature gradient and ambient temperature differentials.
Input data will include continuous read-out of the ambient temperature and
forecasts of the temperature gradient. Such forecasts would be updated
in the same way as the wind data forecasts. (The preceding footnote is
also applicable to this parameter. ) It is assumed that essentially the
same technique discussed for wind velocity and relative bearing would
be employed regardless of whether a sensor is developed to measure
ambient temperature at some distance (ref. 54, 10 to 15 miles) along
the flight path ahead of the aircraft. Such a sensor would undoubtedly
permit a higher degree of refinement to the technique.
Whereas the preceding paragraphs attempted to point up the criti-
cality of reliable and accurate wind data for dealing with one of the three
most severe constraints on SST operation (i. e., sonic boom control),
these paragraphs will attempt to establish the same criticality for reli-
able and accurate temperature data for dealing with another of those
constraints, optimum fuel utilization. This is not to say that this param-
eter does not a/so add difficulty to the navigation problem from another
point of view, i. e., velocity changes and the attendant ETA problems.
Both of these problems are illustrated by the curves in Figure 40.
Power (ref. 57) has pointed out that "... the enormous fuel consumption
capabilities of the SST must at all times be considered. " And Groves
(ref. 59) has stated that differences in ambient temperatures from those
forecast may entail high fuel penalties, and that "... ambient temperature
distribution becomes a decisive factor in defining the transition area
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Figure 40. Effect of conditions which produce a 20 per cent
reduction in acceleration performance and in-
crease in performance capability (from ref. 53).
with precision and in the need to vary the flight profile accordingly. " It
can be seen that differential temperature solution is a critical factor in
SST operations.
In essence, the approach discussed for dealing with wind data
would be feasible for the temperature problem. Considering the absence
of a sensor which can measure 10 to 15 miles in front of the aircraft,
the approach would be essentially the same. Continuous read-out of
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ambient temperature is input to the function, and a resulting temperature
curve indicates the trend or can form the basis for extrapolation from
the trend corrected by the forecast, or vice-versa. The forecast gradi-
ent curves could also be corrected by the extrapolated trend. As is the
case with the wind data, this would be a dynamic situation in which the
predicted gradient would be continuously updated by later forecasts and
the extrapolation of the trend. If outputs from the long range sensor
mentioned above were introduced into the system, significant refinement
,._,,,i_ _o ot+_n_a in that _ gradient would be established immediately for
the next 15 miles of flight. In subsonic regimes this might represent 2
or 3 minutes of flight time, and thus allow adequate time to vary the pro-
file to take advantage of more favorable temperatures. It would still
appear desirable to continue trend extrapolation and forecast correction
to ascertain even longer range implications for, say, fuel management.
Again, as with the wind calculations, the speed, complexity, accuracy,
and cyclic nature of these computations are such that they must be made
by an airborne computer.
3. Radiation level differentials. Input to this function would be
(1) the f_recast radiation level magnitude through all appropriate phases
of the flight, (2) any prognistication regarding solar storms, and (3)
radiation level measurements from an appropriate sensor at whatever
intervals are established as minimum or optimum, depending upon the
extent of the requirement for the data. It would certainly be feasible to
treat these data much the same as the temperature data and wind data.
That is, the data can be treated by a curve-fitting process, and an extrap-
olated radiation level trend can be compared to the forecast curves.
Differentials can be noted and recorded automatically over the appro-
priate portion of the flight to determine cumulative exposure and sub-
stantiate the standards. Of course, absolute values can be available in
the cockpit at all times, as well as an alarm indicator in the event that
the trend appeared to be approaching dangerous zones.
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If it is decided that no particular requirement exists for cumulative
exposure data or data to substantiate standards, it appears likely that
this function would output a danger alarm in the event of a solar flare-up.
The handling of this requirement would be covered by the ATC system
(ref. 58):
Past requirements reports have indicated the need for
information on upper-air ozone distribution--because
of its potential toxic effects on humans--and radiation
conditions--because of the hazard to human tissue. It
now seems likely that ozone will be chemically decom-
posed by onboard equipment before entering the SST
cabin. Similarly, high radiation levels are easily fore-
cast now by detecting solar flares. The 15-30 minute
time required for these flares to enhance the upper-air
radiation levels is sufficient for warning SST aircraft
and diverting them to lower--safe--flight levels. For
these reasons, both ozone distribution and radiation
conditions have been stricken from airspace user re-
quirements with the understanding that the occasional
solar flares will be reported to the ATC system and
SST pilots so that appropriate diversions can be made.
4. Turbulence magnitudes. At the date of this writing, it has been
reported (ref. 55) that no sensor available will detect clear air turbulence
Obviously, weather radar can detect the conditions accompanying turbu-
lence depending upon the storm activity at operating ranges. However,
there is a requirement for a means of detecting light rainfall at distances
of 250 miles; such means are not yet available. There is very little in
the literature regarding the SST procedure during turbulence (both clear
air and that associated with storm activity} except to assume the current
procedure of avoiding it where possible, although NASA is researching
this problem. It appears that the inputs to this function will be weather
forecasts and airborne weather radar display, and possibly an input from
a turbulence-sensing device. The most practical criterion measure for
this parameter is an indication of the presence or non-existence of turbu-
lence in the vicinity of the SST flight path, with possibly some estimate
of severity, such as light, moderate, or severe. The requirements for
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forecasting turbulence (ref. 58),through 1975 indicate that these condi-
tions for the terminal areas and enroute airspace will be forecasted as
to occurrence and location on a O to 1 hour and 1 to 12 hour basis. Data
will also be available on a 2 to 5 minute decision time period for takeoff
and landing operations. The location of the turbulence area will be spe-
cified with accuracies within + 1000 feet and + 0. 5 miles, with forecasts
proportionately less accurate as a function of time elapsed since fore-
cast. As with the other parameters, the forecasts will be updated to the
extent possible via the data link. Monitoring of the airborne weather
radar will be a manual function and hence no automation is envisioned
in the provision of differentials (i. e., presence or non-existence) since
this will be perceived each time the radar display is sampled (viewed)
by a crew member. Reliability, accuracy, and range of any turbulence-
sensing device would certainly contribute significantly to any scheme for
providing differential turbulence solutions, assuming such to be a require-
ment. It appears more likely that the sensor-output will be monitored
by flight managernent and differences between actual and forecasted con-
ditions noted by the system monitor.
5. Other phenomena. It appears that other weather phenomena will
be treated in much the same manner as the turbulence magnitude parame-
ters (i. e., same as the turbulence-sensing device). The remaining phe-
nomena treated by this function may be generally separated into two cate-
gories, enroute and landing conditions. Hazardous weather conditions
in both the terminal area and enroute will be forecasted and observed
with the same time schedule and accuracies indicated for the turbulence
parameters (ref. 58). Runway condition forecasts and observations will
include precipitation types, and depth in a range of 0 to 1 inches to ±20%
and >2 inches, and will be forecast with the same time schedule indicated
for the turbulence parameters. It is further assumed that the function
will provide the means for comparing the newest forecasts with those
preceding and informing flight management of any differences. It should
be pointed out that any of these phenomena which can be described
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parametrically, and whose parameters may be measured over some
dynamic range, could be included in the above described differential
calculation and trend development sequence. The practicality and
necessity for such treatment should be subjected to further analysis.
Feasible Manual Implementation Concepts for SST
This function, as this analysis indicates, is essentially not amen-
able to a manual implementation. That is if the navigation of the SST
were to be implemented with man being responsible for many of the
tasks which this analysis considers to be more amenable to an on-board
data processor, it would appear highly likely that differential weather
parameter solution would be reduced to an evaluation of changes in
weather forecasts which are based on periodic observations by meteor-
ological agencies. As such, sophisticated techniques for calculating
differential solutions for several parameters such as winds and temper-
ature, as well as developing a prognostic trend, would be largely impos-
sible with on-board facilities; and, if practical at all, such calculations
would have to be made by ground-based meteorological facilities. Simply
put, man is only capable of working at a pace which would reduce this
function to noting changes in forecasts and receiving airborne sensor
inputs for evaluation over a longer time base than would appear to be
optimum. It is true that sensors such as search weather radar with a
range of 200 to 250 miles would undoubtedly be monitored to some extent
by man. It is also true that the latest weather forecasts would be moni-
tored to some extent by man. However, these data inputs provide the
evaluative basis for some action to be taken only a few minutes later,
Consequently, sonic boom focusing could be occurring over a significant
area when it could at least be minimized, and possibly even eliminated
by the use of a more sophisticated technique. In the equally critical area
of fuel coms umption , the absence of a sophisticated technique for fuel
cons ervation depending on the ambient temperature gradient and the
resultant engine efficiencies would appear to impose an unrealistic
economic penalty on the SST.
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7. 6 FUNCTION 7.6 CALCULATION OF OVERPRESSURE
BEING GENERATED
Purpose
This function provides the cockpit with an accurate measurement
of the location and strength of ground shock-wave patterns being gener-
ated (along with predictions for the same data) by the SST during all
Current Jet Operational Requirements and Constraints
There are no applicable requirements or constraints.
Current Jet Implementation Concepts
There are no applicable concepts.
SST Potential Operational Requirements and Constraints
The literature reflects the general consensus that the magnitude
of ground overpressure generated by the SST should not exceed some
nominal value (generally _. i. 5 psf). The FAA RFP (ref. 60) indicates:
"Maximum overpressure, during acceleration to supersonic cruise
speeds,less than two pounds per square foot. Maximum cruise and
deceleration overpressures of 1. 5 pounds per square foot. " Polhernus
(ref. 53) suggests that navigation will have the added task "... of detect-
ing (or in some way acknowledging) the possibility of creating damaging
overpressures at the ground, and of displaying the correct flight path
modification necessary to minimizing its effect. " King and Groves
(ref. 56) indicate the criticality of the control requirement:
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... transition from subsonic to supersonic speed may occur
in the altitude range of 30,000-40,000 feet, but, due to the
problem of sonic boom, this altitude range may have to be
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problem will almost certainly means that this transition will
have to take place either over water or over sparsely popu-
lated land areas and will need to be clearly defined geograph-
ically.
Further indication of the seriousness of the control problem is borne out
by Shaw (ref. 61),
Like most other airlines, Qantas regards the sonic
boom problem as the most serious, uncertain, and inher-
ently intractable problem of the SST. To underscore the
seriousness of this problem area, an excerpt is presented
from a paper written a year ago:
... There are two major uncertainties in this prob-
lem, firstly, the precise value of the boom overpressures
that will be developed by aircraft of the size of the SST,
cruising at SST altitudes, and secondly the magnitude of
the booms that will be acceptable to people living on the
ground beneath.
There is a considerable body of theory covering the
first point. While in the main it is well founded theoreti-
cally, it does not include some assumptions that have yet
to be fully confirmed.
On the second point, there have been a number of
experiments carried out already. However, as with most
tests of subjective reactions, the answer is far from defin-
itive. My own tentative view is that boom overpressures
of no more than 1 lb/sq, ft. will be acceptable and up to
1-112 lb/sq, ft. may be acceptable. I feel certain that
boom pressures over 2 lb/sq, ft. will not be acceptable.
Unfortunately the predicted boom pressure for th_ SST
fall right in the band of uncertainty between 1 to 2 lb/sq, ft.
The worst overpressures occur during the accel-
eration which has to be made at altitudes well below the
cruise altitude. There is little doubt in our mind that
the sonic boom problem will determine the minimum
acceleration altitude and consequently exert a decisive
influence on the overall design, particularly on the selec-
tion of engine size and possibly wing loading.
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The boom pressures are a function of aircraft weight
and it is not unlikely that the sonic boom problem will set a
practical upper limit to the gross weight of the machine.
This is a further and compelling argument for the design of
the minimum possible size of the SST.
It is not impossible that the sonic boom problem will
preclude the operation of the SST at supersonic speeds ex-
cept over oceans and deserts of the world. For this reason,
Qantas has included in its route studies of the SST the ques-
tion of alternate operation of sectors over heavily populated
areas at subsonic speeds.
A final indication of the problem criticality is evident in the remarks of
Power (ref. 57), "In reality, actual flight operations of the SST, both
by the flight crew and with consideration of the air traffic control system,
may be defined by sonic boom criteria... " With regard to a simulation
program to support fuel optimization studies, Power goes on to say that
the program is designed such that:
During every portion of the flight (simulated by com-
puter techniques)* ground overpressure due to sonic boom
will be calculated with inputs provided from the Joint FAA-
USAF-NASA Program. On the basis of the best information
available concerning the operational procedures, design
considerations, meteorological effects, and generation of
the sonic boom overpressures, the optimum accelerate-
climb and decelerate-descend profiles will be constrained
to limit overpressures to a nominal maximum value.
Similarly in the cruise region, optimum cruise altitudes
and Mach numbers will have the same overpressure bound-
ary conditions imposed. In this manner the fuel penalties
associated with various sonic boom limits can be evaluated.
Overpressure limits can be varied during the flight by oper-
ational procedures to take advantage of terrain features,
meteorological conditions, and population density wherever
poss ible.
In view of the foregoing, it seems appropriate to state the constraint
as follows: overpressure measured at any point on the ground falling in
the total dispersion area of the shock-wave generated by an SST passing
* Parenthetic insertion ours.
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through the sonic barrier, and while in the supersonic speed regime,
should not exceed the maximum acceptable level (currently established
as _ 1. 5 psf) regardless of the maneuvers being executed and/or unfav-
orable atmospheric conditions.
The proper execution of certain flight control functions such that
established limits of acceptable ground overpressure are not exceeded
will require (1) accurate measurement (by estimation techniques) of
ground overpressure generated throughout the dispersion area with
respect to the flight path; (2) continuous measurement of overpressures
reflecting any change as a result of a change in one of the contributing
factors; (3) a clear presentation of these measured values so that a use-
ful dynamic range is available to flight management at all times; and
(4) data available on a prediction basis such that profile modification
may occur as required.
Feasible Automated Implementation Concepts for SST
The calculation of a best estimate of ground overpressure location
patterns and magnitudes generated by the SST in all phases of its super-
sonic operations is by the nature of the contributing variables, a highly
complex problem.
Given a specific SST design, several components which contribute
to the sonic disturbance can be subjected to analysis such that these com-
ponents may be fixed with respect to the magnitude of their contribution
to the problem under certain conditions. Presumably, some range of
variance may also be established for each fixed component as the condi-
tions are varied. Typical fixed components may be generally categorized
as aircraft configuration characteristics, because the pressure signature
near the aircraft contains shock waves from the airplane nose, wing-
fuselage juncture, engines and tail surfaces, and because it has been
concluded and corroborated that volume and lift effects contribute to the
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pressure signature magnitude (ref. 62). Other variables of a more or
less controllable (or predictable) nature include aircraft gross weight,
altitude, Mach number and attitude. Wind velocity and relative bear-
ing contribute directly to focusing effects and, obviously, are of an un-
controllable nature.
In arriving at an implementation concept for this function, it is
worthwhile to consider the real nature of the calculation to be made
from the standpoint of the contributing factors. Ideally, in the calcu-
lation of overpressures, all contributing configuration characteristics
would be known in absolute magnitude and would be assumed to be abso-
lute constants, the aircraft would be assumed to be in straight and level
flight with a constant angle of _ttack and a constant lift coefficient, alti-
tude would be constant, Mach number would be constant, and gross
weight would be constant, and the flight would be conducted in standard
atmosphere, no-wind conditions. Carlson (ref. 62) states (after Walkden)
that
In the following equation.., the bow-shock overpressure
directly under the flight path of an airplane in level super-
sonic flight is related to the geometry of the airplane and
the flight conditions:
APmax h 3/4 / T
P t 1.19 _ /._o
- j F(r)dr
K r _ 1/4 4 "Y+l O
wh ere
APma x
Ap
P
h
K
r
-- maximum value of Ap (at bow-shock)
= incremental pressure due to flow field of
airplane
-- reference pressure for a uniform atmos-
phe re
= altitude of aircraft
= airplane reference length
= reflection factor
= x/M 2 - 1 (M = Mach number)
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T
To
= ratio of specific heats (1.4 for air)
= dummy variable of integration measured
in same direction and using same units as t
= value of T giving largest positive value of
integral
fT ,T_ _T
J0 " ' -- --
= nondimensionalized distance measured
along longitudinal axis from airplane nose.
x/[ and the function F(T) above depends
on the longitudinal distribution of cross-
sectional area and of lift and is defined as
follows:
T T
1 fo A"t dt+ 1 fo B"(t)F(T)= _ _ _ v_T-t
dt.
where A"(t) represents the second derivative of a distribution
along the longitudinal axis of a nondimensionalized airplane
cross-sectional area determined by supersonic-area-rule
cutting planes and B"(t) represents the second derivative of
a distribution of nondimensionalized equivalent area due to
liftevaluated through an integration of the lifting force per
unit length along the airplane longitudinal axis.
This excerpt is not being offered as proof, nor as a complete, all-
inclusive treatment of the sonic boom problem. Rather, this excerpt
should make it clear that even under ideal conditions the complexity of
computing the problem dictates the use of high-speed computing techniques
if the data to be generated are to be useful in exercising control over the
problem. The problem is further compounded when so many of the com-
ponents in the calculation may be changing slowly or rapidly, non-linearly
or linearly, and in some unpredictable fashion. Consider a typical exam-
ple in which altitude is increasing or decreasing relatively rapidly, gross
weight is decreasing, Mach number is increasing and meteorological con-
ditions are anything but standard. Wind velocity is double what was fore-
casted and the relative bearing is off by 30 to 40%. The aircraft is
scheduled to execute a climbing turn to a new heading in three minutes.
Flight management needs to know immediately if the profile scheduled
will generate sonic boom focusing effects and/or the magnitude of the
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overpressure expected if the profile is followed. And this need must
be met with sufficient response time available to alter the profile. It
certainly seems within the realm of technical feasibility to provide:
. Continuous presentation of the best estimate of
ground overpressure magnitude being generated
by the SST.
o Continuous presentation of the best estimate of
predicted ground overpressure magnitude that
will be generated as a given profile is being
followed.
. Continuous presentation (as required) of profile
modifications necessary to minimize or control
overpressure magnitude such that: (a) the accept-
able level is not exceeded unless absolutely neces-
sary; (b) the time duration for exceeding the accept-
able level is held to the barest minimum; and (c)
insofar as possible, the focusing effects occur in
the most sparsely populated regions.
Results of recent studies (refs. 62 and 63) indicate that techniques
for m easuring and predicting the shock-wave patterns produced by an
SST in normal operating maneuvers are under development and hold
considerable promise. These techniques are being assessed as to their
compatibility for implementation via high-speed computers. And,
results also indicate that, to the extent that the sonic boom phenomena
theory is developed, the theory correlates well with typical data. It
therefore seems reasonable to assume that by the advent of the SST in
commercial airline operations, means will be available for implement-
ing this function (i. e°, the necessary software and hardware will exist
for automatic airborne computation and presentation of the data required
by flight management for control of the problem). A sonic boom control
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concept for the Hughes Aircraft Company's CEMS system (see Activity
1, Flight Management) is presented in Figure 41.
Feasible Manual Implementation Concepts for SST
This function is not considered amenable to manual implementa-
tion.
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41. Sonic boom control concept. (Courtesy Hughes Aircraft Company)
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7.7 FUNCTION 7.7 INTERNAL SYSTEM
POSITION GENERATION
Purpose
This function provides continuous information which reflects the
aircraft's position in three-dimensional space relative to any r_ference
system employed by either the aircraft for navigational purposes or by
ATC. Such information must be provided reliably and accurately from
Self-contained sources. Accuracy of these data must be commensurate
with the ATC requirements regarding separation minima for commercial
SST operations. This information must be in suitable form for:
. Display in the cockpit relative to the optimum profile
for the flight.
e Expression in terms of off-profile components in the
lateral, longitudinal, and vertical planes of the
appropriate reference system(s).
Q Utilization by other navigation functions (i. e., present
position updating, ETA prediction, optimum profile
generation).
. Transmission to appropriate ground-based facilities
(i. e., Air Traffic Control, company facilities).
Current Jet Operational Requirements and Constraints
Current jet commercial airliners are required to carry the nec-
essary navigation equipment which meets the minimum requirements
for on-board navigational capability for either domestic or inter-
continental flights or both, depending upon the aircraft's utilization.
Such equipment must be compatible with present-day capability
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requirements for maintaining current separation minima in all three
planes. This imposes position-fixing accuracy requirements on the
self-contained navigation system.
Current Jet Implementation Concepts
Currently, this function has limited applicability to jetliners
operating on domestic routes. This is primarily due to the fact that
externally referenced systems are much more widely employed within
the continental United States than are self-contained systems. The cur-
rent ATC system within the United States utilizes VOR/DME equipment
as the basic navigational tools. Some airlines operate self-contained
systems (e. g., TWA uses Doppler on transoceanic routes), however,
these systems have yet to be sanctioned by FAA for use in the contin-
ental United States as the primary navigation means.
Internal system position generation does have direct application
to jetliners operating on intercontinental routes. The use of Doppler
radar systems as primary navigation means for transoceanic routes is
well established. Moreover, a major intercontinental carrier (PAA)
has placed an order for a considerable number of inertial guidance navi-
gation systems. Increasingly, these systems are becoming the primary
means of navigation, and externally-referenced systems such as LORAN
relegated to a back-up role. The self-contained systems, however, do
not eliminate man's role in the present-day situation. In this regard,
Powell and Willis (ref. 50) have made very cogent remarks concerning
the Doppler system,
... we have to accept the fact, so often stated, that the
compass-Doppler-computer system can be no better
than the man who manipulates it. Compass manage-
ment is one reason; ignoring this for the moment, one
other reason is that Doppler error is not as straight-
forward as it seems to be.
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•.. On a series of flights, a Doppler operator monitors
equipment performance, programs the computer, keeps
track of compass errors for each stage of the flight, and
later removes t_ the best of his ability the effects of all
factors, including human error, which have deteriorated
Doppler performance.
... We believe these results are near the ultimate with
present equipment and fixing aids. To achieve them
we have found it necessary to follow a fairly intensive
in-flight work schedule. Compasses are checked
celestially an average of every 45 minutes, with cross-
checks between numbers 1 and 2 systems every 10
minutes. Doppler bias in established early in flight
and revised as indicated by subsequent fixes. Position
is fixed by outside means every 20 to 30 minutes, norm-
ally at 3 or 4 lines of position, and the computer is up-
dated fix by fix. Any let-up in this routine has been
found to invite errors. However, when our navigators
adhere to the routine, results indicate that they have
been able to detect and compensate for errors before
they become gross.
•.. There are as many navigational procedures being
followed today as there are operators, probably more.
No doubt every airline operator thinks his is the best.
... There is danger in the concept we sometimes hear
which argues for reduction of separation standards
based upon the capabilities of one particular black box,
the capability of one component of the whole navigation
system...Ultimately, however, separation criteria
must be reduced if we are to avoid having aircraft sit-
ting on the ground, or accepting grossly uneconomical
clearances• Will the standard of North Atlantic navi-
gation be adequate in all cases if, for example, lateral
tolerance is reduced by one half (the only figure ATC
authorities are presently willing to consider)? We have
to say no. We have found it impossible to produce the
required results consistently either by navigating with-
out a serviceable Doppler, using existing long range
navigation aids, loran, consul, and celestial, or by
navigating with Doppler with inadequate fixing or com-
pass-checking programs•
484
Some discussions of present-day inertial systems indicate that
the advent of the "pure inertial" system as a present position naviga-
tion system still requires crew involvement. The equipment must still
be updated on the basis of external fix data, and equipment performance
must be monitored. Regarding present systems, Holm (ref. 64) states,
"During this past summer, the Pan American flight tests demonstrated
the accuracy of a present position navigator which was an inertial plat-
form• " And that, "... a trained observer from the airline operated the
. ,+ _,_,_ reco,.,_o_ ,,
Greenaway (ref. 49) also discusses the crew role in long range
navigation of jet transports and points out that,
Until the introduction of jets, very few transport air-
craft were even equipped with elementary dead reckoning
computers, such as the air position indicator, let alone
with doppler radar• The navigator collected the desired
navigation information from various unrelated aids and
sources, maintained a manual air or track plot, passed
heading alterations to the pilot, and revised times of ar-
rival• The human computer and manual servo loop concept
was quite satisfactory for slow flying transports but left
much to be desired when applied to the navigation of high
speed aircraft• Therefore, it was obvious even some
years ago that the basic dead reckoning system for jet
transports would be an automatic DR computer receiving
inputs from the compass system, and drift and ground-
speed from the doppler radar. In actual fact this has
occurred, and in jet navigation the automatic position
computer has replaced the manual plot. Now the navigator
has only to concentrate on checking the DR position with
various fixing aids, monitoring the heading, computing the
arrival time, and maintaining fuel consumption records•
Automatic computers can be designed to indicate posi-
tion in a number of ways, such as latitude and longitude,
distance and bearing from base or to destination, as x and
y co-ordinates on a rectangular grid, or as distance to go
and miles off the desired track. Of the above systems, the
along- and across-track computer appears to be favoured
today by transport operators• This computer, in conjunc-
tion with doppler radar, underwent trials on global routes
during the mid-1950's, and is now being installed in most
jet transports.
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It is important to note that internal position fixing has now been
largely automated or is in the process of being automated on virtually
all jet aircraft equipped for intercontinental and/or transoceanic flights
where long range navigation is a requirement and must ensue without
the benefit of constantly available external aids to navigation. However,
it should be pointed out that, at least in present systems, complete auto-
mation of the present position navigator system has not been achieved.
Both the doppler systems and the inertial systems still depend on a crew
member for certain operating tasks.
SST Potential Operational Requirements and Constraints
Requirements for position fixing by a self-contained system will
undoubtedly be more stringent for the SST than for current jets in terms
of accuracy and will possibly involve a new dimension--continuous
changing of position in the vertical plane. It also appears a certainty
that present position must be continuously updated and available in a
form and format which can be transmitted and displayed, and must be
in terms of all airborne and ground reference systems being employed
in the navigation of the flight. With regard to the requirements for auto-
mation affecting this function, Greenaway (ref. 49) states that,
• .. automatic dead reckoning systems are approaching
reality... Although this automation is not a requirement
when navigating current transports flying at 7 to 8 miles
per minute, it will be for the MACH 2 - 3 jet transports
flying at 25 miles per minute•
He goes on to indicate that,
Future navigation systems will also use the actual
convergency of meridians to automatically correct for
transport wander, in addition to an automatic correction
for earth rotation. Both corrections are a necessity in
supersonic transport systems. Although the directional
gyro provides an accurate and stable heading, it must be
aligned to a reference and checked at regular intervals.
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The navigator presently carries this out manually by taking
a bearing on a planet or star with the periscopic sextant.
To guard against errors when attempting to read several
dials simultaneously during the heading check, Trans
Continental Airlines is installing a synchronous astro com-
pass. The requirement for this refinement is brought
about by the need for more accurate heading data...
He further indicates that,
•.. automatic position reporting will probably be employed
along the more congested routes. If so,.., there is no rea-
son to suggest that the normal geographical coordinate sys-
tem is not satisfactory for this purpose.
King and Groves (ref. 56) state that,
The need for a continuous knowledge of the aircraft's
position by the ground organization is also self-evident
and indicates a requirement for a suitable air/ground
data link for the transmission of navigational information
and A_ T.C. data necessary for adequate control purposes...
Moreover, it will clearly be of the greatest importance for
the pilot to be able to establish the precise position of the
transition area involved, for both the pilot and A. T.C. to
be able to refer to this area in common geographical terms,
and for the pilot to be able to execute the transition in strict
conformity with the clearance given... Lateral separation
minima must be as small as possible, otherwise the spread
of flight paths appropriate to a given route will entail some
excessive route mileage and tend to offset the advantages
of the vertical freedom gained... Navigation data must be
continuously presented in the cockpit both to facilitate ad-
herence to cleared flight paths and to avoid the cockpit
workload entailed in intermittent position fixing. By the
same token, A. T.C. will require a continuous flow of
accurate information on flight progress for monitor and
control purposes. It is essential that the navigational
data should be presented in the cockpit in a manner which
will reduce the need for interpretation and provide the
pilot with a self-evident and continuous indication of
position.
During the November 1963 Symposium of IFALPA, it was suggested
that each SST should be equipped with a proven instantaneous self-fixing
navigational system so that both the pilot and ground controller could
know the unmistakable location in transoceanic and supersonic flight.
With regard to the new dimension in navigation, i.e., the vertical
ATC for collision avoidance will be modified to give the SST freedom in
the vertical plane. It follows then that the requirement for continuous
position derivation by the self-contained navigation system must include
accurate information reflecting the aircraft's position in some reference
• -__,_ _ 1.I-1_system which includes ____11fh_...._ dlmens ...... A .... ough the _u........_ =._* liter-
ature seems to reflect a general consensus that freedom in the vertical
plane will be allowed for by the ATC environment existing during the
advent of the SST, this has not yet been confirmed by ATC. However,
Power (ref. 57) suggests that,
•.. In reality, the entire concept of navigation as it has
been practiced in the past may very well be subject to
a sweeping change, or rather extension. In addition to
the ever present problems of horizontal global naviga-
tion at ground speeds of 2,000 miles per hour, a com-
pletely new dimension of commercial navigation will
be added• The initial flight plan, and enroute perturba-
tions or deviations therefrom will in all probability be
considerably more complex in the vertical plane than
the horizontal plane .... As a matter of fact, it should
be clearly understood at the outset that SST navigation
must always be considered as three dimensional.
And thus, this study considers the self-contained means of pre-
sent position derivation as one which must satisfy the three dimensional
requirement.
One other major constraint that has a direct bearing on present
position derivation and which appears likely to be modified is the high-
altitude structure of the ATC system. It appears a certainty that air-
ways as we now know them will be non-existent in the ATC altitude
structure for the SST, and that the SST will essentially navigate point-
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to-point using an area-coverage approach and following an optimum
flight profile. The reasons for these assumptions are primarily econ-
omic, although structuring the SST cruise altitude environment in
restrictive airways would in all probability impose severe and undesir-
able maneuvering requirements on the SST at high speeds.
Feasible Automated Implementation Concepts for SST
T_.I .... +_+_,_, _nn,-_p*.q fnr this function are _enerally restricted
to systems employing either Doppler radar or inertial guidance systems
or some marriage of the two. There appears to be general agreement
that the two sensors could be employed so that their complementary
aspects are exploited. White (ref. 65) states that:
The "marriage" of doppler radar and inertial systems
offers some definite advantages over either system used
alone. In the writer's opinion, the self-contained system
most attractive for supersonic aircraft use at the time
these aircraft become operational will probably be some
combination of doppler and inertial techniques in a single
system. Significant operational advantages are offered
by at least three combinations of doppler and inertial
fe atur e s:
le Doppler systems with inertial system heading
reference.
. Inertial systems with aircraft velocity com-
putation corrected continuously on a long-
term basis by doppler groundspeed output.
e Doppler velocity input to an inertial system to
provide fast accurate in-flight north alignment.
There are significant problems associated with both systems,
some of which may have a direct bearing on the crew's involvement in
the function, and, resultantly, in the skills and knowledge which the
crew complement must have available for function performance. Some
indications of these problems follow (White, ref. 65),
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Doppler radar is a proven transport aircraft system
today. In February 1962 TWA received FAA approval
for using doppler radar as a primary overwater navigation
system. Very recently TWA received FAA approval for
doppler radar as a primary navigation system on polar
routes between the U.S. west coast and the west coast of
Europe. The approved route network extends to 72 ° north
latitude. Magnetic heading reference is used from the end
points of these routes to check points marking the boundaries
of the area where magnetic compasses become too unreliable.
The compass system function is changed from magnetic head-
ing reference to gyro heading reference to gyro heading ref-
erence (sic) at these points and is changed back again to the
magnetic mode after crossing the "unreliable" magnetic
field areas.
Several years' flight test experience with commercial
doppler radar indicates quite clearly the capabilities and
limitations of doppler as installed in TWA long range jet
aircraft.
Figure 42 shows system accuracy experience to date
together with future accuracy estimates based on auto-
matic groundspeed bias adjustment and more accurate
heading inputs. The first line shows experience on 34
transatlantic flights flown without resetting computers
or headings on the basis of ground fixes. The reference
line 2 shows experience with 64 transatlantic flights on
which the computer and heading corrections were made
as necessary based on loran and consol fixes.
The 95% probability cross-track errors increased
only about 31% when reference to ground facility fixes
was eliminated. This was a smaller error increase
than we expected.
The third line shows estimated accuracies assuming
the use of automatic groundspeed bias adjustment. To my
knowledge such a system has never been flown. In brief,
this proposed system would adjust the groundspeed bias
as a function of signal return level and indicated altitude,
thereby tending to compensate for groundspeed errors
caused by variations in sea roughness. Since the received
signal returned from the water surface is a function of the
sea state, it should be entirely possible to adjust the ground-
speed bias on the basis of altitude and signal return input
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intelligence. Assuming such a system operates with
reasonable accuracy, the groundspeed errors could
probably be cut approximately in half, as shown in
line 3.
Reference line 4 shows the estimated combined
effect of the automatic groundspeed bias and a plus or
minus . 25 degree heading input accuracy. These cross-
track errors assume a continuation of our present exper-
ience which indicates that drift angle errors in straight
and level flight are extremely small--probably some
small fraction of one degree. Our best estimates to
date indicate, at least roughly, that our drift angle
errors are probably something less than plus or minus
• 2 degree.
In my opinion, the error figures shown in refer-
ence line 4 are about the doppler state-of-the-art we
can visualize now. Any errors less than these figures
are probably crowding the present state-of-the-art.
Assuming these error figures would be attainable in
actual installations, we could expect along-track errors
of plus or minus 17 miles on a 95% probability basis
on 2,000-mile flight segments.
An interesting comparison of achievable accuracies may be made
by examining the data presented by Powell and Willis (ref. 50) which
illustrates the experience of Trans Canada Airlines, using the doppler
system with a full time navigator. These accuracies were achieved
using the navigational procedures discussed above under "Current
Jet Implementation Concepts. " The following is also from the same
publication (Powell and Willis, ref. 50).
The data which follow in no way attempt to reflect
the capability of doppler, computer, or any other parti-
cular piece of equipment. What they illustrate is the
navigational accuracy we have been able to achieve in
T. C.A. Essentially this is system rather than box
accuracy, the accuracy of the whole navigation loop
including the human operator and his control of the
various components.
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It does not include all error originating in the
doppler, computer, or compasses, since much of this
will have been compensated for by the navigator, who
feeds corrections for the errors he measures back into
the system. It does include the results of human errors
which are inadvertently fed in from time to time. The
figures indicating track-keeping capability further in-
clude the effect of occasional steering errors and auto-
pilot malfunctioning.
Results of our most recent analysis, 80 North
Atlantic flights available between completion of the
fleet modification program and preparation for this
papcr, follow. Errors _re expressed as percentages
of distance run, average distance = 1730 nautical miles.
Cross -Track Along -Track
Error Error
Standard deviation 1. 39% 1. 38%
50% error 0. 93% 0.93%
95% error 2. 71% 2.69%
Track maintenance results on the above flights
follow.
Percentage of
Flight Time
Nautical Miles of
Cleared Track
94. 72 10
99. 86 20
100 30
We believe these results are near the ultimate
with present equipment and fixing aids. To achieve
them we have found it necessary to follow a fairly
intensive in-flight work schedule.
Although White gives no specific average distance, it is assumed
that the distance would be comparable to that given by Powell and Willis
since both studies concerned trans-Atlantic operations. It also should
be pointed out that there are data available on blunder type errors,
which occur all too frequently.
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Although a direct comparison is limited by differences in equip-
. . ............. ,.vwu, data sample size, and so on, it is
interesting to note that the TWA figures obtained without updating the
system reflect a track-keeping accuracy considerably better than
TCA's figures which were obtained while using a fairly stringent fixing
and updating schedule. The only significance of such a comparison is
in the wide variation of reported achievable accuracy obtained with such
obvious extremes in navigational procedures. The fact that such a com-
parison is completely inconclusive is borne out by the necessity for con-
ducting such programs as Operation Accordion. (Ref. _6. )
One thing seems fairly certain, however, regarding the use of
doppler sensors; they are subject to errors which are cumulative with
distance flown, and which can apparently become significant in some
cases. It follows that with the SST the errors would accumulate much
more rapidly, and thus provide much less response time for detection
and correction. It is assumed that if the procedure outlined by TCA
were to be necessary with, say, dual doppler system installations on
the SST, the relative impact on the workload for the crew would be such
that the capabilities of at least a full time professional navigator might
be required to provide the necessary support and back-up for the system.
An additional problem with the doppler system is the necessity to pro-
vide an opening in the fuselage for antenna installation. Although this is
not a crew complement problem, it is a design problem which could
well eliminate doppler from further consideration for the SST due to
the impact of the installation on fuselage integrity.
Before leaving the doppler discussion, it should be noted that the
literature reflects considerable support for its use, as the following
statements made by Greenaway (ref. 49) exemplify:
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It is unlikely that inertial systems will have overcome
the lead that doppler has attained by the time the SST's are
flying. Although doppler is only just becoming widely used
in transport aircraft, the results obtained, both in accuracy
and reliability, are very good. It is difficult to imagine
operators going to another sensor which will lack the oper-
ational background that doppler will have acquired by this
time. Moreover, by the time the SST enters service, many
refinements will have been added to current doppler systems
and their reliability will be comparable to the main electri-
cal system of the aircraft...
And with regard to how this may affect the crew loading, Greenaway goes
on to state that,
The flight crew of an SST will probably consist of
three members, and one of the primary tasks during the
enroute phase of the flight will be the monitoring of the
navigation system and checking on the progress of the flight.
Powell and Willis (ref. 50) state the case for doppler,
There are doubtless many valuable places for a full
"inertial navigator, " but we do not believe there is one in
civil aviation. The gap between present serviceability
performance and that required in civil aviation is tremen-
dous. In-flight failures particularly those in the vertical
system, don't just degrade the results; they make them
useless. Both initial and maintenance costs are discour-
aging. So is the allied problem of keeping enough skilled
technicians in the right place at the right time. But, per-
haps above all, an inertial system, and any hybrid system
involving inertial components, would still require in-flight
monitoring and the use of back-up aids. Inertial systems
might well give increased accuracy for considerable per-
iods, but not enough accuracy plus reliability to permit
their performance to go unchecked.
Doppler sensors enjoy an extensive operating back-
ground. It is reasonable to expect some refinements in
both airborne and ground checking equipment. The inci-
dence of airborne failure is significant, and probably
always will be, but it can be minimized by a dual installa-
tion. It seems certain that doppler sensors will supply
drift and groundspeed for civil supersonic systems, but
from everything said so far it is also certain that monitor-
ing and back-up capabilities must be provided.
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There have been some interesting developments in the inertial
navigation field, however, and the inertial technique appears to be the
stronger contender for the primary self-contained aid. White (ref. 65)
points out an important problem with this technique,
One serious limitation of known inertial systems
is the requirement for ground alignment by automatic
gyro compassing for periods up to 30 minutes in order
to attain an adequately accurate true north reference...
Probably the strongest support for use of this technique in the
SST may be found in the following excerpts reflecting FAA thinking
(ref. 55).
Inertial navigation systems now appear almost
certain to find use in U.S. supersonic transports as a
basic en route navigation aid and also for "vertical
navigation"--to provide a climb and descent profile
which maximizes fuel economy and passenger comfort
and minimizes the sonic boom problem... This view
was expressed by Federal Aviation Agency represen-
tatives speaking here at the Institute of Navigation
conference.
All three aircraft companies that submitted bids
in the U.S. supersonic transport competition proposed
the use of inertial navigation systems, according to an
FAA spokesman.
FAA's own studies, and its flight tests last year
of a Litton Industries inertial system on a Pan American
World Airways jetliner, indicate that inertial systems
"have progressed during the long period of military
sponsorship to where they are now approaching the stage
of commercial utility, " according to Alexander B.
Winick of the FAA system design team.
The inertial system has an edge over Doppler
radar navigation aids, Winick said, in several respects.
The external antenna needed by a doppler radar requires
a hole in the aircraft belly which involves added struc-
tural reinforcement and an inertial system consumes
less electric power than a Doppler system.
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If Doppler were used, the supersonic transport prob-
ably would require a gyro stabilized platform to provide a
sufficiently accurate heading reference for the Doppler
system and an accurate attitude reference for climb and
descent maneuvers, so that the supersonic transport would
have most of the elements of a complete inertial navigation
system anyway.
Winick acknowledged that inertial systems still face
cost and reliability hurdles. Present FAA thinking is that
at least two complete inertial systems will be required,
with perhaps a third system carried as a standby.
If an attempt is made to compare automatically hhe
output of the two or three systems to monitor their perfor-
mance, it will be necessary to develop better monitoring
techniques than are now available or else all of the systems
will have to be aligned very closely before take-off, posing
airline operating problems, Winick said.
There are also numerous discussions in the literature regarding
the utilization of a hybrid self-contained system, such as doppler/inertial,
doppler/astro, or inertial/astro. Regardless of which system is ulti-
mately employed, it will not be allowed to operate without adequate mon-
itoring, and updating by removing errors detected or known to be cumu-
lating due to equipment characteristics. The final system will probably
involve certain tasks on the part of the crew. At this time, estimates
of crew involvement must be limited to generalizations of crew require-
ments and associated skills and knowledge. Detailed determinations of
crew involvement must await the selection of the avionics to perform the
function, and the actual man/machine relationship designed into the
avionics ultimately selected. Generalized task requirements would
include the following:.
1. System monitoring. Regardless of the system employed, its
performance will be monitored. The monitoring is visualized in terms
of two requirements, (a) performance monitoring from a credibility
point of view to detect blunder type errors, and (b) performance moni-
toring from an accuracy point of view to detect cumulative and insidious
types of errors. It would be desirable to monitor both the system inputs
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and outputs. System inputs appear amenable to automatic monitoring
from an electrical approach; input voltages could be compared to a
reference voltage. And, credibility monitoring on the output side
aDDears feasible by = o,-{+--,-{o ...... 1,,p ........ _'" given an instanta[_-
eous latitude readout as a beginning point, true heading, and velocity,
the latitude change computed in each machine cycle would not be allowed
to exceed some number representing, say, the change attainable with
maximum speed of the aircraft, or be less than, say, the change attain-
able if the aircraft speed were some fixed pcrcentage less than indicated.
Such monitoring would only insure that the computed value lies within a
range of possibility. This type of monitoring would catch gross errors
in the equipment, such as an analog to digital converter dropping signi-
ficant digits due to malfunctioning components. These monitoring func-
tions are generally amenable to automation.
Monitoring system outputs for accuracy would undoubtedly involve
the crew. This would be true even if triple system installations are
employed, since rough agreement among the equipment only ensures
reliability, and accuracy is not necessarily a function of reliability.
Given three similar installations with similar systematic errors of
varying magnitudes, the average output could be less accurate than the
output of any one of the systems, or than the average of any two outputs.
As a result, monitoring the accuracy of the self-contained system out-
puts will be a task for a crew member to ensure that the inputs to the
Present Position Updating function are within some reasonable limits
of the estimated aircraft position where such an estimate is based on
the crew member's judgment, given the last updated position, heading,
and velocity.
2. System operation. There undoubtedly will be certain operating
procedures applicable to any system employed which will involve basic
tasks for a crew member. For example, both inertial and doppler
systems now utilized employ set-up techniques requiring the manual
498
insertion of the known coordinates of the destination or the initial check-
point. If check points are employed in the SST system, a series of
these set-up operations will be necessary even though they are menial
tasks. Also, if an automatic star tracker is employed for the heading
check task, a crew member would still function with the equipment by
selecting the appropriate stars. Just what part the crew member might
play in an in-flight north alignment scheme is not yet known.
There is, of course, a high probability that other tasks will be
required of the crew in the utilization of the self-contained system
chosen for the SST. It is not likely, however, that such tasks will be
complex as long as the system is functioning properly.
Feasible Manual Implementation Concepts for SST
The performance of this function by conventional methods, or any
method less than the system described above is difficult to consider as
being feasible for the SST, at least as the primary navigation technique.
This seems to be borne out rather conclusively in the literature. Some
representative references follow:
When cruising the Mach 3 aeroplane travels about one mile
in every two seconds. Methods of navigation used with
slower aircraft will not be suitable. The development of
reliable Inertial and Doppler Radar Navigation Systems is
expected to result in the installation of airborne Inertial or
Inertial/Doppler Navigation Systems on the aircraft. These
systerr_ will include small digital computers for continuous
presentation of position and velocity information. (Ref. 39. )
Greenaway (ref. 49) states that,
The manual linking together of the navigation sensors, com-
puter, and directional element when flying at 25 miles per
minute is out of the question, and a fully integrated and auto-
matic navigation system is required.
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And, regarding the navigation problem with the Concorde (ref.
25), it has been stated that,
Navigation computation can no longer be done manually_
since the timc involved would make the information too
stale to be of use.
And (ref. 39),
Airborne navigational equipment will relieve the crew
of what would be an impossible task at speeds of Mach
3 if conventional methods were used.
In summary, it seems a certainty that this function will not involve
a crew member to any greater extent than monitoring and, depending
upon the system characteristics, perhaps one or more manual inser-
tions of a set of geographical coordinates, such as the destination co-
ordinates and/or checkpoint coordinates. This assumes that (in the
event of an inertial system) north alignment will be obtained automati-
cally, and switching from magnetic reference to grid reference will be
automatic. The requirement for heading check is discussed under
External System Position Generation.
SUBSONIC SPEED REGIME
Assuming that the SST returned to the subsonic speed regime to
continue its flight or returned to base for some reason other than failure
of the navigation system, present position generation by the internal
system would continue as an automated function. However, any increase
in flying time would increase the error being accumulated by the system.
Since doppler error is cumulative with distance flown, the error rate
would tend to be no worse than in the supersonic regime, assuming a
doppler system. On the other hand, an inertial system degrades in
accuracy with elapsed time. Hence the slower flying speeds would tend
to cumulate aproportionate increase in system error, assuming an
5o0
inertial system and utilization of external fixing aids where possible,
and possibly celestial fixes in the absence of other sources.
Although the astro-tracker is visualized as being automated to
provide an accurate heading reference, it is assumed that the obtaining
of a fix would involve "unlocking" the tracker from the system, and
manually operating it to obtain an actual fix. Additionally, the slower
speeds would permit more time to establish bias in the doppler system
if one were employed. It is apparent that the skills and knowledge in-
volved parallel those required for the application of conventional navi-
gation techniques, and generally found for the most part only among
specialist navigators.
If the reason for return to the subsonic speed regime was due to
catastrophic failure in the navigation system, and more particularly
in total failure of the self-contained system, the result could be one of
the two following. The external source information could be utilized
with the airborne components to provide adequate navigation, assuming
that the aircraft was always in range of a suitable signal source. Alter-
natively, the aircraft would have to rely on the application of conven-
tional navigation techniques, which generally require the skills and
knowledge of the professional navigator. While returning to the subsonic
speed regime will have severe economic penalties, the impact will
nevertheless be less severe if the aircraft can continue to its destina-
tion and not abort the flight entirely. This obviously has some trade-
off cons id er at ions.
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7. 8 FUNCTION 7. 8 EXTERNAL SYSTEM POSITION GENERATION
Purpose
The purpose of this function is to provide information generated
by an externally referenced source which reflects the precise position
of the aircraft in three-dimensional space in whatever reference system
is compatible with the reference systems employed by the self-contained
system position generator and the ATC system. The timeliness and
accuracy of these data should be such that:
i. Self-contained dead reckoning systems are not allowed
to accumulate errors large enough to put the SST in
jeopardy of violating the assigned air space, thus assur-
ing collision avoidance.
. Self-contained dead reckoning systems are not allowed
to promulgate insidious or blunder type errors.
o Dual installations of self-contained systems are afforded
reliable and accurate means for cross-checking pur-
poses.
e Where required, the initial or origin coordinates
stored in the self-contained system(s) may be pre-
cisely updated, where these systems rely on the
accuracy of such coordinates for total system accur-
acy.
o On domestic routes (or wherever ground installations
permit) the aircraft may be navigated using the ex-
ternally referenced source as the primary navigational
means.
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This information should be in a form suitable for display in the cockpit;
utilization by other navigation functions (i.e., Present Position Updating,
ETA Prediction, Optimum Profile Generation); and transmission to the
ground-based ATC system.
Current Jet Operational Requirements and Constraints
Within the continental United States, jetliners are required to
navigate using the high altitude ATC airway structure for the enroute
portion of any given flight and _u follow standard ir_trumcnt departure
and standard instrument approach patterns for navigation within the
origin and destination terminal areas. These airways and standard
patterns are structured such that the ATC facilities can maintain maxi-
mum control of the air traffic situation. Usually, an airway proceeds
from one ground navaid of a certain class to another ground navaid, or
to some intersection of lines of bearing from two such navaids, with a
maximum distance (e. g., 250 nm) between aids. For given flights,
there are mandatory position checkpoints. Present position is then
generally determined prior to each checkpoint and given in relation to
the checkpoint. Thus the present position derivation by means of an
externally-referenced system is performed at required reporting
points, and upon request by either ATC or company procedure.
Because the externally-referenced system is used as the primary
navigation means in the continental United States, the present position
will also be determined by the crew with whatever frequency may be
required to insure that the aircraft is maintaining its schedule and
keeping within its assigned airspace. Since altitude is generally
assigned as a constant value, the principal concern is aircraft devia-
tion in the lateral and longitudinal planes, although altitude is a required
report component. Further, since longitudinal deviation is usually
more a function of the capability and capacity of the ATC system, air-
craft navigation is generally most concerned with lateral deviations,
which are largely a function of meteorological conditions.
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The requirements for present position derivation by means of an
externally-referenced source on intercontinental flights are necessarily
limited by the availability of the necessary ground-based aids. Since
there is no worid-wide standard of long range, ground-based navigational
aids, and not all points along intercontinental airways are within the
range of available aids, the general requirements for position reporting
are met by utilization of the self-contained systems. The self-contained
systems are updated by the external systems where the necessary facil-
ities are available. On intercontinental flights then, the requirement is
to update the self-contained system by means of a position-fix obtained
from an externally-referenced source when the ground-based facilities
are available. An obvious constraint is that aircraft may not operate
on intercontinental lanes without the appropriate airborne navigation
system components compatible with the available ground aids.
Current Jet Specific Implementation
At present, the standard navigational aid within the continental
United States is the VOR (very high frequency omni-directional radio
range) used in conjunction with DME (distance measuring equipment).
When navigating airways within the United States, commercial jets have
an essentially continuous read-out of the necessary data that will allow
them to plot their position on an appropriate geographical reference.
The VOR is used for azimuth indication and the DME for range. By
dialing in the appropriate frequency (channel) of a given VORTAC station,
the crew member obtains an automatic cockpit display of the range and
azimuth from that station. Current jetliners navigate the airways by
utilizing two such VOR receivers such that intersecting lines of bearing
may be correlated to an appropriate geographical reference (e. g., WAC
chart, or sectional chart) and a set of coordinates may be derived which
describe the aircraft position, or a distance to or from a given station
may be determined. The equipment is also such that the passage over
a VORTAC whose signal is being received in the aircraft is visually
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indicated in the cockpit, and an updated origin point is immediately
available. There are presently some 850 VOR and VORTAC stations
within the U.S. and programs call for increasing that number to II00
(ref. 28). The accuracy of a position fix utilizing these navaids is the
basis for current high-altitude standards for domestic usage (i. e. ,
15 minutes in time longitudinally and 30 to 35 nm laterally, ref. 67).
VORTAC is also currently the standard navaid for commercial jetliner
navigation in terminal areas, even though the aircraft are under radar
surveillance and ground control.
During intercontinental flights, the determination of present
position by means of externally-referenced systems is governed by
availability of means, range of available means, and the type of means.
These means are generall_y referred to as long range and area coverage
and generally are designed around hyperbolic line of position and
"straight, line-of-bearing" disciplines. Such means include LORAN C,
Standard LORAN, and others. Typical basic navigation procedures
(transoceanic) in use today call for checking the heading reference and
fixing the aircraft's geographical position at half-hourly intervals, plus
reporting position to ATC at least once an hour (ref. 68). For example,
current ATC procedure in transoceanic flights in the North Atlantic call
for reporting of present position at every I0 ° of longitude (approximately
450 miles at 50° N latitude). However, in many cases the absence of an
externally-referenced source for navigational signals means that the
position is derived by a navigator, or solely from the self-contained
system and may contain those error components which are both random
and cumulative since the last updating from an external source position
fix.
Where there is such equipment, however, the involvement of a
crew member can range from almost an observer to that of actually
plotting various LOP's from selected pairs of ground-based stations
and extrapolating a position-fix therefrom. Variance in the routine can
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be caused by several factors. For example, there are systems avail-
able today (LORAN C} which provide fixes automatically. Another source
of variance can be the audibility of the ground station signal, or presence
of anomalies of any sort. When the aircr_,ft i._ _n _n _,-,_ ne .... at_ ......
signals, or when discontinuity of the signal becomes a factor, it may be
necessary for the crew member to take several readings before an accur-
ate and reliable fix can be obtained. And in some cases, if the discon-
tinuity is severe, the process cannot be culminated in a fix until the air-
craft is within more suitable range of the ground stations. Additionally,
time differentials from two pair of stations (or three separate stations)
do not in and of themselves constitute a fix. These data must be corre-
lated with the hyperbolic grid reference charts (LORAN charts) and
aircraft velocity so that a position fix can be extrapolated. In the absence
of automation, this entire process is performed manually by a skilled
crew member.
Heading checks (compass alignment checks) and position fixes, if
required in the absence of ground-based aids, are also obtained by celes-
tial techniques which are currently performed manually with the aid of
certain equipment. This process involves deriving the actual range and
azimuth of the aircraft from selected celestial bodies and comparing
these data with the extrapolated range and azimuth from these same
celestial bodies derived by the self-contained system. To some extent,
the process has been largely automated. These are astro-tracking
systems which will provide range and azimuth data on selected celestial
bodies automatically, and the crew member's involvement is restricted
to selecting one of the stored targets in the astro-tracker memory and
recording the results (or equipment read-out). However, in other cases,
it is necessary for one of the crew members to be skilled in the use of
the periscopic sextant and the appropriate manuals. Obtaining range
and azimuth data on selected celestial targets is the preliminary step
in performing a heading check or obtaining a position fix by celestial
techniques. These data must be correlated with aircraft situation data
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(e. g., altitude, heading, velocity) in order to obtain a fix or a compass
alignment. The processes of getting from star data to heading error
component or present position involves definite skills available in
specialist navigators or pilot personnel who have undergone navigation
training. Some airlines have deleted the navigator position from the
crew complement and other airlines still retain this position. The
avionics and job aids undoubtedly vary widely among airlines. It is
obvious that the degree of crew involvement varies just as widely, and
perhaps this is best borne out by reiterating the statement " ...... , ,L_,
"There are as many navigational procedures being followed today as
there are operators, probably more. No doubt every airline operator
thinks his is the best. "
SST Potential Operational Requirements and Constraints
Modifications to current navigational accuracy requirements have
been discussed under the general activity. These new requirements can
be viewed as having considerable impact upon the performance of this
function. Although the reduction in separation minima generally reflect
performance criteria for both self-contained and externally-referenced
systems, there are some indications in the literature that navigational
accuracies anticipated for both the doppler and inertial self-contained
systems will be such in the 1970's that updating via externally-referenced
source aids will not be required.
However, there are also indications in the literature that tend to
substantiate a very realistic need for the updating of self-contained
systems, even when such systems are duplex or triplex installations.
It is important to remember that duplex or triplex installations only
provide an insurance factor of reliability and do not necessarily insure
accuracy. Considering, moreover, the vagaries of electronic equipment,
it seems reasonable to assume that there will be a requirement for, and
therefore facilities for, updating the self-contained system by means of
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an externally-referenced source. There presently is no standard, long
range, ground-based navigational aid along the airways of the world.
Should one be adopted prior to the advent of the SST, an obvious con-
straint ;rill be provision uf the airborne components compatible with
such a system in each SST. Should there be no standard, equipment
cots traints will vary according to the available means along the airways
scheduled to be navigated by any given SST. Generally stated, the SST
is constrained by its integration into the air traffic control system.
Feasible Automated Implementation Concepts for SST
It appears that SST navigation within the continental United States
(and any other areas where similar coverage is afforded) will be accom-
plished utilizing VOHTAC as the primary means. There is some opinion
voiced regarding the use of inertial and]or doppler systems between
VORTAC fixes. However, the general consensus is that the VORTAC
system with some improvements, would suffice alone. There are prob-
lems to be solved first, to be sure. For example, the distance measur-
ing equipment contains an inherent error component in that it measures
slant range rather than surface range. This error component increases
in magnitude with the increase in SST operational altitudes and can become
significant. Another problem is the increased magnitude of the "cone of
confusion" at SST operational altitudes, coupled with the possibility for
co-channel interference at those altitudes. Nevertheless, it seems a
certainty that the VOI:{TAC will be used as either the primary navigation
means where adequate coverage permits, or as an updating and back-up
system for self-contained systems, or both. As Winick (ref. 69) states,
"There is little doubt that the VORTAC system will be the standard
ground based navaid through 1975. "
Alleviation of some of the problems with the present VORTAC
system as it applies to the SST would appear feasible in light of the
following remarks by Winick (ref. 69). Referring to altitudes above
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45, 000 feet, for which the use of the super VORTAC has been proposed,
he says,
There is some question whether or not there must
be complete signal coverage throughout the United States
at these altitudes. If the answer is yes, it appears that
there will be from 24 to 27 Super VORTAC's throughout
the country. As has been discussed many times in the
past, the concept is that ground based facilities will be
available for updating and correcting dopplers and inertial
navigator s.
•.. A second question worth considering is whether
these facilities should be VORTAC or whether they might
be TACAN only. If they are TACAN only, it will certain-
ly help the frequency allocation problem faced by the FAA.
This would place a requirement upon the supersonic trans-
port for use of a TACAN bearing adaptor as an addition to
the DME. The associated DME will be capable of provid-
ing range out to 300 miles.
As you may be aware, some of us in the FAA, for
a considerable time, have been advocating the use of
VORTAC rho-theta displays as a means of utilizing the
area capability which exists in our system. As part of
our reconfiguration of the airways, we will attempt to
designate some airways, where airspace permits, which
will be suitable for flight by those appropriately equipped
with rho-theta pictorial displays. We have found some
divergence of pilot opinion concerning such displays, and
therefore it is difficult to use such preferences as a basis
of decision. To us the pictorial display is something the
system needs, and therefore we have repeatedly encouraged
its use. The important point to be made on this subject is
that VORTAC has an area coverage capability with the appro-
priate type of cockpit instrumentation. It doesn't need a
hyperbolic signal generator to obtain it. In fact, it does a
much better display job without the use of the hyperbola.
Taking a broader look at the subject of area coverage,
we realize that the doppler navigator is likewise an area
coverage device. Therefore, in the period through 1975
we envision the introduction of a pictorial display driven
by the outputs of the doppler navigator computer for use
in the continental U.S. With this type of instrumentation
it should be possible to bring in the ground based VORTAC
signal and display it on the same mechanism. It is gen-
erally accepted that this type of integration of ground based
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and self-contained aid is the very simplest that could be
achieved, and until much more confidence is accumulated
in the use of airborne digital computers it will be a sim-
plified way of accomplishing this objective.
As to plans for increased VOR accuracy, WLnick goes on to say that,
The doppler VOR is a highly successful development
which has resulted in a VOR ground station suitable for in-
stallation at difficult sites where the conventional one could
not work properly. Our next step, one which we have just
begun and which is aimed at 1970, is to convert the doppler
VOR into a multilobe ground station to provide a much higher
order of system accuracy.
We would like to see the accuracy of the ground based
navaid system be essentially the same as that of the radar
surveillance system. The doppler VOR recently developed
is completely compatible with current airborne equipment,
and this was a major objective. However, the precision
VOR will need an additional piece of airborne equipment.
We are not advocating this as an essential part of the
VORTAC system, but we do feel that the system has the
potential of providing bearing information to an accuracy
of essential (sic) 1 or 1-1/2 degrees. The precision ground
units can be very highly specialized facilities rather than those
in general use. They will provide the normal VOR signal
to all aircraft carrying the standard VOR airborne receiver,
but with the addition of an adaptor unit will provide an in-
crease in instrumental accuracy. This growth potential,
with some increase in complexity, coupled with the ability
to provide different degrees of service to different users,
is the reason why we are sure that the system will be suit-
able for the time period of interest.
Another system element, DME, will also be refined
for use at ILS facilities. There are many uses for distance
information associated with the ILS; it can be a monitoring
device as well as a means of feeding signals to an autopilot
approach coupler and flareout computer for landing. These
functions require the highest possible accuracy from the
distance measuring system and it is believed that potentially
the system can provide an accuracy of± 250 feet. We are
actively undertaking this work and should have test results
shortly. DME at ILS sites will be a part of the navigation
system starting within a few years.
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Another view (ref. 68) is that,
Area coverage navigation systems with pictorial
display, which really permit complete utilization of the
airspace, together with extensive utilization of electronic
computers for air traffic control, would undoubtedly assist
but, as neither of these is likely to be available, it appears
that a compromise between the ideal and the attainable will
have to be made.
The navigation is not seen to be greatly different from
that existing today and is primarily a question of adherence
to track: monitoring progress in time and fuel, and regu-
larly reporting this information to A. T. C.
Overland, conventional navigational facilities may be
adequate for these purposes. In areas of high traffic den-
sity, there exists here also a need for more efficient use
of the airspace, which could only be provided by a ground-
based area coverage system. VOR and DME, supported
by a self-contained aid such as Doppler and perhaps by a
proximity warning system, could be sufficient for areas
of low traffic density. In areas of higher density traffic,
the accuracy of VOR and DME would need to be increased.
At supersonic cruise altitudes, the "over station cone" is
much wider than at the levels flown today and would not be
acceptable as ATC checkpoints or for resetting Doppler or
inertial systems. Errors in DME at these altitudes are
also large and must be eliminated. For example, when an
aircraft flying at 60,000 ft. measures a distance of 16 miles
by DME indicator, it is in fact only about 11 miles from
the station. Doppler or inertial systems reset according
to such erroneous indications would carry this error along
with them to the next checkpoint. The large number of
checkpoints and turning points on today's airway patterns
would also be too great for SST airways, since the time
between points will be reduced to one half or one third at
these speeds, and at SST flight levels there is a risk of
interference between transmissions from different facilities.
In order to permit cruise climb procedures, a system of
parallel airways may be required to facilitate the work of
the pilot and air traffic controller.
White (reL 65) states that,
Supersonic transport navigation over the continental
United States can probably utilize the present VORTAC
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ground station network with some modification. Supersonic
aircraft at altitudes in the neighborhood of 60,000 feet can-
not use many of the stations at the present VORTAC network
because of co-channel interference at these higher altitudes.
Therefore, some portion of the VORTAC network should be
tailored specifically for optimizing high altitude supersonic
aircraft navigation.
Ideally, the supersonic transport should fly the long-
est possible straight-line segments compatible with meteo-
orlogical and navigational requirements. Also, since the
supersonic aircraft flies more than twice as fast as the
present subsonic jets, frequency changes must be made
more than twice as often. This is very undesirable, and
possibly unacceptable to flight crews.
The proposed "skip-station" scheme would utilize
selected VOR stations chosen from the present VORTAC
network. These stations should have the necessary co-
channel and adjacent-channel radio frequency protection
so they can be utilized out to radio line-of-sight distances
from the station at supersonic aircraft altitudes.
Figure 43 shows a typical relationship of selected
high-altitude VORTAC stations to the low altitude VORTAC
network. The widely spaced high altitude stations provide
straighter and shorter flight paths between the end points,
as shown by comparing the dashed line representing a
typical low altitude route and the solid line representing
the proposed high altitude route. Conversion of the selected
VORTAC to high-altitude facilities would not decrease
their utility in the low-altitude network.
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Figure 43. VORTAC "skip-station" scheme
(from ref. 65).
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The proposed high altitude VORTAC network would
provide, in effect, area coverage so that any point on the
map within the station coverage could be defined in terms
of a bearing and distance from the referenced station.
This means a line could be drawn on the map from a
VORTAC to any desired check point defined by bearing
and distance.
Figure 44 illustrates this navigational scheme.
The course line between the lefthand VORTAC station
(Station A) and point D can be flown in terms of a bearing
and distance from point A to point D. This flight segment
could be navigated en route by a VOR-DMET off-course
computer, doppler radar or an inertial system.
In effect, the high-altitude network would provide a
set of convenient high altitude check points and a means
of defining any point on the map in terms of bearing and
distance from a referenced VORTAC station. Any one of
the three systems mentioned above could be used to navi-
gate between the series of points defined by the area
coverage VORTAC system.
CHECK
/ POINT |DEFINIED
.._. / ,,o,*,,O,,AC°_
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o
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VOR-DME COURH-LINE COMPUTER,
DOPPLER I[ADAIE OI INERTIAL SYSTEMS
Figure 44. Area-coverage navigation using high-
altitude VORTAC facilities as check
points (from ref. 65).
At the higher cruise altitudes (60, 000-65,000 feet)
the over-the-station "cone" is considerably broader than
at the lower jet and piston aircraft altitudes. A narrower
over-the-station cone is very desirable at the supersonic
cruising altitudes so the VOR stations (which probably
will be ATC check points) can be marked with greater
accuracy.
Any errors in over-the-station indications impose
similar starting point errors in inertial or doppler
systems which use over-the-station indications for ini-
tiating a flight segment. In any case, the end point navi-
gational accuracy is limited by the starting point ac-
curacy (assuming the system is not corrected en route
by some external fixing means).
... A VOIRTAC station and airborne course-line
computer _ombination provides, in effect, an area
coverage navigation system permitting definition of any
chosen flight path with the line-of-sight cover of the
VORTAC facility used.
The primary accuracy limitation is probably im-
posed byVOR system azimuth accuracy. At higher alti-
tudes DME slant range errors become significant when
the aircraft is near the ground facility. Example: When
the aircraft is II. 3 miles horizontally from the ground
facility at 60,000 feet altitude, the DME indicator reads
16 miles, i.e. , a plus error of 4. ? miles. Doppler and
inertial systems are both capable of accurate navigation
between VORTAC network fixes. Accuracy is limited
primarily by fix accuracies of the VORTAC system and
the over-the-station fix accuracy. The capabilities and
limitations of these two systems otherwise are common
to both long- and short-range navigation.
It can be seen from these discussions that, in all probability, an
area coverage navigational system employing VORTAC will be utilized
by the SST on domestic routes for present position determination by
externally referenced sources. It seems highly probably that rho-theta
computers and pictorial displays will be instrumental in the SST. This
would appear to limit the crew involvement to that of selecting appro-
priate VOIRTAC channel(s) or frequencies to obtain indications of the
display of present position. It is also obvious, however, that this con-
cept will be necessarily limited to those geographical zones or areas
where the VORTAC signals are available with the accuracies required
for SST navigation. At the time of this analysis, this potential appears
to be quite limited in scope and is generally restricted to the continental
United States. However, indications that the coverage will become con-
siderably broader are evident in the following quotation (ref. 28).
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.,. VORTAC equipment is also the international
standard, and as such, is being implemented in many
other countries throughout the world. The present plans
include a complete airways installation for the United
Kingdom, France, Germany, Scandinavia, Switzerland,
Italy, and through the Middle East. In the time period
under discussion, it is fairly safe to assume that such a
system will be implemented along a large majority of
high density international routes around the world. Plans
also call for experimental installations on U. S. Coast
Guard weather ships across the North Atlantic and on
various island bas_s throughout thc Pacific.
Concepts for present position derivation via externally referenced
sources for intercontinental and/or transoceanic navigation are neces-
sarily based on the ground navaid environment predicted for the SST era,
and upon agreement that the requirement actually exists. Some discus-
sions follow. Winick (quoted in ref. 55) indicates that,
There is less widespread agreement on the ques-
tion of whether the supersonic transport's navigation
system will need to be updated, or corrected for accum-
ulated errors, and if so, what auxiliary navigation aid
should be used for this purpose. For supersonic flights
of only 2-3 hr. duration, correction may not be neces-
sary, he said.
For the North Atlantic, Loran-A or Loran-C
may be the best auxiliary up-dating means. The use
of celestial sightings for this purpose seems less
desirable. If star trackers were used, they would
have to be more fully automatic than those now used
in the B-52 and B-58, and such complexity and cost
would be difficult to justify if inertial systems develop
the reliability that is now expected.
Some substantiating opinion is available (ref. 74) in the following state-
ment:
While it is too soon to predict exactly what kind
of airborne navigation system will be used on the super-
sonic transport when it is introduced into service, one
report made to a government agency by an impartial
study group has already expressed the opinion that an
inertial guidance system capable of navigating an aircraft
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to within two miles of its destination, with no external aids
to navigation, probably will be in production by 1970.
However, there appears to be much more comment to substantiate the
.... Of _"* .... i _ • •_,_ ,L_, _I urns. Some representative comments follow. King and
Groves (ref. 56):
It has already become generally accepted that an
inertial platform will form a basic element in the naviga-
tion system of the supersonic transport aircraft. How-
ever, where the aircraft are to fit into any systematic
air traffic control pattern, which has as its object the
rigid control of separation between tracks in the hori-
zontal plane and the precise definition of specific geo-
graphical points and areas, it follows that information
of the dead-reckoning type must be supplemented by
information in which errors are non-cumulative, e.g.,
from a ground-based radio navigation system having a
common-reference characteristic.
Without the updating facility that such a system
can provide, separation standards would have to take
into account the possibility that the self-contained aid
in each aircraft in the traffic complex can accumulate
errors of a sign and magnitude which must be regarded
as largely random. Given a sufficient degree of updating
by a common-reference navigation aid, i. e., by a system
in which every aircraft obtains the same reading at a
given geographical location, the problem of establishing
separation standards is eased and the actual separation
values can be markedly reduced since errors of a cumu-
lative nature can be neglected.
In addition to providing this essential common-
reference characteristic, it is clear that an accurate
ground-based radio aid can contribute more effectively
to the navigation and control of air traffic in terminal
areas, where traffic density is such as to require the
highest possible navigational accuracy, than any device
of a dead-reckoning character. Again, the precision
which a ground-based radio system can furnish is of
value in terminal areas as a means of aligning aircraft
accurately with the axis of a guidance pattern established
for landing purposes--more especially when a fully auto-
matic landing capability is required.
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In other phases of S. S.T. flight, the accuracy factor
is scarcely less critical since it is paramount that pilots
should be able to execute flight clearances with a very high
degree of precision if efficient operation is to be assured•
It follows, therefore, that the updating facility is also high-
ly desirable in these phases, both from the A. T. C. and
flight viewpoints. Needless to say, the ground-based
system must at all points provide the requisite accuracy
to compensate for errors accumulating in dead-reckoning
systems.
Greenaway (ref. 49):
Although many of the major intercontinental routes
will be covered to some degree by radio aids, these will
only be used to supplement the aircraft's self-contained
system rather than being an integral part of it.... Simi-
larly, there will be other aids installed which will supple-
ment the automatic navigation system but will not actually
be part of the system. These aids will be the airborne
components of the ground-based systems covering the
more congested intercontinental routes and the terminal
areas.
Powell and Willis (ref. 50):
•.. an inertial system, and any hybrid system
involving inertial components, would still require in-
flight monitoring and the use of back-up aids... It seems
certain that doppler sensors will supply drift and ground-
speed for civil supersonic systems, but from everything
said so far, it is also certain that monitoring and back-
up capabilities must be provided. •. In any event, such an
aid will probably be required as a means of back-up navi-
gation.
Miedzybrodzki (ref. 70):
•.. The display should be driven from the aircraft
navigation computer using self-contained aids and it
should be capable of indicating errors of the navigation
system by an easy, and preferably continuous, reference
to ground radio aids. This, of course, is specially im-
portant in or near terminal areas... It should be possible
to update the navigation system via the display using
radio aids such as VOR's and DME's.
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Reference 71 regarding the Concorde:
It is probable that ATC authorities will insist on "updating"
aircraft___ ,---._.v.._nn_+_"'_'information periodically to ensure that
there are no gross errors in a self-contained system which
might endanger other aircraft.
Groves (ref. 59):
The requirements for a ground-based fixing aid can be
justified solely on the basis that the SST will have to fit
into a systematic ATC pattern... Information of the dead
reckoning type must be updated by information in which
errors are non-cumulative, e. g. , from a ground based
radio navigation system having a common reference char-
acteristic.
This analysis has assumed that, even on intercontinental flights
where there is a paucity of available ground based aids, the self-
contained system will be updated as often as is either practically
necessary Qr possible by a fix obtained from externally referenced
systems. It seems highly likely that such a system will provide auto-
matic position inputs to the integrated SST navigation system, for the
same reasons justifying the automation of the self-contained system
(i.e. , the staleness of the data generated and integrated by manual
methods). Again, it would appear that crew involvement would be
limited to only those operations required by specific equipment char-
acteristics for obtaining the necessary signal source, such as fre-
quency channel selection. The actual integration of the fix obtained
from such sources into the self-contained, automatic navigation system
is discussed under Function 7.9, entitled Present Position Updating.
Certainly, another possibility is fixing the position of the aircraft
by ground-based equipment, and relaying this position via the data link.
Obvious constraints are imposed by available stations.
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Feasible Manual Implementation Concepts for SST
The general consensus seems to indicate manual implementation
of this function only in terminal areas where the SST will have to oper-
ate within the performance envelope of current subsonic jets. There-
fore, speeds and altitudes will be such that terminal area navigation
will utilize essentially the same procedures as on the subsonic jets
with, hopefully, a higher degree of accuracy, particularly for all-
weather landing operations. (See Function, s 7. 3, 7.4, 7. 6, and 7. 7. )
During the enroute flight phases, both domestic and transoceanic,
performance of this function with any degree of manual implementation
is not considered p,'actical with the exception of setting specific dials
for proper equipment operation and display read-out, and as an emer-
gency back-up in the event of catastrophic equipment failure.
SUBSONIC SPEED REGIME
In the event the SST reverts to the subsonic speed regime for any
reason other than catastrophic failure in the navigation system, exter-
nal position generation would continue to be an automated function.
Should there be catastrophic failure in the navigation system, retur:r_ , to
the subsonic speed regime would permit utilization of conventional
techniques such as those employed aboard current jet liners for the
performance of this function.
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7.9 FUNCTION 7.9 PRESENT POSITION UPDATING
Purpose
The purpose of this function is three-fold, including,
0 The integration and processing of all appropriate
navigation inputs from the self-contained naviga-
tion system(s) (i. e., dual, or' triple installations
of identical systems, plus any additional dissimilar
system) such that the most reliable and accurate
indication of present position from these sources
is continuously available in appropriate form and
for m at.
2, The integration and processing of all appropriate
navigation inputs from the externally-referenced
navigational system(s) (e. g., VORTAC, hyper-
bolic, and communications satellite) such that
the present position indicated by the self-contained
system(s) contains minimal cumulative error, and
is cross-checked for the presence of insidious and
blunder errors, and at all times represents the
most reliable and accurate indication of present
position derivable from all navigation system(s)
sources where the complementary capabilities of
these systems are fully exploited.
e The best possible indication of present position
is continuously displayed in the cockpit in a form
and format consistent with requirements for clarity,
accuracy, and correlation with the optimum profile
in a manner which permits flight management to
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stay ahead of the flight situation (i. e., monitor
flight progress with respect to the optimum situ-
ation) and is available in appropriate form and
format for transmission to ground facilities.
Current Jet Operational Requirements and Constraints
There are no current requirements or constraints applicable.
SST Potential Operational Requirements and Constraints
Actually, the justification for this function is inherent in the justifi-
cation for externally referenced system position generation. If position-
fixing system inputs are required to correct and act as back-up for self-
contained systems, then the updating process itself is justified. The
justification (or requirements) for the updating process are given more
fully under Function 7. 8.
Feasible Automated Implementation Concepts for SST
There are generally two methods discussed in the literature for
the integration of data from self-contained and externally-referenced
navigation systems such that the best indication of present position is
available in the form and format required. The widest variance between
these two methods is in their refinement and sophistication.
Using the simplest concept, inputs from the two sources would
be integrated in a pictorial display. This display would be designed so
that a "roller map" would move through the display at a relatively con-
stant speed set to correspond with the best available estimate of the
aircraft's ground speed along the required track. This track would be
pre-drawn as a line down the map center. The aircraft would be posi-
tioned manually in relation to the track as data is availab_,._ from the
position-fixing component. The display would be driven by the dead-
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reckoning component. Figure 45 illustrates this arrangement. In this
arrangement, the speed of the map (representing ground speed) would
be adjusted manually as better estimates become available, and the
aircraft position denoted by external sources would provide the basis
for manually updating the dead-reckoning component. Three obvious
disadvantages of this arrangement for the SST are, (1) probably error
magnitudes that would be intolerable, (2) no provision for the vertical
plane and profile navigation in three dimensions, and (3) the restrictive-
ness of the system in terms of its need for rather constant attention,
which essentially requires one full-time crew member, a situation which
may not be practical or economical.
:ORCo_p ute r
Set, Wind. SetPosL_o_
Figure 45. Elementary compound navigation
system using a flight log to com-
bine the two inputs.
The second method, and the one appearing most advantageous for
the SST, is the use of an airborne digital computer to combine the navi-
gation inputs from both self-contained and externally-referenced systems.
The use of the computer offers many advantages over the manual method,
but perhaps the most significant improvement would be the capability for
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data smoothing, that is, continuous combination of the information from
both types of systems such that their complementary aspects are ex-
ploited fully and their error components minimized. This would permit
an output of substantially higher quality than that obtained from either
input taken separately. Additionally, the computer permits a greater
degree of accuracy because of its capability to make many complex
computations in very short time periods, and because adjustments in
the flight situation display under computer control are not subject to
the gross ex-t_orrf_gnitudes--^_--_-'_ ........................_v_,=_, ,_ from _,,,_I ,-nanip,d_tinn q. The
addition of the computer also greatly reduces the workload on the crew
in this area by essentially automating the derivation of the best estimate
of present position which includes all system inputs.
Computer outputs would be used to drive the pictorial display in
the cockpit, and to provide continuous information to the necessary
ground facilities regarding the precise position of the aircraft and other
desired data, such as aircraft velocity. The computer could even be
preprogrammed such that, at specified points along a given flight path,
navigation receivers could be automatically switched to receiving chan-
nels for the most appropriate radio aids.
Feasible Manual Implementation Concepts for SST
The absence of any indications in the literature regarding crew
role in this process, suggests that the updating of the self-contained
system by inputs from externally-referenced systems is being consi-
dered primarily as an automatic function. Manual implementation is
not considered practical if the externally-referenced system is to be
employed as the primary navigation means, or as the back-up system
in the event the self-contained systems are lost for any reason and the
aircraft remains supersonic.
However, manual insertion of a fix obtained from such sources
strictly as an updating requirement could be feasible, depending upon
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the frequency with which the fixes must be obtained and entered into the
navigation system, and provisions for the necessary means to enter the
data. Manual insertion of fixes would probably be accomplished by pro-
v_,41ng........... th_ m"_nS..__._for "_"_"_...., ._ ,.,,_""*...._ v,_ information h_to the navigation com-
puter, e.g., Lat/Long turning control with time-of-fix data, or buffer
storage of key-punched data where the crew member could enter the
appropriate information into the buffer, check it for accuracy, and cause
the navigation computer to interrogate the buffer and accept the data.
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7. 10 FUNCTION 7. 10 ETA PREDICTION
Purpose
The purpose of this function is to provide the crew and ATC with
the most accurate ETA's at checkpoints and destination based on the
most recent navigational data. This task has been considered 8 separ-
ate function because of the apparent increase in SST requirements for
frequency and accuracy over those for current subsonic jets. Some
following comments illustrate the apparent importance being attached
to this function.
Polhemus (ref. 53) gives some indications of the difficulty in
establishing and maintaining schedule integrity. The effect of temper-
ature differentials on achieving a predicted position and the time neces-
sary to reach that position during the acceleration and climb phase has
already been pointed out in the discussion of Function 7. 3. Polhemus
states that,
Ambient temperature aloft may actually result in greater
problems for ETA validation and position prediction than
will the wind solution. A 25°C change of temperature at
Mach 3. 0... is equivalent to a i00 knot ground speed
change... During the cruise phase of flight the atmos-
pheric conditions can invalidate an ETA, vary true air-
speed by 240 knots in a one-hour period...
It is also evident that the traditional navigation function
is complicated by the need to solve for position and ETA
during periods when velocity may be changing continuous-
ly, and when navigation system performance (accuracy)
is difficult to evaluate.
Further. Hooten (ref. 51) states that, "The SST will require that the
controller be given much more information than at present on the
scheduled flight path and flight times. " Also pertinent here is the
impact of a statement made during the November 1963 IFALPA Sym-
posium to the effect that prior to acceleration beyond subsonic speed,
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the pilot must have details of the time, height and location in which
the aircraft is due to return to subsonic speeds. It is apparent that
such details are merely the accuracy goals for the navigation system
for a given flight, and the key to achieving an ETA as scheduled prior
to the flight lies in accurate and continuous prediction of time and dis-
tance to go based on the most current navigation data. The requirement
for the continuous and accurate derivation of present position has already
been established. By the same token, the ever-changing navigation situ-
ation will demand the same requirements for ETA prediction in order
to maintain cognizance of schedule integrity and provide the basis for
adequate schedule revision.
Current Jet Operational Requirements and Constraints
In current jet operations, scheduled flights operate with "canned"
flight plans which indicate ETA's at all required reporting points and at
destination. In transoceanic operations, ETA's at the next reporting
point and at the destination point are given verbally as a required por-
tion of the standard position reporting format. This means that between
reporting points the crew must calculate ETA at the next reporting point
and at the destination point. This is a simple calculation based upon the
flight's progress and anticipated meteorological conditions.
Within the continental United States, jet liners are not required to
report their ETA at any checkpoint unless specifically requested by ATC
or the airline company. Further, ETA at the destination point is not re-
ported unless it becomes apparent that the flight will deviate by more
than three minutes from the scheduled ETA. This means that although
it may not be necessary to report the ETA at any point during the flight,
it is necessary for the crew to remain cognizant at all times of their"
adherence to the schedule. Hence, ETA must be calculated periodically
to ascertain any necessity for revision. The following regulation is
applicable:
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ICAOReg. 5. 3.1.2.2.1, ref. 14:
Change in estimated elapsed time (EET):
•.. if the estimated elapsed time to arrival
over the next designated reporting point or
to the aerodrome of intended landing as given
in the flight plan is found to be in error, nor-
really in excess of 3 minutes, unless other-
wise prescribed by the appropriate authority
or by regional agreement, a revised EET
shall be notified as soon as possible to the
appropriate air traffic services unit.
Current Jet Implementation Concepts
Generally, the calculation of an ETA to either some checkpoint or
to the destination point involves no more than a direct comparison of the
distance to go with the established ground speed. The accuracy of the
ETA is a function of the accuracy with which the distance to go is known
and the accuracy of the ground speed predicted over the remaining dis-
tance.
In domestic flights, VOR/DME equipment provides a direct read-
out of the distance to go to a VORTAC station lying directly on the flight
path or to either side of it. The flight plan provides a "total miles"
figure from which the distance flown may be subtracted leaving distance
to go. The anticipated ground speed during each leg of the flight is also
available and is based on the anticipated meteorological conditions. It
is, then, a simple matter to check the ETA at any point in the progress
of the flight. The same procedure is utilized during transoceanic flight,
the exception being that aircraft equipped with doppler radar have ground
speed available as a direct read-out in the cockpit.
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SST Potential Operational Requirements and Constraints
It does not appear that the SST will be subject to any requirements
for ETA prediction notably different than those for the current subsonic
jets, other than increased frequency and accuracy. It does appear,
however, that the "time for error" requirement may be necessarily
decreased. In other words, if current jets need to report an ETA
revision when the flight deviates by more than three minutes from the
scheduled ETA, then the SST should probably make such a revision
when the crew can predict an ETA deviating by more than one minute
from the schedule. The decrease in time would be warranted by the
tremendous increase in speed of the SST over that of subsonic jets,
which if no changes were made, would cut ATC reaction time by a factor
of two-thirds.
The operational characteristics of the SST would also seem to
necessitate a much higher degree of accuracy in predicting the ETA.
Accuracy would be particularly important in predicting the ETA at the
deceleration/descent point where missed ETA's generally result in
holding in terminal control areas. The adverse impact of holding for
the SST is evident in considering the fuel penalty for such operations
and the possibility that these penalties could easily affect payload. It
seems obvious that along with more accurate ETA calculations there
will probably be more frequent ETA revisions made to maximize ATC
response time.
Feasible Automated Implementation Concepts for SST
There seems to be little doubt that the vast majority of the naviga-
tion tasks in the SST will be performed by a fully automated, integrated
navigation system utilizing data inputs from various navigation sensors
as well as stored data and information from the ground-to-air communi-
cations system. It is also generally agreed that the heart of this naviga-
tion system will be an airborne digital computer capable of performing
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the entire navigation task as well as many other tasks related to overall
SST operations. ETA predictions based on computations performed by
the computer would be obviously faster and more accurate than manual
calculations. Handling of this function by the computer would insure
utilization of the most current navigation data from all appropriate input
sources because as each computational cycle for wind, ground speed,
and present position is made, updated data would be available for cal-
culation of a more current ETA. In discussing some aspects of SST
navigation and the utilization of an airborne digital computer, Groves
(ref. 59) states that the computer "would perform the additional task of
supplying navigational data.., for the provision of accurate ETA. " And
Richardson (rei 52) states that "present and future destinations, or
course change points, ETA to these points.., are all items of informa-
l!
tion continually being computed and used in the computer program.
Feasible Manual Implementation Concepts for SST
Manual calculation of ETA is a relatively simple task if one has
available the distance to go and estimated ground speed values for the
remainder of a flight or flight leg or series of flight legs. For the SST,
the distance will undoubtedly be in terms of the ground track distance
along the great circle path defining the flight path between the points of
origin and destination. Monitoring of enroute weather conditions will
permit revision of ground speed estimates for the remainder of the
flight as meteorological conditions enroute change. Conversion of
distance-to-go and estimated ground speed over the track remaining
to an estimated time of arrival is a straightforward, simple calculation.
The accuracy in the ETA will be no better than the accuracy with
which distance and ground speed may be resolved. However, it should
be recognized that changes in the atmospheric conditions may occur
rapidly and in magnitudes adequate to invalidate an ETA in a relatively
short time span. That is to say, anticipated ground speed may fluctuate
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considerably as a function of the fluctuation in weather conditions prevail-
ing along the flight route. It is worthwhile to note some remarks of
Polhemus (ref. 53) along this line.
(I.)
(2.)
(3.)
(4.)
During the cruise phase of the flight the atmospheric
conditions can invalidate an ETA, (and) vary true air-
speed by 240 knots in a one-hour period of time due to
changing temperature alone...
Figure (40 presented on page 468) shows the effect of
conditions which produce both a 20 per cent reduction
in acceleration performance and a 20 per cent in-
crease in performance capability. The central curve
showing the case for standard day conditions is based
on an average acceleration of 2-25 ft. /sec. 2. Time to
reach roach 3.0 from mach 0.91 is 15 minutes, dis-
tance 273 n.m. Conditions which produce an unexpec-
ted 20 per cent degradation in performance, such as
temperatures significantly higher than standard and
the aircraft above its sub-sonic optimum altitude
would result in a position error of 17 miles; whereas
an aircraft experiencing colder than standard temper-
atures might be 23 miles further ahead of this standard
day pos ition.
The cruise phase of flight should be characterized by
a high degree of schedule reliability as long as meteo-
rological forecasting errors are not unreasonable.
The effect of an error in forecast wind velocities is
quite small, as can be seen from an analysis of Fig.
(46). Errors in forecast or flight plan ground-speed
can easily be negated by changing power to achieve
a different roach number. The fuel penalty curve in
the upper right corner of Fig. (46) indicates the mag-
nitude of the fue] consumption penalty as a function of
"off-mach" (at mach 3.0) operation for a particular
engine at present under consideration. Ambient tem-
peratures aloft may actually result in greater prob-
lems for E. T.A. validation and position prediction
than will the wind solution.
Some idea of the difficulty which the temperature
gradient may have on the navigation problem may
be gained from inspection of Fig. (47), which is
another of Tewles's cross-sections, lying in proxim-
ity to a segment of the great-circle track between
Los Angeles and London. Somewhere near Churchill
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Figure 46. The effect of non-standard temperature (from
ref. 53).
the aircraft would cross the stratopause and enter
a region of rapid temperature change--between
Churchill and Greenland the increase is approxi-
mately 1 ° C/minute of flight--a T. A. S, change
of 3. 3 knot/min. For a roach 3. 0 vehicle this
temperature change would produce a 160-knot
change in velocity in the 48 minute flying time
between station 913 and Greenland--and a change
inE. T.A. to London of 9 m in. if one based his
estimate on a time-speed-distance solution com-
pleted at the beginning of the leg. Following pass-
age of the -25oc. isotherm over Greenland the
true air-speed would begin to decrease at a rate
of 3, 0 knot/min, until the aircraft reached the
deceleration point off the Scottish coast.
Figure 47. Cross-section for 6 February 1957 from Lajes
(Azores) to Salem (Oregon). Heavy line with open
circles shows the stratopause and heavy dashed
line the lapse rate discontinuity. (From ref. 53. )
It can easily be seen that manually checking and revising ETA as
the meteorological conditions vary during the flight could well turn into
a task which would occupy much more time than would be warranted.
It would therefore seem reasonable to assume that manual implementa-
tion of this function would be reserved for emergency or non-routine
situations. Some support does exist for manual performance of this
function. Greenaway (ref. 49) indicates in his discussion of a possible
navigation system for Mach 2 and Mach 3 transports that "An estimated-
time-of-arrival meter is not required since it is a simple matter to
check the ETA against the actual time of arrival and make adjustments
accordingly. "
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By and large, however, computer calculation and constant revision
of ETA as necessitated by changing flight conditions seem to be a reason-
able trade-off considering the amount of time required to perform this
function manually and the fuel penalties involved in other than optimum
operation, particularly in holding situations resulting from missed ETA's.
In addition, the computer, representing optimum means, is available.
SUBSONIC SPEED REGIME
Assuming that the SST returned to the subsonic speed regime to
continue its flight or return to base for some reason other than failure
of the navigation system, the ETA calculation as performed by the auto-
mated system would not change. If the reason for return to the subsonic
speed regime was catastrophic failure in the navigation system, then
the calculation of ETA would be as discussed under manual implementa-
tion concepts. This would require varying levels of skills and knowledge
depending upon the degree of refinement employed. For gross estimates,
it would be a simple matter of calculating:
ETA = T O + T1, where
T O = time of calculation and
T 1 = Distance-to-go
Average ground speed
However, the extended flight time in the subsonic regime would
undoubtedly call for resumption of some of the more conventional tech-
niques such as position fixing and reporting at fairly regular intervals
where ETA's to each reporting point would have to be calculated, com-
pared to ATA's at each point, and the impact of any error component
between ETA and ATA at any given point examined in terms of the des-
tination ETA. The accuracy of a series of ETA's would reflect the
amount of consideration given to the anticipated meteorological condi-
tions as well as the accuracy of the meteorological forecasts. The
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technique becomes more involved and the use of standard job aids, such
as the E6B computer or Jeppeson computer, would appear to be required.
Hence the skills and knowledge required to use these aids would have to
be available in the crew complement.
7. 11 FUNCTION 7. 11 OPTIMUM PROFILE GENERATION
Purpose
The purpose of this function is to assess the entire navigation
situation and all related parameters and provide on a continuous basis
optimum velocity scheduling and the optimum flight path in all three
dimensions. The optimum flight path should allow the aircraft to either
complete its original flight plan, or a modified flight plan, such that
the operation of the flight from the viewpoint of navigation is executed
in the most efficient and economical manner consistent with governing
regulations and safety.
The following tasks are inherent in the performance of this
function.
. Optimization of the flight profile in the vertical,
lateral, and longitudinal planes taking into con-
sideration all of the applicable constraints and
related parameters, and including the following
performance:
aB Minimization of sonic boom--performance
of this part-task involves the optimization
of the flight profile for minimizing the sonic
disturbance. This includes the utilization
of techniques for predicting ground shock-
wave magnitudes over the entire flight plan
schedule considering al_lthe pertinent con-
tributing factors (e. g. , Mach number, atti-
tude, altitude, bearing and magnitude of
winds aloft, aircraft gross weight, and air-
craft design characteristics inherent in the
pr obl em solution).
be
C,
dt
e,
Cruise phase optimization for minimization
of effects of adverse meteorological condi-
tions--performance of this part-task involves
t|leoptimization of the flight profile for mini-
mizing, and delineating where necessary,
track excursions for hazardous weather avoid-
ance.
Optimization of fuel consumption--perforrnance
of this part-task involves the consideration of
all parameters affecting the fuel flow rate, in-
cluding present aircraft position, current flight
plan, fuel remaining on board, fuel consump-
tion, fuel reserve requirements, Mach number,
predicted and measured local winds and ambient
temperatures.
Optimization of the flight route--performance
of this part-task assumes that area navigation
is authorized, and that variations in the desired
flight path may be made within specified toler-
ances of the cleared flight track; performance
involves the delineation of required (and/or
desired) excursions from the cleared flight
track necessary for the optimization of the
flight profile considering all critical parame-
ters when such excursions exceed specified
tolerances associated with the clearance.
Generation of a truly optimum flight profile
--performance of this part task involves the
derivation of a flight profile truly optimum
in that it is the resultant of a thorough and
complete trade-off analysis considering
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,profile optimization for al._!pertinent paramete_r,s
as a collective body of data.
Continuous presentation of the navigational situation
in the following respects:
a° Parameters representative of the optimum
profile being followed suitable for pictorial
display in the cockpit, and for automatic trans-
missien via d_ta link to apDropriate ground in-
s tallations,
b. Parameters representative of off-profile error
components in all three planes suitable for
transduction into flight control commands, and
optimum in the sense of regaining the track with
the most acceptable aircraft manipulation con-
sidering all the constraints mentioned in (1)
above with the additional constraint of maneuver
limits imposed by aircraft performance envelope
and passenger considerations,
C. Details of the requirement for track excursion
exceeding authorized limits to include: the
optimum profile assuming the excursion takes
place, when and where the excursion is required,
and the justification for the excursion require-
ment (e. g., storm avoidance, or diversion to
an alternate due to fuel reserves).
do Details of fuel management to include fuel
remaining on board, fuel consumption, fuel
flow rates experienced and predicted, pre-
dicted fuel reserve status over destination
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and over all prescribed alternates, fuel transfer
system monitoring data, and velocity scheduling
data suitable for transduction to thrust control
commands.
Parameters representative of meteorological
conditions both current conditions and those
predictions being used for profile optimization
over the remaining track to be followed.
Temporary storage for retrieval and display
upon command of a series or sets of parame-
ters representing the profile optimized for any
given single, critical consideration (e. g., opti-
mum fuel profile, all other constraints notwith-
standing, or optimum velocity scheduling profile,
fuel reserves notwithstanding}.
Current Jet Operational Requirements and Constraints
Generally, this function is performed by current subsonic jets
only in part and only once in the initial specification of an optimum flight
plan for a given flight, although parts of the function are performed en-
rout e.
Current Jet Implementation Concepts
For the most part, current jets operate along a flight route between
two given points which has been optimized to the extent possible prior to
any given operation along that route. This is the use of the so-called
canned flight plans. The following specific regulations apply:
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FAR 91.23, ref. 13:
Fuel requirements for flight in IFR conditions.
No person may operate a civil aircraft in
IFR conditions unless it carries enough fuel
(considering weather reports and forecasts,
and weather conditions) to complete the flight
to the first intended point of landing, to fly
from that point to the alternate airport n and
to fly thereafter for 45 minutes at normal
cruising speed.
FAR 91.81, ref. 13:
Altimeter settings.
(a) Each person operating an aircraft shah
maintain [the cruising altitude or flight level
of that aircraft,.] as the ca_ may be, by refer-
ence to an altimeter that is set, when oper-
ating-
[(1) Below 18,000 feet MSL, to---]
(i) The current reported altimeter set-
ting of a station along the route and
within 100 nautical miles of the aircraft;
(ii) If there is no station within the
area prescribed in subdivision (i) of this
subparagraph, the current reported altim-
eter setting of an appropriate available
station; or
(iii) In the case of an aircraft not
equipped with a radio, the elevation of
the departure airport or an appropriate
altimeter setting available before depar-
ture; or
[(2) At or above 18,000 feet MSL, to
29.9 " ng.:!
(b) The lowest usable flight level is deter-
mined by the atmospheric pressure in the area
of operation, as shown in the following table:
[Cl_rrent aiti_eter _etti;;_ Lowe,_t
usable fligh f
level
29.92 ((,r high_r) ........................ 180
29.91 thru 29.42 ........................... 185
29.41 thru 28.92 ...................... 190
28.91 thru 28.42 .................... : ...... 195
28.41 thru 27.92 ................. 200
27.91 thru 27.42 .......... 205
27.41 thru 2(;.92 ...................... 210
[((') To convert mildmum altitude pre-
scribed under §§ 91.79 and 91.119 to the mini-
mum flight leve]_ the pilot shall take the flight-
level equivalent of the minimum altitude in
feet and add the appropriate number of feet
specified below, according to the current re-
ported altimeter setting:
[('.rrent altimeter settin9 Iditt._tmc.t
]at'tar
29.92 (or higher) .......... None
29.91 thru 29.42 ............. 500 feet
2,().41 thru 28.92 ............... 100} feet
28.91 thru 28.42 .......... 15{_} feet
28.41 thru 27.92 .................. 2000 feet
27.91 thru 27.42 ................ 2500 feet
27.41 thru ')*(" 3000 feet]_t_.,) .............
FAR 91. 121, ref. 13:
IFR cruising altitude or flight level.
(a) In controlled airspace. Each person
operating au aircraft, under IFII in level
cruising flight in controlled airspace shall
maintain the altitude or flight level assigned
that aircraft by ATC. IIowever, if the :kTC
clearance assigns "VFR conditions-on-top," he
shall maintain an altitude or flight level as
prescribed by § 91.109.
(b) In uncontrolled airspace. Except while
holding in a [hohlil_g] 1)attern of two min-
utes or less, or while turning, each person op-
erating an aircraft under IFR in level cruising
flight, in uncontrolled airspace, shall nmintain
an al)lWOl}riate altitude as follows:
_4o
[(1) When operating helow 18,000 feet
MSL and--]
(i) On a magnetic course of zero de-
grees through 179 degrees, any odd thou-
sand foot MSL altitude (such as 3,000,
5,000, or 7,000); or
(ii) On a magnetic course of 180 de-
grees through 359 degrees, any even thou-
sand foot MSL altitude (such as 2000,
4,000, or 6000).
[(2) When operating at or above 18,000
feet MSL but below flight level 290, and--]
(i) On a magnetic course of zero de-
grees through 179 degrees, [ally odd flight
level (such as 190, 210, or 230); or']
(ii) On a magnetic course of 180 de-
gl_ees through 359 degrees, [ally even
flight level (such as lS0, 200, or 220).]
(3) When operating at flight level 290
and above, and-
(i) On a magnetic course of zero de-
grees through 179 degrees, any flight level,
at 4,000-foot intervals, beginning at and
including flight level "290 (such as flight
level 290, 330, or 370); or
(ii) On a maglmtic course of 180 de-
grees through 359 degrees, any flight level,
at 4,000-foot intervals, beginning at and
including flight level 310 (such as flight
level 310, 350, or 390).
FAR 121. 645, ref. 11:
Fuel supply: turbine engine-powered airplanes, other than turbo
propeller: flag and supplemental air carriers and commercial
op er ato rs.
(a) For any flag air carrier operation and for
a supplemental air carrier or commercial oper-
ator operation outside the 48 contiguous States
and the District of Columbia, no person muy re-
lease for flight or take off a turbine-engine pow-
ered airplane (other than a turbo-propeller air-
plane) unless, considering wind and other
weather conditions expected, it has enough
fuel_
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(i) To fly to and land at the airport to
which it is released;
(2) Thereafter, to fly for a period of 10
percent of the total time required to fly from
the airport of departure to, and land at, the
airport to which it was released;
(3) Thereafter, to fly to and land at the
..... a 'lt_L , 1_ JlllO_VUmUallt aite/-nat_ airport specified in the
flight release, if an ulternate is required; and
(4) Thereafter, to fly for 30 minutes at
holding speed at 1,500 feet above the alter-
nate airport (or the destination airport if no
alternate is required) under standard tem-
perature conditions.
(b) No pe._rson may relea_ a turbine-eng;me-
powered airplane (other than a turbo-propeller
airplane) to an airport for which an alternate
is not specified under § 121.621 (a) (2) or 121.623
(b) unless it has enough fuel, considering wind
and other weather conditions expected, to fly to
that airport and thereafter to fly for at least
two hours at normal cruising fuel consumption.
(c) The Administrator may amend the opera-
tions specifications of a flag or supplemental air
carrier or commercial operator to require more
fuel than any of the minimums stated in para-
graph (a) or (b) of this section if he finds that
additional fuel is necessary on a particular
route in the interest of safety.
Area and route requirements: general.
(a) Each supplemental air carrier or com-
mercial operator seeking route and area ap-
proval must show--
(1) That it is able to conduct operations
within the United States in accordance with
subparagraphs (3) and (4) of this para-
graph;
(2) That it is able to conduct operations
in accordance with the applicable require-
ments for each are_ outside the United States
for which authorization is requested;
(3) That it is equipped and able to con-
duct operations over, and use the navigational
facilities associated with, the Federal air-
ways, foreign airways, or advisory routes
(ADR's) to be used; and
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(4) That it will conduct all IFRmdnight
VFR operations over Federal airways_ for-
eign airways_ controlled airspace, or advisory
routes (ADR's).
(b) Notwithstanding parag_ph (_)(4) of
this section, the Administrator may approve a
route outside of controlled airspace if the sup-
plemental air carrier or commercial operator
shows the route is safe for operations and the
Administrator finds that traffic density is such
that an adequate level of safety can be assured.
The air carrier or commercial operator may not
use such a route unless it is approved by the
_'_" _ • • .A_,atcr --_-d "o 1;_1 ,n thA _r _rrier's
or commercial operator's operations SlZ_ifica-
tion_
FAR 91. 119, ref. 13:
Minimum altitudes for IFR operations.
(a) Except when necessary for takeoff or
landing, or unless otherwise authorized by the
Administrator, no person may operate an air-
craft under IFR below--
(1) The applicable minimum altitudes
prescribed in Parts 95 and 97 of this chap-
ter; or
(2) If no applicable minimum altitude is
prescribed in those Parts-
(i) In the case of operations over an
area designated as a mountainous area in
Part 95, an altitude of "2,000 feet above
the highest obstacle within a horizontal
distance of five statute miles from the
course to be flown; or
(ii) In any other case, an altitude of
1,000 feet above the highest obstacle within
a horizontal distance of five statute miles
from the course to be flown.
5_5
Itowever, if both a MEA and a MOCA are
1)rescril)ed for a particular route or route seg-
ment, a person may operate an aircraft below
the 5IEA down to, but not below, the MOCA,
when within 9.5 statute miles of the VOR con-
cerned (based on the pilot's reasonable esti-
mate of that distance).
(b) Climb. Climb to a higher minimum
IFR altitude shall begin immediately after
passing the point beyond which that minimum
altitude applies, except tlmt, when ground ob-
structions intervene, the point beyond which
the higher minimum altitude applies shall be
crossed at or above the applicable MCA.
FAR 91. 123, ref. 13:
Course to be flown.
Unless otherwise authorized by ATC, no
person may operate an aircraft within con-
trolled airspace, under IFR, except as follows:
(a) On a Federal airway, along the center-
line of that airway.
(b) On any other route, along the direct
course between the navigational aids or fixes
defining that route.
However_ this section does not prohibit maneu-
ering the aircraft to pass well clear of other
air traffic or the maneuvering of the aircraft,
in VFR conditions, to clear the intended flight
path both before and during climb or descent.
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ICAO Reg. 4. 3. 3. 1, ref. 12:
Fuel and Oil Supply - All aircraft.
A flight shall
not be commenced unless, taking into
account both the meteorological condi-
tions and any delays that are expected in
flight, the aircraft carries stffficicnt fml
and oil tu ensure that it can safely com-
plete the flight. In addition, a reserve
shall be carried to provide for contingen-
cics, and to enable the aircraft to reach
the alternate aerodrome when such is
included in the flight plan in accordance
...:.t_ 4 2 ! 1
Note.--Nothing in 4.3.3 preclades an
aircraft ]rom amending its flight plan
while in flight in order to re-plan the
flight to another aerodrome proTided that
from the point at _t'hich the flight is
re-planned the requirements o] 4.3.3 can
be complied _(4th.
ICAO Reg. 4. 4. 1, ref. 12:
Aerodrome meteorological minima.
S A flight shall not be con-
tinued towards the aerodrome of intended
landing unless the latest available meteo-
rological information indicates that con-
ditions at that aerodrome, or at least one
alternate aerodrome, will, at the expected
times of arrival, be at or above the meteo-
rological minima specified for such aero-
dromes in the Operations Manual.
S Except in case of emer-
gency an aircraft shall not continue its
approach-to-land at any aerodrome beyond
a point at which the limits of the meteo-
rological minima specified for that aero-
drome in the Operations Manual would be
infringed.
NS A flight shall not be con-
tinued towards the aerodrome of intended
landing unless the latest available meteo-
rological information indicates that con-
ditions at that aerodrome or at least one
alternate aerodrome, will, at the expected
times of arrival, be at or above the
meteorological minima specified for such
aerodromes.
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NS Except in case of emer-
gency, an aircraft shall not continue its
approach-to-land at any aerodrome beyond
a point at which the limits of the meteo-
rological minima specified for that aero-
drome would be infringed.
ICAO Reg. 4. 5, ref. 14:
VFR flights operated in
level cruising flight at 900 metres
(3,000 feet) or more from the ground
or water shall be conducted at a cruising
level appropriate to the track as specified
in Appendix C, except when otherwise
prescribed by the appropriate authority
for VFR flights within controlled air-
space.
ICAO Reg. 5. 2. 1, ref. 14:
Cruising levels.
Except when climbing or descending,
an IFR flight operating outside controlled
airspace shall be flown at a cruising
level appropriate to its track as specified
in Appendix C.
ICAOReg. 5. 3. 1. 2.2. 1,
2) Variation in true airspeed: if the
average true airspeed at cruising level
between reporting points varies or is
expected to vary by plus or minus
5 per cent of the true airspeed, from
that given in the flight plan, the ap-
propriate air traffic services unit shall
be so informed.
ref. 14:
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ICAOReg. 5. 3.1.2.3.1, ref.
Intended changes.
5.3.17-3.1 R_luests for flight plan
changes shall include information as in-
dicated hereunder:
a) CI_we of _g level: air-
craft identification; requested new
cruising level; revised EET (when
applicable) to next designated re-
porting point.
b) Clumge of route:
i) Destbmtlos tmc/umged: type of
flight plan; aircraft identification;
description of new route of flight
including related flight plan data be-
ginning with time and position from
which requested change of route is
to be commenced; estimated elap_.d
time from point of change to des-
tination; any other pertinent in-
formation.
ii) Destination ckcmged: type of
flight plan; aircraft identification ;
description of new route of flight to
new destination including related
flight plan data, beginning with the
time and position from which re-
quested change of route is to be
commenced; estimated elapsed time
from point of change to destination;
alternate airport; any other pertinent
information.
14:
as:
The optimization process will usually have considered such factors
,
.
,
The most appropriate schedule for the flight to depart
and arrive where such may be affected by the tastes
of the traveling public and noise abatement constraints
in the terminal areas.
Routing of the flight to include checkpoints.
Fuel and payload data (e. g., gross weight empty,
total fuel weight, gross weight taxi, gross takeoff
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weight, fuel consumption rate, fuel reserves over
destination, and landing weight).
o Optimum altitudes for fuel consumption and prevail-
ing w inds.
Although frequently deviations from the scheduled times are due
to traffic control problems, the major constraint in using canned flight
plans is the weather condition assuming that the flight departs as
scheduled. The canned flight plan must be modified prior to the flight
to • ef_=_L any necessary changes in such items as fuel requirements,
payload, or re-routing, as may be necessitated by the enroute weather.
Moreover, along highly congested routes, flights may not be given ATC
clearance as requested. For example, the optimum flight path may be
the MTP (minimum time path) along with optimum steps in altitude for
fuel consumption; however, ATC may clear the flight for the MTP, but
not for the altitudes requested, or may clear the altitudes, but not the
flight path. Such ATC clearances result in a re-examination of the
parameters in order to ascertain what is optimum within the constraints
of the clearance specified. Generally, the flight plan is still optimized
pr_ior to takeoff. Deviations enroute may be unavoidable due to hazard-
ous weather, changes in ATC clearance, or equipment malfunctions.
By and large, however, ATC constraints severely limit enroute optimi-
zation of the flight profile, and deviations from the cleared profile, in-
cluding changes ordered by ATC, are generally issued for the avoidance
of traffic and hazardous weather avoidance, rather than for optimum
equipment operation.
Changes in theATC clearance, directed by ATC for whatever
reason, only call for compliance by the crew. However, it may be that
some optimization of the profile based on the revised clearance is possi-
ble, e.g., some change in Mach number may be called for to optimize
fuel consumption. The crew must determine this and implement changes
as required. Changes in the ATC clearance requested by the aircraft
commander usually reflects some sort of profile optimization, such as
a change in altitude to take advantage of better winds, or a course change
to avoid turbulence. Thus the crew does perform enroute profile optimi-
zation to this extent, and it is, or may be construed to be, dynamic.
But, the optimization process is generally gross and does not involve
all of the necessary considerations required by the SST, as may be seen
in the following paragraphs.
SST Potential Operational Requiremunts and Constraints
Although the SST profile described in the literature is basically
optimized for fuel consumption, there are several indications that such
a profile may be modified to consider other factors, such as meteorolo-
gical conditions. This is certainly understandable because of the effects
of the weather on the fuel consumed. It is not enough that an optimum
fuel profile for a given flight be based strictly on standard-day weather
conditions. The following paragraphs will attempt to show the overall
requirement for dynamic profile generation optimized over a more
inclusive set of parameters.
For purposes of this discussion, optimum profile is defined as,
a flight path through three-dimensional space which most nearly meets
all operational requirements and most nearly satisfies all applicable
constraints for a given flight operation. Since operational requirements
and constraints are to a large extent affected by dynamic situations, it
follows that the optimum profile must be dynamic in that it must be con-
tinuously revised to reflect any pertinent changes in the situation. The
optimum profile may then have its origin and termination points defined
by the aircraft's instantaneous position relative to its destination.
However, the aircraft's path through space in an optimized situation
may conceivably depart from the associated great circle path at any
point in time as well as utilize both curvature and step-function vertical
movement. It seems appropriate next to justify the requirement for
generating optimum profiles. King and Groves (ref. 56) have stated that,
Because of its characteristics, the SST has, whenever
possible, to carry out its flight in accordance with an
optimum profile. It has been said that this aircraft is
like a projectile and that, once launched, it should
follow a certain trajectory without deviation, as other-
wise it becomes an uneconomical proposition. This
projectile analogy is obviously an exaggeration... The
problems will in fact arise in attempting to reconcile
the ideal operational flight path with any AT C and en-
vironmental restrictions... In this context, it is evident
that such an analogy has some truth, and a clear oper-
ational requirement, therefore, is that the aircraft shall
have the means to minimize the need to deviate from its
optim,,m flight +_pa LL;,
Groves (ref. 59) believes that "The common requirement becomes the
ability to adhere to the optimum profile. " Polhemus (ref. 53) suggests
tha t,
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The two major constraints to be dealt with are those of
flight path optimization--fuel predictive and conservation
--and sonic boom minimization. It will certainly be a
function of the navigation system, both ground and air,
to acknowledge these two major considerations in the
course of directing the flight of the aircraft.
(ref. 65) remarks that,
In brief, we need maximum flight path flexibility in
three dimensions available to dispatchers and flight
crews so we can tailor the flight path precisely to get
the most from the aircraft... Typical ATC procedures
today.., may impose serious economic penalties on
supersonic transports. The optimum flight paths for
a given supersonic transport flight should be flexible
yet definable rather precisely in three dimensions,
preferably for the total length of flight.
It is indicative, also, that authorization was granted for an FAA-
sponsored study of the "Optimization of Fuel on Supersonic Transport
Vehicles" to be performed by the Hughes Aircraft Company (ref. 57).
The following excerpts are from an article by Power (ref. 57) concern-
ing this program, and are presented here to provide insight into the
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various parameters which affect an optimum fuel profile, and which
would therefore be considerations in optimizing an SST flight profile
where all pertinent parameters were included.
Many parameters with sometimes conflicting re-
quirements affect the fuel consumption of the SST.
Almost all of these parameters concern some aspect
of navigation, either vertical or horizontal. As a
matter of fact, it should be clearly understood at the
outset that SST navigation must always be considered
n_ +h,.oo _._,o._nn._l PT.pei._ _peed-altitude schedul-
ing, particularly during the initial climb-to-cruise
phase of the flight, is one of the most critical facets
of SST operation.
While fuel consumption is markedly affected by
speed-altitude scheduling, so also is the ever present
"sonic boom" or ground overpressure caused by super-
sonic flight. In reality, actual flight operation of the
SST, both by the flight crew and with considerations of
the air traffic control system, may be defined by sonic
boom criteria, with fuel consumption so much a function
of vertical navigation as well as horizontal navigation
the critical reserve fuel problem is being carefully and
exhaustively studied by a joint government and industry
committee. Serious implications for both the flight
crew and the traffic controller, as well as the overall
air traffic control system in the SST era, are contained
in the fuel penalties concomitant with incorrect or inade-
quate flight plan scheduling and execution.
This initial study of optimum flight profiles,
carried out over a range of route segments, fuel, and
payloads, will define the base from which all other
modes of operation will be evaluated. As already men-
tioned, no constraints will be imposed on the flight pro-
files during the determination of the absolute optimum
operating conditions. However, practical considera-
tions of such things as noise or sonic boom effects, air
traffic control restrictions, meteorological effects, and
emergency conditions will all act to require some com-
promise from optimum conditions. One major portion
of this study therefore will systematically investigate
the effects of these parameters both singly and in com-
bination.
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It is immediately obvious that the optimization of a flight path
prior to SST takeoff will not be sufficient. There is clearly a need for
on-board optimization on a real-time basis.
Of the constraints pertinent to flight path optimization while
enroute, there appear to be two which are subject to consideration for
modification, fuel reserves over destination and step-altitude schedul-
ing. These two constraints can certainly be considered as functionally
interreiated, for if fuel reserve numbers are decreased, the more
plausible step-altitude scheduIing becomes. On the other hand, the
more freedom the SST is allowed in the vertical plane, the more likely
it is that current fuel reserve requirements could be met. It seems a
certainty that the ATC system will aim for vertical plane navigation,
and, hence, profile navigation will succeed step-altitude scheduling.
Feasible Automated Implementation Concepts for SST
The literature reflects a general consensus that this function will
be implemented in the SST by means of an airborne navigation computer,
or by an airborne computer provided for flight management purposes.
Power (ref. 57), discussing the FAA-sponsored study of fuel optimiza-
tion, states that,
One of the major objectives of this project is to
define exactly what types of data are required by the
flight crew in order to achieve optimum fuel utilization.
It is highly probable that the traditional flight handbooks
or even the hand-heid type cruise control computers
will not be adequate for the SST operation. There are
so many interrelated effects of vertical flight profiles,
reserve fuel requirements, sonic boom considerations,
atmospheric conditions, and ATC constraints that some
form of on-board data processor may be required.
Although no a priori conclusions have been drawn, the
feasibility of performing both vertical and horizontal
navigation using a simplified form of the Central Elec-
tronic Management System (CEMS) concept will be
evaluated.
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The requirement for on-board determination and
revision of optimum profiles based on current situations
may reflect markedly into the techniques to be developed
for ground control of both en route and terminal area
traffic, as well as in the area of data transmission both
air-to-ground and ground-to-air. Particularly in the
case of diversion to an alternative airport, the capabil-
ity to utilize an optimum fuel profile may have a drastic
effect on the amount of reserve fuel carried or expended.
King and Groves (ref. 56) discussing profile navigation, indicate that,
The use of an airborne digital computer in conjunc-
tion with an accurate ground-based radio aid affords a
further possibility of providing the means of navigation
in three dimensions by the integration of vertical rate of
ascent or descent with horizontal progress, already a
growing requirement in present-day operations. The
operational consequences of climb and descent restric-
tions for the SST make this requirement essential. The
basic difficulty is the present inability of A. T. C. to
monitor continuously the altitude of climbing and des-
cending aircraft and thus to determine, within adequate
safety tolerances, when specific altitudes are vacated.
In consequence, either whole blocks of altitudes have to
be reserved for this purpose or aircraft have to proceed
in a series of "steps" associated with time and geograph-
ical positions for separation purposes. This procedure
is wasteful of airspace and imposes a high workload on
the controller.
One of the potentials of the type of system described
is its capability, coupled with a height sensing element,
of accurately defining the slant track which an aircraft
should follow. The airborne computer forms the means
of combining, for this purpose, navigational information
in the horizontal plane with vertical progress. The three-
dimensional information thus derived would be utilized
to indicate the required action to maintain slant track,
or more probably would be fed directly into the auto-
pilot. Furthermore this information in digital form
could be fed via an air-to-ground data link into any
automatic A. T. C. devices requiring accurate informa-
tion concerning aircraft flight paths. The inherent
advantages of this arrangement are:
a. For the pilot:
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ii.
iii.
Accurate compliance with A. T. C.
clearances for altitude changes.
Immediate indication of the opti-
mum vertical flight profile includ-
ing commencement of descent.
Specific indication of the optimum
altitude and position for transition
from subsonic to supersonic flight
and vice versa to minimize the
sonic boom effects on the ground.
For the A. T. C, organization:
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
Reduction of longitudinal separation
between aircraft during altitude
changes.
The ability to allocate vertically
separated slant tracks to climbing
or descending aircraft.
The possibility of combining hori-
zontal and vertical separation to
provide a concept of volumetric
separation, leading to much more
efficient use of the airspace.
Accurate and continuous updating
of three-dimensional flight data,
thus providing a realistic basis
for conflict avoidance.
Discussing CEMS for the SST, Richardson (reL 52) states that,
With an airborne computer tied in to the various
aircraft subsystems, it is continuously aware of such
pertinent information as aircraft present position, alti-
tude, airspeed, ambient temperature, local wind, fuel
remaining on board, fuel consumption, and current
flight plan. It is now possible to utilize all of this basic
information in conjunction with the cruise control laws
to arrive at an optimum vertical and horizontal flight
profile... The capability of the airborne computer to
handle enroute flight plan changes, either selected by
the flight crew or commanded by a two-way data link,
allows it to render a unique and valuable service pres-
ently unavailable in existing or proposed systems.
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It is evident that successful control of the ground shock-wave
magnitude problem through flight path optimization for this parameter
would undoubtedly require availability of a high-speed computing tech-
nique capable of predicting an optimum flight profile with this parameter
minimized. The degree of concern in both government and industry with
this problem, along with the complexity involved in control, wou]J appear
to clearly dictate the use of an airborne computer capable of a numerical
analysis of the problem, and an extrapolation of a profile to minimize
u_.......pL uu_=_,4'.....,,h_._o,__ such _=p,_nfi|e.... is the result of a tradeoff analysis
with other critical parameters such as fuel optimization.
The requirement for complete automation of this function is further
borne out by the manner in which the product of the function is to be uti-
lized. This function would be quite inefficient if its outputs were in
terms of gross increments of track errors in the lateral and longitudinal
planes, and velocity errors in the vertical plane. What is evidently
much more to be desired is a rather continuous output of error incre-
ments in all three planes representing a smoothed error function imme-
diately translatable to similarly smoothed increments for appropriate
flight control commands in pitch, roll, and yaw. Such correction incre-
ments together with similarly smoothed increments for throttle adj,_st-
ments, would permit the aircraft to maintain, or regain and mai,_tain,
the optimum profile with the optimum number and magnitude of adjust-
ments. Such increments may be beyond the state-of-the-art for useful
incremental displays, and will undoubtedly be beyond the capabilities of
man to efficiently interpret and execute the required corrective actions
at the resolution level achievable by automation. It must be remembered
that the optimum profile w.ill be dynamically derived on a real-time basis.
The insertion of man in the servo-system would generate a response lag
in the loop of a magnitude that over a period of flight time would result
in excessive penalties for off-optimum performance.
There is clearly one area of the Night path optimization process
in which automation, if feasible, would be clearly unnecessary--the
area of significant changes in the route. Such changes are defined as
major modifications to the flight path (or flight plan) as a result of (!)
changes in ATC clearance for whatever reason, (2) hazardous weather
avoidance, and (3) diversions to an alternate destination. When a situ-
ation arises which may be the basis for a significant change in the
route, there are judgmental and decision-making processes involved
in assessing that situation and arriving at the necessary corrective
actions. Obviously, these processes are as numerous as are the situ-
ations which may arise. In order to automate the correction action for
any given situation, every possible comb ina tion of contingencies which
could generate such a situation would have to be known and defined in
numerical terms, given an appropriate series of corrective actions,
and properly stored and addressed for immediate retrieval. It is obvi-
ous that a computer of practically infinite capacity would be required.
Even if that were possible, man would still be required to monitor the
action taken, and override the system should there be a blunder in the
assessment or in the execution of corrective procedure. Here, the
training and experience of man, in both piloting and navigational disci-
plines, is indispensable.
When significant changes in route are required, the navigation
system would continue to function, and the optimum profile generator
would continue to exercise control over the three-dimensional progress
of the aircraft until human judgmental and decision-making processes
resulted in the optimum corrective action to handle the situation. The
nature of the situation and of the required corrective action would affect
that point at which the automated navigation system could be employed.
For example, if ATC were to require a later ETA to avoid a holding
situation, the navig:tion system might certainly be such that flight
management could enter a revised destination ETA into the system,
and the optimum profile generator would immediately compute a revised
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profile with all pertinent parameters optimized for the ETA change,
and there would be no reason to disengage the navigation system from
the flight control and power plant systems. Similarly, for weather
avoidance, the manual entry of a set of geographical coordinates repre-
senting the height of the chord describing the optimum lateral excursion
consistent with the required miss-distance and destination (or possibly
the point at which deceleration and descent is to be initiated) may be
sufficient information for the navigation system to optimize the flight
.[,._l'Ui.l.,tk::_ _-'ak.-_.,_,._'J.. UJ.L.6.,.j.
In Figure 48, barring exceeding ATC restrictions on available
volumetric airspace, flight path optimization for storm avoidance could
conceivably involve beginning the lateral excursion at point 4, which
is arbitrarily defined as the last possible point to initiate a turn which
would:
Io Insure that the required miss-distance would be
achieved.
. Insure the degree of turn necessary to intercept
the point defining minimum miss-distance would
not exceed the performance envelope of the air-
craft, nor exceed the acceptable g force level for
pass engers.
3. Insure zero overshoot beyond the minimum miss-
distance point.
. Insure that the degree of turn necessary to regain
and maintain the optimum profile in the lateral
plane would not exceed the performance envelope
of the aircraft, nor exceed the acceptable g force
level for passengers.
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Point for initiating
_deceleration /descent _
/ Position _ %'-_" __ h-_ _. s \ ......... _ /
Initiate L/ __ =__/___.__--_'__ \_ k / \
/ Cruise /I __-_-;-_'%_/K- _ \ \ Point of closest
 ou,e  'oi;t a,,roachtoo st uction
i____ __;_C_nU__.. _ _ Closest approach distance = \
_;y_f_, u,.,v .,.,.. / l-'osltxon / _ _--'-_ Required miss- distance \
/" Depar.ture P/int / \ \
Figure 48. Flight profile optimization problem.
It also seems reasonable to assume that point 1 may be a better initial
point for such a maneuver, if a truly optimum profile is derived. The
computer, given present position and destination coordinates, and a set
of geographical coordinates representing required miss-distance points
on either side of the obstruction, could be programmed to derive the
optimum flight profile between any such three points in space consider-
ing all of the relative parameters and constraints, and could develop the
necessary data defining the flight control and power plant operation com-
mands, using essentially the same technique as for any two points in
space. Due to its speed and capability to handle complex computations,
the computer could perform a series of calculations designed to pick the
initial point of the maneuver consistent with the required miss-distance,
and to ascertain the relative merit of returning to the original profile in
the lateral plane, and if so, at what point the original profile should be
regained. Or, if necessary for ATC compliance, the computer could
perform the same function, given an IP and a series of two or more
vectors.
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It would appear then, that man would actually perform the situation
assessment, would determine to a lesser or greater degree the fixed
parameters defining the necessary corrective action, and would enter
these parameters into the navigation system. It is evident, however,
that at this point a computer would be much more suited to developing
the implementation commands representative of the corrective action
and informing flight management of its problem solution in the form of
a revised optimum profile and the quantitative impact of this revision
on critical parameters such as destination ETA, or fuel reserves over
destination. Man could either then accept the solution or override the
navigation system based on his judgment of the total impact of the situ-
ation on the safety and efficiency of the flight operation.
Feasible Manual Implementation Concepts for SST
Whenever the terms optimum or optimization are used, it is neces-
sary to define them, particularly if a trade-off analysis of means is in-
volved. Optimum implies relationships among involved means or param-
eters for obtaining some common objective; obviously, the term itself
becomes relative when the means or parameters are varied. Given
nothing more than a gross estimate of present position, a map showing
destination and present position, and a magnetic compass, a pilot opti-
mizes his flight profile by heading corrections, And, in the true sense
of the word, he has developed an optimum flight profile, based on the
information and means available to him. Now, given drift, he can
develop a relatively more optimum profile in the sense of achieving the
objective. And, as more parameters are known, and means are avail-
able for their interpretation in light of the total situation, the optimiza-
tion process approaches the objective even more closely. The important
point is the the degree of optimization may vary widely along a continu-
um defined by means.
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Flight crews on today's subsonic jets perform the profile optimi-
zation function in the cockpit while enroute. The supersonic transport
faces essentially the same navigation problems, and its performance
is affected by essentially the same parameters, with one or two major
J__, ........ 1 ........ • _ • •" , •
_ _uu_c uuum control, potential exposure to raolat_om_U _Ll_wl C e_) L £u[l_
storms, and the like. The case for automating the flight profile opti-
mization function in the SST perhaps best summarized by the following
statements made by Groves (ref. 59) in his discussion of area coverage
navigation systems. With regards to the operational requirements,
Groves rernarked that,
The general characteristics of an SST, be it a Mach 2
or Mach 3 version, have been adequately defined and need no
amplification here. Similarly those characteristics which
relate to the navigation requirements have been covered, not
only at this Symposium but also at numerous international
gatherings. Perhaps I may summarize these by reference
to the three stages of flight:
a. Subsonic phase from terminal area to the
transition area and vice versa.
b. Transition phase of acceleration to super-
sonic speed and of deceleration from super-
sonic to subsonic speed.
c. The supersonic phase.
Certain features are obviously common to these
various flight stages. A viable and economic operation
is very much a function of fuel consumption. The transi-
tion phase from the subsonic to supersonic flight is criti-
cal in this respect. Difference in ambient temperature
from those forecast can entail high fuel penalties. Delayed
or interrupted climbs and descents, the assignment of
non-optimum FlightLevels and the incidence of holding,
all for A. T. C. reasons, can upset the economy of opera-
tion. The common requirement becomes the ability to
adhere to the optimum profile. *
* Underscoring throughout this quotation is the authors.
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Mention should also be made of the effects of
turbulence, precipitation, jet streams and thunder-
storms, all of which raise the need to cater for their
avoidance and for the rapid resumption o-gl_he planned
flight path.
Sonic boom considerations make these (transi-
tion) phases most critical, in the selection of areas
over which transition may take place. Furthermore
the ambient temperature distribution becomes a decis-
ive factor in defining the transition area with precision
and in the need to vary the flight profile accordingly.
As a corollary, the navigation systcm must enable the
pilot to execute the transition in the defined area and
in accordance with the A. T. C. clearance issued for
the flight.
The requirement for cruise/climb and cruise/
descent becomes the significant factor in the super-
sonic regime. The use of vertical separation will be
highly restrictive, and whilst longitudinal separations
must be reduced, close lateral separation becomes
essential. The need is for an accurate and flexible
navigation system to permit A. T. C. to apply clear-
ances along laterally separated tracks. Changing
meteorological conditions or the need to divert may
require flight plan modification and the issue of--r'e-
clearances by A. T.C. The navigation system must
therefore provide clear and continuous position pre-
sentation to facilitate adherence to the cleared flight
path. Furthermore diversion action should be clearly
apparent from the navigitional presentation.
The thoughts outlined above concerning the oper-
ational requirement for navigation in the SST are by
no means revolutionary. With the exception of the
need to define transition areas, the requirements apply
in most cases to the current breed of subsonic jets.
The basic difference becomes apparent in the degree
'to which the requirement is critical for economic SST
operatiori. More paY ticularly, it is the necessity fo_
accurate profile flying which accentuates the differefice.
And in his discussion of a system to meet such requirements, Groves
goes on to say that,
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There is of course much sheer common sense in
using compound systems. Ideally the two elements should
be combined in such a way that the complementary charac-
teristics of each of the data sources are employed to the
best possible advantage. For maximum utilization, parti-
cularly for SST operations such compound systems must
imevitabiy employ an airborne digital computer. Its func-
tion would be to integrate the basic inputs for the provision
of a clear and continuous presentation of the navigational
situation to the pilot. It would perform the additional task
of supplying navigational data to the flight director system,
for auto-coupling, for the provision of accurate E. T.A. and
to define the slant track or profile which the aircraft should
ma intain.
While, to be sure, the case made would appear to be for adherence
to a fixed optimum profile and for a particular system configuration, this is
all the more reason for automating the optimization process in a dynamic
situation based on real-time assessment and integration of the pertinent
information. In summary, it seems clear that manual implementation
of profile optimization would involve essentially the same procedures
followed today, already discussed under Current Jet Implementation
Concepts above, and that such procedures would be woefully inadequate
for SST operations.
SUBSONIC SPEED REGIME
Assuming that the SST returned to the subsonic speed regime to
continue its flight or returned to base for some reason other than failure
of the navigation system, optimum profile generation would continue to
be performed by the automated system.
If the reason for return to the subsonic speed regime was catastro-
phic failure in the navigation system, then profile optimization would
proceed as discussed in Current Jet, Implementation Concepts. The
most significant impact of this situation is that the return to subsonic
operations greatly enhances the feasibility of a manual optimization
process due to the following changes in pertinent parameters:
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I. Optimization of the profile for sonic boom minimi-
zation is no longer a requirement.
.
As a result of (I) above, optimization of the profile
for consideration of adverse winds becomes solely
a function of fuel consumption, since focusing effects
are no longer a consideration.
.
As a result of (1) above, aircraft attitude changes
and mancuvers need not consider the focusing prob-
lem.
. The manual profile optimization process for any
parameter is considerably enhanced by the increased
crew response time for reaction to a given situation
brought about by the decrease in aircraft closure
with the situation.
. There is a pronounced increase in the acceptable
maneuverability envelope due to the slower speeds
resulting in (a) a corresponding decrease in g forces
which will allow application of pitch and roll com-
mands of higher magnitudes, and (b) off-track com-
ponents decreasing in magnitude with corresponding
capability for maintaining track accuracy following
turns of considerably higher bank angles.
One parameter of the optimization program, fuel consumption,
would tend to become extremely critical. This is not to detract from
its obvious importance in the supersonic regime. If, however, fuel
reserves are based on completing the flight at supersonic speeds, the
return to the subsonic regime, even though fuel consumption rates may
be somewhat slower, may increase the block time to the extent that
inadequate fuel reserves are available over the destination. This prob-
lem will undoubtedly be of paramount importance, and consideration
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should be given to a standby or back-up system, or automated capability
for an emergency or non-routine fuel profile optimization process which
can both (1) determine the feasibility of making the destination with fuel
remaining on board, and (2) develop the necessary ve!ocity scheduling
and associated power plant adjustments to execute the optimum profile,
such that the destination or a prescribed alternate is reached with the
maximum fuel reserves possible.
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7. 12 FUNCTION 7. 12 MAINTAIN FLIGHT PATH FOR SIA
Purpose
The purpose of this function is to:
I. Delineate the optimum flight path from the SIA
initiation point to interception of the ILS gates,
considering SIA cleared by ATC, speed-altitude
scheduling, and meteorological conditions.
. Provide continuous presentation of the naviga-
tional situation in the following respects:
ae Parameters representative of the optimum
profile (SIA) being followed suitable for
pictorial display in the cockpit, and for
automatic transmission via data link to
appropriate ground installations.
b. Parameters representative of off-profile
error components in all three planes suit-
able for transduction into flight control
commands and throttle adjustments, and
optimum in the sense of regaining the
track with the most acceptable aircraft
manipulation considering the maneuver
limits imposed by the aircraft performance
envelope and passenger considerations.
C. Details of the requirement for track excur-
sion exceeding authorized limits for hazard-
ous weather avoidance, and for optimization
of fuel flow considering ambient temperature
dis tribution.
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de Parameters representative of profile
modifications for track excursion for
reasons in (c) above suitable for trans-
duction into velocity scheduling com-
mands (throttle adjustments) and flight
control commands (all attitude control).
Current Jet Operational Requirements and Constraints
As is the case with SID's, current subsonic jets are issued a clear-
ance for the execution of a Standard Instrument Approach (SIA) which
includes the necessary information for the aircraft to enter the terminal
area control zone on a course consistent with the designated traffic pat-
tern to be flown for proper interception of the ILS gate. There are sev-
eral SIA's for any given terminal and the assignment of a given SIA to a
given flight will have considered such parameters as:
l.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
Flight origin point and inbound heading
Operational runway in use
Weather conditions
Aircraft performance characteristics
Surrounding terrain, obstructions, etc.
Noise abatement considerations
Conflict avoidance
The aircraft is required to execute the cleared SIA with the greatest
possible accuracy and precision because of the relative high traffic density
in terminal control areas. Deviations from the SIA are not permitted with-
out prior ATC approval. The lone exception to this rule is exercise of
pilot judgment in an emergency situation such as imminent collision.
However, flights are under constant radar surveillance and may have
their respective SIA's altered by radar vectors from ATC, in which case
they must follow the vectors assigned.
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The fact that an SIA is issued and that the flight is under constant
radar surveillance does not reduce the crew's responsibility for know-
ing the location of the aircraft at all times. For example, an SIA may
include instructions to remain at some fixed altitude on such and such a
heading until some low-level airway has been crossed. It is clear that
continuous knowledge of aircraft position is an absolute requirement
for compliance with such directives.
The following reg'.',!atioD_ __re applicable:
FAR 91. 117, ref. 13:
Takeoff and landing under IFR.
(a) Instrument approaches to civil airports.
Unless otherwise authorized by the Adminis-
trator (including ATC), each person oper-
ating an aircraft shall, when an instrument
letdown to an airport is necessary, use a stand-
ard instrument approach procedure prescribed
for that airport in Part 97 [New] of this
chapter.
(b) Use of low or medium frequenvy simuL
taneous radio ranges reTdring flight cheek.
When a flight check of a low or medium fre-
quency (200 through 415 KCS) simultaneous
radio range is required, a Notice to Airmen
will be issued advising that the range is
"ground checked only, awaiting flight check"
and the range may be used as a homing facility
and in addition may be used as an ADF in-
strument approach aid if an ADF procedure
for the airport concerned is prescribed by the
Administrator or if an approach is conducted
using the same courses and altitudes for the
ADF approach as those specified in the ap-
proved range procedure.
(c) Landing minimums. Unless otherwise
authorized by the Administrator, no person
operating an aircraft (except a military air-
craft of the United States) may land that
aircraft using a standard instrument approach
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procedure prescribed in Part 97 [New] of this
chapter unless weather conditions are at or
above the landing weather minimums pre-
scribed in that Part for the procedure used.
(d) Civil airport takeoff minimums. Unless
otherwise authorized by the Administrater, no
person operating all .lircraft under Part __,
__, __, .... , (present Parts 40, 41, 42,
44) or 135 [New] of this clml)ter may take
off from a civil airport under IFR unless
we,tther conditions are at or above the weather
minimums for IFR takeoff prescribed for that
airport in Part 97 [New] of this chapter.
(e) Military airports. Unless otherwise pre-
scribed by the Administrator, each person
operating a civil aircraft under IFR into, or
out of, a military airport shall comply with
the instrument approach procedure and the
takeoff and landing minimums prescribed by
the military authority having jurisdiction on
that airport.
(f) Use of radar in any instrument ap-
proach procedure. When radar is approved at
certain locations for ATC purposes, it may be
used not only for surveillance and precision
radar approaches, as applicable, but also may
be used in conjunction with instrument ap-
proach procedures predicated on other types
of radio navigational aids. Radar transitions
may be authorized from established holding
fixes to final approach positions in relation to
the ILS or other types of radio navigational
aids upon which instrument approach pro-
cedures are predicated. Upon reaching a final
approach position in relation to these facilities,
the pilot will either continue a surveillance or
precision approach to a landing or complete
his instrument approach in accordance with
the procedure approved for the facility in
question.
(g) Zimitations on procedure turns. In the
case of a radar initial aplSroach to a final ap-
proach position or a timed approach from a
holding fix, no pilot may make a procedure
turn unless, when he receives his final approach
clearance, he so advises ATC.
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FAR 121. 567, ref. 11:
Instrument approach procedures and IFR landing minimums.
No person may make an instrument approach
at an airport except in accordance with IFR
weather minimums and instrument approach
procedures set forth in the certificate holder's
operations specifications.
ICAO Reg. 3. 2. 6, reL 14:
Operation on and in the vicinity of an aerodrome.
An aircraft operated on
or in the vicinity of an aerodrome shall,
whether or not within an aerodrome
traffic zone :
a) observe other aerodrome traffic
for the purpose of avoiding collision;
b) conform with or avoid the pattern
of traffic formed by other aircraft in
operation;
c) make all turns to the left, when
approaching for a landing and after
taking off, unless otherwise instructed;
d) land and take off into the wind
unless safety or air traffic considera-
tions determine that a different direc-
tion is preferable.
Current Jet Implementation Concepts
Maintaining the assigned flight path in executing an SIA involves
the use of fairly standard tools in current jet operations. A flight direc-
tor display may be used to indicate aircraft heading and relative head-
ing to desired course to steer, as well as position of the aircraft relative
to the desired track. A bank indicator may be used to indicate rate-of-
turn, and an altimeter used for altitude and rate-of-descent. Position
of the aircraft is obtained from the VOR]DME display read-out. Means
are also available for ascertaining fuel consumption rates. With these
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tools, the pilot manipulates the aircraft in accordance with his displayed
navigational data such that the SIA track and altitude components are
within acceptable limits of the assigned values.
SST Potential Operational Requirements and Constraints
For purposes of clarity, the SIA phase of the SST flight originates
at that point where the aircraft re-enters the subsonic speed regime
following deceleration/descent, and terminates when the aircraft is at
final approach altitude and immediately prior to ILS localizer intercept.
With some possible qualifications, it may be stated that the re-
quirements and constraints discussion for Function 7.2 are the same
as those which should be considered in the execution of the SIA. Econ-
omy will still be a function of fuel optimization which will depend on both
optimized throttle manipulation and block time. Block time can certainly
be decreased by allowing the SST to take advantage of its faster speeds.
Fuel consumption can also be optimized during the SIA phase by consi-
deration of the ambient temperature distribution, and so on. Current
thinking is that the SST must operate, however, as "just another air-
craft" during this phase of the flight. The possibility of holding is
assumed to be minimized by means of ETA revision through the cruise
phase of the flight, but it will still need to be considered. It is conceiv-
able, however, economics notwithstanding, that the requirements and
constraints which are ATC-imposed may not be as critical as during
the SID phase since the aircraft has essentially met the objective, i. e.,
arrival at the destination point. This undoubtedly will not be true in
all cases since the hold condition may be a function of a possible neces-
sity to divert to an alternate. Much depends on the fuel reserves over
destination requirement, and how well the vehicle meets that requirement.
There is an economic difference in the criticality of the SST fuel
situation existing, say, at the completion of the SID (through entry into
the supersonic speed regime) and at the point where the SIA is to be
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initiated. Clearly, an SST which has made the transition to the super-
sonic speed regime, but due to inadequate fuel remaining, must return
to its origin point or land for refueling, faces the possibility of revenue
loss, or, at best, an extreme increase in aircraft-mile costs for that
flight. In contrast, an SST which arrives over its destination with in-
adequate fuel reserves can declare an emergency and receive special
consideration from ATC. It will not experience the same loss of revenue
as in the first example, and will have much more tolerable increases in
_ 2 .... eL _"1, I-_
Hooton (ref. 51) in a discussion of SST navigation in the vertical
plane, discusses this phase of the flight.
The SST will initially require deceleration from cruis-
ing Mach to subsonic flight (probably carried out during a
shallow letdown), followed by a steeper descent into the ter-
minal area at speeds below Mach 1. Figure (49) shows such
a technique.
The initial descent could start 500 miles from the
destination, and in the final subsonic descent, speeds be-
tween 300 and 500 knots are likely, flight path angles being
between 50 and 10 o. These angles are a little steeper than
those of most present-day aircraft.
If the air traffic control situation demands that the
aircraft enter a terminal area "funnel"--such as shown in
Figure 49--we must ensure that the pilot is capable of fly-
ing and navigating over the initial deceleration phase such
that overshoots or undershoots are reduced to a minimum.
At the present time the en route traffic controller
in a busy terminal area usually has the decision as to when
a descent may be started--as indeed he should. The SST
will require that the controller be given much more infor-
mation than at present on the scheduled flight path and
flight times, very close cooperation with the pilot will be
necessary, and the pilot must have the navigation aids to
do what is asked of him. If these conditions are not met,
the controllers will be faced with unpredictable control
situations and airline economics will suffer.
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Figure 49. SST deceleration technique (from ref. 51).
It should also be remembered that by the time the
SST is in operation, terminal area sequencing systems
may have been introduced. If speed control is to be used
the aircraft characteristics must be considered, particu-
larly with respect to drag producing devices which allow
speeds to be controlled for a given angle of descent. If
path-stretching is to be employed, the effects on block
time and fuel consumption must be considered.
In any event, provision for means to satisfy the requirements and
constraints in maintaining the SID certainly would assure the means for
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meeting the requirements and constraints imposed during the SIA phase
of flight from the viewpoint of navigation.
Feasible Automated Implementation Concepts for SST
The automated concept for executing this function is precisely the
same as for that for the execution of the SID phase, with the possible
exception of a different control law than speed-altitude scheduling.
Richardson (ref. 52) indicates that,
Considering the descent phase of the vertical profile, a
slightly different technique was used. In order to achieve
proper terrain clearance on approach, and to insure accur-
ate spatial positioning of the Aircraft, a trajectory of alti-
tude-vs. -distance was used as a control law... For precise,
complete control of the trajectory, automatic throttle con-
trol could be used as an airspeed/rate-of-descent control.
For essentially the same reasons, it would appear highly desirable
to have the SIA phase of the flight available in appropriate numerical
form. With appropriate computer programming, it could provide the
necessary data for transduction into flight control commands to _he
auto-pilot and throttle adjustment commands to the auto-throttle, so
as to provide complete automatic control of the SST throughout the entire
SIA phase. Such an arrangement would help assure that the optimization
process insures the economic operation required, and at the same time
provides the necessary navigational accuracy for meeting ATC require-
m ents.
Feasible Manual Implementation Concepts for SST
The implementation of this function by conventional techniques
would incur the same penalties in off-optimum performance as discussed
for the SID phase, although there may be a relative decrease in the cri-
ticality of such operation from an economics point of view. Hooton (ref.
51) points out some possible weaknesses in the standard navaid to be
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used at the advent of the SST.
Aircraft height for slant airways can be derived
from either pressure altimeters or by some form of
angular radar or radio device such as a "long-range
ILS. " The latter would guarantee altitudes above mean
sea level; pressure altimeters do not, because of air
density/temperature changes. Since the two are not
compatible and pressure altimeters will probably be
with us for a long time, let us presume that height
information will still be obtained from pressure altime-
ters.
The logical navaid to examine is VORTAC, that
is, the combination of VOR angular information and
DME information. Figure (50) shows two VORTAC's
in relationship to a desired slant path, shown in both
plan and side views.
Figure 50.
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Inherent errors of VORTAC navigation (from ref. 51).
Since ideal siting of VORTAC's would require
many more VORTAC's than is practicable, and the
amount of airspace used increases as a function of
slant airway errors_ it appears, after detailed study,
that VORTAC in its present form will not meet the
requirements for slant airways.
For universal application of the slant airway
concept, the following navaid requirements may be
necessary:
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l. Across-track accuracy errors not to exceed ±0.75
n mi.
. Along-track accuracy errors not to exceed +1% of
aircraft distance flown. (Greater accuracy is re-
quired in the airport vicinity because of conflicting
routes and the fact that climb angles are at their
maximum. Accuracy may be relaxed at greater
ranges and higher flight levels}.
.
These errors not to be exceeded within 200 n mi
radius of any given terminal area.
Use of a rho/rho computer using pairs of DME's
appears to offer a reasonable solution if VORTAC cannot
meet the specifications.
VORTAC alone would allow a limited number of
SST descent "funnels" or slant airways, but other typ_s
of aircraft could not use them and would require routing
around them during their use. If the basis of equal pri-
ority for all users of the airspace can be relaxed VORTAC
does offer a limited solution for the final descent path of
the SST, although it should be emphasized that good accur-
acy is still required for the initial deceleration phase.
However, questions of flight planning, flexibility
of routing, and controller displays still remain and re-
quire solution.
None of these problems is insurmountable but
they must be faced soon if we are to provide the right
facilities for SST operations, from the points of view
of both the controllers and of the airlines and their pilots.
A salient remark by Richardson (ref. 52) indicates the impact of navi-
gational accuracy as far as an optimization process is concerned. He
states that:
In general, the digital computer quantization is such that
the input signal accuracy becomes the governing accuracy
of the CEMS. The digital computer does not contribute
any measurable additional inaccuracies.
It is obvious that the price in decreased economy attributable to conven-
tional navigation techniques is solely a function of navigational accuracy.
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And, moreover, it appears that manual (or conventional) techniques will
be sorely pressed to provide the accuracy required for conflict avoid-
ance, if such is indeed feasible via conventional techniques.
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7. 13 FUNCTION 7. 13 MAINTAIN FLIGHT PATH FOR
A LL-WEATHER LANDING
Purpose
The purpose of this function is to provide:
I, Parameters representative of the aircraft's position
in three-din_er_iona! space suitable for continuous
display in the cockpit;
. Parameters representative of off-profile error
components suitable for:
a. Transduction into appropriate commands for
the auto-pilot and auto-throttle systems;
b, Transmission to the appropriate ground
facility;
Co Continuous display in the cockpit in order that
the relationship between the optimum profile
for the landing phase, the present position of
the aircraft, and the corrective action to be
taken by the system, is clearly understand-
able by flight management;
. Parameters representative of the optimum profile for
the landing phase suitable for continuous display in
the cockpit.
. Parameters clearly defining the decision-gate for the
landing, and parameters indicative of any potential
problem associated with the execution of a missed-
approach, all appropriate for display in the cockpit.
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For purposes of this discussion, this function is initiated with
the aircraft at 1500 feet on a constant heading aligned with the runway,
when the ILS localizer has been intercepted and the aircraft is confi-
gured for final approach and ready to begin its final descent. Thc
function is complete when the aircraft has decelerated to taxi speed
and is off the operational runway.
Current Jet Operational Requirements and Constraints
The following specific regulations apply:
FAR 91. 87, ref. 13:
Operation at airports with operating control towers.
(d) Minimum altitudes. When operating
to an airport with an operating control tower,
each pilot of---
(1) A turbine-powered airplane, shall,
unless otherwise required by terrain, ob-
stacles, or applicable distance from clouds
criteria, maintain within the airport traffic
area an altitude of at least 1,500 feet above
the surface of the airport until further
descent is required for a safe landing;
(2) A large airplane approaching to land
on a runway being served by an ILS, shall,
if the airplane is ILS equipped, fly that
airplane at an altitude at or above the glide
slope between the outer marker (or the
point of interception with the glide slope,
if compliance with applicable distance from
clouds criteria requires interception closer
in) and the middle marker; and
(3) An airplane approaching to land on
a runway served by a visual approach slope
indicator, shall maintain an altitude at or
above the glide slope mitil a lower altitude
is necessary for a safe landing.
However, subparagraphs (2) and (3) of this
paragraph do not prohibit normal bracketing
maneuvers above or below the glide slope that
are conducted for the purpose of remaining
on the glide slope.
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FAR 91. 117, ref. 13:
Takeoff and landing under IFR.
(2) The aircraft is in a position from
which a normal approach can be made to
the runway of intended landing and the
approach threshold of that runway or the
approach lights or other markings identifi-
able with that runway are clearly visible to
the pilot.
If, after descent below tile minimum altitude,
the pilot cannot maintain visual reference to
the ground or ground lights, he shall immedi-
ately execute the appropriate prescribed missed
approach procedure.
(c) Landing minimums. Unless otherwise
authorized by the Administrator, no person
operating an aircraft (except a military air-
craft of the United States) may land that
aircraft using a standard instrument approach
procedure prescribed ill Part 97 of this
chapter unless weather conditions are at or
above the landing weather minimums pre-
scribed in that Part foi" the procedure used.
(h) Descent below IFR binding minimums.
No person may operate an aircraft below the
applicable minimum landing altitude unless
clear of clouds. In addition, no person may
operate an aircraft more than 50 feet below
that minimum altitude unless--
(1) The landing minimums are at least
ceiling 1,000 feet and visibility two statute
miles; I'or]
(i) Inoperative ILS components. The com-
ponents of a complete ILS are localizer, glide
slope, outer marker, middle marker, and ap-
proach lights, tIowever, a compass locator at
an outer or middle marker site may be substi-
tuted for the outer or middle marker, respec-
tively. Unless otherwise specified in Part 97
of this chapter, no person may begin an ILS
approach when any component of the ILS is
inoperative, or the related airborne equipment
is ilmperative or not utilized, except as
follows:
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(1) When only one component (other
than the localizer) is inoperative and all
other components are in normal operation, a
straight-in approach may be made if the
ceiling and visibility at the airport are at
least equal to 300 feet and a_ statute mile,
respectively.
(2) When the localizer and the out,_r
marker are the only components in normal
operation--
(i) A circling approach may be made
if the ceiling and visibility are equal to
or higher than the minimums prescribed
for a circling approach; or
(ii) A straight-in approach may be
made if the ceiling and visibility at the
airport are at least equal to 300 feet and
one statute mile, respectively.
(3) In the case of an alternate airport,
when only one component (other than the
localizer) is inoperative and all other com-
ponents are in normal operation, a person
may make an approach if the ceiling and
visibility at the airport are at least equal to
the minimums prescribed for use of the air-
port as an alternate airport.
ICAO Reg. 3. 2. 2. 4, ref. 14:
Landing.
An aircraft in flight, or
operating on the ground or water, shall
give way to other aircraft landing or on
final approach to land.
When two or more heav-
:_,-g.,,,-.,_. aircraft are approaching an
aerodrome for the purpose of landing,
aircraft at the higher altitude shall give
way to aircraft at the lower altit.de, but
the latter shall not take advantage of
this rule to cut in in front of another
which is on final approach to land, or to
overtake that aircraft. Nevertheless,
power-driven heavier-than-air aircraft
shall give way to gliders.
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Emergency la.di.9. An
aircraft that is aware that another is
compelled to land shall give way to that
aircraft.
ICAO Reg. 3. 2.6, ref. 14:
Operation on and in the vicinity of an aerodrome.
An aircraft operated on
or in the vicinity of an aerodrome shall,
;,:berber or not within an aerodrome
traffic zone :
a) observe other aerodrome traffÉc
for the purpose of avoiding collision,
b) conform with or avoid the pattern
of traffic formed by other aircraft in
operation ;
c) make all turns to the left, when
approaching for a landing and after
taking off, unless otherwise instructed;
d) land and take off into the wire]
unless safety or air traffic considera-
tions determine that a different direc-
tion is preferable.
Current Jet Implementation Concepts
At the date of this writing, there are no existing all-weather land-
ing systems sanctioned for commercial airliner (jetliner) utilization.
The data in the preceding paragraph define the constraints under which
current subsonic jets must operate. Aids are available for executing
IFR approaches. However, airports must have measured ceiling and
visibility within the constraints stated above or the aircraft must be
diverted to an alternate airport where such minima are not exceeded.
The current standard aid for IFR approaches is the Instrument Landing
System (ILS). Many current airlines have incorporated coupling systems
which permit ILS and auto-pilot integration such that the airborne system,
following engagement is essentially automatic, the exception being manual
throttle control. However, if the pilot does not have visual contact with
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the runway at the time the minimum altitude is reached, he must execute
a missed approach and request ATC clearance to divert to a prescribed
alternate, or hold until better weather conditions exist, based on param-
eters such as the meteorological [orecasts and fuel remaining on board.
There are systems in various stages of development and usage
which may be categorized as all-weather, automatic landing systems.
Farr and Schmitz (ref. 72) discuss some of the systems currently being
evaluated,
The North American Aviation APN-114 flare-out
altimeter system is a precision instrument designed to
provide extremely accurate elevation information using
a sophisticated airborne flight-control computer which
receives azimuth.information from ILS ground equipment.
With the availability of improved ILS directional locali-
zers, this equipment could be used for near-zero-visibil-
ity landings.
NAFEC is testing the British Government's Blind
Landing Experimental Unit (BLEU) system. This system
utilizes ILS signals until the aircraft reaches an elevation
of approximately 300 feet. From this point, azimuth in-
formation is received from "leader cables" which are
installed in the approach area and alongside the runway
to a distance of about 5,000 feet out from the end of the
runway while height information is obtained from an air-
borne flare-out radio altimeter. These altimeter and
azimuth data are fed to a special pilot display. The
APN-114 and BLEU differ only in flare-out computer
philosophy.
Bell has developed a military landing system
(GSN-5) which is being tested at NAFEC. The GNS-5
employs directional ground-radar tracking. The system
utilizes ground computer-derived signals which are trans-
mitted to the aircraft for automatic (hands-off) approach
and landing. The airborne equipment includes an extremely
fine auto-coupler, a special function box, and a small alum-
inum corner reflector mounted on the outside of the aircraft
to furnish a good radar return. On the ground (to one side
of the runway) a radar scanner and computer in a mobile
unit track the aircraft and constantly compare the aircraft
track being made good with the optimal track which has
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been previously fed into the computer. Deviations are
corrected by automatic radio transmissions to the plane's
auto-coupler. Considerably more testing at NAFEC will
be required before official FAA sanction can be made.
In the long range field, NAFEC is also testing the
Gilfillan REGAL (Range and Elevation Guidance for
Automatic Landing) system. This system uses a ground-
based scanning antenna. Aircraft receives accurate three-
dimensional position information again starting at an
elevation of about 300 feet on the ILS glide slope. This
information is then used to generate the approach and
flare-out commensurate w--"_-_L,*_,,,. req,_T'_ments.... of the
particular aircraft. Aircraft can be brought down manu-
ally, or automatically if the system is hooked into the
plane's auto-coupler. REGAL may be operational about
1965-66.
The Smith Aviation Division of S. Smith & Sons Ltd.
(England), has developed an autopilot, SET. 5 for auto-
tactic landing. British European Airways will use it for
fully automatic landing. The manufacturer predicts a
realistic date for full civil Autoland (automatic landing)
as early as 1968, although they feel the system could be
reliably used at an earlier date. A multiplex SEP. 5 has
been flown in Smith's Dakota aircraft for 2 years and the
company has completed over 4, 000 automatic landings
using the BLEU installation at Bedford, England.
Standard Telephone and Cable of England has developed
a radio altimeter (STR-40) for use in automatic landing that
has an extremely high accuracy with altitude error at touch-
down not exceeding 1 foot. It is hoped that by 1963 an ILS
localizer will be in operation that will provide ._.zimuta
guidance all the way down to the runway and a new direc-
tional glide slope which will be reliable down to 200 feet
or even closer.
These are just a few of the systems being developed
and tested. The airline companies have made it quite
clear they are in the market for a good reliable automatic
landing system that will allow them to begin all weather
operations. As a result, many electronic companies are
just now producing their prototype models of all weather
automatic landing systems. NAFEC will continue to test
many of these systems; as a result of these tests, FAA
will establish safety and reliability criteria which will
then permit the production of all weather automatic
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systems. It seems likely one or more of these systems will
be in operational use by the commercial carriers in a few
years.
Price, Smith and Gartner (ref. 33) have also discussed many all weather
landing concepts and the problems of pilot acceptance.
It is reasonable to assume that any one, or several, of the auto-
matic landing systems which may eventually be sanctioned for use by
subsonic jets, will provide the capability required by the SST, or at
least provide the basis for the refinement of a system which will meet
the SST requirements.
t
SST Potential Operational Requirements and Constraints
There appears to be general agreement that an all-weather landing
system is a necessity for the SST if it is to be an economically profitable
operation. The SST must have the capability to land in conditions of
zero ceiling and zero visibility. It is important to point out that all-
weather landing is in fact synonomous with blind landing since other
weather parameters can still preclude SST operation (e. g. , cross winds,
shear, precipitation accumulation on the runways, severe thunderstorms,
turbulence and icing).
The requirement to land once the deceleration/descent phase has
been executed would appear to have long-range implications. It seems
a certainty that enough fuel would not be available to permit climb-out
and transonic acceleration in the event diversion to an alternate is
called for. Because of these conditions, flight management will need
to commit the aircraft to landing while it is still in the cruise profile
and as much prior to initiating the deceleration/descent as is opera-
tionally feasible. It will be noted that the necessary information for
decision-making in this area has been specifically called for as a
requirement during the enroute navigation phase.
584
At the moment, no clear representation of weather constraints or
SST landing operations has been specified, excluding, of course, zero-
zero ceiling-visibility requirements. It is assumed that the final design
and resulting operational characteristics of the SST will dictate the spe-
cification of such requirements. At present, the general requirement
is for an all-weather landing system which will provide for essentially
blind landings, and will include provisions for the safe execution of the
track-keeping during final descent, decrab, flare-out, touchdown, and
roll-out maneuvers with no visual contact ""=+_" +*'_ ,-,,,,w_y
Modifications to current constraints could possibly include some
changes in weather minima other than ceiling and visibility minima,
which will undoubtedly be modified to essentially include zero-zero con-
ditions. Obviously, this modification will have the effect of deleting the
constraint that the pilot establish visual contact with the runway at a
given altitude.
Feasible Automated Implementation Concepts for SST
The navigation of the SST during the landing phase is characterized
by requirements for three-dimensional location of the aircraft, and off-
profile error components, with precision accuracy considerably higher
than the accuracy requirements during the cruise phase. Winick (ref. 69)
has remarked that, "We (FAA Systems Research and Development Ser-
vice) feel that the landing system which will be used by civil carriers
will be a flare-out landing system as an extension of the ILS. "
It is useful, then, to examine the ILS as a navaid with a view
toward establishing the information it furnishes to flight management
during the landing phase. Generally, the ILS localizer is located so
that it is aligned with the runway centerline and the aircraft steers the
course defined by the radial of the localizer beam. This beam is defined
by a null effect caused by overlapping lobes of two transmitted radio
waves of different frequency. Drift to either side of the null area causes
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null dissipation and the resulting reception of only one of the waves as
a more defined signal so that only one signal is displayed the cockpit.
The display indicates that the aircraft is off the course and the relation
of the aircraft to the desired course.
Another component of the ILS system, the glide slope, provides
a side view of an azimuth envelope shaped like a vortex. The desired
descent path on the glide slope is the center of the envelope and culmin-
ates at the impact area of the runway. Rate-of-descent, or sink rate,
and deviations from the desired descent path are detected and displayed
to flight management as number of feet above or below the desired path.
A flight-director type display is used to establish the necessary crab
angle to maintain the approach course, with these data flight manage-
ment can manipulate control surfaces and make throttle adjustments to
correct detected error components and maintain the approach profile.
The ILS system has drawbacks. Achievable accuracy is influenced
by the ground locations of equipment. ILS is often unusable at certain
altitudes above mean sea level. The ground components are often inoper-
ative due to their vulnerability to certain weather phenomena (e. g., pre-
cipitation), and because redundant equipment is unavailable during periods
of scheduled or unscheduled maintenance. However, it is expected that
the all-weather system for the SST will be an extension of the current ILS
system, and it is reasonable to expect improvements in the ILS system
components prior to the advent of the SST. It is certainly expected that
minimum operating standards will improve along with system reliability,
and that more accuracy will be achievable.
Several aspects of all-weather landing systems are currently under
study, and some systems are anticipating FAA certification for Category
2 airports in the immediate future. Certification of Category 2 includes
landings with a ceiling of 100 feet and R VR of 1,200 feet. FAA documents
AC 120-15 and AC 20-31 list airline operational requirements for Category
2, and equipment requirements for Category 2, respectively. According
d
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to Plattner (ref. 73), the decision height is expected to be lowered in
Category 3A to 50 feet, and it appears necessary to provide automatic
landing capability. This situation relegates the pilot's primary role
to that of "monitoring the approach so he can take over immediately in
event of a failure in the system. " However, whether the landing system
is fully automatic, semi-automatic, or completely manual, the require-
ments for the generation of precise, accurate navigation data will un-
doubtedly be met by a fully automatic navigation system which may or
may not be directly coupled to auto-pilot and auto-throttle systems. It
would appear that coupling of the navigation system to auto-pilot and auto-
throttle systems has some inherent advantages, and possibly some dis-
advantages. An extensive discussion of these pros and cons may be
found in reference 1, pp. 317 to 320.
Assuming a fully automatic system, it would appear that the follow-
ing would be typical. ILS localizer would still provide the beam to fly
with off-course components transduced and coupled directly to the auto-
pilot for lateral control. The primary difference would be in auto-pilot
sensitivity to produce a smoother approach with auto-pilot control. This
would be accomplished by an amplifier-computer for the auto-pilot which
would incorporate gain desensitization by radio altimeter, beam-rate
tracking, and approach monitoring capability. Below the usable height
range of the glide slope equipment, an automatic flare computer would
assume pitch control from the auto-pilot, adjust the rate-of-descent and
flare the aircraft to touchdown. The auto-pilot would continue to keep
the aircraft tracking the localizer beam down the runway centerline until
roll-out has either progressed to the point that flight management can
exercise lateral control through braking and power application, or until
a high speed turn-off maneuver is executed.
Assuming that the primary role of flight management is system
monitoring, systems currently being evaluated, and those under proposed
development schedules are incorporating means to facilitate the monitor-
ing function. In a system for the Boeing 707 and 720 aircraft, developed
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and tested over a two-year period by Boeing and the Bendix Corporation,
certain cues are being made available for the monitoring function. The
Boeing system has been described by Plattner (ref. 73),
]dreakdown of equipment Boeing is proposing for Category
3A includes:
New amplifier-computer for the auto-pilot. Gain
desens-ltization by radio altimeter, beam-rate tracking
and approach monitoring capability have been incorpor-
ated. This computer will be available by next September.
The Category 2 computer, which will be available this
spring, is basically the same with space and wiring pro-
visions for the autopilot monitor. The autopilot system
is designed to handle wind shears up to 10 kt. wind change
per 100 ft. of altitude although the .FAA Category 2 require-
ment is only 4 kt. /i00 ft. This is an order of magnitude
improvement over present Bendix 707 equipment.
Self-monitored flare computer.
Throttle control system. This includes a Bendix-
supplied amplifier and a Bo--e-[Hg-supplied no-back clutch
system which advances or retards the throttles but which
may be easily overridden. The Kollsman airspeed indica-
tor also will be modified to include a bug which is remotely
set to the desired airspeed by a toggle on the overhead
panel.
Approach progress display and cockpit test unit.
The approach progress display is a vertical row of five
separate annunciator blocks with relief printing reading
localizer, glide slope, decision point, flare and abort.
A green light shining through the letters indicates that the
individual system is armed. The light changes to amber
and remains on when the function has been engaged. To
insure the equipment is operating prior to the approach,
the pilot presses an enroute test button and the system
automatically checks itself out with the approach progress
display lights illuminating in sequence over a 3-minutes
interval.
Component failure is indicated when lights fail to
illuminate. The system also checks itself automatically
when glide slope is engaged.
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Figure 51. Boeing 707-720 equipment for Category 2 and Category 3A in
block diagram. Gear which is optional to airlines is indicated.
(From ref. 73.)
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Standby gyro horizon. This is needed as a voting unit
to determine whether the pilot's or copilot's gyro is accur-
ate if a discrepancy occurs and provides a positive reference
for go-around.
The Category 3A equipment package assumes installa-
tion of a series yaw damper, already certified by the FAA,
since the current yaw damper must be turned off during take-
off and landing.
An examination of the system block diagram (Figure 51) shows that some
additional monitoring capability for the navigation system has been pro-
vided in a navigation warning display at both the pilot and copilot stations.
Additionally, a landing phase sequence monitor is incorporated.
Basically, however, current thinking appears to reflect very little,
if any, requirements for the navigational components of the all-weather
landing system beyond those being evaluated today. One possible excep-
tion to this is in the area of visual presentation of the navigational situa-
tion so that the manual override of the automatic system does not intro-
duce lag in response due to time to orient to the situation. Such a
situation obtains where the various elements of the situation may be indi-
vidually displayed and may be such that some collection of parameters
is necessary before the situation may be inferred accurately and correc-
tive action contemplated. In this regard, Price, Behan, and Ereneta
(ref. 1) suggest that,
•.. the pilot may be both psychologically and physiologically
unprepared to take over a complex task if he has been mon-
itoring this task by observing oversimplified displays. There
is reason to believe that monitoring should be accomplished
in the same dimensions and similar order of complexity as
the performance task if the human is to be able to take over
effectively.
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Feasible Manual Implementation Concepts for SST
During this phase of the flight, the only possible manual navigation
would depend upon visual contact with the runway or terrain perturba-
tions from which present position and course to steer could be inferred.
Since it would appear that all landings will be executed at least under
IFR conditions even in VFR weather, if not all automatically, this func-
tion is not considered amenable to implementation via manual techniques.
it would, of course, be possible to make a visual approach under the
appropriate weather conditions should the occasion arise. However,
the utilization of an all-weather landing system implies automatic gen-
eration and display of the necessary navigation elements. Execution of
flight control and throttle adjustments, even though part of the system,
are independent of the navigation data generation and display, and depen-
dent upon navigation data for implementation in and of themselves.
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